Maldonado (2009) IQ MR Atkins death penalty decision: A psychometric miscarriage of justice?

I'm no longer shocked by what passes as credible psychological/psychometric evidence or testimony in some Atkins IQ MR death penalty court decisions.  Another such decision (Maldonado, 2009) has come to my attention.  A link to a PDF copy of the decision is now available in the Court Decisions section of this blog. 

Readers can gather all the relevant background information re: the case by reading the entire decision.  I intend to focus primarily on the psychological interpretation and psychometric issues in the decision that are troubling. 

But first, before delving into these issues, I  present a few quotes (from the Maldonado record) that capture the confusion and uncertainty surrounding many Atkins decisions, a situation that is resulting in considerable variability in the quality of psychological assessment data reported/interpreted and the common occurrence of "dueling expert witnesses".

Quotes from the record:

Because the Supreme Court did not establish a bright-line test to identify mental retardation, the Atkins inquiry has become a fact-intensive question that heavily relies on the opinions provided by mental-health experts. This case, like most involving Atkins claims, requires consideration of testimony from competing experts who disagree about the nature of mental retardation, the means by which it may be identified, the manner in which it manifests in a criminal defendant’s life, and the psychological profession’s role in making the legal decision of whether mental capacity precludes execution. (p.32)

A “welter of uncertainty” followed the Atkins decision because “[t]he Supreme Court neither conclusively defined mental retardation nor provided guidance on how its ruling should be applied to prisoners already convicted of capital murder.” Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330, 332 (5th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, federal courts have approached the implementation of Atkins with some trepidation. (p.36)

After reading a number of of Atkins rulings (see Court Decisions section of this blog), I could not agree more with these statements.  The courts appear ill-equipped to handle the complex psychological measurement issues presented, issues that are, at times, confounded by the inclusion of data from dubious procedures, interpretations of test scores that are not grounded in any solid empirical research, and the deference to a single intelligence battery (the WAIS series) as the "gold standard" when a more appropriate instrument (or combination of WAIS-III/IV and other measures) might have been administered, but the results of the more appropriate measure are summarily dismissed based on personal opinion (and not sound theory or empirical research).

---

Below are some of the troubling psychological/psychometric issues I see in the Maldonado (2009) decision

Lack of English language proficiency:  "A theme developed by both parties is that Maldonado’s lack of English proficiency has madehis exact intellectual capacity difficult to gauge." (p.38).

• As a result, the prosecution psychologist administered the WAIS-III "through a translator" (p.42).  The translator administered WAIS-III resulted in Verbal, Performance, and Full Scale scores of 74, 74, and 72 respectively.  A defense psychologist captures the essence of my reaction to the use of a translator-administered WAIS-III.  “The accepted practice in the evaluation on Spanish-speakers is to communicate with the client in Spanish without the use of translators. In addition, tests should be scientifically translated and validated and the most appropriate norms available should be applied" (p.49).  I agree.  I am unaware of any professionally established and endorsed procedure for the translated administration of the English-normed WAIS-III.  Such a procedure violates a fundamental backbone of the science of individual intelligence testing--standardized test administration.
  

Use of non-empirical clinical judgement procedures to upwardly adjust IQ scores.  On page 53 of the record, it is indicated that the prosecutions psychological expert believed that the translated English-normed WAIS-III scores needed to be upwardly adjusted due to Maldonado's educational and cultural background.  Additional support came from the finding of a Verbal IQ score of 83 on the WAIS Espanol (p.56).  Although psychologists are appropriately trained to recognize the potential impact of such environmental variables when interpreting scores, the psychologist  upwardly adjusted the scores to a specific IQ score estimate ("It’s around the 80s, I guess, if you had to pin me down. Around the 80s; somewhere in there"- p.48) and this expert "conceded that only 'clinical judgment,' not any statistical formula or established methodology, informed how much to alter an IQ score because of cultural and educational factors" (p. 53). 

My concern with this procedure mirrors the testimony of the defense experts in the case.  Adjusting obtained IQ scores, either up or down, based on an n=1 professionals clinical judgement, in the absence of any scientifically established procedure for adjusting IQ scores, is troubling and is not consistent with accepted psychological assessment practices or standards.  In fact, this IQ adjustmend procedure sounds similar to a notable empirical effort (in the late 1970s and early 1980s) to produce IQ scores that better reflected a persons social-cultural background.  Jane Mercer's SOMPA (System of Multicultural Pluralistic Assessment) was a valiant effort to adjust Wechsler IQ scores for African-American individuals based on their social-cultural knowledge and history.  The result was a new score called Estimated Learning Potential (ELP).  From the start, SOMPA was controversial and eventually was found to be flawed for many reasons (see Hellfinger, 1987; also Jirsa, 1983).  If a reasonably conceived theoretical and empirical IQ adjustment procedure (i.e, SOMPA), which was intended to account for a person's social-cultural background, was found to be flawed, how can a specific n=1 psychologist be endowed with unique insights that allow for the invoking of an unspecified personal algrorithm to make IQ score adjustments?  This is indeed troubling.  Also, to the best of my knowledge, SOMPA is no longer around and is not, or is seldom, used.  Race-based or adjusted norms have not been recognized as an acceptable professional psychological assessment practice for over twenty years!

Dismissal of the BAT-R intelligence results.  Maldonado had also been administered the Woodcock-Muñoz Bateria-R (“Bateria-R”), the Spanish-language counerpart of the Woodcock-Johnson Test of Cognitive Abilities--Revised [conflict of interest notice:  I am not a co-author of the BAT-R  or WJ-R, but was a paid measurement consultant on the WJ-R project and have since become a coauthor of the subsequent edition, the WJ III].  Maldonado obtained a Broad Cognitive Ability (BCA) score, which is analagous to the full-scale score from other intelligence batteries, of 61.  Of all the cognitive tests administered, this is the only comprehensive intelligence battery that was administered in Maldonado's natural language and where his performance is compared against appropriate US-equated Spanish norms [note-- the WAIS Español administered was also administered in his natural language and makes comparisons against Spanish norms, but only a portion, the Verbal section, was administered].  Also, as previously noted at this blog, the WJ-R/BAT-R and WJ III/BAT III provide for the most comprehensive assessment of intellectual functioning as per the consensus model of human intelligence (CHC theory) among serious intelligence scholars.  This is what I've termed the "Atkins MR death penalty IQ test-theory gap." 

Why were the BAT-R scores dismissed? 

The prosecution expert "testified that the AAMR has not cited the Bateria-R as a predicate test to the evaluation of mental retardation and “[i]t’s not well suited for that purpose, although you can use it for that" (p. 70).  He also stated that the "Bateria-R test score was especially suspect because it was inconsistent with Dr. _____'s administration of the WAIS Español in which Maldonado scored well above the range for mental retardation." (p.70). Furthermore, this expert "opined that the usefulness of the test was impaired because it 'is used by school psychologists to diagnose learning disabilities and it measures a lot of things like visual and auditory processing. It really measures very little in terms of general intelligence.' " (p.70).  As a result, "the state habeas court dismissed the Bateria-R score because it “is not one of the tests the AAMR cites for mental retardation evaluation,” but instead “is generally used by school psychologists to diagnose learning disabilities” and, in fact, “is not very relevant for establishing general intellectual functioning, so it is not well-suited for determination of the first prong . . . to determine mental retardation" (p.70-71).

There are many problems with the reasons given for dismissing the most culturally appropriate (for Maldonado) and comprehensive measure of intelligence (BAT-R). 

First, dismissing an instrument because it is used primarily by a particular set of psychologists (school psychologists) is non-sensical, and frankly, condescending.  School psychologists typically give many more intelligence tests than psychologists working in adults settings and use these instruments to diagnose mental retardation. School psychologists, in many respects, have more intimate familiarity with intelligence testing than most other professional psychologists.  

Second, the previously mentioned national expert panel that examined the Dx of MR at the same cut-point as Atkin's cases (for SSA benefits) indicated that most intelligence tests would be moving towards measuring the Cattell-Horn and Carroll Gf-Gc models of intelligence (now collectively referred to as CHC theory; also see McGrew, 2009), and instruments based on this model are very relevant to the Dx of MR.  The English version of the WJ-R WJ III (a CHC-based revision of the WJ-R) was listed as one of the approved instruments by the expert panel...which should also implicitly argue for use of the Spanish-language versions.  The prosecution witness, who appears  stuck in the land where the WAIS is the "gold standard," appeared unaware of the recent advancements in understanding the psychometric nature of human intelligence, which has converged on the CHC model of intelligence.  This is particularly ironic given that both John Horn (of Cattell-Horn) and Jack Carroll served as theoretical consultants on the WJ-R...which was the foundation of the BAT-R.

Third, stating that the BAT-R (and WJ-R by implication) is not a respected measure of general intellectual functioning reflects a complete lack of awareness of the CHC-foundation of the instruments, as well as published research (including the WJ-R and BAT-R technical manuals and bulletins).  If CHC theory is the consensus model of psychometric intelligence, then the only battery administered to Maldonado that measured most of the model, which in most conceptualizations has general intelligence (g) at the apex, should have been given serious weight.  I, and others, heard Dr. Arthur Jensen, the most prominent pscyhometric expert on g, at an ISIR conference in Nashville, TN, state, during a discussion of a presentation in front of the entire audience, that (at the time) he considerd the WJ-R (and, thus, the BAT-R by implicit endorsement) the best available intelligence battery for measuring g.  I will return to this point in future posts as I've been analyzing WAIS-III data together with the WJ batteries (as well as other accepted intelligence batteries, e.g., KAIT, K-ABC; SB-IV; SB-IV) to evalute the g-ness of each battery when jointly analyzed.

Fourth, prosecution psychologist used the WAIS Español Verbal score as evidence that the BAT-R was not accurate.  The problem with this logic is that the WAIS Verbal scale is known to be an excellent measure of crystallized intelligence/comprhension-knowledge (Gc), only one of the major 7-8 domains in the CHC model of intelligence.  Conversely, the BAT-R includes indicators from seven of the major CHC broad ability domains, only one of which is Gc.  No attempt was made to compare the WAIS Gc score with the corresponding Gc measure(s) on the BAT-R.  They might have been similar...or not.  More importantly, you cannot compare a measure of Gc to one that includes Gc and fluid reasoning (Gf), visual-spatial processing (Gv), short-term memory (Gsm), long-term retrieval (Glr), auditory processing (Ga), and processing speed (Gs).

I could go on and comment on other issues, such as the use of only the Verbal scale of the Spanish WAIS-III, as well as the whole area of adaptive behavior, but these are issues for another post, possibly by a guest blogger.

Technorati Tags: psychology, forensice psychology, criminal psychology, criminal justice, IQ, IQ tests, IQ scores, Verbal IQ, WAIS-III, Wechserl tests, WJ-R, WJ III, BAT-R, BAT-3, MR, mental retardation, developmental disabilities, death penalty, capital punishment, Atkins cases

Guest bloggers make a difference: Atkins MR IQ death penalty blog guest posts

The above graph represents new people who have visited the Intellectual Competence and Death Penalty blog over the past month.  Notice the various "spikes."  Most all of are directly related to guest blog posts by psychologists or legal professionals involved in Atkins IQ MR death penalty cases.  Today's spike (10-7-09) is directly related to the guest blog post by Dr. Dale Watson.  Thank you Dr. Watson.

If you are interested in issues related to this blog, and want an occasional  platform from which to express thoughtful, scholarly, and logical comments, and/or research synthesis, etc. regarding Atkins IQ MR death penalty cases, a guest post at this blog would be welcome...and, in turn, would provide you some good exposure.  Psychologists and legal professionals are both welcome.

If you are interested, contact me privately at:  iap@earthlink.net.

The blogmaster.

Davis (2009) Atkins decision: IQ part scores and modular nature of intelligence: Guest post by Dr. Dale Watson

A number of recent Atkins-related IQ/MR death penalty court decisions have raised important issues re: the interpretation of variability in part scores when compared to the total (full scale-general intelligence; g) composite index from an intelligence test.  In particular, Davis (2009) and Vidal (2007) are excellent examples of the complex issues...and how they relate to a diagnosis (or not) of mental retardation.

Dr. Dale Watson has studied the Davis (2009) decision and has provided the following thoughtful guest blog post (click here for other guest blog posts].  Thank you Dr. Watson for the excellent analysis and commentary.  I (the blog dictator) have reproduced his post "as is" with a few exceptions.  I've added a few URL links to other sources.  I've also added emphasis to certain statements via underlining, followed by a note that I added the emphasis.  Finally, I've yet to figure out if it is possible to add real footnote superscripts to blog text via the blog editor I use.  So, I've adopted the format of putting footnote numbers in brackets [ ] and placing the footnotes at the end of the blog post.

I encourage other psychologists and measurement specialists to review some of the Atkins court decisions posted at this blog and send me their analysis and thoughts for potential blog posts. 

---

By Dr. Dale Watson

In a recent Maryland case, U.S. v. Davis, (2009 WL 1117401 (D.Md.)) the trial court found the defendant to be mentally retarded and thus ineligible for the death penalty in line with Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002).  An analysis of the IQ results in this case highlights issues regarding the impact of part-score variability in the IQ profile and the diagnosis of mental retardation as well as the modular nature of intelligence. [emphasis added by blogmaster.  Blogmaster note--Also, see prior post regarding the recommended use of total vs part scores from a national panel report ].

Earl Davis, the defendant, had been charged with federal crimes, including murder, which made him potentially eligible for the death penalty unless he were found to be intellectually and developmentally disabled.  In a pre-trial proceeding the court heard evidence regarding whether Mr. Davis was in fact mentally retarded.  The defense presented the testimony of five imminently qualified experts supporting their position.  The prosecution, relying on the opinions of two board certified neuropsychologists, alternatively argued that Mr. Davis did not meet the criteria for being mentally retarded and instead demonstrated a learning disability.  This argument was founded, in part, on the finding of a significant discrepancy between the Verbal Comprehension (VCI) and Perceptual Reasoning Indices (PRI) of the WAIS-IV.[1]   The prosecution contended that the 15-point discrepancy between these indices made the Full Scale IQ (FSIQ) unreliable as an overall measure of his intellectual functioning.[2]   A discrepancy of this magnitude (VCI = 66; PRI = 81) could be expected to occur with a base rate of 12.7 percent within his ability range and could thus be considered “abnormal.” [3]   This argument was advanced despite the fact that Mr. Davis’ WAIS-IV FSIQ of 70 nominally met the first prong of the definition of an intellectual disability (mental retardation).
 
The prosecution argument was not without precedent.  For example, it was noted in testimony that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR) reported:

When there is a significant scatter in the subtest scores, the profile of strengths and weaknesses, rather than the mathematically derived full-scale IQ, will more accurately reflect the person’s learning abilities.  When there is a marked discrepancy across verbal and performance scores, averaging to obtain a full-scale IQ can be misleading (U.S. v. Davis citing DSM-IV-TR, p. 42).

Fiorello et al. (2002) summarized the literature addressing this viewpoint as applied to the Wechsler scales:

Sattler (2001) cautions that the FSIQ may misrepresent a child’s cognitive functioning level if the Verbal IQ (VIQ) and Performance IQ (PIQ) are significantly different; however he indicates that no empirical evidence exists to indicate when the FSIQ should not be reported or used in eligibility decisions.  Prifitera, Weiss, and Saklofske (1998) recommend that FSIQ should not be interpreted when differences between VIQ/PIQ or Verbal Comprehension Index (VCI) and Perceptual Organization Index (POI) scores are extreme, which they define as differences found in less than 10% of the population (p. 117). [4]

The reluctance to make the diagnosis of mental retardation in the face of significant discrepancies between measures of verbal and non-verbal abilities is thus perhaps not surprising or new.  There has been a long-held view that mental retardation is marked by a “flat” cognitive profile.  When confronted with a profile that instead shows a pattern of ipsative strengths and weaknesses perhaps many psychologists would be hesitant to make the diagnosis of mental retardation.  However, recent empirical evidence does not support that position. [emphasis added by blogmaster]

It is the case, as noted in the WAIS-IV Technical and Interpretive Manual, that “The prevalence of large and unusual discrepancies between verbal and nonverbal composite scores [on the Wechsler scales] has been shown to decrease with decreasing levels of ability (internal citations omitted)” p. 102.  However, Bergeron and Floyd (2006), using the Woodcock-Johnson III Tests of Cognitive Abilities (WJ-III Cog.), demonstrated that individuals with mental retardation “will not likely display a flat cognitive profile on comprehensive assessments of CHC broad cognitive abilities—especially when measures vary widely in g loadings—regardless of the information presented in test manuals for mental retardation groups (emphasis added).” [5]  These researchers found that, in children with mental retardation, there was significantly greater intra-individual score ranges (scatter) than in average-achieving individuals.  Specifically, nearly 37% of these children obtained at least one CHC factor score within the average range.  Bergeron and Floyd concluded,

…it is likely that the increasing number of specific cognitive abilities measured by intelligence test batteries and the variation of these scores in individual profiles inadvertently muddies the waters of mental retardation diagnosis.  As a result, when faced with IQs in the range described in the diagnostic criteria for the disorder and part scores that are much higher, practitioners may believe that an individual cannot be diagnosed with mental retardation because of evidence of “intact” or “unimpaired abilities” p. 428.

…denying special education eligibility or failing to make a diagnosis of mental retardation based on significant part score variability may do these children disservice when other ecologically valid evidence of mental retardation (e.g., adaptive behavior skill deficits) indicates genuine need. P. 429.

These findings have implications for the role of g as well as domain specific disabilities in the genesis of mental retardation.  Bergeron and Floyd posited that the centrality of the impaired CHC factors, as measured by the factor’s g-loading, would determine its sensitivity to mental retardation.  In fact, the Comprehension-Knowledge and Fluid Reasoning clusters, with the highest g-loadings, were most commonly associated with the diagnosis of mental retardation, though low average or average scores on one of these clusters did not preclude the diagnosis.

In another line of research, Anderson (1998) has suggested the need to distinguish “between mental retardation as a general deficit of thinking and mental retardation that might result from the global effects of a specific deficit in a cognitive module.” [6]  In a similar vein, Frith and Happé (1998) have argued “that general impairments (e.g. low IQ) in developmental disorders need not be the result of primary damage to domain-general mechanisms.  Rather, they may be the developmental consequence of damage to very specific, even modular, mechanisms which act as gatekeepers in development” p. 270. [7]

Neuroimaging data further supports the view of the modularity of cognitive functions.  In such a view, though g may represent a relatively unitary phenomenon in the normal brain it can fractionate in the face of modular neuropathology.  Gläscher et al. (2009) used CT and MR lesion maps to localize the impairments found on the WAIS-III Index scores in focal brain-damaged patients.   These investigators “found (1) impairments in VCI (Verbal Comprehension Index) were associated with damage in left hemisphere, in particular in the left inferior frontal cortex, (2) impairments in POI (Perceptual Organization Index) were associated with damage in right parietal, occipito-parietal, and superior temporal cortex, (3) impairments in WMI (Working Memory Index) were associated with left hemispheric lesions particularly focused in superior parietal cortex, and (4) impairments in PSI (Processing Speed Index) correlated with a number of small regions distributed across both hemispheres” (p. 686). [8]  Each of these indices, with the exception of the PSI, significantly predicted a lesion in the associated region.  These results largely confirm clinical lore regarding the significance of specific impairments in the Wechsler indices.

Williams syndrome, a genetically determined developmental disorder commonly marked by mental retardation, has frequently been characterized by relatively intact language abilities and profoundly impaired visual-spatial functions.  Thompson et al. (2005), using MRI scans, identified specifically increased cortical thickness within the perisylvian and inferior temporal regions of the right hemisphere.  This pattern of regional neuropathology appears to correspond well with the differentiated pattern of cognitive deficits.

Mental retardation may thus result from both general impairments or as the “developmental consequence of damage to very specific, even modular, mechanisms.”  [emphasis added by blogmaster]. In the former case one could anticipate a relatively “flat” profile of intellectual abilities.  In the latter instance, a more extreme pattern of strengths and weaknesses might emerge and yet result in sufficient impairment of overall intellectual functioning as to meet the criteria for mental retardation.  Evaluators would do well to remember that the diagnostic criteria for mental retardation do not limit the diagnosis to a particular ipsative pattern of scores, that mental retardation can arise from diverse etiologies and that “strengths co-exist with weaknesses.” (emphasis added by blogmaster).  These cautions apply equally within a clinical context and within a capital punishment context when the diagnosis is “a matter of life or death.”

• [1] The opinion reflected some confusion on this issue indicating that the discrepancy was between the VIQ and PIQ despite the fact that these scores are no longer included in the WAIS-IV.
• [2] See People v. Superior Court of Tulare County (Vidal) for an example of even greater discrepancies between verbal and performance IQs in an Atkins case.
• [3] The “abnormality” of such discrepancies is somewhat arbitrary but authors have variously set the cut-off for an unusual finding at a base-rate of either 10 or 15 percent level.
• [4] Fiorello, C.A., Hale, J.B., McGrath, M., Ryan, K. & Quinn, S. (2002).  IQ interpretation for children with flat and variable test profiles.  Learning and Individual Differences, 13, 115-125.
• [5] Bergeron, R. & Floyd, R.G. (2006). Broad cognitive abilities of children with mental retardation: An analysis of group and individual profiles.  American Journal on Mental Retardation, 111(6), 427.
• [6] Anderson, M. & Miller, K.L. (1998).  Modularity, mental retardation and speed of processing.  Developmental Science, 1(2), 239-245.
• [7] Frith, U. & Happé, F. (1998).  Why specific developmental disorders are not specific: On-line and developmental effects in autism and dyslexia.  Developmental Science, 1(2), 267-272.
• [8] Gläscher, J., Tranel, D., Paul, L.K., Rudrauf, D., Rorden, C., Hornaday, A., Grabowski, T., Damasio, H., and Adolphs, R. (2009).  Lesion mapping of cognitive abilities linked to intelligence.  Neuron, 61, 681-691.

Technorati Tags: psychology, forensice psychology, criminal psychology, criminal justice, neuropsychology, clinical psychology, school psychology, educational psychology, cognition, intelligence, IQ, IQ tests, IQ scores, Verbal IQ, Performance IQ, Full Scale IQ, WAIS-III, WJ III, part vs total IQ scores, LD, MR, mental retardation, developmental disabilities, Atkins cases, death penalty, capital punishment

Personal post: Life is GRAND in MN!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

It does not get any better.  I may die a happy blogmaster. 

Click here for explanation.

Technorati Tags: Minnesota, Vikings, Twins

FYI: Ohio governor puts hold on all executions until at least Dec 2009

Courtesy of Sentencing Law and Policy.

Technorati Tags: psychology, forensic psychology, criminal psychology, criminal justic, Ohio, death penalty, capital punishment, state executions

FYI: American Bar Foundation Law and Social Science Doctoral Fellowships

Thanks to In the News for the post regarding ABF doctoral fellowships in law and science. Hopefully an eligible person might be one with interest in research related to Atkins MR death penalty cases.Technorati
Tags: ABA, AMF, American Bar Association, law, social science, fellowships

Race Rears Its Ugly Head in Atkins case: Guest post by Kevin Foley

Race and IQ tests has been one of the most hotly debated controversies in the field of intelligence testing (click here for some recent post over at sister blog--IQs Corner).  To most psychometrician/measurement experts, the mere presence of mean IQ score differences does not meet the psychometric definition of test bias.  We measurement types typically define test bais as: (a) item content bias, which is now commonly removed via expert panels and differential item functioning [DIF] item analysis methods, (b) structural bias, which means that a test doesn't measure the same constructs across groups [and which is typically evaluated with confirmatory factor analysis structural invariance methods], and (c) predictive bias, which means that a test differentially predicts outcomes for different groups [and which is typically evaluated via the examination of potential differential prediction regression slopes].  Most contemporary intelligence tests address all forms of psychometric bias during test development.

The above mini-course not withstanding, Kevin Foley has written another excellent and though-provoking guest  post (click here to see his prior guest post) dealing with the introduction of racial bias claims, with an unusual "spin" on the interpretation of bias, in the context of experts testifying in an Atkins MR death penalty case in Tennessee.  K. Foley's guest post is reproduced "as is" with any URL links added by the blogmaster.  Thanks Kevin Foley for another well written and provocative post.

In an Atkins case out of Tennessee, two prosecution experts “testified that I.Q. tests have historically been biased against minorities in that they tend to underestimate the intelligence of minorities.” Memorandum Decision, Black v. Bell, ( U.S. Dist. Ct., M.D.Tenn., No. 3:00-0764, Apr. 24, 2008). In an Ohio Atkins case involving convicted murderer Kevin Yarbrough, the State “contend[ed] that the early tests were given at a time that IQ tests were culturally biased against minorities and could have lowered the test results”. Decision Order/Entry, State v. Yarbrough, Ohio Common Pleas Court, Shelby County, Case No. 96CR000023 (Feb. 28, 2007). In a similar vein, the trial court in Ex Parte Chester (unpub., Tex. Ct. Crim. App., No. AP-75,037 (2007)) refused to accord appropriate weight to childhood IQ scores obtained by Chester because the WAIS-R “would not adequately account for cultural, regional, or other types of factors that may have influenced [Chester’s] test results.” Since Chester is black, and his native “region” is reported to be Jefferson County, Texas, the import of this comment obviously refers to his racial background. Two other examples include the case of Eldridge v. Quarterman, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19647 (S.D. Tex. 2008), where there was testimony from a psychologist who “acknowledged evidence that minorities score artificially low”, and Maldonado v. Thaler, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88988 (S.D. Tex.) (prosecution expert testified that “cultural differences” probably artificially lowered immigrant defendant’s scores).

The author of a recent law review article about the consequences of Atkins asserted that, “There is evidence that some IQ tests feature an inherent cultural bias that leads some minority groups to score lower than other individuals.” M. Libell, Atkins’ Wake: How the States Have Shunned Responsibility for the Mentally Retarded, 31 Law & Psychol. Rev. 155, 162 (2007). Similarly, the author of another law review article claimed that, as a consequence of “flawed” IQ tests, “[e]conomically deprived people and ethnic minorities are . . . often erroneously found to be mentally retarded.” Lori M. Church, Mandating Dignity: The United States Supreme Court's Extreme Departure From Precedent Regarding the Eighth Amendment and the Death Penalty, 42 Washburn L.J. 305, 325 (2003).

Starting with Arthur Jensen’s tome, Bias in Mental Testing (1987), there is long list of scientific literature which would seem to indicate that IQ tests are not biased against minorities. Even though there is gap of approximately one standard deviation between the mean IQ scores of blacks and whites, and about half that amount between whites and Hispanics, that does not mean that IQ tests are biased.

Are the psychologists referred to above showing a bias of their own in attempting to give their party the testimony they want, and are the prosecutors, courts and legal commentators simply providing spin based on myth, not science? It would be nice to hear from some objective psychologists on this issue. Should comments like those above by made by experts in Atkins cases and in the discussions of commentators?

Technorati Tags: psychology, law, forensic psychology, criminal psychology, criminal justice, Atkins cases, mental retardation, MR, developmental disabilities, IQ, IQ tests, IQ scores, race, test bias, racial bias, bias in mental testing, Kevin Foley, neuropsychology, clinical psychology, school psychology, educational psychological

Atkins MR death penalty IQ test-theory gap: Is this a problem?

[Double cllck on image to enlarge: Click here for a more comprehensive figure that includes IQ tests without adult norms]

Contemporary Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) theory has emerged as the psychometric cognitive/intelligence theory with the largest body of supporting evidence (Kaufman, 2009).  Evidence for the emergence of CHC theory can be seen in a recently invited editorial on CHC theory in the prestigious journal Intelligence (McGrew, 2009).  More importantly, CHC theory “has formed the foundation for most contemporary IQ tests” (Kaufman, 2009, p. 91).

If CHC theory is now the consensus model of psychometric intelligence, and if the intellectual component of most Atkins cases hinges on one of the latest versions of the WAIS (WAIS-III, WAIS-IV), which is often described as the "IQ test standard" in Atkins related decisions, isn't this a serious problem?

Shouldn't life-or-death decisions hinging (to a major degree) on a person's tested level of intelligence be based on the assessment of intelligence as per the most validated model of intelligence?

Would the Vidal (2007) CA decision, which hinged largely on expert debates surrounding existing (prior) Wechsler Verbal, Performance and Full Scale IQ scores, benefited from less debate regarding the meaning of a consistently documented Verbal vs Performance IQ difference and more time spent asking for more comprehensive assessments of Vidal's complete CHC cognitive abilities, many that are either not measured, or are poorly represented, by the Wechsler batteries?

Should the Wechslers continue to be considered "the IQ standard" in these cases?  Shouldn't a standard be consistent with the consensus model of contemporary of intelligence?

It appears that many Atkins IQ MR-determination cases are decided in the presence of an IQ test-contemporary intelligence theory gap.  How long will this continue?   What are the implications?

Many questions to ponder.

Technorati Tags: psychology, forensic psychology, criminal psychology, criminal justice, mental disability, MR, mental retardation, developmental disabilities, Vidal Atkins case, intelligence, IQ, IQ tests, CHC theory, Cattell-Horn-Carroll theory, Wechsler batteries, WAIS-R, WAIS-III, WAIS-IV, death penalty, capital punishment

Total vs part IQ composite scores in mental retardation determination

In a prior post I recommended a book that dealt with eligibility for social security benefits due to mental retardation.  The content is relevant to the current blog since it represents one of the few recommendations from a national panel of experts re: mental retardation eligibility issues (at the same IQ cut-point pivotal in Atkins cases), issues that are very similar to those often raised in Atkins mental retardation death penalty cases.

I've now extracted the main recommendations/statements from the book that are relevant to the total vs part IQ score issue raised in the CA Vidal (2007) decision.  Emphasis (underline/italics) in the material below was added by the blogmaster.  As noted in the prior post, there was a dissenting opinion expressed by Dr. Keith Widaman.  I plan to add his dissenting comments later. 

As someone who was a practicing school psychologist for 10+ years (where I saw many profiles with wild splits in scores due to many different reasons), and who now is primarily an applied psychometrician conducting research in the domain of intelligence theory and testing, I have a complex set of opinions re: the total vs part score issue.  I have yet to crystallize my opinion regarding the Vidal (2007) decision....in fact...I find it has raised many questions which has resulted in myself digging through books, articles, and analyzing datasets. 

The recommendations and statements below reflect the opinion of the Committee on Disability Determination for Mental Retardation as summarized in the above referenced book.  They do not necessarily reflect my opinions at this time.

Extracted from the book:

A client must have an intelligence test score that is two or more standard deviations (SD) below the mean (e.g., a score of 70 or below, if the mean = 100 and the standard deviation = 15.

• Composite score is 70 or below:  If the composite or total test score meets this criterion, then the individual has met the intellectual eligibility component.

• Composite score is between 71 and 75:  If the composite score is suspected to be an invalid indicator of the person’s intellectual disability and falls in the range of 71-75, a part score of 70 or below can be used to satisfy the intellectual eligibility component.

• Composite score is 76 or above:  No individual can be eligible on the intellectual criterion if the composite score is 76 or above, regardless of part scores. (p.5)

Only part scores derived from scales that demonstrate high g-loadings—that is, ones that are better representations of general intellectual ability (e.g., crystallized , fluid measures of intelligence)—should be used in place of the composite IQ score when its validity is in doubt.  Many intelligence tests assess several facets of intelligence, but not all facets are equally important or predict life events equally well.  Those intellectual facets that are heavily “g-saturated” provide the best sources for replacing the composite IQ score when its validity is questionable. (p.5)

The use of part scores, most often from the Wechsler measures, introduces an important consideration in the clinical use of intelligence measures for disability determination.  Current scientific conceptions of intelligence focus primarily on fluid and crystallized abilities, with recognition that working or comprehensive memory is also important to overall intellectual functioning.  Many intelligence tests are based on these distinctions.  The Wechsler measures are also moving in this direction, with a focus on factor scores that are analogous to crystallized intelligence (e.g., verbal comprehension index), fluid intelligence (e.g., perceptual organization index), and working/comprehensive memory (e.g., working memory index).  Consequently, the committee has recommended continued use of part scores in eligibility determination, but is advocating use of part scores that are consistent with current scientific thinking. (p.6)

During the next decade, even greater alignment of intelligence tests and the IQ scores derived from them and the Horn-Cattell and Carroll models is likely.  As a result, the future will almost certainly see greater reliance on part scores, such as IQ scores for Gc and Gf, in addition to the traditional composite IQ.  That is, the traditional composite IQ may not be dropped, but greater emphasis will be placed on part scores than has been the case in the past.  As this movement to part scores develops, it will most likely occur first for Gc and Gf, the most central of the second-stratum factors, and then extend to other second-stratum dimensions as they are determined to be useful for differential prediction. (p.94)

Science vs law in evaluating expert scientific testimony: From Vidal (2007) Atkins decision

Science vs law in the court room.

I've been skimming the CA Supreme Court Vidal (2007) Atkins-related decision and found a fascinating discussion of the distinction between science and law (thanks to In the News Blog for directing my focus to this section).  For those who don't want to read the entire PDF document previously posted, below is the relevant text.  Professionals who testify (or who are considering testifying) in Atkins cases, should be aware of the courts role in mediating/deciding expert-testimony based scientific debates.  Scientific debates in the court room are not the same as debates between scholars at conferences, in journal articles, etc.

Underlined/italics in the text below reflect the blogmasters emphasis.

In assessing the role the Full Scale IQ score (or any other single test score) plays in determining mental retardation, we must distinguish between rules of law and diagnostic criteria of psychology. The expert testimony below included a vigorous scientific debate as to whether Vidal’s Full Scale IQ scores should rule out a diagnosis of mental retardation. While one psychologist, McKinzey, gave his opinion that Full Scale IQ scores are, in all circumstances, the “best measure of general intelligence,” two other psychologists, Couture and Widaman, testified that where testing showed an extraordinarily wide divergence between Performance and Verbal IQ scores, the Full Scale measure was not a fully reliable measure. In support of their views, both sides gave scientific, not legal, reasons and cited scientific, not legal, authority

The Court of Appeal sided squarely with McKinzey in this debate over psychological standards, stating flatly that “general intellectual functioning is primarily determined by the defendant’s FSIQ score.” Like the psychologists who testified at the hearing, the lower court majority cited scientific sources (references published by the American Psychiatric Association and the American Association on Mental Retardation) rather than legal authority in support of its view. The Court of Appeal majority erred in thus purporting to resolve a factual question--the best scientific measure of intellectual functioning--as a matter of law. In finding the facts of a particular case, courts and juries untrained in science are sometimes called upon to resolve contested scientific issues, but such factual findings do not establish generally applicable rules of law. The superior court here, for example, found on the basis of Couture’s and Widaman’s testimony that in Vidal’s case his Full Scale IQ scores in the low average to average range did not preclude a finding of mental retardation. In a given case an appellate court might, within its proper role, hold that such a finding was not supported by substantial evidence in the hearing record. But an appellate court cannot convert a disputed factual assertion into a rule of law simply by labeling it a “legal standard,” as the Court of Appeal purported to do here.

Courts also must sometimes evaluate disputed scientific assertions in the course of determining the admissibility of expert scientific testimony. In determining the evidentiary reliability of a new scientific technique, California courts look primarily to the technique’s general acceptance in the relevant scientific community, an approach designed to ensure “ ‘that those most qualified to assess the general validity of a scientific method will have the determinative voice.’ ”(People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24, 31, italics omitted.) Even under the arguably more searching federal court inquiry described in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) 509 U.S. 579, “the focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” (Id. at p. 595.) The courts’ evidentiary gatekeeping function is thus not a warrant for judicial intervention in genuine scientific debates over substantive principles. In any event, we are not faced here with a question of admissibility of disputed evidence but with the question whether, when both sides of a scientific dispute have been presented by expert testimony, an appellate court may declare the debate’s winner as a matter of law.

The Legislature has mandated that trial courts, in determining mental retardation for Atkins purposes (Atkins, supra, 536 U.S. 304), find whether the individual’s “general intellectual functioning” is significantly impaired (§ 1376, subd. (a)), but has not defined that phrase or mandated primacy for any particular measure of intellectual functioning. The question of how best to measure intellectual functioning in a given case is thus one of fact to be resolved in each case on the evidence, not by appellate promulgation of a new legal rule.

Technorati Tags: psychology, forensic psychology, criminal psychology, criminal justice, neuropsychology, school psychology, educational psychology, clinical psychology, Vidal Atkins case, Atkins cases, intelligence, IQ tests, MR, mental retardation, developmental disabilities, science vs law, capital punishment, death penalty

On-line death row database available from DPIC

I'm not sure if this may be useful for the purpose of this blog, but just in case, the Death Penalty Information Center (DPIC) just announced an on-line death row database.  A unique feature is that the database is editable, which means that individuals with knowledge of inmate cases may add information.  Wouldn't it be nice if someone had the time and resources to flag those cases that involve Atkins MR/IQ/AB issues?

Technorati Tags: psychology, educational psychology, forensic psychology, criminal justice, criminal psychology, death row, capital punishment, death penalty, Atkins cases, IQ, MR, mental retardation, DPIC

Book recommendation: Mental Retardation--Determining Eligibility for SS Benefits

I recommend the book Mental Retardation:  Determining Eligibility for Social Security Benefits) to professionals engaged in Atkins MR death penalty related assessments and decisions, especially since it is relevant to the Vidal (2007) California Supreme Court decision (prior post) where the court and experts grappled with the use of the Wechsler Verbal IQ (and not Full Scale IQ) in estimating Vidal's general intelligence.  The topic of part vs total scores from IQ tests is discussed in detail, and there was some dissent within the committee that produced the book.

It is not a widely known book given its narrow focus (determining mental retardation for social security benefits).  I recommend it as a starting point for a number of intelligence test issues in Atkins cases as the book is the result of a two year process comissioned by the National Academy Press/National Research Council.  The Committee on Disability Determination for Mental Retardation consisted of 16 experts from various disciplines.  The issues and recommendations for MR assessment and eligibility determination for SS eligibility, which are not much different from the three-prong criteria used when deciding Atkins cases, are based on a national expert panel.  Although determining MR eligibility for social security benefits is a much less serious decision than determining MR for Atkins capital punishment cases, the eligibility issues discussed are nearly identical.

The book covers the topics of policy context, the role of intellectual and adaptive behavior assessment, the relationship between intelligence and adaptive behavior, differential diagnosis, and the panels recommendations.

Again...I mention this book primarily because it is a good starting point for reflecting on the Vidal (2007) court decision that hinged on the use of a Verbal IQ score (and not the Full Scale IQ score) in the  determination of Vidal as qualifying as  MR (part vs total score discussion in the text).

When time permits I will likely summarize the key issues and recommendations from the book as they related to the part vs total IQ score issue.  It is a complicated issue.

Conflict of interest notes

• As mentioned in the acknowledgements section of  the book, I was one of a number of  individuals who provided feedback on earlier drafts of the manuscript.

• Also, it is interesting to note, that Dr. Keith Widaman, a leading scholar in intelligence, adaptive behavior, and developmental disabilities research, was a member of the panel and was one of the expert witnesses in the Vidal court decision.  I have the highest professional regard for Dr. Widaman's expertise and credentials.  He is one of the top research methodologists in psychology and a leading scholar in intelligence, adaptive behavior and mental retardation.  I regularly see and chat with Dr. Widaman at the annual ISIR conference.  Furthermore, Dr. Widaman and I coauthored a chapter on adaptive behavior (The Structure of Adaptive Behavior;  Widaman & McGrew, 1996) published in the 1996 Americian Psychological Association (APA) Manual of Diagnosis and Professional Practice in Mental Retardation.  Reflecting his scholarly integrity, Dr. Widaman's reported expert testimony in the Vidal case is 100% consistent with his minority dissenting opinion (in the MR-SS related book) regarding the issue of part vs total IQ scores for diagnosing mental retardation.

Technorati Tags: psychology, educational psychology, school psychology, forensic psychology, criminal justice, criminal psychology, mental disability, IQ, IQ tests, IQ scores, MR, mental retardation, developmental disabilities, Atkins case, California Supreme Court, Vidal, Wechsler IQ tests, general intelligence, part scores

Court decision: Vidal 2007 California Supreme Court decision: Use of part scores vs FS IQ

Two different individuals, one a legal professional the other a neuropsychologist, independently sent me copies (within hours of each other) of a very intriguing 2007 California Supreme Court ruling in an Atkins case.  After taking a quick peek, I can see why.  The court dealt with the thorny issue of using the individuals composite Full Scale IQ vs his Verbal IQ to determine if the individual was mentally retarded as per Atkins criteria.  The subject had been repeatedly tested with various editions of the Wechsler batteries over many years and displayed a very large and consistent Verbal vs Performance IQ split.

As reported at In The News Blog: "The Court unanimously held that a defendant may be spared the death penalty because he is mentally deficient in one area, even if his overall IQ score falls in the normal range. The decision overturned an appeals court finding that “full-scale IQ” was the best measure of intelligence."  Click on the In the News Blog for a lengthier summary.

I've posted copies of the original 2005 decision (click here) and the final California Supreme Court decision (click here) for readers to digest. 

I'm going to read the decision carefully as it raises many important intelligence testing and measurement issues.  I'm not sure if I will eventually make a single post re: my observations, comments, conclusions, quesitons, etc., or if I will present snippets from the two decisions and make comments in separate posts.

My knee jerk reaction, after seeing four different Wechsler test administrations (and a fifth abbreviated Wechsler---WASI), all that produced very consistent findings, is why someone didnt' recommend the administration of other measures of cognitive abilities (not measured by the Wechslers) to gather information re: important cognitive abilities related to intellectual functioning.

I would love to hear from other psychologists, intelligence scholars, and experts in mental retardation re: their opinion of the courts ruling and the evidence presented, logic of the court, etc.  This is a case that can be very instructive.  I just need to find time to do it justice.  Guest blog posts would be much appreciated.


Technorati Tags: psychology, educational psychology, school psychology, forensic psychology, criminal justice, criminal psychology, mental disability, IQ, IQ tests, IQ scores, MR, mental retardation, developmental disabilities, Atkins case, California Supreme Court, Vidal, Wechsler IQ tests, general intelligence, part scores

New York Times Op-Ed on cost of death row and death penalty

The New York Times had an Op-Ed yesterday on the high cost of capital punishment.  Although not specific to Atkins cases, I thought readers may be interested. 

Trying to keep this blog as objective as possible, I'm following my policy of not entering the fray either pro/con re: the positions taken in the editorial.  This is a pass-along FYI only.

Technorati Tags: death penalty, capitol punishment, death row, New York Times

Determining Current Level of Intellectual Functioning: The Courts Dropped the Ball (guest post by K. Foley)

On month ago the US 5th Circuit Court of Appeals rendered a psychometrically puzzling (and troubling) decision in an Atkins mental retardation death penalty case, in favor of the defendant...Eric Lynn Moore.  It was brought to my attention by Kevin Foley who wanted to share his observations regarding the decision (in a guest blog post), particuarly since the ruling hinged on the unusal procedure of mathematically averaging three different IQ scores obtained across decades.  According to the records, the courts averaged a group IQ score administered when the defendent was 7 years old, a 1991WAIS-R, and a 2004 WAIS-III.  Although the scores were very consistent, I have never heard of such a simple mathematical method being applied to scores from different tests across such a long period of time.  The measurement questions raised by this simplistic approach are beyond the scope of a single blog post. 

My initial amazement is echoed in a  32 page dissenting opinion by Appeals Judge Jerry Smith.  As per an AP story: 

• Appeals Judge Jerry Smith, in a 32-page dissent that was twice as long as the court's decision, called the majority ruling "intellectually sluggish" and chastised his colleagues on the court for using "haphazardly-applied standards of review, casually-read caselaw, and superficially-scrutinized evidence." 

 Judge Smith's dissenting opinion starts on page 16 of the final court ruling.


Kevin Foley was similarly struck by the manner in which the court invoked the simplistic approach to establishing mental retardation.  As a result, he wrote the following guest blog post which I'm posting on his behalf "as is."  In addition, I've located copies of the final ruling (click here), and three prior appeals (click here, here, and here). 

I've only skimmed the final ruling but would urge all psychologists  involved in Atkins cases, or psychologists who do intellectual testing of any kind, to read it.  The ruling is an interesting window into a courts logic re: how intelligence testing and scores can be viewed...and how  measurement and psychometric principles can be ignored.   Aside from the simple arithmetic averaging of three different IQ scores, other interesting comments center on the WAIS being the "standard" IQ test for Atkins cases and the argument for determining an MR diagnosis based on IQ scores only (dismissal of adaptive behavior evidence and testimony).  I will be reading it more and may offer additional comments upon greater reflection. 

Below is the Kevin Foley's unedited guest post:

Moore v. Quarterman, Case No. 05-70038, 5th Cir., Aug. 21, 2009 (unpublished).

Eric Lynn Moore, an African American inmate under a sentence of death, sought to escape the death penalty by invoking Atkins. The federal district court ruled in Moore’s favor, exempting him from the death penalty. The state appealed. According to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Moore obtained the following IQ scores: a 76 on the WAIS-R; a 66 on the WAIS-III; and a 74 on the Primary Mental Abilities test. Moore also scored in the bottom eight-tenths of a percentile on the TONI-2. The dissenting opinion in Moore states that the PMA was given to Moore when he was in the first grade; the WAIS-R was given to Moore, in prison, in 1991; and the WAIS-III was given to Moore in 2004. The district court resolved the issue of Moore’s current intellectual functioning by averaging the three scores to come up with an average score of 72, to which he applied the standard error of measurement. The appeals court approved this approach, stating, “In averaging the test scores and relying on the five-point margin of error . . . the district court attempted to find a way to reconcile all three test scores.”

The lone dissenting judge issued a scathing dissent, including biting comments accusing the majority of using “[h]aphazardly-applied standards of review, casually-read case law, and superficially-scrutinized evidence [which] make for an unfortunate combination; here, they result in shallow analysis and the wrong result. The only mitigation is that the majority opinion is unpublished, so it is not binding on anyone or any court.” Ouch!

The dissent correctly, in my opinion, took the trial and appeals courts to task on the issue of using an average of IQ scores from as far back as 1973 to determine current level of functioning. First, the trial court neglected to address issues surrounding the accuracy of the three scores. According to the dissent,

“All three of those test results were called into question at the evidentiary hearing. The PMA score, for example, is only a number; there is no evidence that it was properly scored or whether it was administered individually, as the test protocol requires, or to an entire school class. The vocabulary section of the WAIS-R, according to [defense expert] Llorente, was improperly scored, and in a way that may have slightly inflated the score. Llorente also testified concerning the ‘Flynn Effect,’ the apparent increase in the average IQ scores in populations over time, as measured by a given IQ test. Because the WAIS-R was an older test when it was administered to Moore, Llorente suggested adjusting Moore’s score of 76 downward by about four points.”

In addition, the state’s expert asserted that Moore’s expert improperly scored the WAIS-III test. The dissent correctly complained that the trial court took the easy way out by averaging the scores.

“Instead of grappling with those conflicting upward and downward adjustments, the district court gave the three scores equal weight, averaged them, reached an IQ of 72, applied the ‘five-point standard error of measurement,’ and therefore concluded that Moore had borne his burden of proof. It is that finding, and the district court’s actual reasoning in making it, that the panel must consider, and yet the majority refuses to address it at anything resembling an acceptable level of detail. . . .

“For one thing, there is no legal or record support for taking an average of Moore’s IQ scores. Averaging IQ scores is, to say the least, a creative approach to their analysis and comparison and is highly unusual. Neither expert suggested, employed, or endorsed it. The district court assumed, without any evident backing, that averaging is a meaningful way to compare scores from different IQ testing protocols administered years apart and that the margin of error was the same for all three and was the same after the averaging as before. All of those assumptions are facially implausible, and the district court had no apparent reason to think any of them is correct.”

Although the dissent erred in other respects (some of which may make for other interesting blog entries), it hit the nail on the head on this issue. Although these issues – assertions of invalid results, mis-scoring of tests, application of the Flynn Effect, and determining what weight to give to certain evidence - might be complicated and hard to resolve, that is what courts do. They should educate themselves and use the experts to provide the information necessary to properly decide the case. Moreover, federal judges can appoint an independent expert to offset the parties experts, it the judge feels the need for some impartial testimony to help guide the court.

Technorati Tags: psychology, forensic psychology, criminal justice, criminal psychology, neuropsychology, clinical psychology, educational psychology, school psychology, Atkins case, death penalty, capital punishment, MR, mental retardation, Eric Lynn Moore, IQ tests, IQ scores, intelligence

Court decision added: North Carolina v Jones (2006-2008)

Related to my prior FYI book post (re: The Last Lawyer), I found copies of all relevant court decisions from 2006 to 2008 (North Carolina v Jones) at the ACLU web site. Click here.  The links to the PDF court papers are near the bottom of the page.  A quick search of the files using the keyword "mental retardation" indicates that this is a case where MR was an issue....and it thus fits with other Atkins cases posted at this blog.


Technorati Tags: psychology, forensic psychology, criminal justice, criminal psychology, neuropsychology, law, death penalty, capital punishment, North Carolina v Jones, Bo Jones, innocent, intelligence, IQ tests, IQ scores, mental retardation, MR, developmental disabilities

Book review: The Last Lawyer: The Fight to Save Death Row Inmates

I just stumbled across the forthcoming book (fall, 2009)"  The Last Lawyer:  The Fight to Save Death Row Inmates, by John Temple.  It is not yet published so I have no copy and no reviews.  This is an FYI post without endorsement either way.  Below are a few snippets from the books longer description that is available at the book link above.  It does mention the issue of mental retardation. 

I plan to do some web research to see if I can find the formal court decision for this case (Bo Jones).  If anyone has a pdf copy of the final decision, or can direct me to a URL where it is available, it would be much appreciated.

• The Last Lawyer chronicles Rose's decade-long defense of Bo Jones, a North Carolina farmhand convicted of a 1987 murder.

• Rose called it his most frustrating case in twenty-five years, and it was one that received scant attention from judges or journalists. The Jones case highlights the thorniest issues surrounding capital punishment, including inadequate defense, mental retardation, mental illness, and sketchy witness testimony. Yet for many years, Rose's advocacy gained no traction, and Bo Jones came within three days of his execution.

Technorati Tags: psychology, forensic psychology, criminal psychology, criminal justice, North Carolina, death penalty, capital punihsment, Bo Jones, lawyers

Applied Psychometrics 101: How IQ tests are developed

This past summer I was asked to conduct an introductory level four hour course on the "art and science of test development" for an international psychological assessment conference in Brazil.  It was the first time in 25 years of clinical testing and applied cognitive/IQ/achievement test development that I had ever tried to put the basics of applied test development down in a presentation.  The end result was a series of modules (which are "works in progress") that can be viewed on-line via my sister blog, IQs Corner. 

You can access them by visiting the last post I made re: these PPT modules or go to the main IQs Corner home page and look for the Applied Test Development Series section on the left blog panel.

The goal of the modules is to educate laypersons, psychologists, and other professionals in  the basics of how intelligence (and achievement) tests are developed...kind of an "IQ test development for dummies" series.  It is hoped these materials will increase the sophistication of knowledge of people who use intelligence tests and/or are consumers of intelligence test results (e.g., physicians, lawyers, judges, etc).  The long-term goal will be to turn the PPT modules into either a series of Applied Psychometric 101 research reports or cobble them together in a grand single manuscript.

Enjoy.  Feedback is always welcomeTechnorati

Tags: psychology, educational psychology, forensic psychology, neuropsychology, criminal justic, criminal psychology, school psychology, psychometrics, applied psychometrics, test development, test norms, IQ, IQ tests, IQ scores, intelligence, Applied Psychometrics 101, IQs Corner

Cultural sensivity in test selection in death penalty cases (Perlin & McCain, in press)

The following article came to my attention via Michael Perlin, first author of the article.  Thanks for the contribution.  I do not have a copy of the manuscript for a complete reading.  It is "in press" in Psychology, Public Policy and the Law.

Perlin, Michael L. and McClain, Valerie Rae, 'Where Souls are Forgotten': Cultural Competencies, Forensic Evaluations and International Human Rights (July 30, 2009). Psychology, Public Policy and Law, Vol. 15, 2009; NYLS Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09/10 #6. Available at SSRN(click here):


Abstract

Cultural competency is critical in criminal forensic evaluations. Cultural competency eschews reliance on stereotype, precluding the mistake of assuming that cultural dictates apply with equal force to all who share a cultural background, thus allowing the forensic examiner to provide a comprehensive picture of the defendant to the factfinder. While raised frequently in death penalty cases, it is equally important to the entire criminal process. Cultural sensitivity in test selection and interview techniques that enhance validity of results are addressed. In a parallel fashion, ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has drawn importance to cultural competency. Although international human rights and cultural sensitivity have been considered with regard to race, gender and religion, applications to criminal matters are still in their infancy. This paper considers strategies to enhance the effectiveness of testimony and mitigation efforts.

Technorati Tags: psychology, forensic psychology, cultural competence, neuropsychology, crimnal psychology, criminal justic, educational psychology, school psychology, clinical psychology, disability rights, death penalty, capital punishment, Atkins cases

Research on malingering: IAP database search 9-23-09

I simply have not had the time to read the articles in my in-box related to malingering issues during psychological assessment, issues that are often critical in Atkins MR death penalty cases.  So...I decided to run a search of the IAP Reference Database for any  empirical research related to malingering.  Click here for the result.

Damn....there is a ton.  Not enough time in the day, week, or year to digest it all.  But, for folks looking for references, I hope this reference list helps.

Technorati Tags: psychology, forensic psychology, criminal psychology, psychological testing, Atkins cases, MR, mental retardation, development disabilities, AAIDD, AAMR, malingering, IQ tests, IQ scores, intelligence, death penalty, capital punishment

StandDown Texas Project: Thank you

Thanks to the StandDown Texas Project blog for the post and blogroll link.  I monitor this blog and will FYI/link readers to StandDown when information may be relevant to the purpose of Intellectual Competence and the Death Penalty blog.

Technorati Tags: psychology, forensic psychology, IQ, intelligence, IQ tests, Atkins cases, MR, mental retardation, capital punishment, death penalty, StandDown Project