Joel Schneider and I briefly touched in this topic in our soon to be published CHC intelligence theory update chapter. Below is the select text and some awesome figures crafted by Joel.
Our simplified conceptual structure of knowledge abilities is presented in Figure 3.10. At the center of overlapping knowledge domains is general knowledge—knowledge and skills considered important for any member of the population to know (e.g., literacy, numeracy, self-care, budgeting, civics, etiquette, and much more). The bulk of each knowledge domain is the province of specialists, but some portion is considered important for all members of society to know. Drawing inspiration from F. L. Schmidt (2011, 2014), we posit that interests and experience drive acquisition of domain-specific knowledge.
In Schmidt's model, individual differences in general knowledge are driven largely by individual differences in fluid intelligence and general interest in learning, also known as typical intellectual engagement (Goff & Ackerman, 1992). In contrast, individual differences in domain-specific knowledge are more driven by domain-specific in-terests, and also by the “tilt” of one's specific abilities (Coyle, Purcell, Snyder, & Richmond, 2014; Pässler, Beinicke, & Hell, 2015). In Figure 3.11, we present a simplified hypothetical synthesis of several ability models in which abilities, interests, and personality traits predict general and specific knowledge (Ackerman, 1996a, 1996b, 2000; Ackerman, Bowen, Beier, & Kanfer, 2001; Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997; Ackerman & Rolfhus, 1999; Fry & Hale, 1996; Goff & Ackerman, 1992; Kail, 2007; Kane et al., 2004; Rolfhus & Ackerman, 1999; Schmidt, 2011, 2014; Schneider et al., 2016; Schneider & Newman, 2015; Woodcock, 1993; Ziegler, Danay, Heene, Asendorpf, & Bühner, 2012).
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