Showing posts with label Hall v Florida. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hall v Florida. Show all posts

Tuesday, November 6, 2018

Law Review Article: Evaluating Intellectual Disability: Clinical Assessments in Atkins Cases (Ellis et al., 2018)




This new law review article is, IMHO, the best overview article regarding the history of ID, the legal issues in Atkins cases, and good discussion of the major conceptual and measurement issues found in many Atkins cases. An excellent introduction to ID issues in Atkins cases.

EVALUATING INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: CLINICAL ASSESSMENTS IN ATKINS CASES

James W. Ellis, Caroline Everington, Ann M. Delpha

ABSTRACT

The intersection of intellectual disability and the death penalty is now clearly established. Both under the U.S. Supreme Court's constitutional decisions and under the terms of many state statutes, individual defendants who have that disability cannot be sentenced to death or executed. It now falls to trial, appellate, and post-conviction courts to determine which individual criminal defendants are entitled to the law's protection. This Article attempts to assist judges in performing that task. After a brief discussion of the Supreme Court's decisions in Atkins v. Virginia, Hall v. Florida, and Moore v. Texas, it analyzes the component parts and terminology of the clinical definition of intellectual disability. It then offers more detailed discussion of a number of the clinical issues that arise frequently in adjudicating these cases. For each of these issues, the Article's text and the accompanying notes attempt to provide judges with a thorough survey of the relevant clinical literature, and an explanation of the terminology used by clinical professionals. Our purpose is to help those judges to become more knowledgeable consumers of the clinical reports and expert testimony presented to them in individual cases, and to help them reach decisions that are consistent with what the clinical literature reveals about the nature of intellectual disability and best professional practices in the diagnostic process.

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Saturday, October 20, 2018

Law Review Article: Comment post-Moore: Call for national standard for ID def in capital cases

Article can be found here.



CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in Moore served as little more than a lackluster attempt to provide states with guidance in creating a standard for determining intellectual disability for the purposes of capital punish-ment. While the Court attempted to narrow the leniency it provided to states with its holdings in both Moore and Hall, it has likely done nothing more than cause confusion as states attempt to create legislation that ad-heres to the Court's mandates. The Court's refusal to provide states with a functional definition of intellectual disability in capital cases might seem merely frustrating at first glance, but it is also potentially unconstitu-tional-arguably violating both the Eighth Amendment and the equal pro-tection clause. What is more, as each state creates its own test for deter-mining intellectual disability, the states increase their risk of violating the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Thus, the Court should provide the states with a definition to avoid these pressing constitutional concerns.

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Wednesday, January 17, 2018

Validity, Interrater Reliability, and Measures of Adaptive Behavior: Concerns Regarding the Probative Versus Prejudicial Value

Validity, Interrater Reliability, and Measures of Adaptive Behavior: Concerns Regarding the Probative Versus Prejudicial Value

Psychology, Public Policy, and Law. Article link.

Karen L. Salekin,The University of Alabama
Tess M. S. Neal,Arizona State University
Krystal A. Hedge, Federal Medical Center, Devens, Massachusetts

The question as to whether the assessment of adaptive behavior (AB) for evaluations of intellectual disability (ID) in the community meet the level of rigor necessary for admissibility in legal cases is addressed. AB measures have made their way into the forensic domain, in which scientific evidence is put under great scrutiny. Assessment of ID in capital murder proceedings has garnished a lot of attention, but assessments of ID in adult populations also occur with some frequency in the context of other criminal proceedings (e.g., competence to stand trial, competence to waive Miranda rights), as well as eligibility for social security disability, social security insurance, Medicaid/Medicare, government housing, and postsecondary transition services. As will be demonstrated, markedly disparate findings between raters can occur on measures of AB even when the assessment is conducted in accordance with standard procedures (i.e., the person was assessed in a community setting, in real time, with multiple appropriate raters, when the person was younger than 18 years of age), and similar disparities can be found in the context of the unorthodox and untested retrospective assessment used in capital proceedings. With full recognition that some level of disparity is to be expected, the level of disparity that can arise when these measures are administered retrospectively calls into question the validity of the results and, consequently, their probative value.

Keywords: adaptive behavior measures, Atkins, forensic evaluations, validity, interrater reliability


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Monday, September 25, 2017

Law Review Article (Meyer, 2017): The newly informed decency of death: Hall v Florida endorses the Marsshall hypothesis in eighth ammendment review of the death penalty


The above titled law review article (Meyer, 2017:  The newly informed decency of death:  Hall v Florida endorses the Marshall hypothesis in eighth amendment review of the death penalty can be found here.

Friday, February 3, 2017

Court Decision: Another Hall v Florida related remand in Florida: Nixon v Florida (2017)




Yet another remand for an ID hearing in Florida as a result of Hall v Florida 2014 decision. This time Nixon v Florida (click here for remand order). Prior information regarding this case can be found here.


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Monday, November 21, 2016

Special Olympics Chair comments on Moore v Texas SCOTUS Atkins death penalty case




TIME Ideas (Op-Ed)
Special Olympics Chair: Texas’ Standard of Intellectual Disability Is Horrific
'Labels have consequences'
By Tim Shriver,
November 18, 2016

Tim Shriver is Chairman of the Special Olympics

In recent months, name calling and bullying have grown to unprecedented levels. Even as both the President and the President-elect signal the need for unity, social media is full of venom, talk shows remain full of virulent attacks, winners gloat arrogantly and losers bemoan angrily. In our culture, nasty has become the new normal.

Our nation’s treatment of people with intellectual disabilities is more than enough evidence of this pattern. For them, labeling and ridicule are deadly serious problems. Labeling someone “retarded” isn’t a joke: it’s a sentence. People with intellectual disabilities are still institutionalized and abandoned because of the label. Isolation, unemployment and poverty are too often the norms.

That’s why it’s so important that laws look beyond stereotypes and fears and protect rights and dignity. The Supreme Court has a chance to do that on Nov. 29, 2016, when Justices will hear Moore v. Texas and determine whether Texas overstepped in its standards for determining intellectual disability in death penalty cases.

In 2002 when the Supreme Court handed down its landmark decision Atkins v. Virginia, it moved in the right direction. After suffering through centuries of injustice, people with intellectual disabilities won a small measure of protection when the Court ruled that any individual with an intellectual disability had vulnerabilities that made it unconstitutional for the state to execute them. The same court that in 1927 authorized the forced sterilization of people with intellectual disabilities in state institutions with the infamous words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, “three generations of imbeciles are enough,” this time got it right.

In so doing, the court overturned deep and terrifying stereotypes and recognized what both science and experience should have long made clear: people with intellectual disabilities have abilities but also challenges: they are less able to advocate for themselves; more likely to be coerced into behaviors they don’t understand; less likely to understand the implications of their actions and at higher risk for unreliable trials and wrongful convictions.

As a result of Atkins, the law of the United States now makes it illegal to kill a person with an intellectual disability—even for the state. But sadly, that hasn’t stopped the old stereotypes from remerging.

When Bobby Moore, a person with an intellectual disability, was 14-years old, his father became enraged that Moore couldn’t read and threw him out on the street. As a teen, Bobby did not understand the days of the week, how to tell time, and other basic information and skills.

Bobby ate out of trash cans, mowed lawns for money, and eventually lived in the back of a pool hall where he sometimes played pool. Like every person, including those with intellectual disability, Bobby was better at some things than others. With the help of others, he managed to survive.

But at the age of 20, Bobby was involved in a bungled robbery with two other people in which an employee was tragically shot and killed. He was convicted and sentenced to death. After a lower court found that Bobby had an intellectual disability and was therefore exempt from execution, Texas’s highest criminal court ruled that Bobby’s ability to play pool and mow lawns proved he never had an intellectual disability and could therefore be executed.

Remarkably, the court prohibited the use of current medical standards in evaluating intellectual disability in death-penalty cases and instead used its own unscientific approach and outdated stereotypes. The age-old tendency to label allowed the court to use age-old bias to create a unique set of Texas factors to determine intellectual disability while ignoring decades of science. It is especially shocking that these factors were and are based, in part, on John Steinbeck’s fictional character Lennie from the 1937 novel, Of Mice and Men.

In this case, fiction and stigma trumped science and the Constitution. Never mind that the Texas factors for determining intellectual disability are not used in any medical or clinical setting in the nation. In fact, they’re not even used elsewhere in Texas. In countless situations where the state is responsible for determining intellectual disability, it uses current scientific standards.

The inaccurate Texas standard reinforces one of the most damaging stereotypes about people with intellectual disability—that they can’t be “good” at anything. The reasoning is dangerous and flawed: if you can mow a lawn, you can’t have an intellectual disability. If you have an intellectual disability, therefore, you can’t do anything. Both are wrong—dangerously wrong.

Happily, today people with intellectual and developmental disabilities are living longer and more productive lives than ever thanks to a deeper understanding of their strengths and more generous support for their challenges. In a time of otherwise hopeful change, Texas’ use of stigmatizing stereotypes is a dark blot on our nation’s laws and culture.

Labels have consequences. What we may allow in public discourse, we should not and cannot tolerate in law. It’s time for the Supreme Court to remind our nation that the Constitution and the vision of rights it embodies have no place for ill-informed and deadly stigmas.



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Wednesday, November 16, 2016

Walls v Florida (2016) - remand based on Hall v Florida SCOUTS decision




I just noted that I had failed to post a copy of Walls v Florida (October 2016) decision to the blog roll of cases. It will be available under the Court Decisions blog role in a few moments. A copy can be accessed here.



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Sunday, November 13, 2016

Thompson v Florida: Hall v SCOTUS related new evidentiary hearing


Thompson v Florida decision for a new evidentiary hearing, in light of Hall v Florida, can be found here.


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Monday, November 7, 2016

John Blume Op-Ed in National Law Journal: Why SCOTUS must enforce Atkins protection: Texas Briseno factors

National Law Journal (Op-Ed)
Why the Supreme Court Must Enforce 'Atkins ' Protection in Capital Cases
OPINION: Later this month, Texas' legal standard on the intellectually disabled will be examined.
 John Blume,
November 7, 2016  

In Atkins v. Virginia the U.S. Supreme Court, in 2002, ruled that the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause prohibits the execution of persons with intellectual disability. Given that intellectual disability is a long-­standing, well-established clinical diagnosis, the court naturally relied upon the scientifically valid, clinical consensus definitions of intellectual disability in creating the categorical bar.

Since Atkins, several states, ­primarily Florida and Texas, have exhibited displeasure with — and resistance to — the Supreme Court's decision by embracing nonclinical and unscientific practices that are intended to limit the effect of the constitutional mandate.

In Hall v. Florida, the Supreme Court, in 2014, addressed and rejected Florida's "bright line" 70 IQ score cutoff test for assessing intellectual disability, finding it fundamentally at odds with the generally accepted understanding that intellectual disability is "more than a number." This brought Florida back in line with the current science of intellectual disability.

This term, when Moore v. Texas is argued on Nov. 29, the court will consider Texas' attempt to make death row inmates' assertions of intellectual disability extremely difficult to establish.

Shortly after Atkins, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, in Jose Briseno's case (ex parte Briseno), expressed its dissatisfaction with the Atkins decision, declaring that its task was to determine "that level and degree of [intellectual disability] at which a consensus of Texas citizens would agree that a person should be exempted from the death penalty."

However, that was simply wrong. The Supreme Court had already decided in Atkins that any person with intellectual disability is exempt from the ultimate punishment. The court did not give Texas license to decide that some persons who have intellectual disability can nevertheless be executed because they do not have the "degree" of intellectual disability meeting a Texas-centric consensus. But that is what the state court did.

After explaining that the fictional character Lennie from Steinbeck's "Of Mice and Men" would meet Texas's definition, it created out of whole cloth seven "evidentiary factors" for Texas courts to consider in assessing claims of intellectual disability. The so-called Briseno factors are steeped in misconceptions and lay stereotypes of intellectual disability, and include clinically meaningless considerations, repudiated by the medical community, such as whether an individual's family and friends considered him intellectually disabled during his childhood and whether a person is capable of lying and hiding facts.

The Briseno factors are idiosyncratic to Texas. No other state has embraced them for use in capital cases where intellectual disability is at issue. In fact, even within Texas, the Briseno factors are not used in any other medical or legal context, like disability benefits or special-education determinations. The Texas capital-punishment system is, in short, an outlier. And its use of the aptly named "Lennie standard" explains why death row inmates with very strong claims of intellectual disability (such as Bobby Moore) routinely have those claims rejected. Texas has one of the lowest defendant success rates in the Atkins context in the nation.

The Supreme Court in Hall made clear that states' intellectual-disability determinations must be "informed by the medical community's diagnostic framework." Texas' use of the fictional character Lennie in establishing the intellectual disability baseline, combined with the creation and application of the Briseno factors, violates this requirement.

The clinical consensus definition of intellectual disability has three prongs: (1) significantly subaverage intellectual functioning; (2) significant deficits in adaptive functioning; and (3) onset in the developmental period. In Hall, the Supreme Court corrected Florida's deviation from the diagnostic framework on prong 1 by rejecting the state's bright-line rule that a person must have an IQ of 70 or below, regardless of the standard error of measurement inherent in any test of intelligence.

The Moore case presents the Supreme Court with Texas' nonscientific gloss on prong 2. Since Briseno, Texas courts have assessed adaptive deficits based on misconceptions about intellectual disability. Texas courts have used a person's ability to perform basic life functions like holding an unskilled job, surviving on the streets or obtaining a driver's license to negate compelling evidence of intellectual disability. But the medical community recognizes that many people with intellectual disability can perform these functions, and giving dispositive weight to perceived "strengths" while ignoring deficits is at odds with the basic diagnostic criteria.

The Supreme Court in Moore now has the opportunity to at least partially fix the underenforcement of Atkins in Texas. A trial judge, after hearing the testimony of several expert witnesses, concluded that Bobby Moore was a person with intellectual disability and that his death sentence should be commuted to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

Using the strict nexus requirement and the Briseno factors, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals overturned the lower court's judgment. In doing so, the state court rejected the consensus clinical definition of intellectual disability and failed to use the scientifically mandated diagnostic framework.

Intellectual disability should not mean something different in Texas capital cases than it does in other death penalty jurisdictions. The Atkins court spoke of the risk of the wrongful execution of persons with intellectual disability. That risk is currently a reality in Texas and it is time for the Supreme Court to change that.
     
John Blume is the Samuel F. Leibowitz Professor of Trial Techniques at Cornell Law School.

Wednesday, October 26, 2016

Hall v Florida SCOTUS reverberations: Retroactive in Florida and Kentucky

From Bloomberg Law

The United States Law Week®
October 27, 2016
Criminal Law

IQ Rule for Death Penalty Retroactive in Fla., Ky.

BNA Snapshot

• Rule loosening restraints on mental disability evidence in death cases retroactive
• Opens door for fresh sentencing for some death-row inmates
 

Oct. 24 — Death-row inmates in Florida and Kentucky whose near-normal IQ scores blocked them from introducing any evidence that they are too intellectually disabled to be executed must be given a fresh chance to present their claims, a divided Florida Supreme Court and a unanimous Kentucky Supreme Court ruled Oct. 20 (Walls v. State, 2016 BL 350410, Fla., No. SC15-1449, 10/20/16 and White v. Commonwealth, Ky., No. 2013-SC-000791-MR, 10/20/16).  The decisions throw open the door for other death-row inmates who were barred from introducing such evidence just because their IQ scores were above a bright-line threshold.

Hall Rule Breaks New Ground

In both cases, the courts ruled that Hall v. Florida, 82 U.S.L.W. 4373, 2014 BL 145335 (U.S. May 27, 2014), which declared unconstitutional Florida's categorical bar against intellectual disablility evidence in capital cases for any convicted defendant whose IQ score is above 70, must be applied retroactively.

The rule announced in Hall is not simply a different interpretation of a rule of criminal procedure, it is a substantive restriction on the states’ power to execute someone, the Kentucky Supreme Court said in an opinion by Justice Bill Cunningham. “We are dealing here with a U.S. Supreme Court directive that not only proscribes intellectually disabled people from being put to death, but defines the manner in which the mental deficiencies of offenders must be evaluated,” Cunningham wrote. Kentucky Justice Samuel T. Wright III agreed that Karu Gene White should get a new hearing but concurred in separate opinion that addresses waiver issues.

The Florida Supreme Court reached the same conclusion about retroactivity in its 5-2 per curiam ruling. “We find that Hall warrants retroactive application as a development of fundamental significance that places beyond the State of Florida the power to impose a certain sentence—the sentence of death for individuals within a broader range of IQ scores than before,” it said.  Justice James E. C. Perry concurred in the result only and Barbara J. Pariente filed a separate concurrence arguing that Frank A. Walls was entitled to a new hearing to avoid “manifest injustice.” Justice Charles T. Canady, joined by Justice Ricky L. Polston, argued in dissent against making Hall retroactive, noting that it will cause “a major disruption to the application of the death penalty.”

The Florida Attorney General's Office and the Kentucky Attorney General's Office represented their respective states.

The Department of Public Advocacy represented White. The Office of the Capital Collateral Regional Counsel represented Walls.

To contact the reporter on this story: Lance J. Rogers in Washington at LRogers@bna.com
To contact the editor responsible for this story: C. Reilly Larson at rlarson@bna.com
For More Information

White v. Commonwealth is available at http://src.bna.com/jAE.
Wallis v. State is available at http://src.bna.com/jAI.

Monday, June 6, 2016

David Kaye on Hall v Florida-- "Deadly statistics: Quantifying an "unacceptable risk in capital punishment" - In press article in Law, Probability and Statistics

The following article is "in press" in Law, Probability and Statistics.  A preview can be found here.

 
Deadly Statistics:
Quantifying an “Unacceptable Risk” in Capital Punishment
David H. Kaye*
Law, Probability & Risk
Vol. 15, No. 4, Dec. 2016 (in press)

Abstract: In Atkins v. Virginia, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment ban on
cruel and unusual punishment precludes capital punishment for intellectually disabled offenders.
Death-penalty states responded with laws defining intellectual disability in various ways. In Hall v.
Florida, the Court narrowly struck down the use of a measured IQ of 70 to mark the upper limit of
intellectual disability because it created “an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability
will be executed.” But the Court was unclear if not inconsistent in its description of an upper limit
that would be acceptable. Four dissenting Justices accused the majority not only of misconstruing
the Eighth Amendment, but also of misunderstanding elementary statistics and psychometrics. This
article uses more complete statistical reasoning to explicate the Court’s concept of unacceptable risk.
It describes better ways to control the risk of error than the Court’s confidence intervals, and it argues
that, to the extent that the Eighth Amendment allows any quantitative cut score in determining an
offender’s intellectual disability, these more technically appropriate methods are constitutionally
permissible.

Keywords: Hall v. Florida, cruel and unusual, Eighth Amendment, capital punishment, intellectual
disability, IQ, psychometrics, cut-score, measurement error, standard error, confidence interval,
shrinkage estimator, Bayesian inference, credible region, burden of persuasion

Contents
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I. The Intellectual Disability Trilogy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
II. The Need to Allow States to Use Cut Scores and the Meaning of “Significantly Subaverage”
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
III. True Scores and Single-measurement Error Within Classical Test Theory.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A. First- and Second-order Questions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
B. True Scores and Measurement Error.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
C. Reliability and Standard Error of Measurement (SEM). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
D. Confidence Intervals from the SEM (SEM-IS).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
E. SEM-adjusted-maximum Score (SEM-AM).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
F. Confidence Intervals from the Standard Error of Estimate (SEE-IS). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
IV. Other Statistical Issues in and Outside of Hall. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
A. Multiple Scores. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
B. Credible Regions (BCR). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Summary and Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Wednesday, March 16, 2016

Atkins ID/MR Court Decisions: Nixon v Florida update--2016 initial brief


A initial brief was recently filed with the Florida Supreme Court in the Atkins appeal of Nixon (Nixon v Florida).  A prior 2009 court decision can be found here

Tuesday, August 11, 2015

Law Review Article: Dr. James Ellis on Hall v Florida (SCOTUS, 2014)--ID is a condition-not a number





Dr. James Ellis has presented a nice summary of the major change in the determination of ID in Atkins cases as a result of the Hall v Florida 2014 SCOTUS decision.  The main point is summarized by the statement that ID is a "condition" and "not a number."  Scientific and professional evidence and clinical judgement must be involved in the determination--no longer can "bright line" IQ cut-off scores be used in isolation.  Click here to read the article.



Friday, January 9, 2015

New challenge awaits Georgia’s death-sentence standard

http://shar.es/1HRTv7

When Robert Wayne Holsey was put to death in Georgia recently, it marked yet the latest occasion when top appellate courts declined to consider the state's strict burden of proof for capital defendants seeking to be spared execution based on "intellectual disability.

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Tuesday, May 27, 2014

Victory for psychometrics in Hall v Florida SEM bright-line Atkins MR/ID SCOTUS decision


This morning SCOTUS rectified the long standing "bright line" (ignoring SEM) problem with Atkins ID/MR cases in Florida.  Click here for background information.  Click here for today's decision.

Monday, March 3, 2014

Hall v Florida SCOTUS transcript from today

Here is today's transcript for the oral arguements and questioning before the US Supreme Court (SCOTUS) re the Hall v Florida Atkins case. To someone who has worked his entire career in intelligence testing, it is very interesting to hear the justices talk about IQ, SEM, etc.

Amicus briefs from APA and AAIDD (and others) have been posted previously at this blog. Prior decisions regarding Hall v Florida are available in the blogroll under Atkins decisions

 

Thursday, February 13, 2014

Hall v Florida SCOTUS case: Amicus Briefs by APA and AAIDD

 

The Atkins case of Hall v Florida will be heard by SCOTUS shortly. Like most Atkins cases, the issues are complex. But the essence of the case is Florida's "bright line" test for the first ID Dx prong...which, based on the FLorida Cherry Court decision, is set at a firm IQ score of 70 with no recognition of the standard error of measurement (SEM).

Both APA and AAIDD have spearheaded two separate Amicus Briefs, which also include other organizations. The two briefs have now been posted in the brief sidebar of this blog. They can also be found at the links below.

APA led Amicus Brief

AAIDD led Amicus Brief

 

 

Monday, December 23, 2013

SCOTUS Hall v Florida Atkins ID update: Petitioners and Amicus Briefs--major focus on IQ "bright line" and SEM

The Atkins MR/ID case of Hall v Florida, which is to be heard by SCOTUS this spring, had two mportant briefs posted within the last week.

The Hall v Florida petition was filed Dec 16. Today, an Amicus Brief was filed by a number of organizations, led by the American Psychological Association.
Click here for a variety of posts re: Atkins cases in Flordia, which have been problematic due to the Florida "Cherry court" establishment of a "bright line" score of 70, with no consiseration of the standard error of measurement (SEM)

Thursday, October 24, 2013

Hall v Florida Atkins ID SCOTUS review: ICDP prior comments re SEM and problems with Florida's Atkins criteria

The Hall v Florida Atkins case, which will be reviewed by SCOTUS, has been generating considerable buzz the past few days, including an editorial in the NY Times (Intellectual Disability and the Death Penalty - 10-22-13; image of editorial below--click to enlarge to read). 

This is a very important case given Florida's complete disregard for the scientific facts that underlie the psychometrics of intelligence tests--in favor of a "bright line" criteria that fails to account for the standard error of measurement (SEM) in IQ scores.

I have previously made a couple of posts re this problem in Florida.  These posts can be found here.  Together with Kevin Foley, I published an IAP Psychometrics 101 Report (#11) which addresses the issue of the SEM in Atkins cases.

I hope that SCOTUS will recognize the obvious scientific flaws in the Florida Atkins criteria.

(Click image to enlarge)