Showing posts with label juries. Show all posts
Showing posts with label juries. Show all posts

Sunday, July 31, 2016

Research byte: The influence of working memory and cognitive load on police shooting decisions, interrogation, and jury decisions

Working Memory and Cognitive Load in the Legal System: Influences on Police Shooting Decisions, Interrogation and Jury Decisions

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The ability of police and jurors to make informed, unbiased decisions is paramount to the integrity of the legal system. Police and jurors as decision-makers follow procedures ensuring that individuals receive a fair trial from the time of arrest to sentencing. However this process has come under public scrutiny with recent negative media attention focused on police shootings, aggressive handling or interrogation of suspects, and jurors’ seemingly biased treatment of minority group members. Most researchers studying factors that motivate police and juror behavior focus on the external influences of decision-making, such as the climate of violence in a neighborhood, or culturally-entrenched criminal stereotypes. Fewer have focused on the cognitive factors that impact the internal decision-making processes. In this review we compile the research on individual differences in cognitive ability (e.g., working memory capacity) and event circumstances (e.g., high emotion, attention load), that influence police and jury decision-making. The majority of studies in this area are laboratory-based which may attenuate the transfer of findings to real-world settings, but cognitive mechanisms engaged in the field are likely similar. Overall, this review suggests that overload of cognitive capacity reduces controlled processing ability, which may work to undermine the reliability of decision-making at all phases of the legal process. Field studies are needed to better understand when decision-makers may be overburdened, and what interventions are most appropriate.

Saturday, August 20, 2011

Research briefs: Misc new articles relayed to criminal justice




Bewely, M. T., & Morgan, R. D. (2011). A National Survey of Mental Health Services Available to Offenders with Mental Illness: Who Is Doing What? Law and Human Behavior, 35(5), 351-363


Rogers, R., Gillard, N. D., Wooley, C. N., & Fiduccia, C. E. (2011). Decrements in Miranda Abilities: An Investigation of Situational Effects via a Mock-Crime Paradigm. Law and Human Behavior, 35(5), 392-401.

Smith, A. E., & Haney, C. (2011). Getting to the Point: Attempting to Improve Juror Comprehension of Capital Penalty Phase Instructions. Law and Human Behavior, 35(5), 339-350


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Friday, February 4, 2011

Law Review Article: War and Peace in Capital Jury Rooms by Scott Sundby




The following is being added to the Law Review Article blogroll.

ARTICLE: War and Peace in the Jury Room: How Capital Juries Reach Unanimity

NAME: Scott E. Sundby

Abstract

Using data from the Capital Jury Project, this Article takes a close look inside the jury room at the process by which capital juries reach a unanimous verdict at the penalty phase. The Article first examines the relationship between first ballot voting patterns and the ultimate sentence, then explores the dynamics of group interaction in achieving unanimity. In particular, by using the jurors' own narratives, the piece delves into the psychological process and arguments through which the majority jurors persuade the holdouts to change their votes. This process is especially intriguing because individual juries do not, of course, have any training in how to deliberate and reach unanimity, and yet they are strikingly similar from case to case in how they convert holdouts to the majority position (with striking differences between the dynamics of juries that reach a verdict of death and those that return a sentence of life without parole). Using the closing argument in the death penalty case of Susan Smith (a mother who did the unthinkable, killing her two children by driving them into a lake and then trying to cast blame on a mysterious black man), the Article concludes by examining how a closing argument might address many of the pressures that affect holdouts.


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Wednesday, February 3, 2010

iAbstract: Juror's discussions of defendants history in capital cases



Jurors' discussions of a defendant's history of child abuse and alcohol abuse in capital sentencing deliberations.
By Stevenson, Margaret C.; Bottoms, Bette L.; Diamond, Shari S. S.
Psychology, Public Policy, and Law. Vol 16(1), Feb 2010, 1-38.
Abstract
We tested a novel theoretical model explaining the psychological processes underlying jurors' discussions about a defendant's history of child abuse and alcohol abuse in a capital case. We coded the extent to which jurors used child abuse and alcohol abuse as mitigating factors, as aggravating factors, or argued that they should be ignored. Relying on attribution theory, we coded the extent to which jurors rendered controllable or uncontrollable and stable or unstable attributions regarding the defendant's history of child abuse and alcohol abuse. Jurors were more likely to argue that child abuse and alcohol abuse should not be used as mitigators or to even use them against the defendant as aggravators than they were to use them as mitigators. Jurors made more controllable than uncontrollable attributions regarding child abuse and more stable than unstable attributions regarding both child abuse and alcohol abuse. The more jurors supported the death penalty, the more they argued to discount child abuse and alcohol abuse as mitigators or use them as aggravators and the more controllable and stable attributions they made. Political orientation predicted discussions and attributions about alcohol abuse, but not child abuse.


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Friday, January 15, 2010

Research briefs 1-15-10: Confirmation bias, cultural competencies, adolescent brains, juvenile justice, criminal personalities

Recent articles of interest found during my weekly search of the literature.

Gurley, J. R. (2009). A HISTORY OF CHANGES TO THE CRIMINAL PERSONALITY IN THE DSM. History of Psychology, 12(4), 285-304.

There is much confusion now surrounding the diagnoses of Antisocial Personality Disorder and Psychopathy. Some individuals still refer to the two as the same diagnosis with different names, even though there is a consensus in the psychology field that the two are distinct disorders. Part of this confusion is likely to be the result of the overlap in the diagnostic criteria: both diagnoses are associated with a history of antisocial behavior. However, it is also very possible that this confusion in the literature is a result of consistent name and criteria changes for the “criminal personality” in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. To make sense of the confusion surrounding the two different diagnoses, the evolution of Antisocial Personality Disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders is examined in this paper.


Maroney, T. A. (2009). THE FALSE PROMISE OF ADOLESCENT BRAIN SCIENCE IN JUVENILE JUSTICE. Notre Dame Law Review, 85(1), 89-176.

Recent scientific findings about the developing teen brain have both captured public attention and begun to percolate through legal theory and practice. Indeed, many believe that developmental neuroscience contributed to the U.S. Supreme Court's elimination of the juvenile death penalty in Roper v. Simmons. Post-Roper, scholars assert that the developmentally normal attributes of the teen brain counsel differential treatment of young offenders, and advocates increasingly make such arguments before the courts. The success of any theory, though, depends in large part on implementation, and challenges that emerge through implementation illuminate problematic aspects of the theory. This Article tests the legal impact of developmental neuroscience by analyzing cases in which juvenile defendants have attempted to put it into practice. It reveals that most such efforts fail. Doctrinal factors hamstring most claims--for example, that persons with immature brains are incapable of forming the requisite mens rea for serious crimes. Limitations intrinsic to the science itself--for example, individual variation--also hinder its relevance and impact. These factors both explain why developmental neuroscience has had minimal effects on juvenile justice in the courts and illustrate why it generally should. Moreover, direct reliance on neuroscience as the metric for juvenile justice policy may jeopardize equality and autonomy interests, and brain-based arguments too frequently risk inaccuracy and overstatement. The cases also strongly suggest that neuroscience does not materially shape legal decisionmakers' beliefs and values about youthful offenders but instead will be read through the lens of those beliefs and values.

Developmental neuroscience nonetheless can play a small role in juvenile justice going forward. Legislatures and courts may regard that science as one source among many upon which to draw when basing policy choices on assumptions about juveniles as a group. To go further is unwarranted and threatens to draw attention away from critical legal and environmental factors--good schools, strong families, economic opportunities, mental health care, humane sentencing regimes, and rehabilitative services--that are both more important and subject to greater direct control.



Cunningham, M. D., Sorensen, J. R., & Reidy, T. J. (2009). CAPITAL JURY DECISION-MAKING The Limitations of Predictions of Future Violence. Psychology Public Policy and Law, 15(4), 223-256.

The U.S. Supreme Court in Jurek v. Texas (1976) affirmed that capital juries are able to identify those capital offenders who will commit serious violence in the future. The capability of capital juries to accurately make these judgments as a means of deciding which capital offenders should receive the death penalty has been widely endorsed in both statute and case law, as well as embraced by jurors. A growing body of research on rates and correlates of prison violence, however, points to this confidence being misplaced. Prior investigations of the accuracy of these capital jury predictions, though limited in number, have found alarming error rates. The current study retrospectively reviewed the post-trial (M = 5.7 years) prison disciplinary misconduct of federal capital offenders (N = 72) for whom juries considered “future dangerousness” as an aggravating factor at sentencing. These jurors’ predictive performance was no better than random guesses, with high error (false positive) rates, regardless of the severity of the anticipated violence. In light of prior studies, it is concluded that juror predictions of future violence lack sufficient reliability to play a role in death penalty determinations.

OBrien, B. (2009). PRIME SUSPECT: AN EXAMINATION OF FACTORS THAT AGGRAVATE AND COUNTERACT CONFIRMATION BIAS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS. Psychology Public Policy and Law, 15(4), 315-334.


Confirmation bias is the tendency to bolster a hypothesis by seeking consistent evidence while minimizing inconsistent evidence. In criminal investigations, preferring hypothesis-consistent information could undermine accuracy by leading investigators to disregard evidence that challenges their theory of a case. Two studies examine factors that influence confirmation bias in criminal investigations. In Study 1 (N = 108), participants who articulated a hypothesis early in their review of a mock police file showed bias in seeking and interpreting evidence to favor that hypothesis. In Study 2 (N = 109), participants who considered why their hypothesis might be wrong showed less bias, but those who generated additional hypotheses did not. Implications for improving accuracy of investigations and suggestions for future research are discussed.


Perlin, M. L., & McClain, V. (2009). ''WHERE SOULS ARE FORGOTTEN'': Cultural Competencies, Forensic Evaluations, and International Human Rights. Psychology Public Policy and Law, 15(4), 257-277.

Cultural competency is critical in criminal forensic evaluations. Cultural competency eschews reliance on stereotypes, precluding the mistake of assuming that cultural dictates apply with equal force to all who share a cultural background, thus allowing the forensic examiner to provide a comprehensive picture of the defendant to the fact-finder. While raised frequently in death penalty cases, the idea of cultural competency is equally important to the entire criminal process. To better understand the significance of this inquiry, we address how cultural sensitivity in test selection and interview techniques may enhance result validity. In a parallel fashion, ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has drawn importance to cultural competency. Although international human rights and cultural sensitivity have been considered with regard to race, gender, and religion, applications to criminal matters are still in their infancy. This article considers strategies to enhance the effectiveness of testimony and mitigation efforts

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Monday, December 14, 2009

Research briefs 12-14-09: Effect of race on capital jury deliberation

Lynch, M., & Haney, C. (2009). Capital Jury Deliberation: Effects on Death Sentencing, Comprehension, and Discrimination. Law and Human Behavior, 33(6), 481-496.

Abstract
This study focused on whether and how deliberations affected the comprehension of capital penalty phase jury instructions and patterns of racially discriminatory death sentencing. Jury-eligible subjects were randomly assigned to view one of four versions of a simulated capital penalty trial in which the race of defendant (Black or White) and the race of victim (Black or White) were varied orthogonally. The participants provided their initial ‘‘straw’’ sentencing verdicts individually and then deliberated in simulated 4–7 person ‘‘juries.’’ Results indicated that deliberation created a punitive rather than lenient shift in the jurors’ death sentencing behavior, failed to improve characteristically poor instructional comprehension, did not reduce the tendency for jurors to misuse penalty phase evidence(especially, mitigation), and exacerbated the tendency among White mock jurors to sentence Black defendants to death more often than White defendants.

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Thursday, December 10, 2009

21st century jury, 8th Ammend. and death penalty, Texas Atkins cases: Three Law Review Articles posted


The following law review articles have been posted to ICDP's Atkins-Related Law Review Articles blog sidebar.

Church (2003). Mandating Dignity: The United States Supreme Court’s Extreme Departure From Precedent Regarding the Eighth Amendment and the Death Penalty


Hans (2009).  The Twenty-First Century Jury: Worst of Times or Best of Times?


Kan (2009). Presenting information about mental retardation in the courtroom:  A content analysis of pre-Atkins capital trial transcripts from Texas

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