Showing posts with label Oklahoma. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Oklahoma. Show all posts

Wednesday, November 6, 2019

Atkins Court Decisions: A bunch to update from FL and OK


I have been WAYYYYYYYY behind in posting recent Atkins court decisions and related documents.  Here I post info regarding a number of cases, without comment.  Click on each to access PDF files.

Bowles (2019, FL)

Harris (2019, OK)

Smith (2019, OK)

Walls (2019, FL; one, two).  More info here.

Tuesday, September 25, 2012

Guest post: The 10th Circuit COA Creates More Holes in the Atkins Safety Net: Nancy Haydt, J. D. on Hooks v Workman


This is a Guest Post by Nancy Haydt, J. D. re: Hooks v. Workman  Nancy Haydt is an attorney practicing in California and Colorado. Her research includes a nation-wide database of Atkins cases.  As per the typical policy of the ICDP blog, I post guest posts "as is" without comment.  The only additional information I am providing are links to all court related decisions (I could locate) for this case (2005, 2010, 2012a, 2012b)  


The 10th Circuit COA creates More Holes in the Atkins Safety Net
by Nancy Haydt, J.D.[i]

Hooks v. Workman, --- F.3d ----, 2012 WL 3140916 (C.A.10 (Okla.), 8/3/2012.

In August, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals (COA) granted a habeas corpus petition’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and, at the same time, created bad law for current and future 10th Circuit defendants and petitioners claiming mental retardation per Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). In one fell swoop, the 10th Cir. COA barred IQ score adjustment for the Flynn Effect, discredited any meaningful application of the Standard Error of Measurement, accepted the KBIT as a valid measurement of intelligence for Atkins purposes, and adopted the principle that adaptive functioning is defined by weighing adaptive weaknesses against adaptive strengths.

In Hooks, the Court of Appeals took the position that the AAIDD’s definition of mental retardation is appropriate for clinical application, but the AAIDD’s recommended diagnostic procedures are not binding in legal proceedings. Hooks greatly undermines the scientific and clinical basis of the diagnosis of mental retardation. Hooks widens the ever-expanding gap between science and the science-like proceedings created by the judiciary which will determine the fate of many Atkins clients.

Legal Proceedings

In 1989, Victor Wayne Hooks was tried and convicted by a jury of the capital murder of his pregnant wife and their unborn child. He was sentenced to death. In 2004, an Atkins hearing was tried before a jury. Evidence was presented of IQ test scores ranging from 53 to 80.
Date
Test
Score
1970
SB
80
1972
WISC
70
1978
WAIS
61
1979
WAIS
57
1982
BETA-II
61
1988
WAIS
80
1994
WAIS-R
72
2002
K-BIT
76
2004
WAIS-III
53

Experts for the prosecution and defense agreed that some test scores were probably unreliable. These so-called “experts” also agreed that Hooks’s most reliable scores were the K-BIT and the 1994 WAIS-R. There was testimony that the scores from many tests could be adjusted downward for norm-obsolescence, but neither defense expert was willing to endorse adjustment for the Flynn Effect. Defense experts testified that Mr. Hooks’s IQ “was in the gray area” of subaverage intelligence, but was “most likely mentally retarded.” In light of such underwhelming defense testimony, it was not surprising that the jury found that Hooks did not prove that he had sub-average intellectual functioning.

Defense evidence showed Mr. Hooks’s adaptive limitations from early childhood to his present functioning in custody. Through their experts, they painted the picture of a child who was developmentally delayed, placed in special education classes and diagnosed as mentally retarded while still in grade school. Mr. Hooks’s limitations in communication, social skills, work, self-direction and academics were documented and extensive. The prosecution presented evidence of criminal behavior as evidence of adaptive functioning. That evidence, along with Hooks’s ability to drive, his ability to have children, his daily reading of the bible, and his letters to his daughters was the prosecution’s case against adaptive limitations. The trial court refused to instruct the jury that intellectual disability is defined by a person’s limitations, and not by his strengths. With no expert evidence lending understanding to the concept of adaptive behavior, the jury found that Hooks did not prove that he had limitations in adaptive functioning. The jury found that Mr. Hooks did not have mental retardation.

On appeal Hooks’s conviction and death sentence were affirmed. The jury finding that Hooks did not have mental retardation was affirmed.

On Habeas Corpus: Failure to Establish Scientific Structure for a Clinical Determination of MR

The habeas corpus petition in Hooks contained few references to current scientific source material. They contain no references to the AAIDD User’s Guide or standards of practice. There was no evidence in the habeas record, either by testimony or affidavit, from scholars in the field of intellectual disability. The scientific basis of MR assessment, including psychometric issues and standards of practice, was never entered into evidence by expert testimony or affidavit. The COA was presented no clinical structure for making a reasonable determination of mental retardation. This vacancy of structure gave the COA carte blanche to create their own definition of mental retardation and their own standard for diagnosis.

Binding precedent for the 10th Circuit

Among the damaging holdings are:

 “[T]he Flynn Effect, whatever its validity, is not a relevant consideration in the mental retardation determination for capital defendants." Also, “Atkins does not mandate an adjustment for the Flynn Effect. Moreover, there is no scientific consensus on its validity.”

The K-BIT is a valid measure of intelligence for Atkins purposes.

For legal purposes, Atkins does not require that determination of mental retardation be “based solely on deficiencies to the exclusion of strengths”. The AAIDD definition is a clinical standard, not a legal standard. “[W]hether the legal standard is satisfied depends upon the facts: What is a given defendant able and unable to do? Both strengths and deficiencies enter into this equation because they make up the universe of facts tending to establish that a defendant either has ‘significant limitations’ or does not.”

The SEM supports the concept that “a rational trier of fact could conclude from this evidence that Mr. Hooks indeed functions at a sub-average intellectual level, but it could also rationally draw the conclusion that he does not.”

Hooks sets a bad precedent for 10th circuit defendants and petitioners who assert protection from the death penalty under Atkins. With Hooks in the 10th Circuit, and In re Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1 (Tex.Crim.App.2004),  in Texas, we are seeing an ever widening gap between legal and clinical standards for the determination of mental retardation.

Good News for Mr. Hooks; Bad News for 10th Cir. Atkins Defendants

The COA granted Mr. Hooks’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in the sentencing phase of his case. The COA determined that Mr. Hooks’s counsel did not prepare or present material in mitigation. The COA did not find that Hooks’s counsel was ineffective in his Atkins proceedings. Barring successful appeal of the Atkins issue to the U.S. Supreme Court, the determination that Mr. Hooks does not have mental retardation is final. It is unlikely that the Atkins proceedings will be appealed.

Mr. Hooks’s case was remanded to state court for a new sentencing hearing. However, current and future 10th circuit defendants and petitioners now face greater difficulty in proving that they have mental retardation
.
[Note: Though “Intellectual Disability” is the term preferred by the AAIDD, the courts still, and almost uniformly, use and refer to “Mental Retardation”.]



[i] Nancy Haydt is an attorney practicing in California and Colorado. Her research includes a nation-wide database of Atkins cases.

Sunday, August 19, 2012

Atkins MR/ID Court Decisions: Hooks v Workman (OK, 2012); Maestas v Utah (2012)




Thanks again to Kevin Foley for sending me two new recent Atkins decisions. Decisions are posted without comment.

Hooks v Workman (OK,2012). Prior 2005 decision can be found here.

Maestas v Utah (2012)




Posted using BlogPress from Kevin McGrew's iPad
www.themindhub.com

Sunday, April 29, 2012

Atkins MR/ID death penalty decisions: Bies; Murphy; Sosa; Fults: Moormann




Five recent Atkins decisions. I have fallen way behind and need to post these all at once to clear my in box

Bies v Bagley (OH; 2012)

Sosa v Texas (TX; 2012)

Murphy v Oklahoma (2012). Prior 2002 decision here.

Fults v Upton (GA, 2012)

Moormann v Scriro (AZ, 2012)



Posted using BlogPress from Kevin McGrew's iPad
www.themindhub.com

Saturday, April 24, 2010

Court Decisions: Ochoa (2010), McDade (2010) and Robinson (2010)

I'm working on cleaning up the backlog of Atkins decisions that have occurred recently.  In this post three more are added to the Court Decisions blogroll.  I've only skimmed these three briefly and only make brief comments (I can no longer keep up with reading and analyzing decisions----I'm more in an "FYI archive posting mode" for rulings at this time).  Thanks again to Kevin Foley for monitoring the pulse of decisions and sending copies my way.

Ochoa v Workman (OK, 2010) - Appears to be a week Atkins claim with Ochoa's own expert said not ID/MR.  Ochoa tried to argue even though maybe not ID/MR now he was at time of the murder, and that should be the point of inquiry. The court did not buy this argument saying that it is present level of functioning, not the past. This cases raises the interesting issue/problem of variability across states on the "time of MR/ID".  Many states specify the person must be ID/MR now and before the end of the developmental period (before age 18).  Other states add the additional criteria that the person must have been ID at the time of the crime.  And at least one state (Arkansas I believe) specifies only ID at time of the crime.  The Atkins can of worms just keeps growing.

McDade v US (Al, 2010).  This is a federal criminal case involving sex crimes and is an example of  the proposition that Atkins might being extended beyond death penalty cases.  McDade is ID/MR. Under federal criminal law, if convicted, the sentencing judge must consider the sentence which is recommended under the "sentencing guidelines" (which uses various factors to come up with a range of what is thought to be  an appropriate sentence), and the judge is supposed to articulate supporting facts if he/she wants to sentence above or below the recommended range. Here ID/MR was used as a justification to depart downward from the guidelines. However, it wasn't much of a departure - guidelines recommended 292-360 mos in federal prison; judge sentenced McDade to 240 mos - 20 years. Reading the case one gets the feeling that McDade was a follower and this may be illustrative of the concept of gullibility.

Robinson v Schriro (Az, 2010).  Not an Atkins case per se. Of interest was the appeals court's conclusion that Robinson was denied effective assistance of counsel. Robinson's attorney presented no witnesses at sentencing and appeared to only attack the state's effort to show aggravating factors. Court based its decision, in large part, on the failure to present evidence of Robinson's low IQ, which was reported as being a FSIQ of 81.  The state post-conviction judge (who heard the ineffective assistance claim in state court) was unimpressed with the IQ score, and relied instead on the so-called "street smarts" of Robinson.


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