Forensic Clinicians' Understanding of Bias (MacLean et al., 2019)

Article link.

Abstract

Bias, or systematic influences that create errors in judgment, can affect psychological evaluations in ways that lead to erroneous diagnoses and opinions. Although these errors can have especially serious consequences in the criminal justice system, little research has addressed forensic psychologists' awareness of well-known cognitive biases and debiasing strategies. We conducted a national survey with a sample of 120 randomly selected licensed psychologists with forensic interests to examine (a) their familiarity with and understanding of cognitive biases, (b) their self-reported strategies to mitigate bias, and (c) the relation of a and b to psychologists' cognitive reflection abilities. Most psychologists reported familiarity with well-known biases and distinguished these from sham biases and reported using research-identified strategies but not fictional or sham strategies. However, some psychologists reported little familiarity with actual biases, endorsed sham biases as real, failed to recognize effective bias mitigation strategies, and endorsed ineffective bias mitigation strategies. Furthermore, nearly everyone endorsed introspection (a strategy known to be ineffective) as an effective bias mitigation strategy. Cognitive reflection abilities were systematically related to error, such that stronger cognitive reflection was associated with less endorsement of sham biases.

Keywords: bias, forensic evaluation, survey, cognitive reflection

Research Brief 7-4-10: Investigation of prediction bias in WISC-IV

Excellent article that shows how one form of empirically-defined test bias (differential prediction) should be pursued.

Konold, T. R., & Canivez, G. L. (2010). Differential Relationships Between WISC-IV and WIAT-II Scales: An Evaluation of Potentially Moderating Child Demographics. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 70(4), 613-627.

Considerable debate exists regarding the accuracy of intelligence tests with members of different groups. This study investigated differential predictive validity of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children—Fourth Edition. Participants from the WISC-IV—WIAT-II standardization linking sample (N = 550) ranged in age from 6 through 16 years (M = 11.6, SD  = 3.2) and varied by the demographic variables of gender, race/ethnicity (Caucasian, African American, and Hispanic), and parent education level (8-11, 12, 13-15, and 16 years). Full Scale IQ and General Ability Index scores from the WISC-IV were used to predict scores on Mathematics, Oral Language, Reading, Written Language, and the total composite on the Wechsler Individual Achievement Test—Second Edition. Differences in prediction were evaluated between demographic subgroups via Potthoff’s technique. Of the 30 simultaneous tests, 25 revealed no statistically significant between group differences. The remaining statistically significant differences were found to have little practical or clinical influence when effect size estimates were considered. Results are discussed in the context of other ability measures that were previously investigated for differential validity as well as educational implications for clinicians.

Technorati Tags: psychology, forensic psychology, forensic psychiatry, neuropsychology, intelligence, school psychology, psychometrics, educational psychology, IQ, IQ tests, IQ scores, adaptive behavior, adaptive functioning, intellectual disability, mental retardation, MR, ID, criminal psychology, criminal defense, criminal justice, ABA, American Bar Association, Atkins cases, death penalty, capital punishment, AAIDD, Atkins MR/ID listserv, ICDP blog, bias, test bias, differential prediction bias, race, WISC-IV

Research Briefs 7-26-10: CHC theory & measures (WJ III) invariant (no psychometric bias) across blacks and whites

Kane, H. D., & Oakland, T. D. (2010). Group Differences in Cognitive Ability: A CHC Theory Framework. Mankind Quarterly, 50(4), 318-331.

Abstract

The Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) model of cognitive ability as represented in the Woodcock-Johnson Tests of Cognitive Ability-III (WJ-III) was examined for Black and White adults matched on various demographic variables. Although Whites performed higher than Blacks (i.e., race differences were found in test scores and accompanying factor means), the results of multisample confirmatory factor analyses found that the same constructs are measured in different groups. Therefore results are directly comparable, and in this sense measured differences can be interpreted as “real” differences on the dimensions that the test is meant to measure.

Part of authors conclusions:

With respect to the primary purpose of this study, although White-Black differences in cognitive ability are affirmed in favor of Whites, these analyses reveal no source of psychometric bias (i.e., differences in loadings, test intercepts, and error variance). Constructs are represented adequately and without undo influence of error. The structural fidelity of the WJ-III factor model is psychometrically sound, making it a suitable instrument for psychologists when estimating general and broad cognitive abilities for individuals and groups. The reported indices of fit (e.g., TLI, GFI, and RMSEA) suggest that the threestratum CHC model fits the WJ-III data fairly well and provides evidence of construct validity. This finding substantiates a growing body of research literature that upholds the WJ-III as a strong representation of CHC theory (e.g., Edwards & Oakland, 2006; McGrew & Woodcock, 2001). Further, the data support Carroll’s (1993) belief that the CHC theory is essentially invariant across racial-ethnic groups. Notably, the group differences in test performance are smaller than in most other studies (e.g., Osborne & McGurk, 1982). This particular result is likely due to the samples being matched by parental education and occupational status. In the US, this kind of control is expected to remove approximately one third of the Black-White difference that may be expected in demographically representative samples (Jensen, 1998;
Lynn, 1998).

Technorati Tags: Psychology, school psychology, developmental psychology, educational psychology, forensic psychology, neuropsychology, special education, intelligence, cognitive abilities, cognition, intelligence theories, CHC theory, CHC, Cattell-Horn-Carroll, intelligence, cognition, IQ, IQ tests, Gf, Gc, Gv, Ga, Gsm, Glr, Gs, Gq, Grw, WJ-R, WJ III, Woodcock-Johnson, WJ III NU, race and IQ, racial differences, psychometric bias, CFA, structural invariance

Research briefs 1-15-10: Confirmation bias, cultural competencies, adolescent brains, juvenile justice, criminal personalities

Recent articles of interest found during my weekly search of the literature.

Gurley, J. R. (2009). A HISTORY OF CHANGES TO THE CRIMINAL PERSONALITY IN THE DSM. History of Psychology, 12(4), 285-304.

There is much confusion now surrounding the diagnoses of Antisocial Personality Disorder and Psychopathy. Some individuals still refer to the two as the same diagnosis with different names, even though there is a consensus in the psychology field that the two are distinct disorders. Part of this confusion is likely to be the result of the overlap in the diagnostic criteria: both diagnoses are associated with a history of antisocial behavior. However, it is also very possible that this confusion in the literature is a result of consistent name and criteria changes for the “criminal personality” in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. To make sense of the confusion surrounding the two different diagnoses, the evolution of Antisocial Personality Disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders is examined in this paper.

Maroney, T. A. (2009). THE FALSE PROMISE OF ADOLESCENT BRAIN SCIENCE IN JUVENILE JUSTICE. Notre Dame Law Review, 85(1), 89-176.

Recent scientific findings about the developing teen brain have both captured public attention and begun to percolate through legal theory and practice. Indeed, many believe that developmental neuroscience contributed to the U.S. Supreme Court's elimination of the juvenile death penalty in Roper v. Simmons. Post-Roper, scholars assert that the developmentally normal attributes of the teen brain counsel differential treatment of young offenders, and advocates increasingly make such arguments before the courts. The success of any theory, though, depends in large part on implementation, and challenges that emerge through implementation illuminate problematic aspects of the theory. This Article tests the legal impact of developmental neuroscience by analyzing cases in which juvenile defendants have attempted to put it into practice. It reveals that most such efforts fail. Doctrinal factors hamstring most claims--for example, that persons with immature brains are incapable of forming the requisite mens rea for serious crimes. Limitations intrinsic to the science itself--for example, individual variation--also hinder its relevance and impact. These factors both explain why developmental neuroscience has had minimal effects on juvenile justice in the courts and illustrate why it generally should. Moreover, direct reliance on neuroscience as the metric for juvenile justice policy may jeopardize equality and autonomy interests, and brain-based arguments too frequently risk inaccuracy and overstatement. The cases also strongly suggest that neuroscience does not materially shape legal decisionmakers' beliefs and values about youthful offenders but instead will be read through the lens of those beliefs and values.

Developmental neuroscience nonetheless can play a small role in juvenile justice going forward. Legislatures and courts may regard that science as one source among many upon which to draw when basing policy choices on assumptions about juveniles as a group. To go further is unwarranted and threatens to draw attention away from critical legal and environmental factors--good schools, strong families, economic opportunities, mental health care, humane sentencing regimes, and rehabilitative services--that are both more important and subject to greater direct control.

Cunningham, M. D., Sorensen, J. R., & Reidy, T. J. (2009). CAPITAL JURY DECISION-MAKING The Limitations of Predictions of Future Violence. Psychology Public Policy and Law, 15(4), 223-256.

The U.S. Supreme Court in Jurek v. Texas (1976) affirmed that capital juries are able to identify those capital offenders who will commit serious violence in the future. The capability of capital juries to accurately make these judgments as a means of deciding which capital offenders should receive the death penalty has been widely endorsed in both statute and case law, as well as embraced by jurors. A growing body of research on rates and correlates of prison violence, however, points to this confidence being misplaced. Prior investigations of the accuracy of these capital jury predictions, though limited in number, have found alarming error rates. The current study retrospectively reviewed the post-trial (M = 5.7 years) prison disciplinary misconduct of federal capital offenders (N = 72) for whom juries considered “future dangerousness” as an aggravating factor at sentencing. These jurors’ predictive performance was no better than random guesses, with high error (false positive) rates, regardless of the severity of the anticipated violence. In light of prior studies, it is concluded that juror predictions of future violence lack sufficient reliability to play a role in death penalty determinations.

OBrien, B. (2009). PRIME SUSPECT: AN EXAMINATION OF FACTORS THAT AGGRAVATE AND COUNTERACT CONFIRMATION BIAS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS. Psychology Public Policy and Law, 15(4), 315-334.

Confirmation bias is the tendency to bolster a hypothesis by seeking consistent evidence while minimizing inconsistent evidence. In criminal investigations, preferring hypothesis-consistent information could undermine accuracy by leading investigators to disregard evidence that challenges their theory of a case. Two studies examine factors that influence confirmation bias in criminal investigations. In Study 1 (N = 108), participants who articulated a hypothesis early in their review of a mock police file showed bias in seeking and interpreting evidence to favor that hypothesis. In Study 2 (N = 109), participants who considered why their hypothesis might be wrong showed less bias, but those who generated additional hypotheses did not. Implications for improving accuracy of investigations and suggestions for future research are discussed.

Perlin, M. L., & McClain, V. (2009). ''WHERE SOULS ARE FORGOTTEN'': Cultural Competencies, Forensic Evaluations, and International Human Rights. Psychology Public Policy and Law, 15(4), 257-277.

Cultural competency is critical in criminal forensic evaluations. Cultural competency eschews reliance on stereotypes, precluding the mistake of assuming that cultural dictates apply with equal force to all who share a cultural background, thus allowing the forensic examiner to provide a comprehensive picture of the defendant to the fact-finder. While raised frequently in death penalty cases, the idea of cultural competency is equally important to the entire criminal process. To better understand the significance of this inquiry, we address how cultural sensitivity in test selection and interview techniques may enhance result validity. In a parallel fashion, ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has drawn importance to cultural competency. Although international human rights and cultural sensitivity have been considered with regard to race, gender, and religion, applications to criminal matters are still in their infancy. This article considers strategies to enhance the effectiveness of testimony and mitigation efforts

Technorati Tags: psychology, forensic psychology, forensic psychiatry, neuropsychology, neurotechnology, neuroscience, criminal psychology, criminal justice, criminal personalities, juries, jury decision making, cultural competence, adolescence, adolescent brain, confirmation bias, death penalty, capital punishment, ICDP

iPost: Factors contributing to induced false confessions

Factors influencing police-induced confessions--including intellectual disability. Complete paper can be downloaded by following  link here.

Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations

Saul M. Kassin 
John Jay College of Criminal Justice

Steven A. Drizin 
Northwestern University - School of Law, Bluhm Legal Clinic

Thomas Grisso 
University of Massachusetts at Worcester - University of Massachusetts Medical School

Gisli H. Gudjonsson 
University of London - King's College London

Richard A. Leo 
University of San Francisco - School of Law

Allison D. Redlich 
affiliation not provided to SSRN



Law and Human Behavior, 2009

Abstract:      
Recent DNA exonerations have shed light on the problem that people sometimes confess to crimes they did not commit. Drawing on police practices, laws concerning the admissibility of confession evidence, core principles of psychology, and forensic studies involving multiple methodologies, this White Paper summarizes what is known about police-induced confessions. In this review, we identify suspect characteristics (e.g., adolescence; intellectual disability; mental illness; and certain personality traits), interrogation tactics (e.g., excessive interrogation time; presentations of false evidence; and minimization), and the phenomenology of innocence (e.g., the tendency to waive Miranda rights) that influence confessions as well as their effects on judges and juries. This article concludes with a strong recommendation for the mandatory electronic recording of interrogations and considers other possibilities for the reform of interrogation practices and the protection of vulnerable suspect populations.

Keywords: police interviews, interrogations, false confessions
Accepted Paper Series

Sent from KMcGrew iPhone (IQMobile). (If message includes an image-double click on it to make larger-if hard to see) 

Research briefs 10-23-09: Malingering, bias,expert testimony, IQ testimony,neuropsychological testing

Articles that caught my eye during my weekly search of a wide range of professional literature.

Heilbronner, R. L., Sweet, J. J., Morgan, J. E., Larrabee, G. J., & Millis, S. R. (2009). American Academy of Clinical Neuropsychology Consensus Conference Statement on the Neuropsychological Assessment of Effort, Response Bias, and Malingering. Clinical Neuropsychologist, 23(7), 1093-1129.

During the past two decades clinical and research efforts have led to increasingly sophisticated and effective methods and instruments designed to detect exaggeration or fabrication of neuropsychological dysfunction, as well as somatic and psychological symptom complaints. A vast literature based on relevant research has emerged and substantial portions of professional meetings attended by clinical neuropsychologists have addressed topics related to malingering (Sweet, King, Malina, Bergman, & Simmons, 2002). Yet, despite these extensive activities, understanding the need for methods of detecting problematic effort and response bias and addressing the presence or absence of malingering has proven challenging for practitioners. A consensus conference, comprised of national and international experts in clinical neuropsychology, was held at the 2008 Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Clinical Neuropsychology (AACN) for the purposes of refinement of critical issues in this area. This consensus statement documents the current state of knowledge and recommendations of expert clinical neuropsychologists and is intended to assist clinicians and researchers with regard to the neuropsychological assessment of effort, response bias, and malingering.

Frumkin, I. B. (2006). Challenging expert testimony on intelligence and mental retardation. The Journal of Psychiatry & Law, 34, 51-71.

An accurate assessment of a defendant's intellectual functioning is oftentimes needed to help in the assessment of a variety of psycholegal issues. Psychologists' evaluations and testimony are sometimes based upon misinterpretation of data. A host of factors may not be considered that could influence how the psychologist, and ultimately the court, view a defendant's intellectual capabilities. This article will discuss definitions of intelligence and mental retardation, tests of adaptive functioning, the Flynn and practice effects, abbreviated scales of intelligence, crosscultural issues in intellectual assessment, and malingering of cognitive abilities.

Phillips, S. (2009). Legal disparities in the capital of capital punishment. Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, 99(3), 717-755.

Death penalty opponents charge that wealthy defendants who can hire legal counsel are exempt from capital punishment, but that indigent defendants who receive court-appointed counsel are frequently condemned to death. The critique is based on sensational stories, but anecdotes cannot establish a causal relationship. To explore the issue systematically, the current research examines the impact of legal counsel on the District Attorney's decisions to seek the death penalty and juries' decisions to impose death sentences against adult defendants indicted for capital murder in Harris County (Houston), Texas from 1992 to 1999 (n=504). Harris County is the largest jurisdiction in the nation to use the appointment method rather than the public defender method to deliver indigent capital defense, though by no means the only such jurisdiction. The empirical comparison of hired counsel to appointed counsel in Harris County reveals three central findings: (1) Defendants who hired counsel for the entire case were never sentenced to death; (2) Defendants who hired counsel for a portion of the case were substantially less likely to be sentenced to death; (3) Hiring counsel is not the province of the wealthy, as almost all of the capital murder defendants in this study were poor. Though not the focus of the research and a finding that must be considered tentative, the data also reveal that defendants who hired counsel for the entire case were much more likely to be acquitted. To be clear, the findings are not an indictment of appointed attorneys, but rather an indictment of the structural deficiencies . inherent in the appointment method. The research concludes with a call for Harris County—the capital of capital punishment—to establish a Public Defender Office with a specific Capital Defender Office. Though not a panacea, the public defender method comes much closer to the adversarial ideal of evenly matched partisans doing battle to produce justice.

Technorati Tags: psychology, forensic psychology, criminal psychology, criminal justice, criminology, neuropsychology, school psychology, educational psychology, clinical psychology, malingering, bias, expert testimony, death penalty, capital punishment, Atkins cases, MR, mental retardation, intellectual disability

Race Rears Its Ugly Head in Atkins case: Guest post by Kevin Foley

Race and IQ tests has been one of the most hotly debated controversies in the field of intelligence testing (click here for some recent post over at sister blog--IQs Corner).  To most psychometrician/measurement experts, the mere presence of mean IQ score differences does not meet the psychometric definition of test bias.  We measurement types typically define test bais as: (a) item content bias, which is now commonly removed via expert panels and differential item functioning [DIF] item analysis methods, (b) structural bias, which means that a test doesn't measure the same constructs across groups [and which is typically evaluated with confirmatory factor analysis structural invariance methods], and (c) predictive bias, which means that a test differentially predicts outcomes for different groups [and which is typically evaluated via the examination of potential differential prediction regression slopes].  Most contemporary intelligence tests address all forms of psychometric bias during test development.

The above mini-course not withstanding, Kevin Foley has written another excellent and though-provoking guest  post (click here to see his prior guest post) dealing with the introduction of racial bias claims, with an unusual "spin" on the interpretation of bias, in the context of experts testifying in an Atkins MR death penalty case in Tennessee.  K. Foley's guest post is reproduced "as is" with any URL links added by the blogmaster.  Thanks Kevin Foley for another well written and provocative post.

In an Atkins case out of Tennessee, two prosecution experts “testified that I.Q. tests have historically been biased against minorities in that they tend to underestimate the intelligence of minorities.” Memorandum Decision, Black v. Bell, ( U.S. Dist. Ct., M.D.Tenn., No. 3:00-0764, Apr. 24, 2008). In an Ohio Atkins case involving convicted murderer Kevin Yarbrough, the State “contend[ed] that the early tests were given at a time that IQ tests were culturally biased against minorities and could have lowered the test results”. Decision Order/Entry, State v. Yarbrough, Ohio Common Pleas Court, Shelby County, Case No. 96CR000023 (Feb. 28, 2007). In a similar vein, the trial court in Ex Parte Chester (unpub., Tex. Ct. Crim. App., No. AP-75,037 (2007)) refused to accord appropriate weight to childhood IQ scores obtained by Chester because the WAIS-R “would not adequately account for cultural, regional, or other types of factors that may have influenced [Chester’s] test results.” Since Chester is black, and his native “region” is reported to be Jefferson County, Texas, the import of this comment obviously refers to his racial background. Two other examples include the case of Eldridge v. Quarterman, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19647 (S.D. Tex. 2008), where there was testimony from a psychologist who “acknowledged evidence that minorities score artificially low”, and Maldonado v. Thaler, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88988 (S.D. Tex.) (prosecution expert testified that “cultural differences” probably artificially lowered immigrant defendant’s scores).

The author of a recent law review article about the consequences of Atkins asserted that, “There is evidence that some IQ tests feature an inherent cultural bias that leads some minority groups to score lower than other individuals.” M. Libell, Atkins’ Wake: How the States Have Shunned Responsibility for the Mentally Retarded, 31 Law & Psychol. Rev. 155, 162 (2007). Similarly, the author of another law review article claimed that, as a consequence of “flawed” IQ tests, “[e]conomically deprived people and ethnic minorities are . . . often erroneously found to be mentally retarded.” Lori M. Church, Mandating Dignity: The United States Supreme Court's Extreme Departure From Precedent Regarding the Eighth Amendment and the Death Penalty, 42 Washburn L.J. 305, 325 (2003).

Starting with Arthur Jensen’s tome, Bias in Mental Testing (1987), there is long list of scientific literature which would seem to indicate that IQ tests are not biased against minorities. Even though there is gap of approximately one standard deviation between the mean IQ scores of blacks and whites, and about half that amount between whites and Hispanics, that does not mean that IQ tests are biased.

Are the psychologists referred to above showing a bias of their own in attempting to give their party the testimony they want, and are the prosecutors, courts and legal commentators simply providing spin based on myth, not science? It would be nice to hear from some objective psychologists on this issue. Should comments like those above by made by experts in Atkins cases and in the discussions of commentators?

Technorati Tags: psychology, law, forensic psychology, criminal psychology, criminal justice, Atkins cases, mental retardation, MR, developmental disabilities, IQ, IQ tests, IQ scores, race, test bias, racial bias, bias in mental testing, Kevin Foley, neuropsychology, clinical psychology, school psychology, educational psychological