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Showing posts with label competence. Show all posts
Showing posts with label competence. Show all posts
Saturday, July 1, 2017
Research Byte: Reliability of competence and sanity opinions---a meta-analysis
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Thursday, May 31, 2012
Research brief: Competency to stand trial for MR/ID: MCAT v CAST
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www.themindhub.com
Monday, May 28, 2012
Research brief: Competency evaluation expert agreement
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www.themindhub.com
Thursday, March 8, 2012
Research Bytes: Individuals with ID/MR in the criminal justice system
The journal Exceptionality had a small special issue addressing issues surrounding the involvement of individuals with disabilities in the criminal justice systems. The two key articles are featured below. Greenspan's article is a nice overview of the key issues in Atkins MR/ID death penalty cases.
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Saturday, February 11, 2012
Monday, September 19, 2011
Research Brief: Competence for trial a discrete or continuous dimension?
"In summary, our results suggest that a rational understanding of legal proceedings, as operationalized by performance on the Appreciation scale of the MacCAT–CA, represents a discrete functional ability rather than a continuously distributed construct."
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Thursday, January 20, 2011
Research brief: Competency to stand trial research synthesis
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intelligence intelligence testing Atkins cases ICDP blog psychology school psychology neuropsychology Forensic psychology criminal psychology criminal justice death penalty capital punishment ABA IQ tests IQ scores adaptive behavior AAIDD mental retardation intellectual disability competency competency for trial
Saturday, December 4, 2010
Competency to stand trial: Guest blog post by Joe Feranti
The following is a guest blog post. Our guest describes himself as follows:
Joe Feranti always had a passion for writing about the law, so it was a perfect fit when he began writing about criminal justice and general law practice for OnlineSchools.org. He enjoys spending time with his wife and 2 children, and although at times he misses the rat race, he wouldn't trade his quiet Texas life for the world.
Guest post
The ability to understand the proceedings of the judicial system is essential in order for a defendant to be tried in a criminal proceeding. In order to assess the defendant’s ability to understand the court proceedings there must be a set of standards or guidelines to assess competency. In the United States, most courts use the Dusky criteria. These criteria are based on the case of Milton Dusky, a 33 year-old schizophrenic man who was charged with the rape of a 15 year-old girl in 1959. Dusky’s attorney found him unable to fully understand his situation and attempted to declare him incompetent to stand trial. A court psychiatrist declared Dusky competent and he was convicted, but his attorney appealed the conviction and the Supreme Court eventually heard the appeal. The Supreme Court determined Dusky was not competent to stand trial, set the standards for competency, and overturned the conviction and ordered a new trial if Dusky was found competent.
The Dusky criteria are based on two domains: 1) the cognitive or intellectual capacity to actually understand the procedures and concepts used in the legal system and 2) the functional capacity to utilize all the information suitably in one’s defense and to perform effectively within the court setting. These criteria mean that if the defendant is competent to stand trial then he/she must have both the capacity and ability to demonstrate a sound understanding of the court proceedings and actively participate in their defense. This would include demonstrating an understanding of the roles of the individuals involved in court proceedings (judge, attorneys, witnesses, etc.) and demonstrating an adequate ability to communicate with attorneys and appropriately assist in their case (understanding the ramifications of pleading guilty or not guilty, outcomes of the trial, understanding basic legal concepts, etc.).
The goal in assessing for competency to stand trial involves evaluating the defendant’s state of mind, which includes their ability to reasonably understand possible outcomes their current situation. This differs from the so-called “irresistible impulse” defense that states that the defendant did not understand right and wrong at the time he/she committed the crime. Since the Dusky decision there have been efforts to develop formal tests to measure these criteria. Both clinicians and researchers have developed different checklists or interview formats to access competency. For example, in 1961 the Federal Court for Missouri District offered a set of eight criteria for competency. There have been formal tools to assess these different criteria; however, no one tool is perfect and many of the tools suffer from issues of reliability (consistency across interviewers and defendants) and validity (not actually fully assessing the areas they are meant to assess).
Most often a forensic psychiatrist or forensic psychologist is asked to assess for competency issues. Professional approaches to such an evaluation occur in one of two ways, which simply reflects two standard approaches to assessment in mental health. The first method is an ideographic approach (qualitative or personal approach) using a semi-structured interview and self-report measures (more often used by psychiatrists). This method has the advantage of allowing for more leeway in the interpretation on the part of the mental health professional and offers more flexibility. The downside is that there will often be significant disagreement between different assessments. The second approach is a nomothetic approach (a quantitative approach based on group normative results) and uses structured instruments. Structured inventories (used more often by psychologists who understand statistics) allow the metal health professional the ability compare the defendant’s results to previous scores of others. These techniques have the advantage of providing more consistency in the findings and more agreement between different testers, but allow for less flexibility in assessment. Both methods have their strengths and weaknesses.
Before deciding the evaluation approach the mental health professional should acquire clarification from the requesting party wants from the evaluation. Often video and/or audio records of the formal competency evaluation can provide further evidence to the conclusion and using more than one test for evaluating for competency will assist in the confirmation of the findings. The assessor may provide a cautionary opinion to the court, but most often judges will accept the findings of a mental health professional. The question of whether one is competent to stand trial does not represent a final verdict. For example, Dusky was eventually reevaluated and found competent to stand trial. He was sentenced to 20 years in prison.
Understanding theories of human behavior, cognition, and mental illness is crucial before one can assess competency. One must acquire an advanced degree in either psychology or psychiatry before one can perform such assessments. In order to be able to assess for a defendant’s competency to stand trial one must first obtain at least a Master’s degree in psychology. However, it would be preferable to obtain a Ph.D. in psychology via one of the online law schools or formal attendance at a university
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Atkins cases ICDP blog psychology school psychology neuropsychology Forensic psychology criminal psychology criminal justice competency to stand trial Dusky standard
Joe Feranti always had a passion for writing about the law, so it was a perfect fit when he began writing about criminal justice and general law practice for OnlineSchools.org. He enjoys spending time with his wife and 2 children, and although at times he misses the rat race, he wouldn't trade his quiet Texas life for the world.
Guest post
The ability to understand the proceedings of the judicial system is essential in order for a defendant to be tried in a criminal proceeding. In order to assess the defendant’s ability to understand the court proceedings there must be a set of standards or guidelines to assess competency. In the United States, most courts use the Dusky criteria. These criteria are based on the case of Milton Dusky, a 33 year-old schizophrenic man who was charged with the rape of a 15 year-old girl in 1959. Dusky’s attorney found him unable to fully understand his situation and attempted to declare him incompetent to stand trial. A court psychiatrist declared Dusky competent and he was convicted, but his attorney appealed the conviction and the Supreme Court eventually heard the appeal. The Supreme Court determined Dusky was not competent to stand trial, set the standards for competency, and overturned the conviction and ordered a new trial if Dusky was found competent.
The Dusky criteria are based on two domains: 1) the cognitive or intellectual capacity to actually understand the procedures and concepts used in the legal system and 2) the functional capacity to utilize all the information suitably in one’s defense and to perform effectively within the court setting. These criteria mean that if the defendant is competent to stand trial then he/she must have both the capacity and ability to demonstrate a sound understanding of the court proceedings and actively participate in their defense. This would include demonstrating an understanding of the roles of the individuals involved in court proceedings (judge, attorneys, witnesses, etc.) and demonstrating an adequate ability to communicate with attorneys and appropriately assist in their case (understanding the ramifications of pleading guilty or not guilty, outcomes of the trial, understanding basic legal concepts, etc.).
The goal in assessing for competency to stand trial involves evaluating the defendant’s state of mind, which includes their ability to reasonably understand possible outcomes their current situation. This differs from the so-called “irresistible impulse” defense that states that the defendant did not understand right and wrong at the time he/she committed the crime. Since the Dusky decision there have been efforts to develop formal tests to measure these criteria. Both clinicians and researchers have developed different checklists or interview formats to access competency. For example, in 1961 the Federal Court for Missouri District offered a set of eight criteria for competency. There have been formal tools to assess these different criteria; however, no one tool is perfect and many of the tools suffer from issues of reliability (consistency across interviewers and defendants) and validity (not actually fully assessing the areas they are meant to assess).
Most often a forensic psychiatrist or forensic psychologist is asked to assess for competency issues. Professional approaches to such an evaluation occur in one of two ways, which simply reflects two standard approaches to assessment in mental health. The first method is an ideographic approach (qualitative or personal approach) using a semi-structured interview and self-report measures (more often used by psychiatrists). This method has the advantage of allowing for more leeway in the interpretation on the part of the mental health professional and offers more flexibility. The downside is that there will often be significant disagreement between different assessments. The second approach is a nomothetic approach (a quantitative approach based on group normative results) and uses structured instruments. Structured inventories (used more often by psychologists who understand statistics) allow the metal health professional the ability compare the defendant’s results to previous scores of others. These techniques have the advantage of providing more consistency in the findings and more agreement between different testers, but allow for less flexibility in assessment. Both methods have their strengths and weaknesses.
Before deciding the evaluation approach the mental health professional should acquire clarification from the requesting party wants from the evaluation. Often video and/or audio records of the formal competency evaluation can provide further evidence to the conclusion and using more than one test for evaluating for competency will assist in the confirmation of the findings. The assessor may provide a cautionary opinion to the court, but most often judges will accept the findings of a mental health professional. The question of whether one is competent to stand trial does not represent a final verdict. For example, Dusky was eventually reevaluated and found competent to stand trial. He was sentenced to 20 years in prison.
Understanding theories of human behavior, cognition, and mental illness is crucial before one can assess competency. One must acquire an advanced degree in either psychology or psychiatry before one can perform such assessments. In order to be able to assess for a defendant’s competency to stand trial one must first obtain at least a Master’s degree in psychology. However, it would be preferable to obtain a Ph.D. in psychology via one of the online law schools or formal attendance at a university
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Atkins cases ICDP blog psychology school psychology neuropsychology Forensic psychology criminal psychology criminal justice competency to stand trial Dusky standard
Monday, November 8, 2010
Research brief: Taxometric analysis of adjudicative competence
Adjudicative competence: Evidence that impairment in “rational understanding” is taxonic. Marcus, David K.; Poythress, Norman G.; Edens, John F.; Lilienfeld, Scott O. Psychological Assessment, Vol 22(3), Sep 2010, 716-722. doi: 10.1037/a0020131
Abstract
In Dusky v. United States (1960), the U.S. Supreme Court articulated 3 abilities that determine a criminal defendant's competence to stand trial: He or she must be able to consult with counsel, have a factual understanding of the proceedings, and have a rational understanding of the proceedings. Although the legal determination of a defendant's competence involves a dichotomous judgment, the latent structures of the constructs that underlie the abilities articulated in Dusky are unknown. The current study focused on the rational understanding prong of the Dusky standard. We hypothesized that, whereas factual knowledge of the legal system and ability to assist counsel may fall on a continuum, plausible (i.e., rational) beliefs about legal proceedings may be dichotomous in nature. Taxometric analyses of the Appreciation scale of the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool—Criminal Adjudication, with a sample of 721 defendants, provided support for a taxonic structure.
intelligence intelligence testing Atkins cases ICDP blog psychology school psychology neuropsychology Forensic psychology criminal psychology criminal justice death penalty capital punishment ABA Ajudicative competence Competence to stand trial
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Monday, October 25, 2010
Attempt at restoration-to-competence for an Atkins death penalty case--Floyd Brown story
The following information regarding the capital case of Floyd Brown has been sitting in my "to post" inbox for months. I am posting it now as an FYI post...without much in the way of comment. Thanks again to Kevin Foley, a regular guest blogger for ICDP, for bringing the case and related materials to the attention of the ICDP blog.
Floyd Brown is an individual from North Carolina with /MRID who languished in state custody for 14 years "awaiting" doctors' efforts to render him competent to stand trial, and once deemed competent, his trial on murder charges. The story was partially detailed in a story in the Charlotte Observer.
The case highlights the issue of whether someone who is not competent to stand trial due to significant cognitive disabilities can ever be made competent through restoration-of-competency programs. I am not aware of any empirical research that has addressed restoration-of-competency programs with individuals with MR/ID. If any readers are aware of any such literature, please let the blogmaster know.
For those who want additional facts that were not reported by the newspaper a copy of a complaint filed by Brown's guardian can be found by clicking here. The complaint notes that Brown consistently obtained IQ scores in the mid-50's or less (para. 11) and while in school he was in Trainable MR (TMR) classes (para. 13). He was found to be not competent to stand trial on misdemeanor charges in 1991. (para. 206). He was found to be ID and exempt from the death penalty under Atkins. (para. 83)
In June, the states insurance company filed a suit in federal court hoping to have the court say the insurer is not responsible under its policies.
Atkins cases mental retardation intellectual disability capital punishment death penalty restoration to competence competency Floyd Brown ICDP blog
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Floyd Brown is an individual from North Carolina with /MRID who languished in state custody for 14 years "awaiting" doctors' efforts to render him competent to stand trial, and once deemed competent, his trial on murder charges. The story was partially detailed in a story in the Charlotte Observer.
The case highlights the issue of whether someone who is not competent to stand trial due to significant cognitive disabilities can ever be made competent through restoration-of-competency programs. I am not aware of any empirical research that has addressed restoration-of-competency programs with individuals with MR/ID. If any readers are aware of any such literature, please let the blogmaster know.
For those who want additional facts that were not reported by the newspaper a copy of a complaint filed by Brown's guardian can be found by clicking here. The complaint notes that Brown consistently obtained IQ scores in the mid-50's or less (para. 11) and while in school he was in Trainable MR (TMR) classes (para. 13). He was found to be not competent to stand trial on misdemeanor charges in 1991. (para. 206). He was found to be ID and exempt from the death penalty under Atkins. (para. 83)
In June, the states insurance company filed a suit in federal court hoping to have the court say the insurer is not responsible under its policies.
Atkins cases mental retardation intellectual disability capital punishment death penalty restoration to competence competency Floyd Brown ICDP blog
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Friday, January 15, 2010
Research briefs 1-15-10: Confirmation bias, cultural competencies, adolescent brains, juvenile justice, criminal personalities
Gurley, J. R. (2009). A HISTORY OF CHANGES TO THE CRIMINAL PERSONALITY IN THE DSM. History of Psychology, 12(4), 285-304.
There is much confusion now surrounding the diagnoses of Antisocial Personality Disorder and Psychopathy. Some individuals still refer to the two as the same diagnosis with different names, even though there is a consensus in the psychology field that the two are distinct disorders. Part of this confusion is likely to be the result of the overlap in the diagnostic criteria: both diagnoses are associated with a history of antisocial behavior. However, it is also very possible that this confusion in the literature is a result of consistent name and criteria changes for the “criminal personality” in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. To make sense of the confusion surrounding the two different diagnoses, the evolution of Antisocial Personality Disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders is examined in this paper.
Maroney, T. A. (2009). THE FALSE PROMISE OF ADOLESCENT BRAIN SCIENCE IN JUVENILE JUSTICE. Notre Dame Law Review, 85(1), 89-176.
Recent scientific findings about the developing teen brain have both captured public attention and begun to percolate through legal theory and practice. Indeed, many believe that developmental neuroscience contributed to the U.S. Supreme Court's elimination of the juvenile death penalty in Roper v. Simmons. Post-Roper, scholars assert that the developmentally normal attributes of the teen brain counsel differential treatment of young offenders, and advocates increasingly make such arguments before the courts. The success of any theory, though, depends in large part on implementation, and challenges that emerge through implementation illuminate problematic aspects of the theory. This Article tests the legal impact of developmental neuroscience by analyzing cases in which juvenile defendants have attempted to put it into practice. It reveals that most such efforts fail. Doctrinal factors hamstring most claims--for example, that persons with immature brains are incapable of forming the requisite mens rea for serious crimes. Limitations intrinsic to the science itself--for example, individual variation--also hinder its relevance and impact. These factors both explain why developmental neuroscience has had minimal effects on juvenile justice in the courts and illustrate why it generally should. Moreover, direct reliance on neuroscience as the metric for juvenile justice policy may jeopardize equality and autonomy interests, and brain-based arguments too frequently risk inaccuracy and overstatement. The cases also strongly suggest that neuroscience does not materially shape legal decisionmakers' beliefs and values about youthful offenders but instead will be read through the lens of those beliefs and values.
Developmental neuroscience nonetheless can play a small role in juvenile justice going forward. Legislatures and courts may regard that science as one source among many upon which to draw when basing policy choices on assumptions about juveniles as a group. To go further is unwarranted and threatens to draw attention away from critical legal and environmental factors--good schools, strong families, economic opportunities, mental health care, humane sentencing regimes, and rehabilitative services--that are both more important and subject to greater direct control.
Cunningham, M. D., Sorensen, J. R., & Reidy, T. J. (2009). CAPITAL JURY DECISION-MAKING The Limitations of Predictions of Future Violence. Psychology Public Policy and Law, 15(4), 223-256.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Jurek v. Texas (1976) affirmed that capital juries are able to identify those capital offenders who will commit serious violence in the future. The capability of capital juries to accurately make these judgments as a means of deciding which capital offenders should receive the death penalty has been widely endorsed in both statute and case law, as well as embraced by jurors. A growing body of research on rates and correlates of prison violence, however, points to this confidence being misplaced. Prior investigations of the accuracy of these capital jury predictions, though limited in number, have found alarming error rates. The current study retrospectively reviewed the post-trial (M = 5.7 years) prison disciplinary misconduct of federal capital offenders (N = 72) for whom juries considered “future dangerousness” as an aggravating factor at sentencing. These jurors’ predictive performance was no better than random guesses, with high error (false positive) rates, regardless of the severity of the anticipated violence. In light of prior studies, it is concluded that juror predictions of future violence lack sufficient reliability to play a role in death penalty determinations.
OBrien, B. (2009). PRIME SUSPECT: AN EXAMINATION OF FACTORS THAT AGGRAVATE AND COUNTERACT CONFIRMATION BIAS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS. Psychology Public Policy and Law, 15(4), 315-334.
Confirmation bias is the tendency to bolster a hypothesis by seeking consistent evidence while minimizing inconsistent evidence. In criminal investigations, preferring hypothesis-consistent information could undermine accuracy by leading investigators to disregard evidence that challenges their theory of a case. Two studies examine factors that influence confirmation bias in criminal investigations. In Study 1 (N = 108), participants who articulated a hypothesis early in their review of a mock police file showed bias in seeking and interpreting evidence to favor that hypothesis. In Study 2 (N = 109), participants who considered why their hypothesis might be wrong showed less bias, but those who generated additional hypotheses did not. Implications for improving accuracy of investigations and suggestions for future research are discussed.
Perlin, M. L., & McClain, V. (2009). ''WHERE SOULS ARE FORGOTTEN'': Cultural Competencies, Forensic Evaluations, and International Human Rights. Psychology Public Policy and Law, 15(4), 257-277.
Cultural competency is critical in criminal forensic evaluations. Cultural competency eschews reliance on stereotypes, precluding the mistake of assuming that cultural dictates apply with equal force to all who share a cultural background, thus allowing the forensic examiner to provide a comprehensive picture of the defendant to the fact-finder. While raised frequently in death penalty cases, the idea of cultural competency is equally important to the entire criminal process. To better understand the significance of this inquiry, we address how cultural sensitivity in test selection and interview techniques may enhance result validity. In a parallel fashion, ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has drawn importance to cultural competency. Although international human rights and cultural sensitivity have been considered with regard to race, gender, and religion, applications to criminal matters are still in their infancy. This article considers strategies to enhance the effectiveness of testimony and mitigation efforts
Technorati Tags: psychology, forensic psychology, forensic psychiatry, neuropsychology, neurotechnology, neuroscience, criminal psychology, criminal justice, criminal personalities, juries, jury decision making, cultural competence, adolescence, adolescent brain, confirmation bias, death penalty, capital punishment, ICDP
Thursday, January 7, 2010
JAAPL special issue on evidence, Daubert standard and forensic psychiatry and the law
The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law Online has published a special issue covering evidence-based practice and the Daubert standard with the field of forensic psychiatry and law. The on-line table of contents is reproduced below. Thanks to Kevin Foley for bringing this to my attention.
Contents: December 2009, Volume 37, Issue 4
INTRODUCTION TO SPECIAL ISSUE:
EDITORIALS:
REGULAR ARTICLE:
ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY:
LEGAL DIGEST:
BOOK REVIEWS:
Contents: December 2009, Volume 37, Issue 4
INTRODUCTION TO SPECIAL ISSUE:
Graham D. Glancy and Michael Saini
The Confluence of Evidence-Based Practice and Daubert Within the Fields of Forensic Psychiatry and the Law
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 438-441. [Full Text] [PDF]
EDITORIALS:
Michael Welner
The Justice and Therapeutic Promise of Science-Based Research on Criminal Evil
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 442-449. [Full Text] [PDF]
REGULAR ARTICLE:
Richard Rogers and Jill Johansson-Love
Evaluating Competency to Stand Trial with Evidence-Based Practice
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 450-460. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
Frank Sirotich
The Criminal Justice Outcomes of Jail Diversion Programs for Persons With Mental Illness: A Review of the Evidence
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 461-472. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
Michael Saini
A Meta-analysis of the Psychological Treatment of Anger: Developing Guidelines for Evidence-Based Practice
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 473-488. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
J. Arturo Silva
Forensic Psychiatry, Neuroscience, and the Law
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 489-502. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
Richard D. Schneider
Commentary: Evidence-Based Practice and Forensic Psychiatry
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 503-508. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
Amy Phenix and Shoba Sreenivasan
A Practical Guide for the Evaluation of Sexual Recidivism Risk in Mentally Retarded Sex Offenders
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 509-524. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
Stanley L. Brodsky, Tess M. S. Neal, Robert J. Cramer, and Mitchell H. Ziemke
Credibility in the Courtroom: How Likeable Should an Expert Witness Be?
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 525-532. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY:
Neil Krishan Aggarwal
Allowing Independent Forensic Evaluations for Guantánamo Detainees
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 533-537. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
Marilyn Price and Donna M. Norris
White-Collar Crime: Corporate and Securities and Commodities Fraud
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 538-544. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
Sohrab Zahedi, Robert Burchuk, David C. Stone, and Alex Kopelowicz
Gun Laws and the Involuntarily Committed: A California Road Map
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 545-548. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
Anasuya Salem and Cecilia Leonard
Psychiatric and Clinical Sequelaeof Delirium and Competenceto Stand Trial
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 549-551. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
Joseph D. Bloom
Forensic Psychiatry and the Forensic Sciences: In Memory of Peter J. Batten, MD
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 552-555. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
LEGAL DIGEST:
J. Jason Buckland and Richard L. Frierson
Constitutionality of the Federal Sex-Offender Commitment Law
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 556-558. [Full Text] [PDF]
Joel Watts and Joy Stankowski
The Therapist-Patient Privilege Challenged
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 558-561. [Full Text] [PDF]
Praveen Kambam and Sherif Soliman
IQ in Miranda Waivers and Death Penalty
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 561-563. [Full Text] [PDF]
Sara G. West and Stephen Noffsinger
Absolute Right to Privacy for Prison Inmates
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 563-565. [Full Text] [PDF]
Edward Poa and Phillip Resnick
Arwen Podesta and D. Clay Kelly
Forced Medication for Death Penalty Appeals
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 567-570. [Full Text] [PDF]
Mehdi Qalbani and D. Clay Kelly
Franklin J. Bordenave, II and D. Clay Kelly
D. Clay Kelly
Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 573-574. [Full Text] [PDF]
BOOK REVIEWS:
Denise C. Kellaher
Drug Court: Constructing the Moral Identity of Drug Offenders
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 575. [Full Text] [PDF]
Elizabeth Hogan
Correctional Psychiatry: Practice Guidelines and Strategies
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 576. [Full Text] [PDF]
M. Jerome Fialkov
Edward Poa
Technorati Tags: psychology, psychiatry, forensic psychiatry, forensic psychology, neuroscience, neuropsychology, psychiatry and law, psychology and law, competence for trial, mental retardation, MR, ID, intellectual disability, Miranda rights, Atkins cases, death penalty, capital punishment, ICDP blog
Thursday, September 10, 2009
Dr. Tedd Judd guest comment post re: adaptive behavior and Switzky and Greenspan (2005) chapter
Guest comment post re: adaptive behavior by Dr. Tedd Judd, a neuropsychologist and current President of the Hispanic Neuropsychological Society.
Dr. Tedd Judd contacted the blogmaster via email as he had tried to post comments to the recent post re: the adaptive behavior chapter by Switzky and Greenspan, but the comment box was too limited for his complete set of comments. Posted below are Dr. Tedd Judd's comments ("as is") regarding the Switzky and Greenspan chapter post.
It is gratifying to see individuals reading and responding to the content of this blog. Thanks to all current and future readers. Active scholarly discourse is one of the goals of this blog.
Dr. Tedd Judd's comments below:
Very good chapter which addressed many pertinent issues well. I especially like the general principle of putting greater emphasis on adaptive functioning, even though the measuring of adaptive functioning is and will likely continue to be more problematic than IQ testing. For too long we have been looking for the keys under the street lamp where the light is good instead of over in the dark where we dropped them.
I also like the emphasis on refining what we really mean by adaptive functioning. The available adaptive behavior scales, in my reading of them, not only fail to measure gullibility adequately, that actually seem to reward it by giving higher ratings to compliant behavior (something that, for me, reflects the nicey nice world of MR services). There are more details in my chapter except below.
I take a bit of exception with this chapter placing gullibility so centrally, however. Some people with MR are not very nice or compliant or gullible, but may be somewhat paranoid, egocentric, and angry, although perhaps for reasons of faulty thinking that are similar to the faulty thinking of those who are gullible. Those individuals may look much more like someone with an antisocial personality disorder (they may even be diagnosable with ASP), but with a cognitive deficit underlying that disorder. It seems to me that it is for just such individuals that the SCOTUS included in their reasons for the Atkins decision that for people with MR "their demeanor may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their crimes." So, while social skills deficits need greater elaboration and emphasis, they can take various forms.
I am hopeful that readers who have stuck with me thus far may be willing to pursue some discussion of related points from my chapter section below from
Adaptive Behavior Scales
Adaptive behavior rating scales are not tests of abilities. The focus person and/or an informant who knows that person well rate the person on the ability to carry out various everyday activities. These scales are particularly important in the diagnosis of mental retardation because the accepted definitions of mental retardation (American Association on Mental Retardation, 2002; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) require impairment not only on IQ testing but also in adaptive behavior. Such scales are typically normed by age on a nationally representative sample (Scales of Independent Behavior—Revised, Bruininks, Woodcock, Weatherman, & Hill, 1996; Adaptive Behavior Assessment System, Harrison & Oakland, 2000; AAMR Adaptive Behavior Scale, Nihira, Leland, & Lambert, 1993; Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale, Sparrow, Balla, & Cicchetti, 1985). These scales typically do not have validity scales to determine if there is response bias on the part of the rater. The cultural competence to complete the rating scales and potential biases of the informant must be taken into account.
Adaptive behavior is clearly culturally relative, and this is evident in the rating scales. For example, the referenced scales contain items referring to the use of telephones, microwaves, small electrical appliances, clothes washers and dryers, repair services, cars, seatbelts, air conditioners, thermometers, handkerchiefs, televisions, menus, dictionaries, alphabetizing, phone books, zip codes, bathroom cleaning supplies, electricity, scales, rulers, schedules, Christmas, Hanukah, forks, reading materials, ticket reservations, shoelaces, clocks, classified ads, and checkbooks. Access to these items is not universal and is related to culture, urbanization, and social class. There are no items referring to clotheslines, chopsticks, domestic animals, Ramadan, etc.
Other items depend upon cultural norms of behavior or values that are not universal (looking at others’ faces when talking, ending conversations, not interrupting, carrying identification, traveling independently in the community, stores with hours of operation, obeying street signs, needing time alone, choosing to join group activities, haircuts, daily bathing, punctuality, hospitality, controlling temper, “pleasant breath,” saying “thank you,” conversational distance, dating, etc.). Although several of these scales have been translated into Spanish (and possibly other languages) there has been minimal cultural adaptation of the items, and there are minimal instructions in the manuals concerning cross-cultural applications.
Some items imply that it is more functional to be compliant than to stand up for oneself. These items include: controlling anger when someone else breaks the rules, when an activity is cancelled, when disagreeing with friends, or when not getting one’s way; not telling a lie to escape punishment; saying “thank you” for gifts (something that is not a part of many Native American cultures); moving out of another person’s way; offering assistance and sympathy; selecting “good” friends; avoiding embarrassing others; doing extra work willingly; and following supervisor’s suggestions. There are no items giving credit for knowing: when and how to direct one’s anger, when it is wise to lie, when to offer assistance and sympathy and when not, when to use one’s own judgment and when to follow others’ in selecting friends, when it is appropriate to embarrass others, when it makes sense to do extra work or follow the supervisor and when to object or go on strike, etc. There are no items saying, “Asserts ones rights.” Or “Stands up for others who are treated unjustly.” It is sobering to realize that people might be declared legally stupid for having bad breath, not telling jokes, not making their beds, or not buying tickets in advance.
Adaptive behavior scales can play an important role in cross-cultural neuropsychology. At times they may help document that an individual who does not “test well” on standardized cognitive tests, perhaps for cultural reasons, nevertheless is able to function adequately and competently in this society. Adaptive behavior scales in brain injury cases can document the changes in a way that cognitive tests cannot. However, interpretation of low scores is problematic because the scales are culture bound. In some instances the adaptive behavior scale may function more as a measure of acculturation than of ability. At present such interpretations may require an item-by-item analysis of low scored items, perhaps including a discussion of those items with the rater and/or other cultural informant. In spite of their cultural limitations, however, these standardized scales have advantages over the evaluation of adaptive behavior exclusively by interview. They are more thorough than typical interviews, they allow for objective comparisons to known populations, and they allow for greater clarity regarding the database for opinions and decisions. They do not, however, replace the evaluation of adaptive behavior via interview, since interviews are likely to bring out the most pertinent impairments in adaptive behavior and may cover areas not found in the scales.
Technorati Tags: psychology, forensice psychology, criminal justice, criminal psychology, developmental disabilities, educational psychology, neuropsychology, school psychology, mental retardation, MR, Atkins cases, death peantly, capital punishment, adpative behavior, adaptive functioning, gullibility
Dr. Tedd Judd contacted the blogmaster via email as he had tried to post comments to the recent post re: the adaptive behavior chapter by Switzky and Greenspan, but the comment box was too limited for his complete set of comments. Posted below are Dr. Tedd Judd's comments ("as is") regarding the Switzky and Greenspan chapter post.
It is gratifying to see individuals reading and responding to the content of this blog. Thanks to all current and future readers. Active scholarly discourse is one of the goals of this blog.
Dr. Tedd Judd's comments below:
Very good chapter which addressed many pertinent issues well. I especially like the general principle of putting greater emphasis on adaptive functioning, even though the measuring of adaptive functioning is and will likely continue to be more problematic than IQ testing. For too long we have been looking for the keys under the street lamp where the light is good instead of over in the dark where we dropped them.
I also like the emphasis on refining what we really mean by adaptive functioning. The available adaptive behavior scales, in my reading of them, not only fail to measure gullibility adequately, that actually seem to reward it by giving higher ratings to compliant behavior (something that, for me, reflects the nicey nice world of MR services). There are more details in my chapter except below.
I take a bit of exception with this chapter placing gullibility so centrally, however. Some people with MR are not very nice or compliant or gullible, but may be somewhat paranoid, egocentric, and angry, although perhaps for reasons of faulty thinking that are similar to the faulty thinking of those who are gullible. Those individuals may look much more like someone with an antisocial personality disorder (they may even be diagnosable with ASP), but with a cognitive deficit underlying that disorder. It seems to me that it is for just such individuals that the SCOTUS included in their reasons for the Atkins decision that for people with MR "their demeanor may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their crimes." So, while social skills deficits need greater elaboration and emphasis, they can take various forms.
I am hopeful that readers who have stuck with me thus far may be willing to pursue some discussion of related points from my chapter section below from
- Judd, T. & Beggs, B. (2005). Cross-cultural forensic neuropsychological assessment (pp. 141-162). In K. Barrett & W. H. George (Eds.) Race, Culture, Psychology and Law. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Press. Reprinted (2006) (pp. 175-186) in C.R. & A.M. Bartol (Eds.) Current Perspectives in Forensic Psychology and Criminal Justice. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Press.
Adaptive Behavior Scales
Adaptive behavior rating scales are not tests of abilities. The focus person and/or an informant who knows that person well rate the person on the ability to carry out various everyday activities. These scales are particularly important in the diagnosis of mental retardation because the accepted definitions of mental retardation (American Association on Mental Retardation, 2002; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) require impairment not only on IQ testing but also in adaptive behavior. Such scales are typically normed by age on a nationally representative sample (Scales of Independent Behavior—Revised, Bruininks, Woodcock, Weatherman, & Hill, 1996; Adaptive Behavior Assessment System, Harrison & Oakland, 2000; AAMR Adaptive Behavior Scale, Nihira, Leland, & Lambert, 1993; Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale, Sparrow, Balla, & Cicchetti, 1985). These scales typically do not have validity scales to determine if there is response bias on the part of the rater. The cultural competence to complete the rating scales and potential biases of the informant must be taken into account.
Adaptive behavior is clearly culturally relative, and this is evident in the rating scales. For example, the referenced scales contain items referring to the use of telephones, microwaves, small electrical appliances, clothes washers and dryers, repair services, cars, seatbelts, air conditioners, thermometers, handkerchiefs, televisions, menus, dictionaries, alphabetizing, phone books, zip codes, bathroom cleaning supplies, electricity, scales, rulers, schedules, Christmas, Hanukah, forks, reading materials, ticket reservations, shoelaces, clocks, classified ads, and checkbooks. Access to these items is not universal and is related to culture, urbanization, and social class. There are no items referring to clotheslines, chopsticks, domestic animals, Ramadan, etc.
Other items depend upon cultural norms of behavior or values that are not universal (looking at others’ faces when talking, ending conversations, not interrupting, carrying identification, traveling independently in the community, stores with hours of operation, obeying street signs, needing time alone, choosing to join group activities, haircuts, daily bathing, punctuality, hospitality, controlling temper, “pleasant breath,” saying “thank you,” conversational distance, dating, etc.). Although several of these scales have been translated into Spanish (and possibly other languages) there has been minimal cultural adaptation of the items, and there are minimal instructions in the manuals concerning cross-cultural applications.
Some items imply that it is more functional to be compliant than to stand up for oneself. These items include: controlling anger when someone else breaks the rules, when an activity is cancelled, when disagreeing with friends, or when not getting one’s way; not telling a lie to escape punishment; saying “thank you” for gifts (something that is not a part of many Native American cultures); moving out of another person’s way; offering assistance and sympathy; selecting “good” friends; avoiding embarrassing others; doing extra work willingly; and following supervisor’s suggestions. There are no items giving credit for knowing: when and how to direct one’s anger, when it is wise to lie, when to offer assistance and sympathy and when not, when to use one’s own judgment and when to follow others’ in selecting friends, when it is appropriate to embarrass others, when it makes sense to do extra work or follow the supervisor and when to object or go on strike, etc. There are no items saying, “Asserts ones rights.” Or “Stands up for others who are treated unjustly.” It is sobering to realize that people might be declared legally stupid for having bad breath, not telling jokes, not making their beds, or not buying tickets in advance.
Adaptive behavior scales can play an important role in cross-cultural neuropsychology. At times they may help document that an individual who does not “test well” on standardized cognitive tests, perhaps for cultural reasons, nevertheless is able to function adequately and competently in this society. Adaptive behavior scales in brain injury cases can document the changes in a way that cognitive tests cannot. However, interpretation of low scores is problematic because the scales are culture bound. In some instances the adaptive behavior scale may function more as a measure of acculturation than of ability. At present such interpretations may require an item-by-item analysis of low scored items, perhaps including a discussion of those items with the rater and/or other cultural informant. In spite of their cultural limitations, however, these standardized scales have advantages over the evaluation of adaptive behavior exclusively by interview. They are more thorough than typical interviews, they allow for objective comparisons to known populations, and they allow for greater clarity regarding the database for opinions and decisions. They do not, however, replace the evaluation of adaptive behavior via interview, since interviews are likely to bring out the most pertinent impairments in adaptive behavior and may cover areas not found in the scales.
Technorati Tags: psychology, forensice psychology, criminal justice, criminal psychology, developmental disabilities, educational psychology, neuropsychology, school psychology, mental retardation, MR, Atkins cases, death peantly, capital punishment, adpative behavior, adaptive functioning, gullibility
Monday, August 3, 2009
Book review: Criminal Mental Heath and Disability Law: Evidence and Testimony
I've not read this book nor do I have a copy. It was mentioned in a "comment" to the Purpose statement of this blog. I just noticed the comment and decided to mention the resource and provide a link. I would like to encourage other readers of this blog to submit other resources that may be relevant and useful to readers. This post should not be recognized as an endorsement/recommendation of the book...it is just an FYI post.
Thanks for the information.
Thanks for the information.
Wednesday, July 1, 2009
Competence issues in death penalty cases: Freedman (2009)
Freedman, D. (2009). When is a capitally charged defendant incompetent to stand trial? International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 32, 127–133. (click here to view/read entire article)
Abstract (emphasis to abstract and quotes added by blogmaster)
Competence to stand trial is a functional test rather than a bright line test, which therefore requires a case and fact specific assessment of a client's abilities in context. This article discusses competence in the context of capital trial cases. There are serious potential pitfalls for the client when raising incompetence and the decision to do so must be based on the specific ways in which the client's mental illness interferes with specific abilities to communicate with counsel and understand the proceedings. This article addresses counsel's duties in the context of assessing competence, but focuses on the little addressed issue of what abilities a client must have and what tasks a client must participate in so as to be engaged in a competent manner. It also discusses the types of conditions which may interfere with competence to stand trial.According to the author, "Dusky set out a number of abilities and capacities required of a criminal defendant, yet it is the present ability to communicate with counsel based on a reasonable degree of rational understanding prong that has proven significantly more difficult to assess than the rational and factual understanding prong. How, exactly, are lawyers, judges and mental health professionals expected to assess the communication prong of the standard? There is little agreement as to what abilities ought to be required, how to assess them or even who bears responsibility for making the assessment. Most mental health professionals have little legal knowledge and few have, nor should they be expected to obtain, an understanding or proficiency in criminal defense representation, especially capital case representation. How, then, can they be expected to determine whether a defendant has sufficient ability to effectively communicate with counsel about a specific case? Similarly, most lawyers and judges have little training on mental illness or in determining what symptoms are significantly interfering with communication or a basic understanding of the cognitive and behavioral processes of decision-making and communication. Yet, competence to stand trial determinations rest primarily on the assessment of what a criminal defendant must be able to do with counsel."
Select highlights from article:
- What are the counsel's obligations in ascertaining competence is discussed.
- What abilities of the defendant are relevant to determining competence?
- According to Freedman, "the abilities required to be competent, as noted, may implicate a vast number of symptoms and illnesses. Take psychosis, the diagnosis most often found in those adjudicated incompetent, as an example. What are the symptoms that define the illness? DSM-IV-TR defines psychosis as referring to the presence of a set of symptoms, but the symptoms vary across the specific diagnostic categories."
- "A plethora of physical and psychological conditions can interfere with competence to stand trial. If the question of competence is, as suggested, one of a person's functional ability to engage in the interactive dialogue, a number of conditions must be considered, including, at the least:
Authors conclusion
- Executive functions: which are the neurocognitive processes that initiate and inhibit movement and behaviors, constitute the abilities to plan, initiate new tasks, stop, judge, assess options and consequences, reason, self-monitor and self-regulate, and recognize social cues; they also encompass language processing, mental flexibility, reasoning (deductive and inductive), working memory, abstract thinking, incorporating new information, and strategic inquiry. In short, executive functions are the very capacities necessary to be competent, although, oddly, they are rarely measured or tested when evaluations are conducted. Mood Disorders : include both depression and mania.
- Anxiety Disorders: include both anxiety and Post-traumatic Stress disorders.
- Language Abilities: include receptive and expressive language deficits, as well as fluency impairments. Associated with learning and language disorders are slowed information processing speeds, low self-esteem and deficits in social skills. Medication : as Sell recognized, medications can have an observable effect which may undermine competency by slowing responses to fast moving proceedings, by altering how the client looks and acts, or by interfering with communication.
- Medical conditions: Many medical conditions can adversely affect a person's ability to undertake the 10 necessary steps of rational communication and participation. Among others, Dementia's, Parkinson's, Huntington's, Wilson's, and Fahr's Diseases, strokes, seizure disorders may all have an adverse impact on functioning. Cognitive ability: which may include both people with mental retardation and people who have IQ's higher than the MR cut-off but function in a substantially impaired manner, as well as people where the cause of the impairment is known (traumatic brain injury, exposure to lead, neurotoxins or fetal-alcohol, or genetic disorders).
- Cognitive ability includes such capacities as memory and recall; organizing concepts and understanding how things relate to each other; communication (receptive and expressive language); and flexibility in dealing with new information and a capacity to engage with new information. Although ruling that people with mental retardation may be competent, in Atkins, the Court noted: Because of their impairments, however, by definition they have diminished capacities to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others. These are the disabilities that may also render some people with cognitive impairment functionally not competent in the specific context of working with counsel. Typically, cognitively impaired people attempt to mask their illnesses, often by making decisions which have long-term negative consequences but in the short-term permit them to avoid being fully assessed; they may confabulate (filling in details to portray a coherent story despite not having actual knowledge of details provided); and often exhibit passivity, compliance and deference (likely to agree with interviewer in effort to please) in the face of a lack of understanding and competence; exhibit rigidity in the face of contradictory evidence; and, as the hallmark of low cognitive ability, they have a fundamental lack of comprehension."
"Competence to stand trial is a functional test rather than a bright line test, which therefore requires a case and fact specific assessment of a client's abilities in context. While there are serious pitfalls to raising incompetence, and while the decision to do so must be based on the specific ways in which the client's mental illness interferes with specific abilities to communicate with counsel, it is also clear that some of our clients are functionally unable to engage in the interactive dialogue required—that is, they are unable to see, hear and digest the trial related information and communicate with counsel about that information. Nevertheless, these issues require pursuit in a coherent and thorough manner because the outcome of trying a capital case in which the client is unable to participate is an appalling affront to due process."
Technorati Tags: psychology, law, legal, death penalty, Atkins cases, educational psychology, school psychology, forensic psychology, competence, intelligence, IQ, IQ tests,
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