New important Atkins SCOTUS decision on fall 2025 docket: How to evaluate and interpret multiple IQ scores in Atkins cases (Hamm[AL] v Smith)?

 This fall 2025, the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) will be hearing a case related to intelligence testing in the context of Atkins intellectual disability (ID) death penalty cases. The case is Hamm v Smith.

The question before SCOTUS is :  Whether and how courts may consider the cumulative effect of multiple IQ scores in assessing Atkins claims (in the context of diagnosis ID in death penalty cases)?

Note.  In order to save space and time, instead of writing “general intelligence” or “general intellectual functioning” every time, I use the abbreviation “IQ”.

The respondent (Joseph Smith) has five IQ test scores from comprehensive IQ tests.  He obtained two scores of 75 and 74 during the developmental period (before age 22), and three scores of 72, 78, and 74 between the ages of 28 and 46.  

This case is important for assessment professionals who conduct intelligence testing in general, and potential ID diagnostic cases (Atkins cases in particular).  I find this SCOTUS case particularly interesting given that in 2021, after the 2021 release of the latest official AAIDD manual (Intellectual disability: Definition, diagnosis, classification, and systems of supports), I published a critique where I specifically stated, as one weakness of the new AAIDD manual that “…many high-stakes ID cases often include case files that include multiple IQ scores across time or from different IQ tests. Some form of guidance, at minimum in a passing reference, to the issues of the convergence of indicators and IQ score exchangeability would have been useful. Users will need to go beyond the AAIDD manual for guidance (see Floyd et al., 2021; McGrew, 2015; and Watson, 2015)” (click here to download and read this critique).

All official petitioner and respondent legal briefs (and amicus briefs) have now been published at the SCOTUS blog as of yesterday.  The number of documents posted on the SCOTUS docket are many.  To help the reader better determine which documents are most critical (the final briefs), instead of clicking away on the various links at the SCOUTUS blog, I’ve organized the petitioner and respondent brief links below.

If you prefer to not wade through all the briefs (it is not for everyone), I would encourage practicing assessment professionals read the three respondent-related briefs.  The points made are relevant to all who conduct intellectual assessments.  As a potential conflict of interest notice, I (Dr. Kevin McGrew), together with Dr. Joel Schneider and Dr. Cecil Reynolds (as noted on page three for the APA amicus brief), were consultants to APA in the drafting of that brief.  This work was performed pro bono. I, at a minimum, suggest reading all the respondent briefs.  If time permits, I would also suggest reading the petitioner’s Alabama brief and the US Justice Department Solicitor General’s brief to better understand the petitioner and respondent positions re Hamm v Smith. 

Petitioner briefs

• The state of Alabama brief.  Alabama is the petitioner.  That is, if you want to read why the State of Alabama asked SCOTUS to hear this case, click on the link provided.
• The Alabama brief also includes a very long appendix for those who want to read the prior courts related testimony from the state and various experts. This is a very long read and is not necessary for readers who only want to understand the legal and professional issues. 
• Supporting amicus brief from the US Justice Department Solicitor General.
• Two supporting briefs from legal groups—the American Legal Foundation and the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation.
• Supporting amicus briefs from other states (Idaho et al.; Kentucky)

Respondent briefs

• Smiths respondent brief.
• Supporting amicus brief from American Psychological Association (APA), American Psychiatric Assocation (ApA), and Alabama APA.
• Supporting amicus brief from AAIDD et al.

Final comment.  Those from school psychology should make note that we three consultants involved in drafting the APA/ApA,AL-APA brief all had our original educational roots in the profession of school psychology.  Furthermore, SP professionals should note the significant number of authoritative references to publications authored by school psychologists in the respondents briefs, as well as in some of the petitioners briefs.  I’ve been doing expert consultation, writing declarations, and testifying in court re: Atkins ID cases since 2009.  Joel Schneider and Cecil Reynolds have also been active in a similar capacity.  There are more psychologists who come from, or are affiliated with, the field of school psychology who have been prominent consultants/experts to lawyers and the courts re Atkins cases.  

Perhaps some of these briefs should be assigned readings (in intellectual assessment courses or special topic seminars) for graduate students being trained in the art and science of intelligence testing and interpretation.

IQs Corner: What is (and what is not) clinical judgment in intelligence test interpretation?

What is clinical judgment in intelligence testing?  

This term is frequently invoked when psychologists explain or defend their intelligence test interpretations.  Below is a brief explanation I’ve used to describe what it is…and what it is not, based on several sources.  Schalock and Luckasson’s AAIDD Clinical Judgment book (now in a 2014 revised version) is the best single source I have found that addresses this slippery concept in intelligence testing, particularly in the context of a potential diagnosis of intellectual disability (ID)—it is a recommended reading.

—————

Clinical judgment is a process based on solid scientific knowledge and is characterized as being “systematic (i.e., organized, sequential, and logical), formal (i.e., explicit and reasoned), and transparent (i.e., apparent and communicated clearly)” (Schalock & Luckasson, 2005, p.1). The application of clinical judgment in the evaluation of IQ scores in the diagnosis of intellectual disability includes consideration of multiple factors that might influence the accuracy of an assessment of general intellectual ability (APA: DSM-5, 2013).  The “unanimous professional consensus that the diagnosis of intellectual disability requires comprehensive assessment and the application of clinical judgment” (Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric Association, American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, Florida Psychological Association, National Association of Social Workers, and National Association of Social Workers Florida Chapter, in Support of Petitioner; Hall v. Florida; S.Ct., No. 12-10882; 2014; p. 8).

The misuse of clinical judgment in the interpretation of scores from intelligence test batteries should not be used as the basis for “gut instinct” or “seat-of-the-pants” impressions and conclusions of the assessment professional (Macvaugh & Cunningham, 2009), or justification for shortened evaluations, a means to convey stereotypes or prejudices, a substitute for insufficiently explored questions, or an excuse for incomplete testing and missing data (Schalock & Luckasson, 2005). Idiosyncratic methods and intuitive conclusions are not scientifically based and have unknown reliability and validity. 

If clinical judgment interpretations and opinions regarding an individual’s level of general intelligence are based on novel or emerging research-based principles, the assessment professional must document the bases for these new interpretations as well as the limitations of these principles and methods. This requirement is consistent with the Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing Standard 9.4 which states:

When a test is to be used for a purpose for which little or no validity evidence is available, the user is responsible for documenting the rationale for the selection of the test and obtaining evidence of the reliability/precision of the test scores and the validity of the interpretations supporting the use of the scores for this purpose (p. 143).

American Educational Research Association, American Psychological Association, & National Council on Measurement in Education (2014).  Standards for educational and psychological testing.  Washington, DC:  Author. 

American Psychiatric Association (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders— Fifth Edition. Washington D.C.:  Author. 

Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric Association, American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, Florida Psychological Association, National Association of Social Workers, and National Association of Social Workers Florida Chapter, in Support of Petitioner; Hall v. Florida; S.Ct., No. 12-10882; 2014; p. 8.

MacVaugh, G. S. & Cunningham, M. D. (2009). Atkins v. Virginia: Implications and recommendations for forensic practice.  The Journal of Psychiatry and Law, 37, 131-187.

Schalock, R. L. & Luckasson, R. (2005). Clinical judgment. Washington, DC: American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities. 

—————

Kevin S. McGrew, PhD.

Educational Psychologist

Director 

Institute for Applied Psychometrics (IAP)

www.theMindHub.com

The use of the Woodcock-Johnson Fourth Edition (WJ IV) GIA Cognitive IQ score in intellectual disability (ID) determination

The WJ IV Cognitive GIA in iintellectual disability (ID) assessment from Kevin McGrew

Law Review Article: Evaluating Intellectual Disability: Clinical Assessments in Atkins Cases (Ellis et al., 2018)

This new law review article is, IMHO, the best overview article regarding the history of ID, the legal issues in Atkins cases, and good discussion of the major conceptual and measurement issues found in many Atkins cases. An excellent introduction to ID issues in Atkins cases.

EVALUATING INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: CLINICAL ASSESSMENTS IN ATKINS CASES

James W. Ellis, Caroline Everington, Ann M. Delpha

ABSTRACT

The intersection of intellectual disability and the death penalty is now clearly established. Both under the U.S. Supreme Court's constitutional decisions and under the terms of many state statutes, individual defendants who have that disability cannot be sentenced to death or executed. It now falls to trial, appellate, and post-conviction courts to determine which individual criminal defendants are entitled to the law's protection. This Article attempts to assist judges in performing that task. After a brief discussion of the Supreme Court's decisions in Atkins v. Virginia, Hall v. Florida, and Moore v. Texas, it analyzes the component parts and terminology of the clinical definition of intellectual disability. It then offers more detailed discussion of a number of the clinical issues that arise frequently in adjudicating these cases. For each of these issues, the Article's text and the accompanying notes attempt to provide judges with a thorough survey of the relevant clinical literature, and an explanation of the terminology used by clinical professionals. Our purpose is to help those judges to become more knowledgeable consumers of the clinical reports and expert testimony presented to them in individual cases, and to help them reach decisions that are consistent with what the clinical literature reveals about the nature of intellectual disability and best professional practices in the diagnostic process.

Click on images to enlarge







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The Relation between Intelligence and Adaptive Behavior: A Meta-Analysis

Very important meta-analysis of AB IQ relation. Primary finding on target with prior informal synthesis by McGrew (2015)

The Relation between Intelligence and Adaptive Behavior: A Meta-Analysis   
 
Ryan M. Alexander 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Intelligence tests and adaptive behavior scales measure vital aspects of the multidimensional nature of human functioning. Assessment of each is a required component in the diagnosis or identification of intellectual disability, and both are frequently used conjointly in the assessment and identification of other developmental disabilities. The present study investigated the population correlation between intelligence and adaptive behavior using psychometric meta-analysis. The main analysis included 148 samples with 16,468 participants overall. Following correction for sampling error, measurement error, and range departure, analysis resulted in an estimated population correlation of ρ = .51. Moderator analyses indicated that the relation between intelligence and adaptive behavior tended to decrease as IQ increased, was strongest for very young children, and varied by disability type, adaptive measure respondent, and IQ measure used. Additionally, curvilinear regression analysis of adaptive behavior composite scores onto full scale IQ scores from datasets used to report the correlation between the Wechsler Intelligence Scales for Children- Fifth edition and Vineland-II scores in the WISC-V manuals indicated a curvilinear relation—adaptive behavior scores had little relation with IQ scores below 50 (WISC-V scores do not go below 45), from which there was positive relation up until an IQ of approximately 100, at which point and beyond the relation flattened out. Practical implications of varying correlation magnitudes between intelligence and adaptive behavior are discussed (viz., how the size of the correlation affects eligibility rates for intellectual disability).
 
Other Key Findings Reported
 
McGrew (2012) augmented Harrison's data-set and conducted an informal analysis including a total of 60 correlations, describing the distributional characteristics observed in the literature regarding the relation. He concluded that a reasonable estimate of the correlation is approximately .50, but made no attempt to explore factors potentially influencing the strength of the relation.
 
Results from the present study corroborate the conclusions of Harrison (1987) and McGrew (2012) that the IQ/adaptive behavior relation is moderate, indicating distinct yet related constructs. The results showed indeed that the correlation is likely to be stronger at lower IQ levels—a trend that spans the entire ID range, not just the severe range. The estimated true mean population is .51, and study artifacts such as sampling error, measurement error, and range departure resulted in somewhat attenuated findings in individual studies (a difference of about .05 between observed and estimated true correlations overall).
 
 
The present study found the estimated true population mean correlation to be .51, meaning that adaptive behavior and intelligence share 26% common variance. In practical terms, this magnitude of relation suggests that an individual's IQ score and adaptive behavior composite score will not always be commensurate and will frequently diverge, and not by a trivial amount. Using the formula Ŷ = Ȳ + ρ (X - X ̅ ), where Ŷ is the predicted adaptive behavior composite score, Ȳ  is the mean adaptive behavior score in the population, ρ  is the correlation between adaptive behavior and intelligence, X is the observed IQ score for an individual, and X ̅ is the mean IQ score, and accounting for regression to the mean, the predicted adaptive behavior composite score corresponding to an IQ score of 70, given a correlation of .51, would be 85 —a score that is a full standard deviation above an adaptive behavior composite score of 70, the cut score recommended by some entities to meet ID eligibility requirements. With a correlation of .51, and accounting for regression to the mean, an IQ score of 41 would be needed in order to have a predicted adaptive behavior composite score of 70. Considering that approximately 85% of individuals with ID have reported IQ scores between 55 and 70±5 (Heflinger et al., 1987; Reschly, 1981), the eligibility implications, especially for those with less severe intellectual impairment, are alarming. In fact, derived from calculations by Lohman and Korb (2006), only 17% of individuals obtaining an IQ score of 70 or below would be expected to also obtain an adaptive behavior composite score of 70 or below when the correlation between the two is .50. 
 
 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the relation between IQ and adaptive behavior and variables moderating the relation using psychometric meta-analysis. The findings contributed in several ways to the current literature with regard to IQ and adaptive behavior. First, the estimated true mean population correlation between intelligence and adaptive behavior following correction for sampling error, measurement error, and range departure is moderate, indicating that intelligence and adaptive behavior are distinct, yet related, constructs. Second, IQ level has a moderating effect on the relation between IQ and adaptive behavior. The correlation is likely to be stronger at lower IQ levels, and weaker as IQ increases. Third, while not linear, age has an effect on the IQ/adaptive behavior relation. The population correlation is highest for very young children, and lowest for children between the ages of five and 12. Fourth, the magnitude of IQ/adaptive behavior correlations varies by disability type. The correlation is weakest for those without disability, and strongest for very young children with developmental delays. IQ/adaptive behavior correlations for those with ID are comparable to those with autism when not matched on IQ level. Fifth, the IQ/adaptive correlation when parents/caregivers serve as adaptive behavior respondents is comparable to when teachers act as respondents, but direct assessment of adaptive behavior results in a stronger correlation. Sixth, an individual's race does not significantly alter the correlation between IQ and adaptive behavior, but future research should evaluate the influence of race of the rater on adaptive behavior ratings. Seventh, the correlation between IQ and adaptive behavior varies depending on IQ measure used—the population correlation when Stanford-Binet scales are employed is significantly higher than when Wechsler scales are employed. And eighth, the correlation between IQ and adaptive behavior is not significantly different between adaptive behavior composite scores obtained from the Vineland, SIB, and ABAS families of adaptive behavior measures, which are among those that have been deemed appropriate for disability identification. Limitations of this study notwithstanding, it is the first to employ meta-analysis procedures and techniques to examine the correlation between intelligence and adaptive behavior and how moderators alter this relation. The results of this study provide information that can help guide practitioners, researchers, and policy makers with regard to the diagnosis or identification of intellectual and developmental disabilities.


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Validity, Interrater Reliability, and Measures of Adaptive Behavior: Concerns Regarding the Probative Versus Prejudicial Value

Validity, Interrater Reliability, and Measures of Adaptive Behavior: Concerns Regarding the Probative Versus Prejudicial Value

Psychology, Public Policy, and Law. Article link.

Karen L. Salekin,The University of Alabama
Tess M. S. Neal,Arizona State University
Krystal A. Hedge, Federal Medical Center, Devens, Massachusetts

The question as to whether the assessment of adaptive behavior (AB) for evaluations of intellectual disability (ID) in the community meet the level of rigor necessary for admissibility in legal cases is addressed. AB measures have made their way into the forensic domain, in which scientific evidence is put under great scrutiny. Assessment of ID in capital murder proceedings has garnished a lot of attention, but assessments of ID in adult populations also occur with some frequency in the context of other criminal proceedings (e.g., competence to stand trial, competence to waive Miranda rights), as well as eligibility for social security disability, social security insurance, Medicaid/Medicare, government housing, and postsecondary transition services. As will be demonstrated, markedly disparate findings between raters can occur on measures of AB even when the assessment is conducted in accordance with standard procedures (i.e., the person was assessed in a community setting, in real time, with multiple appropriate raters, when the person was younger than 18 years of age), and similar disparities can be found in the context of the unorthodox and untested retrospective assessment used in capital proceedings. With full recognition that some level of disparity is to be expected, the level of disparity that can arise when these measures are administered retrospectively calls into question the validity of the results and, consequently, their probative value.

Keywords: adaptive behavior measures, Atkins, forensic evaluations, validity, interrater reliability


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Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rules against Flynn effect adjustment of IQ scores in Atkins death penalty cases: Black v Carpenter (2017)

A newly published 6th Circuit opinion (Black v Carpenter, 2017) rules against norm obsolescence (the Flynn effect) in the evaluation of IQ test scores in Atkins ID death penalty cases.  I obviously disagree with this decision as outlined in my 2015 chapter in the AAIDD "The Death Penalty and Intellectual Disability" (Polloway, 2015).

I have no further comment at this time as my expert opinion is clearly articulated in the AAIDD publication and I will continue my efforts to educate the courts.  This decision is at variance with the official positions of American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD) and the American Psychiatric Association (DSM-5), the two professional associations with official  guidance regarding  the diagnosis of ID. 

This looks like another issue that might need the attention of SCOTUS.

The following section is extracted from the complete ruling.


E. Implications of the Flynn Effect

There is good reason to have pause before retroactively adjusting IQ scores downward to offset the Flynn Effect. As we noted above, see n.1, supra, the Flynn Effect describes the apparent rise in IQ scores generated by a given IQ test as time elapses from the date of that specific test’s standardization. The reported increase is an average of approximately three points per decade, meaning that for an IQ test normed in 1995, an individual who took that test in 1995 and scored 100 would be expected to score 103 on that same test if taken in 2005, and would be expected to score 106 on that same test in 2015. This does not imply that the individual is “gaining intelligence”: after all, if the same individual, in 2015, took an IQ test that was normed in 2015, we would expect him to score 100, and we would consider him to be of the same “average” intelligence that he demonstrated when he scored 100 on the 1995-normed test in 1995. Rather, the Flynn Effect implies that the longer a test has been on the market after initially being normed, the higher (on average) an individual should perform, as compared with how that individual would perform on a more recently normed IQ test.

At first glance, of course, the Flynn Effect is troubling: if scoring 70 on an IQ test in 1995 would have been sufficient to avoid execution, then why shouldn’t a score of 76 on that same test administered in 2015 (which would produce a “Flynn-adjusted” score of 70) likewise suffice to avoid execution? Further, even if IQ tests were routinely restandardized every year or two to reset the mean score to 100, and even if old IQ tests were taken off the market so as to avoid the Flynn Effect “inflation” of scores that is visible when an IQ test continues to be administered long after its initial standardization, that would only mask, but not change, the fact that IQ scores are said to be rising.

Indeed, perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the Flynn Effect is that it is true. As Dr. Tassé states in his declaration, “[t]he so-called ‘Flynn Effect’ is NOT a theory. It is a wellestablished scientific fact that the US population is gaining an average of 3 full-scale IQ points per decade.” The implications of the Flynn Effect over a longer period of time are jarring: consider a cohort of individuals who, in 1917, took an IQ test that was normed in 1917 and received “normal” scores (say, 100, on average). If we could transport that same cohort of individuals to the present day, we would expect their average score today on an IQ test normed in 2017—a century later—to be thirty points lower: 70, making them mentally retarded, on average.

Alternatively, consider a cohort of individuals who, in 2017, took an IQ test that was normed in 2017 and received “normal” scores (of 100, on average). If we could transport that same cohort of individuals to a century ago, we would expect that their average score on a test normed in 1917 would be thirty points higher: 130, making them geniuses, on average.

It thus makes little sense to use Flynn-adjusted IQ scores to determine whether a criminal is sufficiently intellectually disabled to be exempt from the death penalty. After all, if Atkins stands for the proposition that someone with an IQ score of 70 or lower in 2002 (when Atkins was decided) is exempt from the death penalty, then the use of Flynn-adjusted IQ scores would conceivably lead to the conclusion that, within the next few decades, almost no one with borderline or merely below-average IQ scores should be executed, because their scores when adjusted downward to 2002 levels would be below 70. Indeed, the Supreme Court did not amplify just what moral or medical theory led to the highly general language that it used in Atkins when it prohibited the imposition of a death sentence for criminals who are “so impaired as to fall within the range of mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national consensus,” 536 U.S. at 317. If Atkins had been a 1917 case, the majority of the population now living—if we were to apply downward adjustments to their IQ scores to offset the Flynn Effect from 1917 until now—would be too mentally retarded to be executed; and until the Supreme Court tells us that it is committed to making such downward adjustments, we decline to do so.

* * *

COLE, Chief Judge, concurring in the opinion except for Section II.E. I concur with the majority opinion except as to the section discussing the implications of the Flynn Effect. In holding that Black did not prove that he had significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning, we concluded that Black’s childhood IQ scores would be above 70 even if we adjusted those scores to account for both the SEM and the Flynn Effect. Accordingly, I would not address the question of whether we should apply a Flynn Effect adjustment in cases generally because it is unnecessary to the resolution of Black’s appeal. Regardless, courts, including our own in Black I, have regarded the Flynn Effect as an important consideration in determining who qualifies as intellectually disabled. See, e.g., Black v. Bell, 664 F.3d 81, 95–96 (6th Cir. 2011); Walker v. True, 399 F.3d 315, 322–23 (4th Cir. 2005).

SCOTUS blog analysis of yesterday's Moore v Texas arguments before SCOTUS

You can find an analysis of yesterday's oral arguments re Moore v Texas (hinging primary on adaptive behavior and Texas Briseno factors) a the SCOTUS blog.




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Stephen Greenspan on "Why DSM5 suggested a switch from adaptive behavior to adaptive reasoning": APA Div 33 featured conversation

 

My long time professional colleague Dr. Stephen Greenspan, is conducting a featured conversation hour for Division 33 at the forthcoming APA convention in Denver.  He has provided me an advanced copy of his outline and has graciously given me permission to make it available at the ICDP blog.  A copy can be obtained by clicking here.

Stephen is one of the great "thinkers" in the field of intellectual disabilities.  Our professional lives crossed long distance when I was a doctoral student.  My advisor, Dr. Robert Bruininks, put me in charge of a series of studies investigating the constructs of adaptive and maladaptive behavior.  These studies eventually led to my dissertation--which was a CFA validation study of Greenspan's Model of Personal Competence (see 1990 reference below).  To the best of my knowledge, this was the first published article validating Greenspan's model.

Below are links to the various articles (I simply grabbed them from my MindHub web page--please visit if you want additional information).  Consistent with Stephen's outline notes, in this validated model of personal competence, conceptual intelligence was operationalized as measured by intelligence tests, and was not considered a domain of adaptive behavior.

Of interest is the recent study by MaCann et al. that provides structural (CFA) evidence for a separate cognitively oriented social-emotional construct, distinct from the other cognitive domains in the CHC taxonomy of human intelligence.  Although MaCann et al. refer to the construct as emotional intelligence, a reading of the dimensions suggest it could easily be called social intelligence.  

Finally, as Bruininks and I were pulled away from our AB/PC program of research for different reasons, I continue to be perplexed why other researchers have not tried to extend and refine the research on the model of personal competence, particularly given its prominence (and disagreements) in definitions of ID.

Adaptive Behavior and Personal Competence Research (select articles)

• Thompson, J. R., McGrew, K. S., & Bruininks, R. H. (2002).  Pieces of the puzzle. Measuring the personal competence and support needs of persons with intellectual disabilities. Peabody Journal of Education, 77(2), 23-29.
• Thompson, J., McGrew, K. & Bruininks, R. (1999).  Adaptive and maladaptive behavior.  Functional and structural characteristics.  In R. L. Schalock & D Braddock (Eds), Adaptive behavior and its measurement: Implications for the field of mental retardation(pp. 15-42).  Washington, DC.  American Association on Mental Retardation.
• Widaman, K. & McGrew K., (1996).  The structure of adaptive behavior.  In J.W. Jacobson & J.A. Mulick (Eds.), Manual of diagnosis and professional practice in mental retardation (pp. 97-110).  Washington, D.C.  American Psychological Association.
• McGrew, K., Bruininks, R., & Johnson, D. (1997).  Confirmatory factor analysis investigation of Greenspan's model of personal competence.  American Journal on Mental Retardation, 100(5) 533-545.
• Greenspan, S., & McGrew, K. (1996).  Response to Mathias and Nettlebeck on the structure of competence.  Need for theory-based methods to test theory-based questions.  Research in Developmental Disabilities, 17, 145-152.
• Bruininks, R., Chen, T., Lakin, C., & McGrew, K. (1992).  Components of personal competence and community integration for persons with mental retardation in small residential programs. Research in Developmental Disabilities, 13, 463-479.
• Ittenbach, R., Spiegel, A., McGrew, K., & Bruininks, R.  (1992). A confirmatory factor analysis of early childhood ability measures within a model of personal competence.  Journal of School Psychology, 30, 307-323.
• McGrew, K., Bruininks, R., & Thurlow, M. (1992). Relationship between measures of adaptive functioning and community adjustment for adults with mental retardation. Exceptional Children, 58, 517-529.
• McGrew, K., Ittenbach, R., Bruininks, R., & Hill, B. (1991). Factor structure of maladaptive behavior across the lifespan for persons with mental retardation. Research in Developmental Disabilities, 12, 181-199.
• McGrew, K., & Bruininks, R. (1990).  Defining adaptive and maladaptive behavior within a model of personal competence. School Psychology Review, 19, 53-73.
• McGrew, K., & Bruininks, R. (1989).  The factor structure of adaptive behavior. School Psychology Review, l8, 64-8l.
• Bruininks, R., McGrew, K., & Maruyama, G. (1988).  Structure of adaptive behavior in samples with and without mental retardation.  American Journal on Mental Retardation, 95(3), 265-272.

ID is a "condition"...not a number. Ethics of IQ cut-off scores for ID Dx

Click on image to enlarge abstract.  Very thought provoking article (click to view) by Greenspan, Harris and Woods on the use of IQ cutoff scores to define ID.

AAIDD/ARC SCOTUS 2015 amicus brief regarding Texas adaptive behavior issues (Briseno factors)

An amicus brief (click to access) has been filed with SCOTUS by AAIDD and ARC regarding a petition for writ of certiorari for a case in Texas (Lizcano).  Briefly, the amicus brief points out the problems with the Texas Briseno factors (click here for all prior Briseno related posts) in the evaluation of prong 2 of the Dx of ID (adaptive behavior).  The problems at issue address the most basic principles of scientific reliability and validity in the evaluation of the adaptive behavior prong of the ID definition

AAIDD chapters on intellectual functioning and the Flynn effect - overdue post

(Click on image to enlarge)

It has been along time since I've been able to devote time to any of my three professional blogs.  I have been unbelievably busy with travel and professional presentations.  In fact, I have been so busy that I failed to feature two of my own recent Atkin's death penalty related book chapters that appeared in the new AAIDD book "Determining Intellectual Disability in the courts: Focus on capital cases." I have made these two chapters available via the MindHub web portal but do not believe I featured them at this blog (or at IQ's Corner).  One chapter deals with assessment of intellectual functioning issues and the other IQ test norm obsolescence (aka., the Flynn Effect).  The references (with links) are below.

McGrew, K. (2015a). Intellectual functioning. In Polloway, E. (Ed.), Determining Intellectual Disability in the courts: Focus on capital cases (pp. 85-111). Washington, DC: American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities.

McGrew, K. (2015b). Norm obsolescence: The Flynn Effect. In Polloway, E. (Ed.), Determining Intellectual Disability in the courts: Focus on capital cases (pp. 155-169). Washington, DC: American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities

AAIDD "The Death Penalty and Intellectual Disability: A Guide" Press release

The staff from AAIDD gave me permission to post a copy of the official AAIDD press release about the new publication on ID and the death penalty (Atkins cases).  A PDF copy of the release can be found here.

AAIDD's "Intellectual Disability and the Death Penalty: A Guide" now available!

The AAIDD ID and death penalty guide is now available at the AAIDD webpage!  Although the title is focused on the death penalty and ID (Atkins cases), having written two of the chapters (Flynn effect; Intellectual functioning), I believe all professionals in the field of psychological, assessment and ID should have this reference book--it presents recommendations for ID practice that go well beyond the official AAIDD classification book (the Green book) and are relevant to ID assessment practices in general.

Description of the guide at the AAIDD webpage.

• In the 2002 landmark decision Atkins v. Virginia 536 U.S. 304, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that executing a person with intellectual disability is a violation of the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits “cruel and unusual punishment,” but left states to determine their own criteria for intellectual disability. AAIDD has always advocated against the death penalty for people with intellectual disability and has long provided amicus curiae briefs in Supreme Court cases. Thus, in this comprehensive new book published by AAIDD, notable authors in the field of intellectual disability discuss all aspects of the issues, with a particular focus on foundational considerations, assessment factors and issues, and professional concerns in Atkins assessments.

Victory for psychometrics in Hall v Florida SEM bright-line Atkins MR/ID SCOTUS decision

This morning SCOTUS rectified the long standing "bright line" (ignoring SEM) problem with Atkins ID/MR cases in Florida.  Click here for background information.  Click here for today's decision.

Hall v Florida SCOTUS transcript from today

Here is today's transcript for the oral arguements and questioning before the US Supreme Court (SCOTUS) re the Hall v Florida Atkins case. To someone who has worked his entire career in intelligence testing, it is very interesting to hear the justices talk about IQ, SEM, etc.

Amicus briefs from APA and AAIDD (and others) have been posted previously at this blog. Prior decisions regarding Hall v Florida are available in the blogroll under Atkins decisions

 

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Hall v Florida SCOTUS case: Amicus Briefs by APA and AAIDD

 

The Atkins case of Hall v Florida will be heard by SCOTUS shortly. Like most Atkins cases, the issues are complex. But the essence of the case is Florida's "bright line" test for the first ID Dx prong...which, based on the FLorida Cherry Court decision, is set at a firm IQ score of 70 with no recognition of the standard error of measurement (SEM).

Both APA and AAIDD have spearheaded two separate Amicus Briefs, which also include other organizations. The two briefs have now been posted in the brief sidebar of this blog. They can also be found at the links below.

APA led Amicus Brief

AAIDD led Amicus Brief

 

 

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The Death Penalty and Intellectual Disability: AAIDD forthcoming pub--TOC with authors and chapter titles

    

 The Death Penalty and Intellectual Disability: A Guide (1/3/14)*

* Note the above title is as registered by AAIDD with Library of Congress and as presentedon their website. The working title of the task force had been:  Determining Intellectual Disability in the Courts: Focus on Capital Cases

 

As described at the AAIDD publications page:

 In the 2002 landmark decision Atkins v. Virginia 536 U.S. 304, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that executing a person with intellectual disability is a violation of the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits “cruel and unusual punishment,” but left states to determine their own criteria for intellectual disability. AAIDD has always advocated against the death penalty for people with intellectual disability and has long provided amicus curiae briefs in Supreme Court cases. Thus, in this comprehensive new book published by AAIDD, notable authors in the field of intellectual disability discuss all aspects of the issues, with a particular focus on foundational considerations, assessment factors and issues, and professional concerns in Atkins assessments. 

                     

Chapter	Titles	Authors
	Preface	Ed Polloway
	Foreword	Honorable Kevin Foley
	Part 1:  Foundational Considerations
1	Guide for Persons with Intellectual Disability and Capital Cases: An Introduction	Edward A. Polloway James R. Patton J. David Smith
2	Intellectual Disability:  A Review of its Definitions and Diagnostic Criteria	Marc J. Tassé
3	Mild Intellectual Disability	Gary Siperstein Melissa Collins
4	Analysis of Atkins Cases	John Blume Karen Salekin
	Part 2:  Assessment Considerations
	A.  General Topics:
5	Concepts of Measurement	Keith Widaman
6	Age of Onset and the Developmental Period Criterion	Stephen Greenspan George Woods Harvey Switzky
	B. Intellectual Functioning:
7	Intellectual Functioning: Conceptual Issues	Kevin McGrew
8	Consideration in the Selection and Analysis of IQ Tests	Dale Watson
9	Variability of IQ scores	Stephen Greenspan J. Gregory Olley
10	Norm Obsolescence: The Flynn Effect	Kevin McGrew
	C. Adaptive Behavior:
11	Evolving Concepts of Adaptive Behavior	Stephen Greenspan
12	Selection of Appropriate Adaptive Behavior Instruments	J. Gregory Olley
13	Challenges in Assessment of Adaptive Behavior in Capital Cases	Caroline Everington Gilbert S. Macvaugh III Karen Salekin Timothy J. Derning
14	Time at Which Disability Must Be Shown in Atkins Cases	J. Gregory Olley
15	Briseño Factors	Stephen Greenspan
	Part 3:  Related Topics
16	Cultural Factors in Assessment	Richard Ruth
17	Assessment Issues: Competence to Waive Miranda Rights and Competence to Stand Trial	Karen Salekin Caroline Everington
18	Considerations of Retrospective Assessment and Malingering	Denis Keyes David Freedman
19	Intellectual Disability, Comorbid Disorders and Differential Diagnosis	George Woods David Freedman Timothy J. Derning
20	School and Other Key Records	James Patton
21	Relevance of Other Assessments in Atkins Evaluations	Karen Salekin Gilbert S. Macvaugh III Timothy J. Derning
22	Professional Issues in Atkins Assessments	Gilbert S. Macvaugh III Mark D. Cunningham Marc J. Tassé