IQ score differences across time may relfect real changes in the brain

Lay people and many professionals often express consternation when an individuals measured IQ scores are different at different times in their life.  This concern is particularly heightened in high stakes settings where differences in IQ scores can result in changes in eligibility for programs (e.g., social security disability income) or life-or-death decisions (e.g., Atkins MR/ID death penalty cases).

Factors contributing to significant IQ score differences are many (McGrew, in press a) and may include: (a) procedural or test administration errors (e.g., scoring errors; improper nonstandardized test administration; malingering; age vs. grade norms; practice effects), (b) test norm or standardization differences (e.g., norm obsolescence or the Flynn Effect; McGrew, in press b), (c) content differences across different test batteries or between different editions of the same battery, or (d) variations in a person’s performance on different occasions.

 An article "in press" (Neuroimage) by Burgaleta et al. (click here to view copy with annotated comments)  provides the important reminder that differences in IQ scores for an individual (across time) may be due to real changes in general intelligence related to real changes in brain development.  These researchers found that changes in cortical brain thickness were related to changes in IQ scores.  They concluded that "the dynamic nature of intelligence-brain relations...support the idea that changes in IQ across development can reflect meaningful general cognitive ability changes and have a neuroanatomical substrate" (viz., changes in cortical thickness in key brain regions).  The hypothesis was offered that changes in the the cortical areas of  frontoparietal brain network (see P-FIT model of intelligence) may be related to changes in working memory, which in turn has been strongly associated with general reasoning (fluid intelligence; Gf).

The cortical thickness-IQ change relation was deemed consistent with "cellular events that are sensitive to postnatal development and experience."  Possible causal factors suggested included insufficient education or social stimulation during sensitive developmental periods, as well as lifestyle, diet and nutrition, and genetic factors.

• McGrew, K. S. (in press a).  Intellectual functioning:  Conceptual issues.  In E. Polloway (Ed.), Determining intellectual disability in the courts:  Focus on capital cases.  AAIDD, Washington, DC.

•  McGrew, K. S. (in press b).  Norm obsolescence:  The Flynn Effect.  In E. Polloway (Ed.), Determining intellectual disability in the courts:  Focus on capital cases.  AAIDD, Washington, DC.

[Click on images to enlarge]

Research Brief: Does neurological-image evidence influence jurors in criminal jury trials ?

Double click OM image to enlarge




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Law Review Article: Maroney (2011) on Adolescent Brain Science since Graham v FL

The following has been added to the ICDP Law Review Article blogroll.

Maroney, T. A. (2011). ADOLESCENT BRAIN SCIENCE AFTER GRAHAM V. FLORIDA. Notre Dame Law Review, 86(2), 765-793.


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intelligence intelligence testing Atkins cases ICDP blog psychology school psychology neuropsychology forensic psychology criminal psychology criminal justice death penalty capital punishment ABA IQ tests IQ scores adaptive behavior AAIDD mental retardation intellectual disability Graham v Florida adolescent brain science neuroscience and law

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iPost: Judges intro guide to neuroscience

Nice little intro at link below. And I've learned that I can view PDF file in my new iBooks app on my iPhone...sweet

http://bit.ly/9Fzxgz

Sent from KMcGrew iPhone (IQMobile). (If message includes an image-double click on it to make larger-if hard to see)

Law Review Articles: Neuroimaging; false confessions

Brown, T., & Murphy, E. (2010). THROUGH A SCANNER DARKLY: FUNCTIONAL NEUROIMAGING AS EVIDENCE OF A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S PAST MENTAL STATES. Stanford Law Review, 62(4), 1119-1208.

As with phrenology and the polygraph, society is again confronted with a device that the media claims is capable of reading our minds. Functional magnetic resonance imaging ("fMRI"), along with other types of functional brain imaging technologies, is currently being introduced at various stages of a criminal trial as evidence of a defendant's past mental state. This Article demonstrates that functional brain images should not currently be admitted as evidence into courts for this purpose. Using the analytical framework provided by Federal Rule of Evidence 403 as a threshold to a Daubert/Frye analysis, we demonstrate that, when fMRI methodology is properly understood brain images are only minimally probative of a defendant's past mental states and are almost certainly more unfairly prejudicial than probative on balance. Careful and detailed explanation of the underlying science separates this Article from others, which have tended to paint fMRI with a gloss of credibility and certainty for all courtroom-relevant applications. Instead we argue that this technology may present a particularly strong form of unfair prejudice in addition to its potential to mislead jurors and waste the court's resources. Finally, since fMRI methodology may one day improve such that its probative value is no longer eclipsed by its extreme potential for unfair prejudice, we offer a nonexhaustive checklist that judges and counsel can use to authenticate functional brain images and assess the weight these images are to be accorded by fact finders.

Garrett, B. L. (2010). THE SUBSTANCE OF FALSE CONFESSIONS. Stanford Law Review, 62(4), 1051-1118.

A puzzle is raised by cases of false confessions: How could an innocent person convincingly confess to a crime? Postconviction DNA testing has now exonerated over 250 convicts, more than forty of whom falsely confessed to rapes and murders. As a result, there is a new awareness that innocent people falsely confess, often due to psychological pressure placed upon them during police interrogations. Scholars increasingly examine the psychological techniques that can cause people to falsely confess and document instances of known false confessions. This Article takes a different approach, by examining the substance of false confessions, including what was said during interrogations and how the confession statements were then litigated at trial and postconviction. Doing so sheds light on the phenomenon of confession contamination. Not only can innocent people falsely confess, but all except two of the exonerees studied were induced to deliver false confessions with surprisingly rich, detailed, and accurate information. We now know that those details could not have likely originated with these innocent people, but rather must have been disclosed to them, most likely during the interrogation process. However, our constitutional criminal procedure does not regulate the postadmission interrogation process, nor do courts evaluate the reliability of confessions. This Article outlines a series of reforms that focus on the insidious problem of contamination, particularly videotaping interrogations in their entirety, but also reframing police procedures, trial practice, and judicial review. Unless criminal procedure is reoriented towards the reliability of the substance of confessions, contamination of facts may continue to go undetected, resulting in miscarriages of justice.

Technorati Tags: psychology, forensic psychology, forensic psychiatry, neuropsychology, intelligence, school psychology, psychometrics, educational psychology, IQ, IQ tests, IQ scores, adaptive behavior, adaptive functioning, intellectual disability, mental retardation, MR, ID, criminal psychology, criminal defense, criminal justice, ABA, American Bar Association, Atkins cases, death penalty, capital punishment, AAIDD, Atkins MR/ID listserv, ICDP blog, Flynn Effect, neurotechnology, lie detection, confessions

Research Briefs 5-31-10: Don't blink--you may be quilty

Leal, S., & Vrij, A. (2010). The occurrence of eye blinks during a guilty knowledge test. Psychology Crime & Law,
16(4), 349-357.

Abstract
In the present experiment we examined whether eye blinks could discriminate between guilty and innocent examinees in a Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT). Based on the assumption that guilty examinees would experience more cognitive load when responding to the key items than to the control items, we hypothesized that they would display fewer eye blinks during the key items than during the control items. For innocent examinees, responding to the key and control items should be equally demanding, and no differences in eye blinks between key and control items were expected. A total of 26 participants took part in an experiment where 13 guilty examinees committed a mock theft (of an exam paper) and the remaining 13 innocent examinees went on with their normal business. All participants underwent a GKT whereby their eye blinks were measured. Both guilty and innocent examinees displayed the pattern of eye blinks that we predicted. The implications of the findings are discussed.

Technorati Tags: psychology, forensic psychology, forensic psychiatry, neuropsychology, intelligence, school psychology, psychometrics, educational psychology, IQ, IQ tests, IQ scores, adaptive behavior, adaptive functioning, intellectual disability, mental retardation, MR, ID, criminal psychology, criminal defense, criminal justice, ABA, American Bar Association, Atkins cases, death penalty, capital punishment, AAIDD, Atkins MR/ID listserv, ICDP blog, Flynn Effect, neurotechnology, lie detection

iPost: fMRI lie detection and Daubert standard

Story at MIND HACKS link below
http://www.mindhacks.com/blog/2010/05/brain_scan_lie_detec.html

Kevin McGrew PhD
Educational Psychologist
IAP (www.iapsych.com)
FInd via Google: IQs Corner
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double click on it to make larger-if hard to see)

iPost: SCOTUS Graham decision and neuroscience

The SCOTUS decision re Graham was all over the blawgosphere the past
few days. The NEUROETHICS AND LAW blog had an interesting observation
re the role that neuroscience evidence may have played a role in the
decision via various amicus briefs. Story at link below---which also
includes link to copy of decision.
http://kolber.typepad.com/ethics_law_blog/2010/05/us-supreme-court-cites-brain-evidence.html

Kevin McGrew PhD
Educational Psychologist
IAP (www.iapsych.com)
FInd via Google: IQs Corner
Sent from KMcGrew iPhone (IQMobile). (If message includes an image-
double click on it to make larger-if hard to see)

Research briefs 2-13-10: Neurscience and criminal justice

An interesting article "in press" regarding role of neuroscience in legal proceedings.

Schauer, F (in press) Neuroscience, Lie-Detection, and the law Contrary to the prevailing view, the suitability of brain-based lie-detection for courtroom or forensic use should be determined according to legal and not scientific standards.  Trends in Cognitive Sciences.

Abstract

The possibility of using neuroimaging to detect deception in legal settings has generated widespread resistance. Many neuroscientists insist the research is flawed science, containing weaknesses of reliability (the degree of accuracy), external validity (do laboratory results predict real-world outcomes), and construct validity (do studies test what they purport to test). These flaws are real, but although using neural lie-detection in non-experimental legal settings is premature, the critics are mistaken in believing that scientific standards should determine when these methods are ready for legal use. Law's goals differ from science's, and the legal suitability of neural lie-detection depends on legal standards and not those determining what good science is.

Article Outline

The current debate
Challenging the challengers
The standards for the use of science in law cannot be derived from science alone
Acknowledgements
References

Technorati Tags: Psychology, neuropsychology, neuroscience, neurotechnology, forensic psychology, forensic psychiatry, criminal psychology, criminal defense, criminal justice, ABA, American Bar Association, lie detection, death penalty, capital punishment, Atkins cases

Research briefs 1-27-10: Relevance of neuroscience to criminal responsibility

The following article is available as "open access" from the Journal of criminal Law and Philosophy. The article can be accessed and read by clicking here.

Vincent, N. A. (2010).On the relevance of neuroscience to criminal responsibility

Abstract:  Various authors debate the question of whether neuroscience is relevant to criminal responsibility. However, a plethora of different techniques and technologies, each with their own abilities and drawbacks, lurks beneath the label “neuroscience”; and in criminal law responsibility is not a single, unitary and generic concept, but it is rather a syndrome of at least six different concepts. Consequently, there are at least six different responsibility questions that the criminal law asks—at least one for each responsibility concept—and, I will suggest, a multitude of ways in which the techniques and technologies that comprise neuroscience might help us to address those diverse questions. In a way, on my account neuroscience is relevant to criminal responsibility in many ways, but I hesitate to state my position like this because doing so obscures two points which I would rather highlight: one, neither neuroscience nor criminal responsibility are as unified as that; and two, the criminal law asks many different responsibility questions and not just one generic question.

Keywords  Responsibility - Neuroscience - Criminal law - Neurolaw

Technorati Tags: psychology, forensic psychology, neuropsychology, neuroscience, neurotechnology, neuroscience and law, criminal psychology, criminal justice, criminal responsibility, ABA, American Bar Association, Atkins cases, mental retardation, intellectual disability, MR, ID, death penalty, capital punishment, criminal law

Research briefs 1-15-10: Confirmation bias, cultural competencies, adolescent brains, juvenile justice, criminal personalities

Recent articles of interest found during my weekly search of the literature.

Gurley, J. R. (2009). A HISTORY OF CHANGES TO THE CRIMINAL PERSONALITY IN THE DSM. History of Psychology, 12(4), 285-304.

There is much confusion now surrounding the diagnoses of Antisocial Personality Disorder and Psychopathy. Some individuals still refer to the two as the same diagnosis with different names, even though there is a consensus in the psychology field that the two are distinct disorders. Part of this confusion is likely to be the result of the overlap in the diagnostic criteria: both diagnoses are associated with a history of antisocial behavior. However, it is also very possible that this confusion in the literature is a result of consistent name and criteria changes for the “criminal personality” in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. To make sense of the confusion surrounding the two different diagnoses, the evolution of Antisocial Personality Disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders is examined in this paper.

Maroney, T. A. (2009). THE FALSE PROMISE OF ADOLESCENT BRAIN SCIENCE IN JUVENILE JUSTICE. Notre Dame Law Review, 85(1), 89-176.

Recent scientific findings about the developing teen brain have both captured public attention and begun to percolate through legal theory and practice. Indeed, many believe that developmental neuroscience contributed to the U.S. Supreme Court's elimination of the juvenile death penalty in Roper v. Simmons. Post-Roper, scholars assert that the developmentally normal attributes of the teen brain counsel differential treatment of young offenders, and advocates increasingly make such arguments before the courts. The success of any theory, though, depends in large part on implementation, and challenges that emerge through implementation illuminate problematic aspects of the theory. This Article tests the legal impact of developmental neuroscience by analyzing cases in which juvenile defendants have attempted to put it into practice. It reveals that most such efforts fail. Doctrinal factors hamstring most claims--for example, that persons with immature brains are incapable of forming the requisite mens rea for serious crimes. Limitations intrinsic to the science itself--for example, individual variation--also hinder its relevance and impact. These factors both explain why developmental neuroscience has had minimal effects on juvenile justice in the courts and illustrate why it generally should. Moreover, direct reliance on neuroscience as the metric for juvenile justice policy may jeopardize equality and autonomy interests, and brain-based arguments too frequently risk inaccuracy and overstatement. The cases also strongly suggest that neuroscience does not materially shape legal decisionmakers' beliefs and values about youthful offenders but instead will be read through the lens of those beliefs and values.

Developmental neuroscience nonetheless can play a small role in juvenile justice going forward. Legislatures and courts may regard that science as one source among many upon which to draw when basing policy choices on assumptions about juveniles as a group. To go further is unwarranted and threatens to draw attention away from critical legal and environmental factors--good schools, strong families, economic opportunities, mental health care, humane sentencing regimes, and rehabilitative services--that are both more important and subject to greater direct control.

Cunningham, M. D., Sorensen, J. R., & Reidy, T. J. (2009). CAPITAL JURY DECISION-MAKING The Limitations of Predictions of Future Violence. Psychology Public Policy and Law, 15(4), 223-256.

The U.S. Supreme Court in Jurek v. Texas (1976) affirmed that capital juries are able to identify those capital offenders who will commit serious violence in the future. The capability of capital juries to accurately make these judgments as a means of deciding which capital offenders should receive the death penalty has been widely endorsed in both statute and case law, as well as embraced by jurors. A growing body of research on rates and correlates of prison violence, however, points to this confidence being misplaced. Prior investigations of the accuracy of these capital jury predictions, though limited in number, have found alarming error rates. The current study retrospectively reviewed the post-trial (M = 5.7 years) prison disciplinary misconduct of federal capital offenders (N = 72) for whom juries considered “future dangerousness” as an aggravating factor at sentencing. These jurors’ predictive performance was no better than random guesses, with high error (false positive) rates, regardless of the severity of the anticipated violence. In light of prior studies, it is concluded that juror predictions of future violence lack sufficient reliability to play a role in death penalty determinations.

OBrien, B. (2009). PRIME SUSPECT: AN EXAMINATION OF FACTORS THAT AGGRAVATE AND COUNTERACT CONFIRMATION BIAS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS. Psychology Public Policy and Law, 15(4), 315-334.

Confirmation bias is the tendency to bolster a hypothesis by seeking consistent evidence while minimizing inconsistent evidence. In criminal investigations, preferring hypothesis-consistent information could undermine accuracy by leading investigators to disregard evidence that challenges their theory of a case. Two studies examine factors that influence confirmation bias in criminal investigations. In Study 1 (N = 108), participants who articulated a hypothesis early in their review of a mock police file showed bias in seeking and interpreting evidence to favor that hypothesis. In Study 2 (N = 109), participants who considered why their hypothesis might be wrong showed less bias, but those who generated additional hypotheses did not. Implications for improving accuracy of investigations and suggestions for future research are discussed.

Perlin, M. L., & McClain, V. (2009). ''WHERE SOULS ARE FORGOTTEN'': Cultural Competencies, Forensic Evaluations, and International Human Rights. Psychology Public Policy and Law, 15(4), 257-277.

Cultural competency is critical in criminal forensic evaluations. Cultural competency eschews reliance on stereotypes, precluding the mistake of assuming that cultural dictates apply with equal force to all who share a cultural background, thus allowing the forensic examiner to provide a comprehensive picture of the defendant to the fact-finder. While raised frequently in death penalty cases, the idea of cultural competency is equally important to the entire criminal process. To better understand the significance of this inquiry, we address how cultural sensitivity in test selection and interview techniques may enhance result validity. In a parallel fashion, ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has drawn importance to cultural competency. Although international human rights and cultural sensitivity have been considered with regard to race, gender, and religion, applications to criminal matters are still in their infancy. This article considers strategies to enhance the effectiveness of testimony and mitigation efforts

Technorati Tags: psychology, forensic psychology, forensic psychiatry, neuropsychology, neurotechnology, neuroscience, criminal psychology, criminal justice, criminal personalities, juries, jury decision making, cultural competence, adolescence, adolescent brain, confirmation bias, death penalty, capital punishment, ICDP

Law review article: Irreconcilable Differences? The Troubled Marriage of Science and Law (Haack, 2009)

Irreconcilable Differences? The Troubled Marriage of Science and Law

Susan Haack
University of Miami - School of Law; University of Miami - Department of Philosophy



Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 72, No. 1, 2009
University of Miami Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009-22
Abstract:     
Because its business is to resolve disputed issues, the law very often calls on those fields of science where the pressure of commercial interests is most severe. Because the legal system aspires to handle disputes promptly, the scientific questions to which it seeks answers will often be those for which all the evidence is not yet in. Because of its case-specificity, the legal system often demands answers of a kind science is not well-equipped to supply; and, for related reasons, constitutes virtually the entire market for certain fields of forensic science and for certain psychiatric specialties. Because of its adversarial character, the law tends to draw in scientists who are more willing than most to give an opinion on less-than-overwhelming evidence; and the more often such a witness testifies, the more unbudgeably confident he may become in his opinion. Legal rules can make it impossible to bring potentially useful scientific information to light, and the legal penchant for “indicia” and the like can transform scientific subtleties into legal shibboleths. And because of its concern for precedent, and the desideratum of finality, the law sometimes lags behind scientific advances.
Keywords: expert testimony, Daubert, Joiner, science, inquiry vs. advocacy, fallibilism vs. finality, innovation vs. inertia
 
Technorati Tags: psychology, forensic psychology, forensic psychiatry, expert witnesses, expert testimony, scientific evidence, Daubert standard, science and law, neuroscience, law review articles

New expert added to ICDP professional expert blogroll: Dr. Timothy Derning

Timothy J. Derning, Ph.D., M.S.Ed.
Clinical and Forensic Psychology

Timothy J. Derning, Ph.D., M.S.Ed. is an forensic psychologist specializing in neurocognitive and neurobehavioral disabilities, including Intellectual Disability/Mental Retardation (ID/MR), developmental disabilities, high functioning Autism/Asperger’s disorder, Nonverbal Learning Disorder (NLD), Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder, etc.

Over the course of the past 20 years he has testified in numerous capital and non-capital cases involving intellectual disabilities in juveniles and adults. He has given expert testimony in pre- and post-conviction cases regarding deficits related to mental retardation, adaptive abilities, developmental delay, social naïveté’, the impact of low intelligence, suggestibility, coercive influence, malingering, communication impairment, psychological trauma, psychopathology and mental illness as these pertain to forensic questions of trial competency, ability to understand and waive rights, confession validity, diminished capacity, competency for execution, dangerousness, etc. Dr. Derning has also prepared opinions in retrospective evaluations of mental retardation in ‘Atkins’ capital cases.

Dr. Derning has been retained and qualified as an expert in Federal courts, and in Superior Courts in California, as well as in jurisdictions of New York, Georgia, Arkansas, Texas, Florida, Hawaii, Arizona, Kansas, Missouri, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, and elsewhere. He served as the mental retardation expert in the case against Jesse Misskelley (‘The Memphis Three’), the mental retardation re-trial of Johnny Paul Penry in 2002, and mental retardation case Craig Godineaux (co-defendant, ‘Wendy’s Massacre’ Queens, NY). Dr. Derning was retained by Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro in two class-separate action suits brought against the California Dept. of Corrections and the California Board of Prison Terms regarding the identification and ADA accommodation of individuals with developmental disabilities (Clark v. California (1998); Armstrong v. Wilson (1999)).

He currently serves as a member of the American Association of Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD) Death Penalty Task Force.  He also serves as a member of Arc California’s Task Force for Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder, and formerly served as a member of Arc’s California Task Force for Persons with Developmental Disabilities in the Criminal Justice System.

Over the past 20 years Dr. Derning has written and lectured on mental retardation and intellectual disabilities in the criminal justice system. He has conducted professional trainings and workshops for lawyers, mental health professionals, forensic psychologists, investigators, law enforcement, and the lay public at local, state, and national conferences. Working with Temple University's Institute on Disabilities he co-authored a training curriculum for mental health professionals regarding the assessment of defendants with mental retardation.

Dr. Derning serves as an independent psychological expert who subscribes to the ethical code of forensic psychology, which demands a balanced evaluation that is guided by the evaluation data and professional psychological research, favoring neither defense nor prosecution. He is not an advocate for individuals with intellectual disabilities, nor does advocate for or against the death penalty.

Contact information

710 W. Napa St.
Suite #2
Sonoma, CA  95476

Phone: 925-933-8661
Fax: 707-935-6224
timderning@aol.com

Technorati Tags: psychology, forensic psychology, mental retardation, intellectual disability, neurocognitive, FAS, developmental disabilites, MR, ID, death penalty, capital punishment, Atkins cases, Atkins experts, expert witnesses

Review articles (2005) on Daubert standard and role of social science in death penalty cases

Annual Review of Law and Social Science
Vol. 1: 105-130 (Volume publication date December 2005)
(doi:10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.1.041604.115907)
First published online as a Review in Advance on June 28, 2005

EXPERT EVIDENCE AFTER DAUBERT (click here to view)

Michael J. Saks 1 and David L. Faigman 2
1 College of Law and Department of Psychology, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona 85287; 2 Hastings College of the Law, University of California, San Francisco, California 94102; email: Michael.Saks@asu.edu, faigmand@uchastings.edu

Abstract: Daubert stands for a trilogy of Supreme Court cases as well as revisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Together they represent American law's most recent effort to filter expert evidence offered at trial. This review begins by placing the Daubert trilogy in the context of earlier judicial efforts to solve the screening problem, which began well before the twentieth century, and then provides a brief explication of evidence law under Daubert. Next, we discuss several aspects of the jurisprudence of expert evidence: its connection to debates in the philosophy of science, the practical legal problems courts are trying to solve, and procedural implications. Then we review and discuss varied impacts of Daubert: changes in law, marked increases in cases and scholarship relating to expert evidence, and research examining judicial gatekeeping under Daubert (civil defendants appear to benefit greatly and criminal defendants hardly at all). We conclude by offering several predictions and prescriptions for the future of expert evidence.

Annual Review of Law and Social Science
Vol. 1: 151-170 (Volume publication date December 2005)
(doi:10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.1.051804.082336)
First published online as a Review in Advance on June 30, 2005

THE DEATH PENALTY MEETS SOCIAL SCIENCE: Deterrence and Jury Behavior Under New Scrutiny (click here to view)

Robert Weisberg
Stanford University, School of Law, Stanford, California 94305; email: weisberg@stanford.edu

Abstract: Social science has long played a role in examining the efficacy and fairness of the death penalty. Empirical studies of the deterrent effect of capital punishment were cited by the Supreme Court in its landmark cases in the 1970s; most notable was the 1975 Isaac Ehrlich study, which used multivariate regression analysis and purported to show a significant marginal deterrent effect over life imprisonment, but which was soon roundly criticized for methodological flaws. Decades later, new econometric studies have emerged, using panel data techniques, that report striking findings of marginal deterrence, even up to 18 lives saved per execution. Yet the cycle of debate continues, as these new studies face criticism for omitting key potential variables and for the potential distorting effect of one anomalously high-executing state (Texas). Meanwhile, other empiricists, relying mainly on survey questionnaires, have taken a fresh look at the human dynamics of death penalty trials, especially the attitudes and personal background factors that influence capital jurors.

Technorati Tags: psychology, neuropsychology, neurotechnology, neuroscience, forensic psychology, Daubert standard, capital punishment, death penalty, Atkins cases, mental retardation, intellectual disability, American Bar Association, ABA, criminal psychology, criminal justice, juries, scientific evidence, expert witness

More on neuroscience and criminal justice

More on the increasing interest (and use) of neuroscience-based brain scan techniques in criminal court proceedings.  Check it out at the Stanford Law School:  Center for Law and the Biosciences.

Technorati Tags: psychology, school psychology, educational psychology, forensic psychology, neuropsychology, neuroscience, neurotechnology, criminal justice, neuroscience and law, mitigating evidence, Stanfor Law School, Center for Law and the Biosciences

Use of brain neuroscience in juvenile justice matters: Law Review Article post

Thanks to the Neuroethics and Law Blog for the information regarding the final version of "The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice" (Notre Dame Law Review, 2010) article. 

Technorati Tags: psychology, neuropsychology, neuroscience, juvenile justice, SCOTUS, adolescents, brain maturity

The right to silence--neurotechnology based probing of mental thoughts: Law review article

Although not directly related to Atkins MR death penalty cases, the emerging possibility of the use of neurotechnology to probe a person's thoughts and mind for criminal proceedings is thought-provoking...and frankly, a bit scary.

Fox, D. (2009).  The Right to Silence as Protecting Mental Control: Forensic Neuroscience and 'the Spirit and History of the Fifth Amendment  Akron Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 2, 2009 (click here to access site where manuscript can be downloaded)

This article examines the idea that individuals have a moral and constitutional right of control over the use of their thoughts vis-a-vis the state. As a point of departure, I consider the prospect of a forensic neuroimaging device that could elicit recall and recognition from a criminal suspect without his having even to answer an interrogator's question. Reflection on government access to this sort of interrogation technique leads me to argue that the state should be prohibited either from extracting a person's thoughts without her meaningful consent or from making use of her compelled thoughts to lay criminal blame upon her. Though neither judges nor scholars have defended this account of the right to silence in explicit terms, the notion of "mental control" I shall develop here underlies much that is assumed about the relation between the Fifth Amendment and the values of freedom and privacy. By promising acquisition of incriminating information from a person's brain in a way that avoids traditional concerns about physical or psychological harm, advances in cognitive science and neurotechnology bring the moral and legal significance of mental control into sharp relief.

Technorati Tags: psychology, forensic psychology, forensic science, neuroscience, neurotechnology, law review articles, criminal justice, criminal psychology, Fifth Ammendment, mental thoughts, mental control, right to silence, Akron Law Review

Behavioral Sciences & Law (2009, V27): Neuroscience, psychology, moral decsion making and the law

A recent issue Behavioral Sciences and the Law (2009, V27) may indirectly relate to mental retardation death penalty cases. The issue deals with The Neuroscience and Psychology of Moral Decision Making and the Law. A copy of the editors (Erickson et al., 2009) introductory article can be found here.