MUST READ: Atkins best practice and standard recommendations (McVaugh & Cunningham, 2009)

I've been toying with the idea of jotting down a list of suggested "best practice" recommendations and suggested professional standards based on the mass of literature that I've been reading since starting the ICDP blog.  Every time I think I should start, I have been paralyzed by the sheer scope of the task....reading and taking notes from all relevant literature sources would take massive time...and I have no grad. assistants or employees.  I was thus thrilled when the following article arrived in my email inbox today.

Although I may not agree 100% with everything these authors state, I must say that with regard to what I have read to date, this article is probably the best single and solid source on suggested best practice and professional standard recommendations for the assessment and Dx of MR/ID in Atkins cases.  The authors present 20 different recommended guidelines covering a large number of the critical issues in assessment and DX of MR/ID in a legal context (e.g., practice effects, SEM, Flynn Effect, retrospective assessment of AB, adaptive behavior domains, different state statutes, etc.). 

This is a MUST read for all mental health professionals and folks in the legal profession who are involved in Atkins cases.  I think this document could serve as a foundational starting point for any group working on the development of standards and practice recommendations in Atkins MR/ID cases.

Kudos to the authors for the excellent work.  I plan to reread numerous times, and may add "my variations on a theme" to some of the specific guidelines (when time permits).

MacVaugh, G. & Cunningham, M. (2009).  Atkins v. Virginia: Implications and recommendations for forensic practice. The Journal of Psychiatry the Law, 37, 131-187 (click here to view)

Abstract

In 2002, the United States Supreme Court held in the landmark case of Atkins v. Virginia that the execution of individuals who have mental retardation is unconstitutional. Following the Atkins holding, courts in death penalty jurisdictions have relied heavily upon mental health professionals in making a determination of whether or not capital offenders have mental retardation. The determination of mental retardation in death penalty cases, however, presents complex challenges for both courts and mental health professionals. In addition, there is variability in how death penalty states define mental retardation and in the assessment methods used by mental health professionals to diagnose mental retardation in such cases. The purpose of this article is to (a) describe how statutes in death penalty jurisdictions have operationalized the various clinical definitions of mental retardation, (b) discuss issues confronting examiners in assessing and diagnosing mental retardation in Atkins cases, and (c) provide recommendations for forensic practice.

Technorati Tags: psychology, forensic psychology, forensic psychiatry, neuropsychology, intelligence, school psychology, psychometrics, educational psychology, IQ, IQ tests, IQ scores, adaptive behavior, adaptive functioning, intellectual disability, mental retardation, MR, ID, criminal psychology, criminal defense, criminal justice, ABA, American Bar Association, Atkins cases, death penalty, capital punishment, AAIDD, Atkins MR/ID listserv, ICDP blog, standards, cultural issues, professional standards, best practice, Daubert standard, clinical judgment

The Wechsler-like IQ subtest scaled score metric: The potential for misuse, misinterpretation and impact on critical life decisions---draft report in search of feedback

The following are the first three paragraphs (and a critical figure) of a draft of an IAP Applied Psychometrics 101 Brief Report (#5).  The complete report can be download in PDF format by clicking here.  A web-page version of the complete report can be found by clicking here (note - the web page verision may NOT display two embedded figures....viewing the PDF copy may be necessary)

I'm providing this initial draft report with the expressed intent of soliciting feedback and comments regarding the accuracy and soundness of my analyses and logic.  I'm looking for critical feedback to improve the report.  This is a draft report that will be revised if comments suggest important changes.  Please read it in the spirit of "tossing out some critical ideas" for reflective analysis and feedback.  Feedback can be sent directly to me (iap@earthlink.net) or could be provided in the form of listserv thread discussions at the NASP and/or CHC listservs.


I've recently been skimming James Flynn's new book (What is Intelligence:  Beyond the Flynn Effect) to better understand the methodology and interpretation of the Flynn effect. Of particular interest to me (as an applied measurement person) is his analysis of the individual subtest scores from the various Wechsler scales across time. As most psychologists know, Wechsler subtest scaled scores (ss) are on a scale with a mean (M) = 10 and a standard deviation (SD) = 3. The subtest ss range from 1 to 19.  In Appendix 1 of his book, Flynn states "it is customary to score subtests on a scale in which the SD is 3, as opposed to IQ scores which are scaled with SD set at 15. To convert to IQ, just multiply subtest gains by five, as was done to get the IQ gains in the last column."  At first glance, this statement makes it sound as if the transformation of subtest ss to IQ SS is an easy (“just multiply….”; emphasis added by me) and mathematically acceptable procedure without problems. However, on close inspection this transformation has the potential to introduce unknown sources of error into the precision of the transformed SS scores.  It is the goal of this brief technical post to explain the issues involved when making this ss-to- IQ SS conversion.

The ss 1-19 scale has a long history in the Wechsler batteries. For sample, in Appendix 1 of Measurement of Adult Intelligence (Wechsler, 1944), Wechsler described the steps used to translate subtest raw scores to the new ss metric. The Wechsler batteries have continued this tradition in each new revision, although the methodology and procedures to calculate the ss 1-19 values have become more sophisticated over time.   Although the methods used to develop the Wechsler ss 1-19 scale may have become more sophisticated, the resultant underlying scale for each subtest has not…scores still range from 1-19 (M=10; SD=3).  Also, the most recent Stanford-Binet—5th Edition (SB5; Roid, 2003) and Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children-2nd Edition (KABC-II) have both adopted the same ss 1-19 scale for their respective individual subtests.

Why is this relatively crude (to be defined below) scale metric still used in some intelligence batteries when other contemporary intelligence batteries provide subtest scale metrics with finer measurement resolution?  For example, the DAS-II (Elliott, 2007) places individual test scores on the T-scale (M=50; SD=10), with scores that range from 10-90.  The WJ III (McGrew & Woodcock, 2001) places all test and composite scores on the standard score (SS) metric associated with full scale and composite scores (M=100; SD=15).  The critical question to be asked is “are there advantages or disadvantages to retaining the historical ss 1-19 scale or, are their real advantages to having individual test scales with finer measurement resolution (DAS-II; WJ III)?”

......continued............
(complete report available at links in first paragraph of this post)

[Double click on image to enlarge]

Technorati Tags: psychology, Flynn Effect,school psychology, educational psychology, neuropsychology, forensice psychology, criminal psychology, criminal justice, psychometrics, Wechslers, WISC-III, WISC-IV, WAIS-III, WAIS-IV, WJ III, DAS-II, KABC-II, SB5, intelligence, IQ tests, IQ scores, scaled scores, MR, ID, mental retardation, intellectual disability, capital punishment, death penalty, IAP AP101 report

Adapitve behavior "best practices" in Atkins MR/ID cases: Tasse (2009)

The ongoing critical issue poll on the ICDP  blog sidebar has made it clear that readers want more information regarding the nature and measurement of the construct of adaptive behavior.  Although the assessment and definition of adaptive behavior has progressed over the past decades, it is not enjoyed the lengthy history of research that has resulted in current intelligence testing technology. That being said, I'm going to attempt to make more posts related to adaptive behavior in the context of Atkins cases. These posts will be based primarily on my reading of professional journal articles or book chapters written by authorities in the field.   As always, I'm extend an open invitation to individuals with expertise in adaptive behavior to submit guest blog posts in this area.

I selected this article because I agree with most of what  Dr. Tassé suggests and recommends.

• Tassé, M. J.  Adaptive Behavior Assessment and the Diagnosis of Mental Retardation in Capital Cases.  Online Publication Date: 01 April 2009 . To cite this Article Tassé, Marc J.(2009)'Adaptive Behavior Assessment and the Diagnosis of Mental Retardation in Capital Cases',Applied Neuropsychology,16:2,114 — 123 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/09084280902864451 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09084280902864451

Highlights from article

(unless otherwise specified via italics or underlying, the following text are direct extractions from the article. Any comments by the blog master are designated by italics or underlining.)

• According to the author, the primary adaptive behavior issues in Atkins cases are: Issues related to standardized assessment instruments, self-report, selection of respondents, use of collateral information, malingering, and clinical judgment are discussed.

• Adaptive behavior is defined as the collection of conceptual, social, and practical skills that have been learned by people to function in their everyday lives

• Standard definitions of mental retardation indicates that there must be:  deficits in both intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior, and these deficits must have originated during the developmental period. It should be noted that ‘‘originated during the developmental period’’ does not preclude making a first time diagnosis of mental retardation when an individual is an adult. The clinician must, however, adequately document that the deficits in intellectual and adaptive functioning were present before the end of the developmental period.

• A major distinction between adaptive behavior and intellectual assessment is typical versus maximal performance. This is a long-standing classic distinction first articulated by Cronbach.  This view is consistent with AAIDD’s long standing position that adaptive behavior assessment must focus on the individual’s typical performance and not maximal ability (see Luckasson et al., 2002).  Thompson, McGrew, Bruininks (2002) discuss this distinction in the context of MR/ID, personal competence, and adaptive behavior. The figure below, which highlights the typical versus maximal performance distinction (within the context of Greenspan's model of personal competence), was extracted from that Thompson et al. article and can be viewed by clicking here.

[Double click on the image to enlarge and make more readable]

• Luckasson et al. also emphasized the importance of using standardized adaptive measures that had been normed on the general population and assessed the broad array of adaptive behavior, including conceptual, practical, and social skills.  Note--the inappropriate use of adaptive behavior measures that have not been normed on the general population (e.g., SSSQ), when used in the context of Atkins cases, was the topic of  two prior posts.
  

• The use of a standardized adaptive behavior scale is often insufficient to capture all aspects of an individual’s adaptive behavior. Elements of adaptive behavior that are related to adult social adaptive skills or higher order interpersonal skills are lacking from most existing adaptive behavior scales

• Greenspan (Greenspan, 1981; Greenspan, 2006; Greenspan, 2008; Greenspan, Loughlin, & Black, 2001; Greenspan & Switzky, 2006) has devoted much of his career to studying and publishing on concepts that are often present in individuals with mild mental retardation, but under-represented in standardized adaptive behavior scales: social competence, gullibility, naivety, and lack of wariness

• Anyone conducting an adaptive behavior assessment is strongly encouraged to consult the chapter by Harrison and Raineri (2008) on the Best Practices in the Assessment of Adaptive Behavior. [Harrison, P. L., & Raineri, G. (2008). Best practices in the assessment of adaptive behavior. In A. Thomas & J. Grimes (Eds.), Best practices in school psychology (5th ed.) (pp. 605–616). Bethesda, MD: NASP Press.]
  

• Two of the more challenging aspects of any adaptive behavior assessment of an individual who is incarcerated include: the assessment of the individual’s present functioning and the assessment of the individual’s typical behavior in meeting community demands and expectations.
  

• Thus, assessment of adaptive behavior for the purpose of making a diagnosis of mental retardation involves assessing the individual’s present, typical behavior. as well as the individual’s functioning as it occurs in the community. It is not a measure of capacity or knowledge, but in fact is a measure of what the individual typically does and what is the degree of independence in performing these skills

• Stevens and Price (2006) recommended that future research in the area of adaptive behavior assessment should develop norms on prison populations. This author strongly disagrees with this notion. Norming an adaptive behavior scale on people living in prisons would have as much value as norming a new IQ test on people living in prisons.  Note--the blog master strongly agrees with this position.
  

The authors discuss the important concept of using convergent information

• There exists no one standardized adaptive behavior scale that captures the entire spectrum of adaptive behavior across all age groups (Luckasson et al., 2002; Thompson, McGrew, & Bruininks, 1999). This does not, however, negate the importance of using such measures when possible. Rather, any comprehensive evaluation of adaptive behavior should seek to corroborate information obtained on standardized measures from sources such as: school records, employment history, social security administration records, medical records, and interviews with respondents who know the individual well but who might not be able to provide comprehensive information sufficient to complete all domains on an adaptive behavior scale. In addition to the use of standardized measures of adaptive behavior, it is crucial to obtaining corroborating information from other sources. For example, the individual’s school records can provide a wealth of information regarding conceptual, practical, and social skills. It will be necessary to also consult social security administration records, driving record, employment history, medical records, and social and family history. In addition to interviewing individuals to complete a standardized adaptive behavior scale, it is vital to conduct clinical interviews of relatives, friends, teachers, coaches, employers, roommates, etc. in order to obtain some qualitative information regarding the individual’s adaptive behavior. This information can be crucial in providing corroborating information regarding areas of limitations and strengths.
  

Administration of standardized behavior scales and completing semi-structured interviews

• There are at present perhaps four well-known and often-used standardized adaptive behavior scales for the purpose of making or ruling out a diagnosis of mental retardation: Scales of Independent Behavior– Revised (SIB-R; Bruininks, Woodcock, Weatherman, Hill, 1996), Adaptive Behavior Assessment System– 2nd Edition (ABAS-2; Harrison & Oakland, 2003). Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales–2nd Edition (Vineland-II; Sparrow, Cicchetti, & Balla, 2005), and Adaptive Behavior Scale–School Edition (ABS-S:2; Lambert, Nihira, & Leland, 1993). The latter instrument, although used with some frequency in the schools, it is less well known in the forensic setting.

• The ideal respondents are individuals who have the most knowledge of the individual’s everyday functioning across settings. Typically, the individual’s parents or caregivers are the persons with the most opportunity to observe the assessed individual in his=her everyday functioning. As the individual becomes an adult, this role may shift to a spouse or roommate. Other individuals who may provide valuable adaptive behavior information include: older siblings, grandparents, aunts=uncles, neighbors, teachers, coaches, employers, coworkers, friends, or other adults who may have had multiple opportunities over an extended period of time to observe the individual in his everyday functioning in one or more contexts (e.g., home, leisure, school, work, community).

• Correctional officers and other prison personnel should probably never be sought as respondents to provide information regarding the adaptive behavior of an individual that they’ve observed in a prison setting.

The critical issue of retrospective assessment

• A retrospective assessment of adaptive behavior is often considered as the only viable option when the assessed individual is incarcerated. Interviewing a respondent while asking them to recall a time prior to the individual’s incarceration is the proposed means of capturing the individual’s typical adaptive behavior in the community and establishing a retrospective diagnosis (Schalock et al., 2007). It should be noted that there is no research available examining the reliability or error rate of adaptive behavior assessments obtained retrospectively. At issue is the respondent’s ability to correctly recall from memory the assessed individual’s actual performance. Memory degradation is a real issue and we do not have any solid research regarding (Memon & Henderson, 2002) recollection of another person’s adaptive behavior.

• To assist the clinician with this difficult task, Schalock et al. (2007) recommended specific guidelines to follow when making a retrospective diagnosis of mental retardation, including using multiple respondents and multiple contexts and assessing adaptive functioning within the general community and within the individual’s
  

The issue of clinical judgment

• Professionals should always use clinical judgment throughout the process of making or ruling out a diagnosis of mental retardation. One uses their clinical judgment in selecting an appropriate adaptive behavior assessment instrument, identifying who to interview as a respondent, assessing the respondent’s reliability, identifying and reviewing available records, and analyzing and interpreting all the available information to form an opinion.

• Schalock and Luckasson (2005) defined clinical judgment as being founded upon clinical expertise in a particular area and that clinical judgment is based upon a thorough analysis of extensive data. Equally important, these authors state that, ‘‘Clinical judgment should not be thought of as a justification for abbreviated evaluations, a vehicle for stereotypes or prejudices, a substitute for insufficiently explored questions, an excuse for incomplete or missing data, or a way to solve political problems’’ (p. 6). Hence, clinical judgment should not be used as a shield when one draws conclusions that are not supported by the assessment results, observations, and=or case records.

Authors concluding comments

• Most individuals with mental retardation will have strengths and areas of ability (see Luckasson et al., 2002). These strengths may confound a layperson or a professional with limited clinical experience with individuals who have mild mental retardation.

• Mental retardation is a clinical diagnosis that should be made or ruled out based on a rigorous and comprehensive professional evaluation of the individual’s intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior. If there is a presence of significant deficits, there must be an ascertainment that these deficits were manifest prior to age 18. A person who has been appropriately diagnosed with mental retardation should be identified as having mental retardation regardless of the individual’s living arrangement, accommodations, or supports in place that could very well result in better functioning.

• When we assess adaptive behavior for the purpose of making or ruling out a diagnosis of mental retardation, the use of standardized adaptive behavior scales is often central since they provide an objective metric with which to determine whether or not the individual’s limitations are significantly below the average of the general population. The information obtained from standardized adaptive behavior scales should be corroborated with information from other sources, such as interviews with other informants and a thorough review of records and previous evaluations.

• Assessment of adaptive behavior needs to be conducted using a combination of standardized adaptive behavior scales, adaptive behavior interviews of multiple informants who have observed the individual in different contexts, and a review of all available records. The standardized instrument is not error-free. The results obtained on a standardized adaptive behavior scale must be interpreted in relation to the instrument’s reliability and resulting standard error of measurement.
  

• Self-ratings on standardized adaptive behavior scales are fraught with potential problems and should be interpreted with caution.

• Retrospective adaptive behavior assessments should be well-documented with respect to respondents interviewed, procedure used, assessed time-frame (e.g., when individual was 17 years old), normative group used to interpret results, and source of convergent information that corroborates or contradicts results obtained. As with any type of adaptive behavior assessment, multiple respondents should be used and these respondents should preferably have had the opportunity to observe the assessed individual in different contexts. Results from a retrospective evaluation should be interpreted with caution.

• Making a diagnosis of mental retardation is not like baking a cake, where one opens a book, follows the in order to meet societal settings (Luckasson et al., prescribed instructions, and out comes the certainty of whether or not a diagnosis such as mental retardation exists. Making a diagnosis of mild mental retardation is one of the more challenging diagnoses to make (Schalock et al., 2007). Most forensic psychologists have broad clinical training as well as training and experience to work with the courts and criminal defendants. Mental retardation professionals often have training and experience in working with individuals with and without mental retardation, but lack the training regarding the forensic science. The Atkins Supreme Court decision has resulted in the bridging of two fields: forensic psychology and the interdisciplinary field of mental retardation. Perhaps it is time to answer Everington and Olley’s (2008) call for forensic and mental retardation professionals to join forces and provide leadership in developing practice of mental retardation proposed practice guidelines should build upon an established national standard for diagnosing mental retardation (such as the AAIDD system), or else we risk creating a clinical diagnosis and a forensic diagnosis of mental retardation. guidelines for in the forensic the diagnosis setting.
  

Technorati Tags: psychology, school psychology, educational psychology, forensic psychology, neuropsychology, criminal psychology, criminal justice, ABA, adaptive behavior, AAIDD, SEM, standard error of measurment, clinical judgement, Atkins cases, MR, ID, mental retardation, intellectual disability, death penalty, capital punishment

Malingering in Atkins MR/ID DP cases: State-of-the art, malinger by proxy, and voodoo psychometrics

A quick reading of a small sample of Atkins MR/ID death penalty court decisions makes it clear that the issue of malingering is often a critical component of expert testimony.

The APA Dictionary of Psychology defines malingering as:

the deliberate feigning of an illness or disability to achieve a particular desired outcome (e.g., financial gain or escaping responsibility, punishment, impresonment, or military duty) (p.551)

    
I am not an expert on the state-of-the-art of the psychometric integrity of various malingering measures used to purportedly detect defendant malingering.  Clearly in capital punishment cases there is the possibility of a strong motivation to score low on IQ tests or standardized measures of adaptive behavior -- lower scores may make the difference between execution or life in prison without parole. Not being an expert in this area of forensic assessment, I'm going to try provide information from high quality sources re: the state-of-the art of malingering assessment.  Also, when appropriate, I will point out situations of inappropriate (unethical?) malingering assessment methods when they are obvious.  This current post contains a sampling of interesting malingering issues, research, and an example of inappropriate malingering assessment.  Click here for prior posts re: malingering issues, research and references.

What does the research say about malingering assessment in the context of intellectual disability determination?

I've found the scholarly work of Salekin and Doane to be of particular value in providing an evaluation of the research in this area. Below are two recent journal articles by Salekin and Doane.  I believe the abstracts/summaries speak for themselves.

Doane, B., & Salekin, K. L. (2009). Susceptibility of current adaptive behavior measures to feigned deficits. Law and Human Behavior, 33, 329-343.

Abstract

The current study examined the susceptibility of the Adaptive Behavior Assessment System—2nd edition (ABAS-II; Harrison & Oakland, 2003) and the Scales of Independent Behavior—Revised (S1B-R; Bruininks, Woodcock, Weatherman, & Hill, 1996) to the feigning of adaptive functioning deficits. Using four different instruction sets, the authors evaluated whether the provision of diagnostic information (a form of coaching) improved participants’ ability to simulate adaptive deficits commensurate with a diagnosis of mental retardation. The authors found that the ABAS-II was quite vulnerable to believable manipulation by raters, while the SIB-R was not. In fact, exaggeration on the SIB-R was easily detected regardless of the information provided. Implications regarding the use of these measures in Atkins mental retardation evaluations are discussed.

Salekin, K. L., & Doane, B. (2009). Malingering intellectual disability: The value of available measures and methods. Applied Neuropsychology, 16, 105-113.

Abstract

Atkins v. Virginia (2002) is a case that has changed the landscape in relation to the assessment of malingering in a legal context. This landmark decision abolished the death penalty for defendants found to have intellectual disability (ID; formally known as mental retardation), but limitations in our assessment techniques lead to questions regarding the veracity of ID claims. In fact, Justice Scalia noted with clarity that concerns exist regarding the ability of individuals to feign ID and to do so successfully. At the time of writing, little empirical research has been completed, but that which exists demonstrates an overall lack of validity for traditional measures of cognitive malingering for use with this population. This manuscript provides an overview of the utility of many of the traditional measures of malingering for use with an ID population and serves as a call for research in this very important area.

Summary

In closing, review of the research in the assessment of malingered ID demonstrates that effort tests and indices of cognitive malingering are not working with this population, and that true cases can be misidentified as malingered. Some would say that the inclusion of multiple measures of malingering and the interpretation of all of the data together, rather than tests in isolation, provide control for diagnostic error. But to date, we have no data to suggest that either of these techniques is protective and more importantly, we have no data on how a juror or a judge might be impacted by even the slightest mention of malingering. Though untested, these authors posit that it is very unlikely that a defense expert will succeed in supporting an Atkins claim if there is even a hint that malingering may have occurred.

Another interesting topic is malingering resulting from examiner bias.  I find the concept of "malingering by proxy" very interesting.  Below is a discussion of this phenomenon as described by Schlesinger:

Schlesinger, L. B. (2003).  A case study involving competency to stand trial:  Incompetent defendant, incompetent examiner, or "malingering by proxy" ? Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 9 (3/4), 381-399.

The most blatant kind of examiner bias, however, is seen mostly in forensic cases: the deliberate, conscious intent to distort or misrepresent findings for partisan purposes. This sort of conduct is a breach of professional ethics (Committee on Ethical Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists, 1991), unlike the involuntary forms of bias resulting from patient attributes.

There is yet another variety of examiner bias that is not an automatic act of impaired judgment arising from patient demographics, nor is it an intentional falsification of results. Here, the forensic psychologist finds in the defendant (nonexistent) signs, symptoms, or disorders that were initially suggested by the referring attorney. External incentives (such as economic gain) are typically absent. The effect, which could be called “malingering by proxy,” derives from the forceful opinions of the legal advocate, which can be quite contagious. My impression is that this form of examiner bias is not an uncommon occurrence in forensic work, where the structure of relationships leaves the clinician particularly vulnerable to such (nonconscious) infection.

The genesis of this form of examiner bias begins when the clinician is first approached about the case. Most forensic referrals come from a lawyer who attempts to recruit the consultant for the defense or the prosecution team. For instance, an attorney might call and say:

• Hello Dr. Z; I was referred to you by a psychiatrist, Dr. Y. She told me you had worked with her on many cases. Your colleague regards you highly and said you are one of the top forensic psychologists in the area. I’d like to retain your services for help with a client I represent. Dr. Y. saw my client yesterday and thought he was mentally retarded. My law partner and I just came back from the county jail, and he seemed retarded to the both of us. We all think he is incompetent to stand trial. Can I count on you to be part of the defense team? By the way, don’t worry about your fee; my client’s family is very supportive of him, and they’ll be sure to pay you promptly.

After an introduction like this, some consultants may find it difficult to disregard the flattery or to challenge members of a “team” they are about to join. However, if forensic psychologists are not careful at this point, they could succumb to a form of examiner bias that could jeopardize the entire evaluation before they have even met the defendant.

Junk science malingering assessment--from actual cases

In two recent Atkins court decisions in the state of Oklahoma (see Salazar, 2005 and Lambert, 2005), the states prosecution psychologist (Dr. Prosecution Psychologist - Dr. PP) testified re: malingering based, in part, on non-normed, non-standardized malingering measures that Dr. PP had developed himself, and one which he named after his secretary (in an attempt to mask the purpose of the test to the defendant).  The two "instruments" in question were the non-standardized Blackwell Memory Test and the Oklahoma Spelling Test.  Apparently the Blackwell Memory test was modelsx after other formal instruments that use a "forced choice symptom validity" test format.   Similar to prior voodoo psychometric activities commented on at this blog, I'm dumb founded that a professional psychologist testifying in an Atkins hearing, or any other clinical or forensic setting, would attempt to assess a psychological construct (viz., malingering) via the development of their own special instrument that did not undergo the professional accepted and required test development procedures (as clearly spelled out the the Joint Test Standards).  This activity clearly violates a number of professional standards. Below are at least two (and I'm sure there are more when one examines all relevant professional codes of ethics/standards) from the Joint Test Standards:

Standard 1.4:  If a test is used in a way that has not been validated, it is incumbent on the user to justify the new use, collecting new evidence if necessary

Standard 11.2.  When a test is to be used for a purpose for which little or no documentation is available, the user is responsible for obtaining evidence of the test's validity and reliability for this purpose.

Unbelievable.

Technorati Tags: psychology, forensic psychology, criminal psychology, criminal justice, neuropsychology, school psychology, educational psychology, ABA, American Bar Association, criminal defense lawyers, MR, ID, mental retardation, intellectual disability, IQ, IQ tests, IQ scores, intelligence, adaptive behavior, malingering, Joint Test Standards

Book: Clinical Judgement in mental retardation classification

FYI (no comment) post.  Clinical judgment in MR/ID determination is a complicated issue for courts to deal with in Atkins MR/ID death penalty cases.  I recently read an article where this AAIDD book was recommended reading.  I do not have a copy nor have I read the book.  Click here to learn more and/or order

Technorati Tags: psychology, forensic psychology, clinical psychology, developmental disabilities, MR, ID, mental retardation, intellectual disability, school psychology, educational psychology, special education, AAIDD, Atkins cases, death penalty, capital punishment