Showing posts with label neurotechnology. Show all posts
Showing posts with label neurotechnology. Show all posts

Friday, July 30, 2010

iPost: Judges intro guide to neuroscience

Nice little intro at link below. And I've learned that I can view PDF file in my new iBooks app on my iPhone...sweet

http://bit.ly/9Fzxgz

Sent from KMcGrew iPhone (IQMobile). (If message includes an image-double click on it to make larger-if hard to see)

Monday, May 31, 2010

Law Review Articles: Neuroimaging; false confessions

Brown, T., & Murphy, E. (2010). THROUGH A SCANNER DARKLY: FUNCTIONAL NEUROIMAGING AS EVIDENCE OF A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S PAST MENTAL STATES. Stanford Law Review, 62(4), 1119-1208.
As with phrenology and the polygraph, society is again confronted with a device that the media claims is capable of reading our minds. Functional magnetic resonance imaging ("fMRI"), along with other types of functional brain imaging technologies, is currently being introduced at various stages of a criminal trial as evidence of a defendant's past mental state. This Article demonstrates that functional brain images should not currently be admitted as evidence into courts for this purpose. Using the analytical framework provided by Federal Rule of Evidence 403 as a threshold to a Daubert/Frye analysis, we demonstrate that, when fMRI methodology is properly understood brain images are only minimally probative of a defendant's past mental states and are almost certainly more unfairly prejudicial than probative on balance. Careful and detailed explanation of the underlying science separates this Article from others, which have tended to paint fMRI with a gloss of credibility and certainty for all courtroom-relevant applications. Instead we argue that this technology may present a particularly strong form of unfair prejudice in addition to its potential to mislead jurors and waste the court's resources. Finally, since fMRI methodology may one day improve such that its probative value is no longer eclipsed by its extreme potential for unfair prejudice, we offer a nonexhaustive checklist that judges and counsel can use to authenticate functional brain images and assess the weight these images are to be accorded by fact finders.


Garrett, B. L. (2010). THE SUBSTANCE OF FALSE CONFESSIONS. Stanford Law Review, 62(4), 1051-1118.

A puzzle is raised by cases of false confessions: How could an innocent person convincingly confess to a crime? Postconviction DNA testing has now exonerated over 250 convicts, more than forty of whom falsely confessed to rapes and murders. As a result, there is a new awareness that innocent people falsely confess, often due to psychological pressure placed upon them during police interrogations. Scholars increasingly examine the psychological techniques that can cause people to falsely confess and document instances of known false confessions. This Article takes a different approach, by examining the substance of false confessions, including what was said during interrogations and how the confession statements were then litigated at trial and postconviction. Doing so sheds light on the phenomenon of confession contamination. Not only can innocent people falsely confess, but all except two of the exonerees studied were induced to deliver false confessions with surprisingly rich, detailed, and accurate information. We now know that those details could not have likely originated with these innocent people, but rather must have been disclosed to them, most likely during the interrogation process. However, our constitutional criminal procedure does not regulate the postadmission interrogation process, nor do courts evaluate the reliability of confessions. This Article outlines a series of reforms that focus on the insidious problem of contamination, particularly videotaping interrogations in their entirety, but also reframing police procedures, trial practice, and judicial review. Unless criminal procedure is reoriented towards the reliability of the substance of confessions, contamination of facts may continue to go undetected, resulting in miscarriages of justice.

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Research Briefs 5-31-10: Don't blink--you may be quilty

Leal, S., & Vrij, A. (2010). The occurrence of eye blinks during a guilty knowledge test. Psychology Crime & Law,
16(4)
, 349-357.

Abstract
In the present experiment we examined whether eye blinks could discriminate between guilty and innocent examinees in a Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT). Based on the assumption that guilty examinees would experience more cognitive load when responding to the key items than to the control items, we hypothesized that they would display fewer eye blinks during the key items than during the control items. For innocent examinees, responding to the key and control items should be equally demanding, and no differences in eye blinks between key and control items were expected. A total of 26 participants took part in an experiment where 13 guilty examinees committed a mock theft (of an exam paper) and the remaining 13 innocent examinees went on with their normal business. All participants underwent a GKT whereby their eye blinks were measured. Both guilty and innocent examinees displayed the pattern of eye blinks that we predicted. The implications of the findings are discussed.

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Wednesday, May 19, 2010

iPost: fMRI lie detection and Daubert standard

Story at MIND HACKS link below
http://www.mindhacks.com/blog/2010/05/brain_scan_lie_detec.html

Kevin McGrew PhD
Educational Psychologist
IAP (www.iapsych.com)
FInd via Google: IQs Corner
Sent from KMcGrew iPhone (IQMobile). (If message includes an image-
double click on it to make larger-if hard to see)

iPost: SCOTUS Graham decision and neuroscience

The SCOTUS decision re Graham was all over the blawgosphere the past
few days. The NEUROETHICS AND LAW blog had an interesting observation
re the role that neuroscience evidence may have played a role in the
decision via various amicus briefs. Story at link below---which also
includes link to copy of decision.
http://kolber.typepad.com/ethics_law_blog/2010/05/us-supreme-court-cites-brain-evidence.html

Kevin McGrew PhD
Educational Psychologist
IAP (www.iapsych.com)
FInd via Google: IQs Corner
Sent from KMcGrew iPhone (IQMobile). (If message includes an image-
double click on it to make larger-if hard to see)

Saturday, February 13, 2010

Research briefs 2-13-10: Neurscience and criminal justice

An interesting article "in press" regarding role of neuroscience in legal proceedings.

Schauer, F (in press) Neuroscience, Lie-Detection, and the law Contrary to the prevailing view, the suitability of brain-based lie-detection for courtroom or forensic use should be determined according to legal and not scientific standards.  Trends in Cognitive Sciences.

Abstract
The possibility of using neuroimaging to detect deception in legal settings has generated widespread resistance. Many neuroscientists insist the research is flawed science, containing weaknesses of reliability (the degree of accuracy), external validity (do laboratory results predict real-world outcomes), and construct validity (do studies test what they purport to test). These flaws are real, but although using neural lie-detection in non-experimental legal settings is premature, the critics are mistaken in believing that scientific standards should determine when these methods are ready for legal use. Law's goals differ from science's, and the legal suitability of neural lie-detection depends on legal standards and not those determining what good science is.
Article Outline
The current debate
Challenging the challengers
The standards for the use of science in law cannot be derived from science alone
Acknowledgements
References

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Wednesday, January 27, 2010

Research briefs 1-27-10: Relevance of neuroscience to criminal responsibility


The following article is available as "open access" from the Journal of criminal Law and Philosophy. The article can be accessed and read by clicking here.

Vincent, N. A. (2010).On the relevance of neuroscience to criminal responsibility


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Thursday, January 7, 2010

Law review article: Irreconcilable Differences? The Troubled Marriage of Science and Law (Haack, 2009)


Irreconcilable Differences? The Troubled Marriage of Science and Law




Susan Haack
University of Miami - School of Law; University of Miami - Department of Philosophy



Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 72, No. 1, 2009
University of Miami Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009-22

Abstract:     
Because its business is to resolve disputed issues, the law very often calls on those fields of science where the pressure of commercial interests is most severe. Because the legal system aspires to handle disputes promptly, the scientific questions to which it seeks answers will often be those for which all the evidence is not yet in. Because of its case-specificity, the legal system often demands answers of a kind science is not well-equipped to supply; and, for related reasons, constitutes virtually the entire market for certain fields of forensic science and for certain psychiatric specialties. Because of its adversarial character, the law tends to draw in scientists who are more willing than most to give an opinion on less-than-overwhelming evidence; and the more often such a witness testifies, the more unbudgeably confident he may become in his opinion. Legal rules can make it impossible to bring potentially useful scientific information to light, and the legal penchant for “indicia” and the like can transform scientific subtleties into legal shibboleths. And because of its concern for precedent, and the desideratum of finality, the law sometimes lags behind scientific advances.
Keywords: expert testimony, Daubert, Joiner, science, inquiry vs. advocacy, fallibilism vs. finality, innovation vs. inertia
 
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Thursday, December 31, 2009

Review articles (2005) on Daubert standard and role of social science in death penalty cases

Annual Review of Law and Social Science
Vol. 1: 105-130 (Volume publication date December 2005)
(doi:10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.1.041604.115907)
First published online as a Review in Advance on June 28, 2005

EXPERT EVIDENCE AFTER DAUBERT (click here to view)

Michael J. Saks 1 and David L. Faigman 2
1 College of Law and Department of Psychology, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona 85287; 2 Hastings College of the Law, University of California, San Francisco, California 94102; email: Michael.Saks@asu.edu, faigmand@uchastings.edu
Abstract: Daubert stands for a trilogy of Supreme Court cases as well as revisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Together they represent American law's most recent effort to filter expert evidence offered at trial. This review begins by placing the Daubert trilogy in the context of earlier judicial efforts to solve the screening problem, which began well before the twentieth century, and then provides a brief explication of evidence law under Daubert. Next, we discuss several aspects of the jurisprudence of expert evidence: its connection to debates in the philosophy of science, the practical legal problems courts are trying to solve, and procedural implications. Then we review and discuss varied impacts of Daubert: changes in law, marked increases in cases and scholarship relating to expert evidence, and research examining judicial gatekeeping under Daubert (civil defendants appear to benefit greatly and criminal defendants hardly at all). We conclude by offering several predictions and prescriptions for the future of expert evidence.

Annual Review of Law and Social Science
Vol. 1: 151-170 (Volume publication date December 2005)
(doi:10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.1.051804.082336)
First published online as a Review in Advance on June 30, 2005

THE DEATH PENALTY MEETS SOCIAL SCIENCE: Deterrence and Jury Behavior Under New Scrutiny (click here to view)

Robert Weisberg
Stanford University, School of Law, Stanford, California 94305; email: weisberg@stanford.edu
Abstract: Social science has long played a role in examining the efficacy and fairness of the death penalty. Empirical studies of the deterrent effect of capital punishment were cited by the Supreme Court in its landmark cases in the 1970s; most notable was the 1975 Isaac Ehrlich study, which used multivariate regression analysis and purported to show a significant marginal deterrent effect over life imprisonment, but which was soon roundly criticized for methodological flaws. Decades later, new econometric studies have emerged, using panel data techniques, that report striking findings of marginal deterrence, even up to 18 lives saved per execution. Yet the cycle of debate continues, as these new studies face criticism for omitting key potential variables and for the potential distorting effect of one anomalously high-executing state (Texas). Meanwhile, other empiricists, relying mainly on survey questionnaires, have taken a fresh look at the human dynamics of death penalty trials, especially the attitudes and personal background factors that influence capital jurors.


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