More on the Daubert standard: Two reports

Thanks to Kevin Foley for sending me these two Daubert related publications. Click on images to enlarge. Links provided under each image.

Click here to access

 

Click here to access

 

Posted with Blogsy

Book nook: Reference book on scientific evidence

Thanks to Kevin Foley for bringing the following National Academy of Sciences publication to my attention. It is possible to download PDF copies of the entire book or select chapters by going to this link and registering and following the instructions. Below is a copy of the table of contents

Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence: Third Edition
Committee on Science, Technology, and Law





- iPost using BlogPress from Kevin McGrew's iPad
intelligence intelligence testing Atkins cases ICDP blog psychology school psychology neuropsychology forensic psychology criminal psychology criminal justice death penalty capital punishment ABA IQ tests IQ scores psychometrics adaptive behavior AAIDD mental retardation intellectual disability scientific evidence Daubert standard expert testimony law and science

Generated by: Tag Generator

Law Review Article: Scientific evidence in the courts--Dillhoff (2011) on the Daubert standard

Scientific evidence in the courts----the Daubert standard. New law review article added to Law Review Article blogroll.

Dillhoff, M. (2011). SCIENCE, LAW, AND TRUTH: DEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE DAUBERT TRILOGY. Notre Dame Law Review, 86(3), 1289-1317. Click here



- iPost using BlogPress from Kevin McGrew's iPad

More on relevance of Daubert Standard to Atkins MR/ID death penalty cases

Ten days ago I made a post about an interesting Law Review Article dealing with scientific evidence and the Daubert standard.

Interestingly, a non-MR/ID court decision came to my attention almost simultaneously. The case is Millward & Millward v Acuity Speciality Products Group.

I am no lawyer and am not qualified to comment on the relevance of this court decision to Atkins MR/ID cases. However, a couple of trusted and respected colleagues of mine, who have extensive experience in law or psychology and law sent me comments and their permission to share their reactions and comments. They are reproduced below (with minor editing for format and readability) without comment.




Commentator # 1

The federal appeals court in Boston decided a case this week dealing with causation and stated that, “In this mode of reasoning [used by the expert], the use of scientific judgment is necessary.” And that, “No matter what methodology is used, ‘an evaluation of data and scientific evidence to determine whether an inference of causation is appropriate requires judgment and interpretation.’" Pgs 12-13.

There was no discussion whatsoever about “error rate.”

While disease causation and ID/MR assessment are far apart in the world of expert testimony, the court’s discussion is relevant in either situation, IMHO. With the ID/MR cases, since courts must decide whether the person is ID/MR, and can only do so with the use of expert testimony, experts have to be allowed to give their opinions. There are just some situations where the calculation of an accurate error rate is just not practical. But, my argument is there still needs to be some sort of definitive guidance in the areas, both legal-wise and psychology-wise. It shouldn't be like the Wild West.


Commentator # 2

That is a great opinion regarding admissibility. I read it and found many places that are great teaching points on admissibility, especially for those of us testifying in an area often referred to as "soft science." I cut and pasted some of the more interesting passages below. The entire opinion is really well written and the court clearly took time to reason through cases like Kumho, Joiner, and Daubert and examine he total picture rather than focusing on the narrow findings that came from Daubert (or at least the way many courts interpret the findings in Daubert).

---------------------------------------------

These factors "do not constitute a 'definitive checklist or test.'"
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999) (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593). Given that "there are
many different kinds of experts, and many different kinds of
expertise," these factors "may or may not be pertinent in assessing
reliability, depending on the nature of the issue, the expert's
particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony." Id.

Exactly what is involved in "reliability" was not and could not have been filled out by Daubert. Rather, the answers must come from developing case law in adjudicating individualcontroversies. "[T]he question of admissibility 'must be tied to the facts of a particular case.'" Beaudette v. Louisville Ladder,Inc., 462 F.3d 22, 25-26 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Kumho Tire, 526U.S. at 150).

Although Daubert stated that trial courts should focus "on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate," Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595, the Court subsequently clarified that this focus "need not completely pretermit judicial consideration of an expert's conclusions," Ruiz-Troche, 161 F.3d at 81 (citing Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146). In Joiner, the Court explained that "conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another" and "nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the
ipse dixit of the expert." Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146. Expert
testimony may be excluded if there is "too great an analytical gap
between the data and the opinion proffered." Id. "[T]rial judges
may evaluate the data offered to support an expert's bottom-line
opinions to determine if that data provides adequate support to
mark the expert's testimony as reliable." Ruiz-Troche, 161 F.3d at
81.

This does not mean that trial courts are empowered "to determine which of several competing scientific theories has the best provenance." Id. at 85. "Daubert does not require that a party who proffers expert testimony carry the burden of proving to the judge that the expert's assessment of the situation is correct." Id. The proponent of the evidence must show only that "the expert's conclusion has been arrived at in a scientifically sound and methodologically reliable fashion." Id.; see also United States v. Vargas, 471 F.3d 255, 265 (1st Cir. 2006). The object of Daubert is "to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony on professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field."Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152.

So long as an expert's scientific testimony rests upon "'good grounds,' based on what is known," Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590,
it should be tested by the adversarial process, rather than
excluded for fear that jurors will not be able to handle the
scientific complexities, id. at 596. "Vigorous cross-examination,
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the
burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of
attacking shaky but admissible evidence."


- iPost using BlogPress from my Kevin McGrew's iPad

intelligence intelligence testing Atkins cases ICDP blog psychology school psychology neuropsychology Forensic psychology criminal psychology criminal justice death penalty capital punishment ABA IQ tests IQ scores adaptive behavior AAIDD mental retardation intellectual disability Daubert standard standards of scientific evidence scientific evidence expert witnesses

Generated by: Tag Generator

Research brief: Can juror's detect junk science expert witness testimony?

I Spy with My Little Eye: Jurors’ Detection of Internal Validity Threats in Expert Evidence.. Click here for on-line version.

Bradley D. McAuliff and Tejah D. Duckworth. Law and Human Behavior. American Psychology-Law Society/Division 41 of the American Psychological Association 201010.1007/s10979-010-9219-3


Abstract

This experiment examined whether jury-eligible community members (N = 223) were able to detect internally invalid psychological science presented at trial. Participants read a simulated child sexual abuse case in which the defense expert described a study he had conducted on witness memory and suggestibility. We varied the study’s internal validity (valid, missing control group, confound, and experimenter bias) and publication status (published, unpublished). Expert evidence quality ratings were higher for the valid versus missing control group version only. Publication increased ratings of defendant guilt when the study was missing a control group. Variations in internal validity did not influence perceptions of child victim credibility or police interview quality. Participants’ limited detection of internal validity threats underscores the need to examine the effectiveness of traditional legal safeguards against junk science in court and improve the scientific reasoning ability of lay people and legal professionals.


- iPost using BlogPress from my Kevin McGrew's iPad

intelligence intelligence testing Atkins cases ICDP blog psychology school psychology neuropsychology Forensic psychology criminal psychology criminal justice Daubert standard Junk science expert testimony

Law Review Article: Admitting Doubt: A New Standard for Scientific Evidence

I am not a lawyer, but I find reading law review articles relevant to Atkins cases interesting...and they help me better understand the legal issues and court proceedings.  I found the recent Harvard Law Review note Admitting Doubt:  A New Standard for Scientific Evidence very interesting.  It deals extensively with standards of evidence and expert testimony and a specific focus on the Daubert standard.

As I learn more about Atkins proceedings, I've learned that there is a distinct distinction between legal and scientific standards of evidence and procedures.  As a social scientist who deals with probability-based research and methods, I found the following section particularly illuminating.  My guess is that psychologists who provide expert testimony in Atkins hearings are often frustrated with the different view that legal proceedings take toward evidence and the determination of truth.

Indeed, law and science take a number of different views on the determination of truth. At a structural level, the judicial system typically relies on zealous advocacy — within certain ethical bounds — to reach conclusions, while the scientific community tends to follow an organized skepticism model based on critical peer review.72 At a more detailed level, science and law treat causation differently:

• The law demands certainty and finality and generally forces its participants to render decisions and verdicts in binary pairs, such as causation/no causation and liability/no liability, even where evidence is ambiguous, uncertain, complex, and immature. In contrast, the scientific enterprise generally embraces probability and uncertainty and does not require the occasionally premature dichotomization of outcomes often required by the courts

iPost: fMRI lie detection and Daubert standard

Story at MIND HACKS link below
http://www.mindhacks.com/blog/2010/05/brain_scan_lie_detec.html

Kevin McGrew PhD
Educational Psychologist
IAP (www.iapsych.com)
FInd via Google: IQs Corner
Sent from KMcGrew iPhone (IQMobile). (If message includes an image-
double click on it to make larger-if hard to see)

Law Review Article: Twenty-five years of social science in law (Monahan & Walker, 2010)

Monahan, J., & Walker, L. (2010).  Twenty-Five Years of Social Science in Law.  Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2010-99


Abstract:    

In this Essay, we take the publication of the seventh edition of the casebook Social Science in Law (2010) as an opportunity to reflect on continuities and changes that have occurred in the application of social science research to American law over the past quarter-century. We structure these reflections by comparing and contrasting the original edition of the book with the current one. When the first edition appeared, courts’ reliance on social science was often confused and always contested. Now, courts’ reliance on social science is so common as to be unremarkable. What has changed - sometimes radically - are the substantive legal questions on which social science has been brought to bear.

Technorati Tags: psychology, forensic psychology, forensic psychiatry, neuropsychology, intelligence, school psychology, psychometrics, educational psychology, IQ, IQ tests, IQ scores, adaptive behavior, adaptive functioning, intellectual disability, mental retardation, MR, ID, criminal psychology, criminal defense, criminal justice, ABA, American Bar Association, Atkins cases, death penalty, capital punishment, AAIDD, Atkins MR/ID listserv, ICDP blog, Law Review Articles, social science and law, experts, expert testimony, Daubert Standard

MUST READ: Atkins best practice and standard recommendations (McVaugh & Cunningham, 2009)

I've been toying with the idea of jotting down a list of suggested "best practice" recommendations and suggested professional standards based on the mass of literature that I've been reading since starting the ICDP blog.  Every time I think I should start, I have been paralyzed by the sheer scope of the task....reading and taking notes from all relevant literature sources would take massive time...and I have no grad. assistants or employees.  I was thus thrilled when the following article arrived in my email inbox today.

Although I may not agree 100% with everything these authors state, I must say that with regard to what I have read to date, this article is probably the best single and solid source on suggested best practice and professional standard recommendations for the assessment and Dx of MR/ID in Atkins cases.  The authors present 20 different recommended guidelines covering a large number of the critical issues in assessment and DX of MR/ID in a legal context (e.g., practice effects, SEM, Flynn Effect, retrospective assessment of AB, adaptive behavior domains, different state statutes, etc.). 

This is a MUST read for all mental health professionals and folks in the legal profession who are involved in Atkins cases.  I think this document could serve as a foundational starting point for any group working on the development of standards and practice recommendations in Atkins MR/ID cases.

Kudos to the authors for the excellent work.  I plan to reread numerous times, and may add "my variations on a theme" to some of the specific guidelines (when time permits).

MacVaugh, G. & Cunningham, M. (2009).  Atkins v. Virginia: Implications and recommendations for forensic practice. The Journal of Psychiatry the Law, 37, 131-187 (click here to view)

Abstract

In 2002, the United States Supreme Court held in the landmark case of Atkins v. Virginia that the execution of individuals who have mental retardation is unconstitutional. Following the Atkins holding, courts in death penalty jurisdictions have relied heavily upon mental health professionals in making a determination of whether or not capital offenders have mental retardation. The determination of mental retardation in death penalty cases, however, presents complex challenges for both courts and mental health professionals. In addition, there is variability in how death penalty states define mental retardation and in the assessment methods used by mental health professionals to diagnose mental retardation in such cases. The purpose of this article is to (a) describe how statutes in death penalty jurisdictions have operationalized the various clinical definitions of mental retardation, (b) discuss issues confronting examiners in assessing and diagnosing mental retardation in Atkins cases, and (c) provide recommendations for forensic practice.

Technorati Tags: psychology, forensic psychology, forensic psychiatry, neuropsychology, intelligence, school psychology, psychometrics, educational psychology, IQ, IQ tests, IQ scores, adaptive behavior, adaptive functioning, intellectual disability, mental retardation, MR, ID, criminal psychology, criminal defense, criminal justice, ABA, American Bar Association, Atkins cases, death penalty, capital punishment, AAIDD, Atkins MR/ID listserv, ICDP blog, standards, cultural issues, professional standards, best practice, Daubert standard, clinical judgment

Court Decision: Johnston v Florida appeal denied--interesting expert opinions re: old vs new IQ scores

Last month I passed along an urgent plea re: an appeal of the non-MR/ID determination of Johnstone (Johnstone v Florida, 2010).  Yesterday the judge ruled against Johnstone an indicated that the burden of proof that he was MR/ID was not meet.

Although I have only glanced at the ruling (it was just yesterday), it provides some very interesting insights into how multiple IQ test scores across many years and different instruments are treated by different psychological experts and the court.  An interesting twist in the appeal was an attempt to make the case that scores from a new version (WAIS-IV) of a previously administered WAIS-III constituted "new evidence" that should be used in the MR/ID determination.  This brought up the issues of practice effects and the Flynn Effect...and the very interesting issue of how to treat scores on a new revision of a previously administered (but older) IQ test.  The discussion of how to evaluate the old and new WAIS scores (and old vs new norms) by the different experts is interesting, and in some places troubling.

I find it amazing that two of the psychological experts did not know the correlation between the WAIS-III/WAIS-IV as reported in the WAIS-IV technical manual.  One admitted not knowing the correlation and another suggested it was probably in the "mid .8."  The correct value, as reported in the WAIS-IV technical manual is .94----a point accurately made by the states psychological expert.  One would think that psychological experts testifying in Atkins cases would review the latest available research re: new instruments about which they are to testify...esp. the information in the technical manuals.  On this point the states expert was much more credible.

Also of interest was the introduction of the controversial 2009 Flynn article where Flynn suggests that the WAIS-III test norms are flawed.  Weiss (2007) has challenged the basis of Flynn's claim, and in an article I have "in press" (McGrew, in press; The Flynn Effect and Its Critics: Rusty Linchpins and “Lookin’ for g and Gf in Some of the Wrong Places”, Journal of Psychoeducational Assessment---special issue on the Flynn effect due to be published Dec 2010 or early 2011) I concur with Weiss's arguments.  Issues surrounding the Flynn effect are starting to heat up among IQ scholars.

Finally, the defense argues that the newer norms of the WAIS-IV make it a more accurate measure.  On this point I agree.  They then further argue that the change in the factor scores from the WAIS-III/WAIS-IV, which results in a different interpretation system of major component scores, makes the WAIS-IV a better indicator of intelligence.  Although I agree with the fact that the WAIS-IV factor-based index score system is a more valid system for interpreting cognitive strengths and weaknesses, this argument overlooks the more important central IQ score comparison issue..which is at the core of MR/ID Dx in Atkins cases.  Namely, as I have reported previously, despite the new organizational structure of the WAIS-IV, the ability composition of the FS IQ score (which is the best indicator of general intelligence -- baring concerns for the validity of the FS score and the need to look at part scores) is nearly identical across editions.

Using the consensus CHC model of intelligence as the cognitive ability taxonomy for understanding what IQ tests measure, CHC analysis of the FS IQ scores reveals that the WAIS-III/WAIS-IV FS IQ scores are not dramatically different in CHC ability representation (Gc- 31.8 v 30 %; Gv - 22.7 v 20 %; Gs - 18.2 v 20%; Gq - 4.6 v 5 %; Gsm - 13.6 v 15 %; Gf - 9.1 v 10%).  The high .94 WAIS-III/WAIS-IV correlation reported in the TM is not surprising given this CHC content comparative analysis.

Lots more to think about and discuss in the examination of all the IQ scores.  Maybe a future post...or, if anyone is interested, a good opportunity for a guest post.

I think there is a good chance that this case may try to get before SCOTUS   Correction----this case needs to go to the FL Supreme Court first.

Technorati Tags: psychology, forensic psychology, forensic psychiatry, neuropsychology, intelligence, school psychology, psychometrics, educational psychology, IQ, IQ tests, IQ scores, intellectual disability, mental retardation, MR, ID, criminal psychology, criminal defense, criminal justice, ABA, American Bar Association, Atkins cases, death penalty, capital punishment, AAIDD, scientific evidence, Flynn effect, validity, norms, practice effects, Johnstone v Florida, WAIS-III, WAIS-IV, CHC intelligence theory, CHC, Cattell-Horn-Carroll, Daubert standard

Flynn Effect Daubert challenges in Atkins MR/ID death penatly cases: The Flynn Effect is heating up

As discussed previously, the Flynn Effect (adjusting IQ scores downward due to the date of the norms of an intelligence test---click here for definition; click here for all prior FE related posts at IDCP) is a critical psychometric issues raised with regularity in Atkins MR/ID death penalty cases.  Although the FE is generally accepted as a scientifically and empirically-supported finding among intelligence scholars and applied intelligence test developers (although the "why" of the FE is still being debated), the FE concept is sometimes challenged as per scientific validity (Daubert challenges) Atkins cases.

Kevin Foley, a regular guest blogger here at ICDP (who has  a tremendous database of literature re: Atkins cases)  has located a few Daubert challenges.  In the  Kevin Green matter, there was a Daubert challenge to the Flynn Effect. Although the analysis was brief, the judge allowed the use of the FE and concluded that, " In addition to these indications that the Flynn Effect is widely accepted in the profession, the experts testifying during the evidentiary hearing all accepted that there is a Flynn Effect which causes, or at least caused through the 1990s, IQ scores to rise over time." 

In addition, Kevin has located FE Daubert-type challenge heating up in Texas (Eric Dewayne Cathey). In November, 2008, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the case back to the trial court to hold a hearing to determine,

• the scientific validity and reliability of the "Flynn effect";

• whether clinical practitioners who are ordinarily called upon to diagnose mental retardation for purposes outside of the criminal justice system use and apply the "Flynn effect" to I.Q. test results when making their particularized diagnoses of mental retardation;

• whether the application of the "Flynn effect" to individual test results is generally accepted scientific procedure in the pertinent professional community outside of the criminal justice system; and

•  the known or potential "error rate" of the "Flynn effect" as it applies to a specific I.Q. test result.

Click here for a copy of the document. As far as we know, the Cathey case is in the discovery phase.

Finally, the blogmaster (Kevin McGrew) is aware that a psychological assessment journal has organized a special issue dealing with the FE.  How do I know?  Well.....I've been provided copies of the two featured FE-related articles a as I agreed to be 1 of a number of responders to the two key articles.  I don't have permission to share the name of the journal, who wrote the two central articles, or whom else is responding at this time.  But...it is clear that scholars in intelligence theory and testing are raising some new questions re: the FE.  It is clear the the "heat is being turned up" on the FE both in the court of law and the court of psychological research.  During the next year there are going to be a number of important new research articles published re: the FE.  ICDP will post information regarding these reports as soon as it is possible.

Technorati Tags: psychology, educational psychology, school psychology, forensic psychology, court decisions, criminal psychology, criminal defense, Atkins cases, MR, ID, mental retardation, intellectual disability, death penalty, capital punishment, IQ, IQ scores, Flynn Effect, Daubert standard, ABA, American Bar Association, ISIR

JAAPL special issue on evidence, Daubert standard and forensic psychiatry and the law

The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law Online has published a special issue covering evidence-based practice and the Daubert standard with the field of forensic psychiatry and law.  The on-line  table of contents is reproduced below.  Thanks to Kevin Foley for bringing this to my attention.  

Contents: December 2009, Volume 37, Issue 4

INTRODUCTION TO SPECIAL ISSUE:

Graham D. Glancy and Michael Saini

The Confluence of Evidence-Based Practice and Daubert Within the Fields of Forensic Psychiatry and the Law
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 438-441. [Full Text] [PDF]

EDITORIALS:

Michael Welner

The Justice and Therapeutic Promise of Science-Based Research on Criminal Evil
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 442-449. [Full Text] [PDF]

REGULAR ARTICLE:

 Richard Rogers and Jill Johansson-Love

Evaluating Competency to Stand Trial with Evidence-Based Practice
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 450-460. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

 Frank Sirotich

The Criminal Justice Outcomes of Jail Diversion Programs for Persons With Mental Illness: A Review of the Evidence
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 461-472. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

 Michael Saini

A Meta-analysis of the Psychological Treatment of Anger: Developing Guidelines for Evidence-Based Practice
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 473-488. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

 J. Arturo Silva

Forensic Psychiatry, Neuroscience, and the Law
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 489-502. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

 Richard D. Schneider

Commentary: Evidence-Based Practice and Forensic Psychiatry
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 503-508. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

 Amy Phenix and Shoba Sreenivasan

A Practical Guide for the Evaluation of Sexual Recidivism Risk in Mentally Retarded Sex Offenders
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 509-524. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

 Stanley L. Brodsky, Tess M. S. Neal, Robert J. Cramer, and Mitchell H. Ziemke

Credibility in the Courtroom: How Likeable Should an Expert Witness Be?
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 525-532. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY:

 Neil Krishan Aggarwal

Allowing Independent Forensic Evaluations for Guantánamo Detainees
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 533-537. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

 Marilyn Price and Donna M. Norris

White-Collar Crime: Corporate and Securities and Commodities Fraud
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 538-544. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

 Sohrab Zahedi, Robert Burchuk, David C. Stone, and Alex Kopelowicz

Gun Laws and the Involuntarily Committed: A California Road Map
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 545-548. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

 Anasuya Salem and Cecilia Leonard

Psychiatric and Clinical Sequelaeof Delirium and Competenceto Stand Trial
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 549-551. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

 Joseph D. Bloom

Forensic Psychiatry and the Forensic Sciences: In Memory of Peter J. Batten, MD
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 552-555. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

LEGAL DIGEST:

J. Jason Buckland and Richard L. Frierson

Constitutionality of the Federal Sex-Offender Commitment Law
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 556-558. [Full Text] [PDF]

Joel Watts and Joy Stankowski

The Therapist-Patient Privilege Challenged
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 558-561. [Full Text] [PDF]

Praveen Kambam and Sherif Soliman

IQ in Miranda Waivers and Death Penalty
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 561-563. [Full Text] [PDF]

Sara G. West and Stephen Noffsinger

Absolute Right to Privacy for Prison Inmates
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 563-565. [Full Text] [PDF]

Edward Poa and Phillip Resnick

Competence to Waive Mitigation
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 565-567. [Full Text] [PDF]

Arwen Podesta and D. Clay Kelly

Forced Medication for Death Penalty Appeals
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 567-570. [Full Text] [PDF]

Mehdi Qalbani and D. Clay Kelly

Ineffective Counsel
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 570-571. [Full Text] [PDF]

Franklin J. Bordenave, II and D. Clay Kelly

Not Guilty by Reason of Somnambulism
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 571-573. [Full Text] [PDF]

D. Clay Kelly

Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 573-574. [Full Text] [PDF]

BOOK REVIEWS:

Denise C. Kellaher

Drug Court: Constructing the Moral Identity of Drug Offenders
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 575. [Full Text] [PDF]

Elizabeth Hogan

Correctional Psychiatry: Practice Guidelines and Strategies
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 576. [Full Text] [PDF]

M. Jerome Fialkov

Treating the Juvenile Offender
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 577. [Full Text] [PDF]

Edward Poa

Criminal Behavior
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 577-578. [Full Text] [PDF]

Technorati Tags: psychology, psychiatry, forensic psychiatry, forensic psychology, neuroscience, neuropsychology, psychiatry and law, psychology and law, competence for trial, mental retardation, MR, ID, intellectual disability, Miranda rights, Atkins cases, death penalty, capital punishment, ICDP blog

Review articles (2005) on Daubert standard and role of social science in death penalty cases

Annual Review of Law and Social Science
Vol. 1: 105-130 (Volume publication date December 2005)
(doi:10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.1.041604.115907)
First published online as a Review in Advance on June 28, 2005

EXPERT EVIDENCE AFTER DAUBERT (click here to view)

Michael J. Saks 1 and David L. Faigman 2
1 College of Law and Department of Psychology, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona 85287; 2 Hastings College of the Law, University of California, San Francisco, California 94102; email: Michael.Saks@asu.edu, faigmand@uchastings.edu

Abstract: Daubert stands for a trilogy of Supreme Court cases as well as revisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Together they represent American law's most recent effort to filter expert evidence offered at trial. This review begins by placing the Daubert trilogy in the context of earlier judicial efforts to solve the screening problem, which began well before the twentieth century, and then provides a brief explication of evidence law under Daubert. Next, we discuss several aspects of the jurisprudence of expert evidence: its connection to debates in the philosophy of science, the practical legal problems courts are trying to solve, and procedural implications. Then we review and discuss varied impacts of Daubert: changes in law, marked increases in cases and scholarship relating to expert evidence, and research examining judicial gatekeeping under Daubert (civil defendants appear to benefit greatly and criminal defendants hardly at all). We conclude by offering several predictions and prescriptions for the future of expert evidence.

Annual Review of Law and Social Science
Vol. 1: 151-170 (Volume publication date December 2005)
(doi:10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.1.051804.082336)
First published online as a Review in Advance on June 30, 2005

THE DEATH PENALTY MEETS SOCIAL SCIENCE: Deterrence and Jury Behavior Under New Scrutiny (click here to view)

Robert Weisberg
Stanford University, School of Law, Stanford, California 94305; email: weisberg@stanford.edu

Abstract: Social science has long played a role in examining the efficacy and fairness of the death penalty. Empirical studies of the deterrent effect of capital punishment were cited by the Supreme Court in its landmark cases in the 1970s; most notable was the 1975 Isaac Ehrlich study, which used multivariate regression analysis and purported to show a significant marginal deterrent effect over life imprisonment, but which was soon roundly criticized for methodological flaws. Decades later, new econometric studies have emerged, using panel data techniques, that report striking findings of marginal deterrence, even up to 18 lives saved per execution. Yet the cycle of debate continues, as these new studies face criticism for omitting key potential variables and for the potential distorting effect of one anomalously high-executing state (Texas). Meanwhile, other empiricists, relying mainly on survey questionnaires, have taken a fresh look at the human dynamics of death penalty trials, especially the attitudes and personal background factors that influence capital jurors.

Technorati Tags: psychology, neuropsychology, neurotechnology, neuroscience, forensic psychology, Daubert standard, capital punishment, death penalty, Atkins cases, mental retardation, intellectual disability, American Bar Association, ABA, criminal psychology, criminal justice, juries, scientific evidence, expert witness