Research Byte: Comparison of norms from three Spanish-language and one English-language WAIS-III tests (select subtests)

Norm Comparisons of the Spanish-Language and English-Language WAIS-III: Implications for Clinical Assessment and Test Adaptation.  Funes, Cynthia M.; Hernandez Rodriguez, Juventino; Lopez, Steven Regeser.  Psychological Assessment, Mar 7 , 2016, No Pagination Specified. http://dx.doi.org.ezp1.lib.umn.edu/10.1037/pas0000302

Abstract

1. This study provides a systematic comparison of the norms of 3 Spanish-language Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scales (WAIS–III) batteries from Mexico, Spain, and Puerto Rico, and the U.S. English-language WAIS–III battery. Specifically, we examined the performance of the 4 normative samples on 2 identical subtests (Digit Span and Digit Symbol-Coding) and 1 nearly identical subtest (Block Design). We found that across most age groups the means associated with the Spanish-language versions of the 3 subtests were lower than the means of the U.S. English-language version. In addition, we found that for most age ranges the Mexican subsamples scored lower than the Spanish subsamples. Lower educational levels of Mexicans and Spaniards compared to U.S. residents are consistent with the general pattern of findings. These results suggest that because of the different norms, applying any of the 3 Spanish-language versions of the WAIS–III generally risks underestimating deficits, and that applying the English-language WAIS–III norms risks overestimating deficits of Spanish-speaking adults. There were a few exceptions to these general patterns. For example, the Mexican subsample ages 70 years and above performed significantly better on the Digit Symbol and Block Design than did the U.S. and Spanish subsamples. Implications for the clinical assessment of U.S. Spanish-speaking Latinos and test adaptation are discussed with an eye toward improving the clinical care for this community. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)

Dr. Tedd Judd comments on Arbaleaz v Florida (2010) decision: Guest blog comment

Dr. Tedd Judd sent me the following comments re: the recent posting of the Arbaleaz v Florida case.  His comments were too long for the blog post comment feature.  His comments are reproduced "as is"

Dr. Judd states:

This case raises a host of issues. In this comment I would like to mention several and then discuss one, measuring adaptive behavior, in more depth.

1.       Should U.S. norms for IQ and/or adaptive behavior be used since that is the population they are being judged against and the context of the Atkins decision? Or should we use national norms from the nation of origin or some other subpopulation norms? Or national norms for childhood and U.S. norms for current?

2.       MR is not necessarily lifelong. Which time period is relevant? Childhood is relevant by definition. Time of the crime? Time of trial? Time of execution? (The reasoning behind various Atkins decisions suggests to me that all 4 of these time periods are pertinent, so perhaps Atkins evaluations should address all 4 distinctly.)

3.       Clinically measuring adaptive behavior in prison and using prison guards is problematic and prone to misinterpretation by the court but should not be entirely ruled out, since such behavior can be pertinent. Just by way of example, if a defendant earned a college degree while in prison it would not be intellectually honest to say that that was irrelevant.

4.       Potential bias in rating adaptive behavior (whether by self, family members, friends, teachers, prison guards, etc.) is problematic not only for Atkins but also when mitigation or access to services and disability accommodations and payments may be at stake. For this reason, validity scales in future versions of adaptive behavior scales would be useful. How to devise such scales is tricky, but I have some suggestions to offer here:

a.       Items that are very similar to one another could be included and compared for consistency of response, as is done in the PAI, BRIEF and others. This would address accuracy of comprehension, etc. but not systematic bias.

b.      Instead of presenting items in order of increasing difficulty by category, as the ABAS and Vineland do, they could be mixed, as in most personality inventories. Then a computer analysis may be able to discriminate if responses regarding the easy versus hard activities show consistency. I believe that a similar strategy is used in the VIP malingering test.

c.       The rating scale could be linked to a performance scale concerning selected items on the rating scale. For example, there might be an item, “Is able to read a telephone number of 10 digits and dial it accurately.” This ability could then be tested directly. A few such measures might be unobtrusive, such as filling out their name and address and other information on the rating form and following certain written directions on the form. Norms could be developed regarding how closely performance matches rating and significant deviations might suggest invalid ratings. While an individual might still malinger on both rating and performance, they might not do so consistently. Such a matching could potentially pick up both overly negative and overly positive rating sets and may be particularly useful with respect to the validity of informant ratings.

d.      With respect to cultural bias, peer comparisons might be used instead of more absolute ability norms. In other words, items might be constructed as follows: “Compared to others his/her age, his/her ability to ____________ is: Much better, somewhat better, about the same (or average), somewhat worse, much worse.” A similar approach has been used with the Informant Questionnaire on Cognitive Decline in the Elderly (IQCODE) in which the person rated is compared to themselves 10 years earlier on various everyday memory and executive abilities. The IQCODE has been found to be sensitive to dementia and insensitive to effects of culture and education.



Tedd Judd, PhD, ABPP-CN

Cross-Cultural Neuropsychologist

Technorati Tags: psychology, forensic psychology, forensic psychiatry, neuropsychology, intelligence, school psychology, psychometrics, educational psychology, IQ, IQ tests, IQ scores, adaptive behavior, adaptive functioning, intellectual disability, mental retardation, MR, ID, criminal psychology, criminal defense, criminal justice, ABA, Atkins cases, Atkins death penalty, American Bar Association, Atkins cases, death penalty, capital punishment, AAIDD, Atkins MR/ID listserv, ICDP blog, psychiatry, psychiatry and criminal justice, Arbeleaz v Florida, cultural issues, cultural sensitivity

Court Decision: Arbaleaz v Florida (2010)

I am attempting to catch up on cases that need to be posted.  Arbalaez v. Florida (2010) is now listed in the Court Decisions.

I have only skimmed the decision and see that it is fraught with some of the usual thorny issues of a defendant being born and raised in a different culture (Columbia), demonstrating considerable fluency in his first language, and the inappropriateness (as outlined by expert witness Dr. Tom Oakland) of assessing adaptive behavior in a prison environment.   Lots to chew on in this one.  Given my close personal and professional affiliation with Dr. Oakland (he is listed as an expert here at the ICDP blog and is a good friend) I refrain from additional commentary due to potential conflicts of interest.

Technorati Tags: psychology, forensic psychology, forensic psychiatry, neuropsychology, intelligence, school psychology, psychometrics, educational psychology, IQ, IQ tests, IQ scores, adaptive behavior, adaptive functioning, intellectual disability, mental retardation, MR, ID, criminal psychology, criminal defense, criminal justice, ABA, Atkins cases, Atkins death penalty, American Bar Association, Atkins cases, death penalty, capital punishment, AAIDD, Atkins MR/ID listserv, ICDP blog, psychiatry, psychiatry and criminal justice, Arbeleaz v Florida, cultural issues, cultural sensitivity

Atkins MR/ID death penalty case a "notable petition" before SCOTUS. Hall v Thaler

Interesting potential SCOTUS development as reported at the SCOUTUS BLOG.  Hall v Thaler (previously listed here at ICDP as Hall v Quartermann;  has now been updated to be Hall v Thaler under the Court Decisions section to reflect recent developments) is reported to be a "notable petition"----which, according to the site, "indicates it is a case scheduled for consideration by the Justices."

The listing is under the notable petitions section of the SCOTUS blog, and includes links to filed background documents (5th Circuit opinion; Petition for certiorari;  Amicus brief of Texas State Senator Rodney Ellis et al; and Amicus brief of AAIDD and ARC.  The case is docket number 10-37.  I've only had time to skim a few pages but this Texas case appears to have the potential to raise a number of critical Atkin's issues---and provide SCOTUS with the chance to address some of the mess left post-Atkins.

Will monitor as close as possible.  Would appreciate others sending me FYI's as they learn and hear more.

Technorati Tags: psychology, forensic psychology, forensic psychiatry, neuropsychology, intelligence, school psychology, psychometrics, educational psychology, IQ, IQ tests, IQ scores, adaptive behavior, adaptive functioning, intellectual disability, mental retardation, MR, ID, criminal psychology, criminal defense, criminal justice, ABA, Atkins cases, Atkins death penalty, American Bar Association, Atkins cases, death penalty, capital punishment, AAIDD, Atkins MR/ID listserv, ICDP blog, psychiatry, psychiatry and criminal justice, Flynn effect, Briseno standards, Texas and death penalty, SCOUTS petition, Hall v Thaler

iPost: Adapting psych instruments to other languages: Master plans good idea

The adaptation of assessment instruments to the various European languages.

By Schweizer, Karl

European Journal of Psychological Assessment, Vol 26(2), 2010, 75-76.

Abstract

The peoples of Europe use many languages for communication. This variety of languages is, on the one hand, advantageous for the expression of local specialties and peculiarities; but there are also disadvantages. One of them is the restriction on the applicability of psychological measures since psychological assessment by means of questionnaires, tests, and other assessment instruments can only be accomplished by taking the clients' linguistic capabilities into account. As a consequence, measures have to be developed and validated separately for each and every European language. The development and validation of measures can be achieved in two ways: They can be developed according to one master plan or by following quite different routes. Fortunately, there is presently the tendency to accept major theoretical developments and related measures as master plans and to transfer such measures from the original language into other languages. This makes it possible that many scientists concentrate their research efforts on key concepts and theories. 

Sent from KMcGrew iPhone (IQMobile). (If message includes an image-double click on it to make larger-if hard to see) 

MUST READ: Atkins best practice and standard recommendations (McVaugh & Cunningham, 2009)

I've been toying with the idea of jotting down a list of suggested "best practice" recommendations and suggested professional standards based on the mass of literature that I've been reading since starting the ICDP blog.  Every time I think I should start, I have been paralyzed by the sheer scope of the task....reading and taking notes from all relevant literature sources would take massive time...and I have no grad. assistants or employees.  I was thus thrilled when the following article arrived in my email inbox today.

Although I may not agree 100% with everything these authors state, I must say that with regard to what I have read to date, this article is probably the best single and solid source on suggested best practice and professional standard recommendations for the assessment and Dx of MR/ID in Atkins cases.  The authors present 20 different recommended guidelines covering a large number of the critical issues in assessment and DX of MR/ID in a legal context (e.g., practice effects, SEM, Flynn Effect, retrospective assessment of AB, adaptive behavior domains, different state statutes, etc.). 

This is a MUST read for all mental health professionals and folks in the legal profession who are involved in Atkins cases.  I think this document could serve as a foundational starting point for any group working on the development of standards and practice recommendations in Atkins MR/ID cases.

Kudos to the authors for the excellent work.  I plan to reread numerous times, and may add "my variations on a theme" to some of the specific guidelines (when time permits).

MacVaugh, G. & Cunningham, M. (2009).  Atkins v. Virginia: Implications and recommendations for forensic practice. The Journal of Psychiatry the Law, 37, 131-187 (click here to view)

Abstract

In 2002, the United States Supreme Court held in the landmark case of Atkins v. Virginia that the execution of individuals who have mental retardation is unconstitutional. Following the Atkins holding, courts in death penalty jurisdictions have relied heavily upon mental health professionals in making a determination of whether or not capital offenders have mental retardation. The determination of mental retardation in death penalty cases, however, presents complex challenges for both courts and mental health professionals. In addition, there is variability in how death penalty states define mental retardation and in the assessment methods used by mental health professionals to diagnose mental retardation in such cases. The purpose of this article is to (a) describe how statutes in death penalty jurisdictions have operationalized the various clinical definitions of mental retardation, (b) discuss issues confronting examiners in assessing and diagnosing mental retardation in Atkins cases, and (c) provide recommendations for forensic practice.

Technorati Tags: psychology, forensic psychology, forensic psychiatry, neuropsychology, intelligence, school psychology, psychometrics, educational psychology, IQ, IQ tests, IQ scores, adaptive behavior, adaptive functioning, intellectual disability, mental retardation, MR, ID, criminal psychology, criminal defense, criminal justice, ABA, American Bar Association, Atkins cases, death penalty, capital punishment, AAIDD, Atkins MR/ID listserv, ICDP blog, standards, cultural issues, professional standards, best practice, Daubert standard, clinical judgment

iPost: Caution urged in admin of neuropsych tests to Spanish speaking individuals

More info at BRAIN INJURY blog

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double click on it to make larger-if hard to see)

Research briefs 1-15-10: Confirmation bias, cultural competencies, adolescent brains, juvenile justice, criminal personalities

Recent articles of interest found during my weekly search of the literature.

Gurley, J. R. (2009). A HISTORY OF CHANGES TO THE CRIMINAL PERSONALITY IN THE DSM. History of Psychology, 12(4), 285-304.

There is much confusion now surrounding the diagnoses of Antisocial Personality Disorder and Psychopathy. Some individuals still refer to the two as the same diagnosis with different names, even though there is a consensus in the psychology field that the two are distinct disorders. Part of this confusion is likely to be the result of the overlap in the diagnostic criteria: both diagnoses are associated with a history of antisocial behavior. However, it is also very possible that this confusion in the literature is a result of consistent name and criteria changes for the “criminal personality” in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. To make sense of the confusion surrounding the two different diagnoses, the evolution of Antisocial Personality Disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders is examined in this paper.

Maroney, T. A. (2009). THE FALSE PROMISE OF ADOLESCENT BRAIN SCIENCE IN JUVENILE JUSTICE. Notre Dame Law Review, 85(1), 89-176.

Recent scientific findings about the developing teen brain have both captured public attention and begun to percolate through legal theory and practice. Indeed, many believe that developmental neuroscience contributed to the U.S. Supreme Court's elimination of the juvenile death penalty in Roper v. Simmons. Post-Roper, scholars assert that the developmentally normal attributes of the teen brain counsel differential treatment of young offenders, and advocates increasingly make such arguments before the courts. The success of any theory, though, depends in large part on implementation, and challenges that emerge through implementation illuminate problematic aspects of the theory. This Article tests the legal impact of developmental neuroscience by analyzing cases in which juvenile defendants have attempted to put it into practice. It reveals that most such efforts fail. Doctrinal factors hamstring most claims--for example, that persons with immature brains are incapable of forming the requisite mens rea for serious crimes. Limitations intrinsic to the science itself--for example, individual variation--also hinder its relevance and impact. These factors both explain why developmental neuroscience has had minimal effects on juvenile justice in the courts and illustrate why it generally should. Moreover, direct reliance on neuroscience as the metric for juvenile justice policy may jeopardize equality and autonomy interests, and brain-based arguments too frequently risk inaccuracy and overstatement. The cases also strongly suggest that neuroscience does not materially shape legal decisionmakers' beliefs and values about youthful offenders but instead will be read through the lens of those beliefs and values.

Developmental neuroscience nonetheless can play a small role in juvenile justice going forward. Legislatures and courts may regard that science as one source among many upon which to draw when basing policy choices on assumptions about juveniles as a group. To go further is unwarranted and threatens to draw attention away from critical legal and environmental factors--good schools, strong families, economic opportunities, mental health care, humane sentencing regimes, and rehabilitative services--that are both more important and subject to greater direct control.

Cunningham, M. D., Sorensen, J. R., & Reidy, T. J. (2009). CAPITAL JURY DECISION-MAKING The Limitations of Predictions of Future Violence. Psychology Public Policy and Law, 15(4), 223-256.

The U.S. Supreme Court in Jurek v. Texas (1976) affirmed that capital juries are able to identify those capital offenders who will commit serious violence in the future. The capability of capital juries to accurately make these judgments as a means of deciding which capital offenders should receive the death penalty has been widely endorsed in both statute and case law, as well as embraced by jurors. A growing body of research on rates and correlates of prison violence, however, points to this confidence being misplaced. Prior investigations of the accuracy of these capital jury predictions, though limited in number, have found alarming error rates. The current study retrospectively reviewed the post-trial (M = 5.7 years) prison disciplinary misconduct of federal capital offenders (N = 72) for whom juries considered “future dangerousness” as an aggravating factor at sentencing. These jurors’ predictive performance was no better than random guesses, with high error (false positive) rates, regardless of the severity of the anticipated violence. In light of prior studies, it is concluded that juror predictions of future violence lack sufficient reliability to play a role in death penalty determinations.

OBrien, B. (2009). PRIME SUSPECT: AN EXAMINATION OF FACTORS THAT AGGRAVATE AND COUNTERACT CONFIRMATION BIAS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS. Psychology Public Policy and Law, 15(4), 315-334.

Confirmation bias is the tendency to bolster a hypothesis by seeking consistent evidence while minimizing inconsistent evidence. In criminal investigations, preferring hypothesis-consistent information could undermine accuracy by leading investigators to disregard evidence that challenges their theory of a case. Two studies examine factors that influence confirmation bias in criminal investigations. In Study 1 (N = 108), participants who articulated a hypothesis early in their review of a mock police file showed bias in seeking and interpreting evidence to favor that hypothesis. In Study 2 (N = 109), participants who considered why their hypothesis might be wrong showed less bias, but those who generated additional hypotheses did not. Implications for improving accuracy of investigations and suggestions for future research are discussed.

Perlin, M. L., & McClain, V. (2009). ''WHERE SOULS ARE FORGOTTEN'': Cultural Competencies, Forensic Evaluations, and International Human Rights. Psychology Public Policy and Law, 15(4), 257-277.

Cultural competency is critical in criminal forensic evaluations. Cultural competency eschews reliance on stereotypes, precluding the mistake of assuming that cultural dictates apply with equal force to all who share a cultural background, thus allowing the forensic examiner to provide a comprehensive picture of the defendant to the fact-finder. While raised frequently in death penalty cases, the idea of cultural competency is equally important to the entire criminal process. To better understand the significance of this inquiry, we address how cultural sensitivity in test selection and interview techniques may enhance result validity. In a parallel fashion, ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has drawn importance to cultural competency. Although international human rights and cultural sensitivity have been considered with regard to race, gender, and religion, applications to criminal matters are still in their infancy. This article considers strategies to enhance the effectiveness of testimony and mitigation efforts

Technorati Tags: psychology, forensic psychology, forensic psychiatry, neuropsychology, neurotechnology, neuroscience, criminal psychology, criminal justice, criminal personalities, juries, jury decision making, cultural competence, adolescence, adolescent brain, confirmation bias, death penalty, capital punishment, ICDP

Cultural competencies and forensic evaluations: Perlin & McClain (2009)

Perlin, M. & McClain, V. (2009).  Where souls are forgotten:  Cultural competencies, forensic evaluations, and internal human rights.  Psychology Public Policy and Law, 15(4), 257-277. (click here to view)

Abstract

Cultural competency is critical in criminal forensic evaluations. Cultural competency eschews reliance on stereotypes, precluding the mistake of assuming that cultural dictates apply with equal force to all who share a cultural background, thus allowing the forensic examiner to provide a comprehensive picture of the defendant to the fact-finder. While raised frequently in death penalty cases, the idea of cultural competency is equally important to the entire criminal process. To better understand the significance of this inquiry, we address how cultural sensitivity in test selection and interview techniques may enhance result validity. In a parallel fashion, ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has drawn importance to cultural competency. Although international human rights and cultural sensitivity have been considered with regard to race, gender, and religion, applications to criminal matters are still in their infancy. This article considers strategies to enhance the effectiveness of testimony and mitigation efforts.

Technorati Tags: psychology, forensic psychology, neuropsychology, school psychology, educational psychology, criminal psychology, criminal justice, ABA, cutural sensitivity, cultural competencies, psychology and law

More voodoo psychometrics in Atkins MR death penalty cases? This time adaptive behavior

Voodoo psychometrics strikes again!

A few days ago I made a post (and a subsequent brief FYI follow-up post)  regarding a number of theoretical and psychometric issues that surfaced in the Maldonado (2009) Atkins MR death penalty court decision (click here and here).  It was my opinion that a number of questionable arguments and decisions had been made re: the entirety of the psychometric intelligence test data available in the Maldonado (2009) decision. I won't repeat them here.

Probably my biggest criticism was the use of a non-empirical, unvalidated n=1 psychologist clinical procedure to upwardly adjust IQ scores based on educational and cultural background variables.  Today I learned  that similar "social-cultural" upward adjustment of adaptive behavior scale scores, which are the foundation of the second prong of the determination of mental retardation (or not) in Atkins cases, has also occurred in a number of Atkins cases.  This time I was able to locate an article by Denkowski and Denkowski (2008) that outlined the logic and reasoning for the recommended "systematic" procedure.  I read it in psychometric disbelief!

There is no reason for me to outline my psychometric criticisms, as a number of authors replied with most of the arguments I would have made.  These response, in the same journal, are by Widaman & Siperstein (2009) and Olley (2009) (click here for post re: AB-related chapter by Olley &Cox, 2008). Denkowski and Denkowski (2009) then reply.

As an applied psychometrician, I concur with most of the reactions and arguements of Widaman, Siperstein and Olley.  There is simply insufficent scientifc and psychometric grounds for the upward adjustment of AB scores as outlined.  Yes, psychologists are trained to use clinical adjustment when interpreting test scores, and I so invoked such judgement when conducting countless intellectual assessments during my years as a practicing school psychologist, but clinical judgement is not the same as the development of special score adjustments of nationally standardized psychological instruments based primarily on logic and reason.

Technorati Tags: psychology, forensic psychology, criminal psychology, criminal justice, neuropsychology, adaptive behavior, ABS-II, MR, mental retardation, developmental disabilities, Atkins cases, capital punishment, death penalty

Maldonado (2009) IQ MR Atkins death penalty decision: A psychometric miscarriage of justice?

I'm no longer shocked by what passes as credible psychological/psychometric evidence or testimony in some Atkins IQ MR death penalty court decisions.  Another such decision (Maldonado, 2009) has come to my attention.  A link to a PDF copy of the decision is now available in the Court Decisions section of this blog. 

Readers can gather all the relevant background information re: the case by reading the entire decision.  I intend to focus primarily on the psychological interpretation and psychometric issues in the decision that are troubling. 

But first, before delving into these issues, I  present a few quotes (from the Maldonado record) that capture the confusion and uncertainty surrounding many Atkins decisions, a situation that is resulting in considerable variability in the quality of psychological assessment data reported/interpreted and the common occurrence of "dueling expert witnesses".

Quotes from the record:

Because the Supreme Court did not establish a bright-line test to identify mental retardation, the Atkins inquiry has become a fact-intensive question that heavily relies on the opinions provided by mental-health experts. This case, like most involving Atkins claims, requires consideration of testimony from competing experts who disagree about the nature of mental retardation, the means by which it may be identified, the manner in which it manifests in a criminal defendant’s life, and the psychological profession’s role in making the legal decision of whether mental capacity precludes execution. (p.32)

A “welter of uncertainty” followed the Atkins decision because “[t]he Supreme Court neither conclusively defined mental retardation nor provided guidance on how its ruling should be applied to prisoners already convicted of capital murder.” Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330, 332 (5th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, federal courts have approached the implementation of Atkins with some trepidation. (p.36)

After reading a number of of Atkins rulings (see Court Decisions section of this blog), I could not agree more with these statements.  The courts appear ill-equipped to handle the complex psychological measurement issues presented, issues that are, at times, confounded by the inclusion of data from dubious procedures, interpretations of test scores that are not grounded in any solid empirical research, and the deference to a single intelligence battery (the WAIS series) as the "gold standard" when a more appropriate instrument (or combination of WAIS-III/IV and other measures) might have been administered, but the results of the more appropriate measure are summarily dismissed based on personal opinion (and not sound theory or empirical research).

---

Below are some of the troubling psychological/psychometric issues I see in the Maldonado (2009) decision

Lack of English language proficiency:  "A theme developed by both parties is that Maldonado’s lack of English proficiency has madehis exact intellectual capacity difficult to gauge." (p.38).

• As a result, the prosecution psychologist administered the WAIS-III "through a translator" (p.42).  The translator administered WAIS-III resulted in Verbal, Performance, and Full Scale scores of 74, 74, and 72 respectively.  A defense psychologist captures the essence of my reaction to the use of a translator-administered WAIS-III.  “The accepted practice in the evaluation on Spanish-speakers is to communicate with the client in Spanish without the use of translators. In addition, tests should be scientifically translated and validated and the most appropriate norms available should be applied" (p.49).  I agree.  I am unaware of any professionally established and endorsed procedure for the translated administration of the English-normed WAIS-III.  Such a procedure violates a fundamental backbone of the science of individual intelligence testing--standardized test administration.
  

Use of non-empirical clinical judgement procedures to upwardly adjust IQ scores.  On page 53 of the record, it is indicated that the prosecutions psychological expert believed that the translated English-normed WAIS-III scores needed to be upwardly adjusted due to Maldonado's educational and cultural background.  Additional support came from the finding of a Verbal IQ score of 83 on the WAIS Espanol (p.56).  Although psychologists are appropriately trained to recognize the potential impact of such environmental variables when interpreting scores, the psychologist  upwardly adjusted the scores to a specific IQ score estimate ("It’s around the 80s, I guess, if you had to pin me down. Around the 80s; somewhere in there"- p.48) and this expert "conceded that only 'clinical judgment,' not any statistical formula or established methodology, informed how much to alter an IQ score because of cultural and educational factors" (p. 53). 

My concern with this procedure mirrors the testimony of the defense experts in the case.  Adjusting obtained IQ scores, either up or down, based on an n=1 professionals clinical judgement, in the absence of any scientifically established procedure for adjusting IQ scores, is troubling and is not consistent with accepted psychological assessment practices or standards.  In fact, this IQ adjustmend procedure sounds similar to a notable empirical effort (in the late 1970s and early 1980s) to produce IQ scores that better reflected a persons social-cultural background.  Jane Mercer's SOMPA (System of Multicultural Pluralistic Assessment) was a valiant effort to adjust Wechsler IQ scores for African-American individuals based on their social-cultural knowledge and history.  The result was a new score called Estimated Learning Potential (ELP).  From the start, SOMPA was controversial and eventually was found to be flawed for many reasons (see Hellfinger, 1987; also Jirsa, 1983).  If a reasonably conceived theoretical and empirical IQ adjustment procedure (i.e, SOMPA), which was intended to account for a person's social-cultural background, was found to be flawed, how can a specific n=1 psychologist be endowed with unique insights that allow for the invoking of an unspecified personal algrorithm to make IQ score adjustments?  This is indeed troubling.  Also, to the best of my knowledge, SOMPA is no longer around and is not, or is seldom, used.  Race-based or adjusted norms have not been recognized as an acceptable professional psychological assessment practice for over twenty years!

Dismissal of the BAT-R intelligence results.  Maldonado had also been administered the Woodcock-Muñoz Bateria-R (“Bateria-R”), the Spanish-language counerpart of the Woodcock-Johnson Test of Cognitive Abilities--Revised [conflict of interest notice:  I am not a co-author of the BAT-R  or WJ-R, but was a paid measurement consultant on the WJ-R project and have since become a coauthor of the subsequent edition, the WJ III].  Maldonado obtained a Broad Cognitive Ability (BCA) score, which is analagous to the full-scale score from other intelligence batteries, of 61.  Of all the cognitive tests administered, this is the only comprehensive intelligence battery that was administered in Maldonado's natural language and where his performance is compared against appropriate US-equated Spanish norms [note-- the WAIS Español administered was also administered in his natural language and makes comparisons against Spanish norms, but only a portion, the Verbal section, was administered].  Also, as previously noted at this blog, the WJ-R/BAT-R and WJ III/BAT III provide for the most comprehensive assessment of intellectual functioning as per the consensus model of human intelligence (CHC theory) among serious intelligence scholars.  This is what I've termed the "Atkins MR death penalty IQ test-theory gap." 

Why were the BAT-R scores dismissed? 

The prosecution expert "testified that the AAMR has not cited the Bateria-R as a predicate test to the evaluation of mental retardation and “[i]t’s not well suited for that purpose, although you can use it for that" (p. 70).  He also stated that the "Bateria-R test score was especially suspect because it was inconsistent with Dr. _____'s administration of the WAIS Español in which Maldonado scored well above the range for mental retardation." (p.70). Furthermore, this expert "opined that the usefulness of the test was impaired because it 'is used by school psychologists to diagnose learning disabilities and it measures a lot of things like visual and auditory processing. It really measures very little in terms of general intelligence.' " (p.70).  As a result, "the state habeas court dismissed the Bateria-R score because it “is not one of the tests the AAMR cites for mental retardation evaluation,” but instead “is generally used by school psychologists to diagnose learning disabilities” and, in fact, “is not very relevant for establishing general intellectual functioning, so it is not well-suited for determination of the first prong . . . to determine mental retardation" (p.70-71).

There are many problems with the reasons given for dismissing the most culturally appropriate (for Maldonado) and comprehensive measure of intelligence (BAT-R). 

First, dismissing an instrument because it is used primarily by a particular set of psychologists (school psychologists) is non-sensical, and frankly, condescending.  School psychologists typically give many more intelligence tests than psychologists working in adults settings and use these instruments to diagnose mental retardation. School psychologists, in many respects, have more intimate familiarity with intelligence testing than most other professional psychologists.  

Second, the previously mentioned national expert panel that examined the Dx of MR at the same cut-point as Atkin's cases (for SSA benefits) indicated that most intelligence tests would be moving towards measuring the Cattell-Horn and Carroll Gf-Gc models of intelligence (now collectively referred to as CHC theory; also see McGrew, 2009), and instruments based on this model are very relevant to the Dx of MR.  The English version of the WJ-R WJ III (a CHC-based revision of the WJ-R) was listed as one of the approved instruments by the expert panel...which should also implicitly argue for use of the Spanish-language versions.  The prosecution witness, who appears  stuck in the land where the WAIS is the "gold standard," appeared unaware of the recent advancements in understanding the psychometric nature of human intelligence, which has converged on the CHC model of intelligence.  This is particularly ironic given that both John Horn (of Cattell-Horn) and Jack Carroll served as theoretical consultants on the WJ-R...which was the foundation of the BAT-R.

Third, stating that the BAT-R (and WJ-R by implication) is not a respected measure of general intellectual functioning reflects a complete lack of awareness of the CHC-foundation of the instruments, as well as published research (including the WJ-R and BAT-R technical manuals and bulletins).  If CHC theory is the consensus model of psychometric intelligence, then the only battery administered to Maldonado that measured most of the model, which in most conceptualizations has general intelligence (g) at the apex, should have been given serious weight.  I, and others, heard Dr. Arthur Jensen, the most prominent pscyhometric expert on g, at an ISIR conference in Nashville, TN, state, during a discussion of a presentation in front of the entire audience, that (at the time) he considerd the WJ-R (and, thus, the BAT-R by implicit endorsement) the best available intelligence battery for measuring g.  I will return to this point in future posts as I've been analyzing WAIS-III data together with the WJ batteries (as well as other accepted intelligence batteries, e.g., KAIT, K-ABC; SB-IV; SB-IV) to evalute the g-ness of each battery when jointly analyzed.

Fourth, prosecution psychologist used the WAIS Español Verbal score as evidence that the BAT-R was not accurate.  The problem with this logic is that the WAIS Verbal scale is known to be an excellent measure of crystallized intelligence/comprhension-knowledge (Gc), only one of the major 7-8 domains in the CHC model of intelligence.  Conversely, the BAT-R includes indicators from seven of the major CHC broad ability domains, only one of which is Gc.  No attempt was made to compare the WAIS Gc score with the corresponding Gc measure(s) on the BAT-R.  They might have been similar...or not.  More importantly, you cannot compare a measure of Gc to one that includes Gc and fluid reasoning (Gf), visual-spatial processing (Gv), short-term memory (Gsm), long-term retrieval (Glr), auditory processing (Ga), and processing speed (Gs).

I could go on and comment on other issues, such as the use of only the Verbal scale of the Spanish WAIS-III, as well as the whole area of adaptive behavior, but these are issues for another post, possibly by a guest blogger.

Technorati Tags: psychology, forensice psychology, criminal psychology, criminal justice, IQ, IQ tests, IQ scores, Verbal IQ, WAIS-III, Wechserl tests, WJ-R, WJ III, BAT-R, BAT-3, MR, mental retardation, developmental disabilities, death penalty, capital punishment, Atkins cases

Race Rears Its Ugly Head in Atkins case: Guest post by Kevin Foley

Race and IQ tests has been one of the most hotly debated controversies in the field of intelligence testing (click here for some recent post over at sister blog--IQs Corner).  To most psychometrician/measurement experts, the mere presence of mean IQ score differences does not meet the psychometric definition of test bias.  We measurement types typically define test bais as: (a) item content bias, which is now commonly removed via expert panels and differential item functioning [DIF] item analysis methods, (b) structural bias, which means that a test doesn't measure the same constructs across groups [and which is typically evaluated with confirmatory factor analysis structural invariance methods], and (c) predictive bias, which means that a test differentially predicts outcomes for different groups [and which is typically evaluated via the examination of potential differential prediction regression slopes].  Most contemporary intelligence tests address all forms of psychometric bias during test development.

The above mini-course not withstanding, Kevin Foley has written another excellent and though-provoking guest  post (click here to see his prior guest post) dealing with the introduction of racial bias claims, with an unusual "spin" on the interpretation of bias, in the context of experts testifying in an Atkins MR death penalty case in Tennessee.  K. Foley's guest post is reproduced "as is" with any URL links added by the blogmaster.  Thanks Kevin Foley for another well written and provocative post.

In an Atkins case out of Tennessee, two prosecution experts “testified that I.Q. tests have historically been biased against minorities in that they tend to underestimate the intelligence of minorities.” Memorandum Decision, Black v. Bell, ( U.S. Dist. Ct., M.D.Tenn., No. 3:00-0764, Apr. 24, 2008). In an Ohio Atkins case involving convicted murderer Kevin Yarbrough, the State “contend[ed] that the early tests were given at a time that IQ tests were culturally biased against minorities and could have lowered the test results”. Decision Order/Entry, State v. Yarbrough, Ohio Common Pleas Court, Shelby County, Case No. 96CR000023 (Feb. 28, 2007). In a similar vein, the trial court in Ex Parte Chester (unpub., Tex. Ct. Crim. App., No. AP-75,037 (2007)) refused to accord appropriate weight to childhood IQ scores obtained by Chester because the WAIS-R “would not adequately account for cultural, regional, or other types of factors that may have influenced [Chester’s] test results.” Since Chester is black, and his native “region” is reported to be Jefferson County, Texas, the import of this comment obviously refers to his racial background. Two other examples include the case of Eldridge v. Quarterman, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19647 (S.D. Tex. 2008), where there was testimony from a psychologist who “acknowledged evidence that minorities score artificially low”, and Maldonado v. Thaler, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88988 (S.D. Tex.) (prosecution expert testified that “cultural differences” probably artificially lowered immigrant defendant’s scores).

The author of a recent law review article about the consequences of Atkins asserted that, “There is evidence that some IQ tests feature an inherent cultural bias that leads some minority groups to score lower than other individuals.” M. Libell, Atkins’ Wake: How the States Have Shunned Responsibility for the Mentally Retarded, 31 Law & Psychol. Rev. 155, 162 (2007). Similarly, the author of another law review article claimed that, as a consequence of “flawed” IQ tests, “[e]conomically deprived people and ethnic minorities are . . . often erroneously found to be mentally retarded.” Lori M. Church, Mandating Dignity: The United States Supreme Court's Extreme Departure From Precedent Regarding the Eighth Amendment and the Death Penalty, 42 Washburn L.J. 305, 325 (2003).

Starting with Arthur Jensen’s tome, Bias in Mental Testing (1987), there is long list of scientific literature which would seem to indicate that IQ tests are not biased against minorities. Even though there is gap of approximately one standard deviation between the mean IQ scores of blacks and whites, and about half that amount between whites and Hispanics, that does not mean that IQ tests are biased.

Are the psychologists referred to above showing a bias of their own in attempting to give their party the testimony they want, and are the prosecutors, courts and legal commentators simply providing spin based on myth, not science? It would be nice to hear from some objective psychologists on this issue. Should comments like those above by made by experts in Atkins cases and in the discussions of commentators?

Technorati Tags: psychology, law, forensic psychology, criminal psychology, criminal justice, Atkins cases, mental retardation, MR, developmental disabilities, IQ, IQ tests, IQ scores, race, test bias, racial bias, bias in mental testing, Kevin Foley, neuropsychology, clinical psychology, school psychology, educational psychological

Court decision: Vidal 2007 California Supreme Court decision: Use of part scores vs FS IQ

Two different individuals, one a legal professional the other a neuropsychologist, independently sent me copies (within hours of each other) of a very intriguing 2007 California Supreme Court ruling in an Atkins case.  After taking a quick peek, I can see why.  The court dealt with the thorny issue of using the individuals composite Full Scale IQ vs his Verbal IQ to determine if the individual was mentally retarded as per Atkins criteria.  The subject had been repeatedly tested with various editions of the Wechsler batteries over many years and displayed a very large and consistent Verbal vs Performance IQ split.

As reported at In The News Blog: "The Court unanimously held that a defendant may be spared the death penalty because he is mentally deficient in one area, even if his overall IQ score falls in the normal range. The decision overturned an appeals court finding that “full-scale IQ” was the best measure of intelligence."  Click on the In the News Blog for a lengthier summary.

I've posted copies of the original 2005 decision (click here) and the final California Supreme Court decision (click here) for readers to digest. 

I'm going to read the decision carefully as it raises many important intelligence testing and measurement issues.  I'm not sure if I will eventually make a single post re: my observations, comments, conclusions, quesitons, etc., or if I will present snippets from the two decisions and make comments in separate posts.

My knee jerk reaction, after seeing four different Wechsler test administrations (and a fifth abbreviated Wechsler---WASI), all that produced very consistent findings, is why someone didnt' recommend the administration of other measures of cognitive abilities (not measured by the Wechslers) to gather information re: important cognitive abilities related to intellectual functioning.

I would love to hear from other psychologists, intelligence scholars, and experts in mental retardation re: their opinion of the courts ruling and the evidence presented, logic of the court, etc.  This is a case that can be very instructive.  I just need to find time to do it justice.  Guest blog posts would be much appreciated.


Technorati Tags: psychology, educational psychology, school psychology, forensic psychology, criminal justice, criminal psychology, mental disability, IQ, IQ tests, IQ scores, MR, mental retardation, developmental disabilities, Atkins case, California Supreme Court, Vidal, Wechsler IQ tests, general intelligence, part scores

Cultural sensivity in test selection in death penalty cases (Perlin & McCain, in press)

The following article came to my attention via Michael Perlin, first author of the article.  Thanks for the contribution.  I do not have a copy of the manuscript for a complete reading.  It is "in press" in Psychology, Public Policy and the Law.

Perlin, Michael L. and McClain, Valerie Rae, 'Where Souls are Forgotten': Cultural Competencies, Forensic Evaluations and International Human Rights (July 30, 2009). Psychology, Public Policy and Law, Vol. 15, 2009; NYLS Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09/10 #6. Available at SSRN(click here):


Abstract

Cultural competency is critical in criminal forensic evaluations. Cultural competency eschews reliance on stereotype, precluding the mistake of assuming that cultural dictates apply with equal force to all who share a cultural background, thus allowing the forensic examiner to provide a comprehensive picture of the defendant to the factfinder. While raised frequently in death penalty cases, it is equally important to the entire criminal process. Cultural sensitivity in test selection and interview techniques that enhance validity of results are addressed. In a parallel fashion, ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has drawn importance to cultural competency. Although international human rights and cultural sensitivity have been considered with regard to race, gender and religion, applications to criminal matters are still in their infancy. This paper considers strategies to enhance the effectiveness of testimony and mitigation efforts.

Technorati Tags: psychology, forensic psychology, cultural competence, neuropsychology, crimnal psychology, criminal justic, educational psychology, school psychology, clinical psychology, disability rights, death penalty, capital punishment, Atkins cases

FYI: NERONORMA Project: Spanish norms for common neuropsychological tests

Today, during my weekly literature search, I ran across a series of articles providing results from the NERONORMA project (Spanish Multicenter Normative Studies).  The project is described in a free on-line copy of an article available in the Archives of Clinical Psychology.  The abstract for the article is below.  Psychologists who engage in forensic testing related to Atkins cases may find this information informative.  I have not read the series of articles in depth yet. 

This paper describes the methods and sample characteristics of a series of Spanish normative studies (The NEURONORMA project). The primary objective of our research was to collect normative and psychometric information on a sample of people aged over 49 years. The normative information was based on a series of selected, but commonly used, neuropsychological tests covering attention, language, visuo-perceptual abilities, constructional tasks, memory, and executive functions. A sample of 356 community dwelling individuals was studied. Demographics, socio-cultural, and medical data were collected. Cognitive normality was validated via informants and a cognitive screening test. Norms were calculated for midpoint age groups. Effects of age, education, and sex were determined. The use of these norms should improve neuropsychological diagnostic accuracy in older Spanish subjects. These data may also be of considerable use for comparisons with other normative studies. Limitations of these normative data are also commented

Other articles published in the series are listed below:

• PenaCasanova, J., Blesa, R., Aguilar, M., GramuntFombuena, N., GomezAnson, B., Oliva, R., Molinuevo, J. L.,Robles, A., Barquero, M. S., Antunez, C., MartinezParra, C., FrankGarcia, A., Fernandez, M., Alfonso, V., & Sol, J. M. (2009). Spanish Multicenter Normative Studies (NEURONORMA Project): Methods and Sample Characteristics. Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology, 24(4), 307-319.

• PenaCasanova, J., GramuntFombuena, N., QuinonesUbeda, S., SanchezBenavides, G., Aguilar, M., Badenes, D., Molinuevo, J. L., Robles, A., Barquero, M. S., Payno, M., Antunez, C., MartinezParra, C., FrankGarcia, A., Fernandez, M., Alfonso, V., Solk, J. M., & Blesa, R. (2009). Spanish Multicenter Normative Studies (NEURONORMA Project): Norms for the Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure (Copy and Memory), and Free and Cued Selective Reminding Test. Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology, 24(4), 371-393.

• PenaCasanova, J., QuinonesUbeda, S., GramuntFombuena, N., Aguilar, M., Casas, L., Molinuevo, J. L., Robles, A., Rodriguez, D., Barquero, M. S., Antunez, C., MartinezParra, C., FrankGarcia, A., Fernandez, M., Molano, A., Alfonso, V., Sol, J. M., & Blesa, R. (2009). Spanish Multicenter Normative Studies (NEURONORMA Project): Norms for Boston Naming Test and Token Test. Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology, 24(4), 343-354.

• PenaCasanova, J., QuinonesUbeda, S., GramuntFombuena, N., Quintana, M., Aguilar, M., Molinuevo, J. L., Serradell, M., Robles, A., Barquero, M. S., Payno, M., Antunez, C., MartinezParra, C., FrankGarcia, A., Fernandez, M., Alfonso, V., Sol, J. M., & Blesa, R. (2009). Spanish Multicenter Normative Studies
• (NEURONORMA Project): Norms for the Stroop Color-Word Interference Test and the Tower of London-Drexel. Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology, 24(4), 413-429.

• PenaCasanova, J., QuinonesUbeda, S., GramuntFombuena, N., QuintanaAparicio, M., Aguilar, M., Badenes, D., Cerulla, N., Molinuevo, J. L., Ruiz, E., Robles, A., Barquero, M. S., Antunez, C., MartinezParra, C., FrankGarcia, A., Fernandez, M., Alfonso, V., Sol, J. M., & Blesa, R. (2009). Spanish Multicenter Normative Studies (NEURONORMA Project): Norms for Verbal Fluency Tests. Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology, 24(4), 395-411.

• PenaCasanova, J., QuinonesUbeda, S., QuintanaAparicio, M., Aguilar, M., Badenes, D., Molinuevo, J. L., Torner, L., Robles, A., Barquero, M. S., Villanueva, C., Antunez, C., MartinezParra, C., FrankGarcia, A., Sanz, A., Fernandez, M., Alfonso, V., Sol, J. M., & Blesa, R. (2009). Spanish Multicenter Normative Studies (NEURONORMA Project): Norms for Verbal Span, Visuospatial Span, Letter and Number Sequencing, Trail Making Test, and Symbol Digit Modalities Test. Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology, 24(4), 321-341.

• PenaCasanova, J., QuintanaAparicio, M., QuinonesUbeda, S., Aguilar, M., Molinuevo, J. L., Serradell, M., Robles, A., Barquero, M. S., Villanueva, C., Antunez, C., MartinezParra, C., FrankGarcia, A., Aguilar, M. D., Fernandez, M., Alfonso, V., Sol, J. M., & Blesa, R. (2009). Spanish Multicenter Normative Studies (NEURONORMA Project): Norms for the Visual Object and Space Perception Battery-Abbreviated, and Judgment of Line Orientation. Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology, 24(4), 355-370.

Technorati Tags: psychology, educational psychology, school psychology, neuropsychology, neurosciences, clinical neuropsychology, psychological testing, NERONORMA, Hispanic, bilingual, Spanish

Dr. Tedd Judd guest comment post re: adaptive behavior and Switzky and Greenspan (2005) chapter

Guest comment post re: adaptive behavior by Dr. Tedd Judd, a neuropsychologist and current President of the Hispanic Neuropsychological Society.

Dr. Tedd Judd contacted the blogmaster via email as he had tried to post comments to the recent post re: the adaptive behavior chapter by Switzky and Greenspan, but the comment box was too limited for his complete set of comments. Posted below are Dr. Tedd Judd's comments ("as is") regarding the Switzky and Greenspan chapter post.

It is gratifying to see individuals reading and responding to the content of this blog. Thanks to all current and future readers. Active scholarly discourse is one of the goals of this blog.

Dr. Tedd Judd's comments below:

Very good chapter which addressed many pertinent issues well. I especially like the general principle of putting greater emphasis on adaptive functioning, even though the measuring of adaptive functioning is and will likely continue to be more problematic than IQ testing. For too long we have been looking for the keys under the street lamp where the light is good instead of over in the dark where we dropped them.

I also like the emphasis on refining what we really mean by adaptive functioning. The available adaptive behavior scales, in my reading of them, not only fail to measure gullibility adequately, that actually seem to reward it by giving higher ratings to compliant behavior (something that, for me, reflects the nicey nice world of MR services). There are more details in my chapter except below.

I take a bit of exception with this chapter placing gullibility so centrally, however. Some people with MR are not very nice or compliant or gullible, but may be somewhat paranoid, egocentric, and angry, although perhaps for reasons of faulty thinking that are similar to the faulty thinking of those who are gullible. Those individuals may look much more like someone with an antisocial personality disorder (they may even be diagnosable with ASP), but with a cognitive deficit underlying that disorder. It seems to me that it is for just such individuals that the SCOTUS included in their reasons for the Atkins decision that for people with MR "their demeanor may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their crimes." So, while social skills deficits need greater elaboration and emphasis, they can take various forms.

I am hopeful that readers who have stuck with me thus far may be willing to pursue some discussion of related points from my chapter section below from

• Judd, T. & Beggs, B. (2005). Cross-cultural forensic neuropsychological assessment (pp. 141-162). In K. Barrett & W. H. George (Eds.) Race, Culture, Psychology and Law. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Press. Reprinted (2006) (pp. 175-186) in C.R. & A.M. Bartol (Eds.) Current Perspectives in Forensic Psychology and Criminal Justice. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Press.

Adaptive Behavior Scales

Adaptive behavior rating scales are not tests of abilities. The focus person and/or an informant who knows that person well rate the person on the ability to carry out various everyday activities. These scales are particularly important in the diagnosis of mental retardation because the accepted definitions of mental retardation (American Association on Mental Retardation, 2002; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) require impairment not only on IQ testing but also in adaptive behavior. Such scales are typically normed by age on a nationally representative sample (Scales of Independent Behavior—Revised, Bruininks, Woodcock, Weatherman, & Hill, 1996; Adaptive Behavior Assessment System, Harrison & Oakland, 2000; AAMR Adaptive Behavior Scale, Nihira, Leland, & Lambert, 1993; Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale, Sparrow, Balla, & Cicchetti, 1985). These scales typically do not have validity scales to determine if there is response bias on the part of the rater. The cultural competence to complete the rating scales and potential biases of the informant must be taken into account.

Adaptive behavior is clearly culturally relative, and this is evident in the rating scales. For example, the referenced scales contain items referring to the use of telephones, microwaves, small electrical appliances, clothes washers and dryers, repair services, cars, seatbelts, air conditioners, thermometers, handkerchiefs, televisions, menus, dictionaries, alphabetizing, phone books, zip codes, bathroom cleaning supplies, electricity, scales, rulers, schedules, Christmas, Hanukah, forks, reading materials, ticket reservations, shoelaces, clocks, classified ads, and checkbooks. Access to these items is not universal and is related to culture, urbanization, and social class. There are no items referring to clotheslines, chopsticks, domestic animals, Ramadan, etc.

Other items depend upon cultural norms of behavior or values that are not universal (looking at others’ faces when talking, ending conversations, not interrupting, carrying identification, traveling independently in the community, stores with hours of operation, obeying street signs, needing time alone, choosing to join group activities, haircuts, daily bathing, punctuality, hospitality, controlling temper, “pleasant breath,” saying “thank you,” conversational distance, dating, etc.). Although several of these scales have been translated into Spanish (and possibly other languages) there has been minimal cultural adaptation of the items, and there are minimal instructions in the manuals concerning cross-cultural applications.

Some items imply that it is more functional to be compliant than to stand up for oneself. These items include: controlling anger when someone else breaks the rules, when an activity is cancelled, when disagreeing with friends, or when not getting one’s way; not telling a lie to escape punishment; saying “thank you” for gifts (something that is not a part of many Native American cultures); moving out of another person’s way; offering assistance and sympathy; selecting “good” friends; avoiding embarrassing others; doing extra work willingly; and following supervisor’s suggestions. There are no items giving credit for knowing: when and how to direct one’s anger, when it is wise to lie, when to offer assistance and sympathy and when not, when to use one’s own judgment and when to follow others’ in selecting friends, when it is appropriate to embarrass others, when it makes sense to do extra work or follow the supervisor and when to object or go on strike, etc. There are no items saying, “Asserts ones rights.” Or “Stands up for others who are treated unjustly.” It is sobering to realize that people might be declared legally stupid for having bad breath, not telling jokes, not making their beds, or not buying tickets in advance.

Adaptive behavior scales can play an important role in cross-cultural neuropsychology. At times they may help document that an individual who does not “test well” on standardized cognitive tests, perhaps for cultural reasons, nevertheless is able to function adequately and competently in this society. Adaptive behavior scales in brain injury cases can document the changes in a way that cognitive tests cannot. However, interpretation of low scores is problematic because the scales are culture bound. In some instances the adaptive behavior scale may function more as a measure of acculturation than of ability. At present such interpretations may require an item-by-item analysis of low scored items, perhaps including a discussion of those items with the rater and/or other cultural informant. In spite of their cultural limitations, however, these standardized scales have advantages over the evaluation of adaptive behavior exclusively by interview. They are more thorough than typical interviews, they allow for objective comparisons to known populations, and they allow for greater clarity regarding the database for opinions and decisions. They do not, however, replace the evaluation of adaptive behavior via interview, since interviews are likely to bring out the most pertinent impairments in adaptive behavior and may cover areas not found in the scales.

Technorati Tags: psychology, forensice psychology, criminal justice, criminal psychology, developmental disabilities, educational psychology, neuropsychology, school psychology, mental retardation, MR, Atkins cases, death peantly, capital punishment, adpative behavior, adaptive functioning, gullibility