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Showing posts with label neuropsychology. Show all posts
Showing posts with label neuropsychology. Show all posts
Tuesday, August 5, 2014
The Richard Woodcock Institute for Advancement of Cognitive Assessment: Oct, 25, 2014
The 2nd Richard Woodcock Institute for Advancement of Cognitive Assessment is now scheduled and enrollment is open. Registration and additional information can be found at the WMF web page.
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Wednesday, July 25, 2012
The NIH Toolbox for Assessment of Neurological and Behavioral Function to be unveiled
Meeting Unveils NIH Neurological, Behavioral Toolbox for Clinical Research
Registration is now open for “Unveiling the NIH Toolbox”, a free scientific conference Sept. 10-11 presenting the NIH Toolbox for Assessment of Neurological and Behavioral Function— a set of brief but comprehensive neurological and behavioral health measurements designed for use particularly in large-scale research studies such as epidemiological studies or clinical trials. Developed by a team of more than 250 scientists from nearly 100 academic institutions, the NIH Toolbox provides a battery of on-line and royalty-free measures of motor, cognitive, sensory and emotional function for study participants aged 3 to 85 years. Developed under the auspices of the NIH Blueprint for Neuroscience Research, a coalition that creates new tools and resources to advance neuroscience research, the highly anticipated NIH Toolbox promotes economies of scale and enhanced efficiency in measurement.
Taking place in Bethesda, Md., the meeting features lectures, interactive demonstrations and panel discussions about the development, testing and use of the NIH Toolbox in biomedical research. An optional “Administering the NIH Toolbox” training workshop follows the conference on Sept. 12-15. To register for the conference and/or training workshop or to learn more about the NIH Toolbox
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Wednesday, July 11, 2012
AP 101 Brief #14: Demographically adjusted neuropsych (Heaton) norm-based scores inappropriate for MR/ID Dx
Applied Psychometrics 101 Brief #
14: Demographically adjusted neuropsychological
(Heaton) norm-based scores are inappropriate for the diagnosis of MR/ID
Kevin S. McGrew, PhD.
Director
Dale G. Watson, PhD.
Berkeley, CA
Neuropsychological
assessments are sometimes part of psychological evaluations in Atkins MR/ID death penalty cases. These assessments include specialized tests,
often in addition to an age-appropriate IQ battery, that are
specifically designed to assess brain-behavior relations. The neuropsychological-specific
tests (NPST) are used to draw inferences about brain function/dysfunction
and to provide functional implications of neuropsychological test data for a
person’s real-world functioning. NPST
batteries, as well as all the individual tests included in NPST batteries, are not designed or validated to provide
a reliable and valid estimate of a person’s general intelligence (of
course, an exception is the portion of the battery that may include an
individualized measure of general intelligence; e.g., WAIS-IV; WJ III; SB5).
Demographically Adjusted Test Norm
Interpretation is Inappropriate in the Diagnosis of Atkins MR/ID in Capital
Cases
A
test interpretation feature used in some neuropsychological assessments is demographically adjusted norms. The specialized NPST of memory,
sensory-motor function, concept formation, etc. may be reported with these
special demographically adjusted norms.
Also, demographically adjusted norms are sometimes applied to the
individualized measure of general
intelligence included as part of the NPST (see Lange et al., 2006).
The
most well known demographically adjusted norms are the Heaton norms.
As described by a
neuropsychologist in a recent Atkins
cases, Heaton norms are “number crunching, age-corrected, you know,
socioeconomic variable-corrected data,” and as generating “a comprehensive
T-score age-, education, sex-corrected, actually race-corrected, also.” In simple terms, the demographically-adjusted
norms make equation-based statistical adjustments that allow certain NPST
scores for an individual to be compared
against other individuals of the same age and other demographic characteristics
(e.g., gender, race, socio-economic status and level of education. In the context of neuropsychological assessment
to determine whether an individual’s functioning has decreased, such as after a
brain injury or a stroke, demographically adjusted norms may help with the
diagnosis of brain dysfunction and the identification of relative strength- and
weakness-generated interventions.
Siverberg and Millis (2009)
have outlined the clear distinction between using neuropsychological measures
to identify acquired deficits as opposed
to developmental deficiencies. They note:
If the clinician is interested in whether a patient has declined
from their premorbid status, contrasting their obtained raw scores with their
expected premorbid scores (based on age, education, gender, ethnicity, and any
other variables that add to their prediction) is most appropriate. This type of
comparison quantifies impairment—how much examinees’ scores are lowered
relative to their (estimated) preinjury/disease onset baseline. The degree of
impairment is likely most predictive of the patient’s success in returning to
(or continuing) work or other premorbidly engaged-in functional activities with
extraordinary or idiosyncratic cognitive demands. If, in contrast, the
clinician is interested in determining whether the patient’s cognitive
abilities are sufficient for the demands of universal functional tasks (e.g.,
activities of daily living, driving a car, operating a cashier, etc.),
comparing their raw [non-demographically adjusted] scores with general healthy
adult population norms, generating “absolute” scores, is most appropriate (p.
98).
When
used in the context of neuropsychological assessment, certain NPST scores are adjusted
so an individual’s performance is compared
not to the general population but only to others of the same age,
gender, race and level of education.
Norm-referenced testing is at
the heart of psychological assessment for the diagnosis of MR/ID (AAIDD, 2010). The diagnosis of MR/ID requires comparison of
a person’s scores against nationally
representative norms, not a comparison to others of
the same age, gender, race and level of education. An analogous situation would be for a
professional psychologist or lawyer whose intellectual functioning is in the
top 2% of the population as a whole, and who therefore obtains an IQ of 130
when his/her score is compared to nationally representative norms. If his/her score is instead compared only to
those of a group of his/her peers with a similar level of education, he/she may
fall only in the top 16% of that group and so his/her score would be much lower, perhaps 115.
Demographically
adjusted norm scores result in a sliding
reference point that no longer
represents a comparison to the general population, which is the only proper
reference point in the diagnosis of MR/ID. The use of demographically adjusted
norms is inappropriate if such adjusted scores are used to formulate and
inform an opinion regarding level of general intellectual functioning for the
diagnosis of MR/ID.
The
technical adequacy and appropriate use of demographically adjusted NPST scores
is not a settled professional consensus in the field of
neuropsychological assessment. A lack of
consensus in the field is represented by the significantly differing opinions
as articulated by Heaton et al. (1996), Lange,
Chelune, Taylor, Woodward and Heaton (2006), Russell (2005), Sattler (2001),
Sherrill-Pattison, Donders, and Thompson (2000), Strauss,
Sherman and Spreen (2006), Romero et al.
(2009), Yantz,
Gavett, Lynch and McCaffrey (2006).
Particularly
important is the professional consensus-based report produced by the 2008 Multicultural Problem Solving Summit (Byrd et al.,
2010)
of neuropsychologists that produced the document “Challenges in the Neuropsychological Assessment of Ethnic
Minorities: Summit Proceedings” (Romero et al., 2009). This consensus report stated (emphasis added via underline):
Demographic
adjustments to normative data are not validated for the use of
predicting future academic or employment performance, and laws exist to prohibit
the use of race-based norms in employment decisions (p. 767).
There was
consensus among participants that the field would benefit from guidelines for
neuropsychological practice among ethnic and racial minorities…The
guidelines should include a specific focus on appropriate and inappropriate
uses of demographic adjustments, as well as a discussion of the risks of
overpathologizing groups or denying appropriate services, and details of
limitations to the application of various normative standards (p. 767).
Additionally,
a number of authoritative assessment texts used frequently in the graduate
training of psychologists learning to conduct intellectual or
neuropsychological assessments have highlighted the potential problems with
demographically adjusted norm scores (emphasis added via underlining or bold
font) .
Pluralistic
norms[1]
are norms derived for individual groups, such as Euro Americans, African
Americans, Hispanic Americans, Asian Americans, and Native
Americans…Pluralistic norms are potentially dangerous, however, because
they (a) provide a basis for invidious comparisons among different ethnic
groups, (b) may lower expectations of culturally and linguistically
diverse children and reduce their level of aspiration to succeed, (c) may have
little relevance outside of the child’s specific geographic area, and (d)
furnish no information about the complex reasons why some ethnic groups tend to
score lower than others on intelligence tests (p. 661).
There
are two schools of thought regarding how closely matched the norms must be to
the demographic characteristics of the individual being assessed, and these views are diametrically opposed.
These are: (1) that norms should be
as
representative of the general population as possible, and (2) that norms should
approximate, as closely as possible, the unique subgroup to which the
individual belongs. (p. 47).
At
times, it will be paramount to compare the individual to all other persons of
the same age in the general population. Determining a diagnosis of mental retardation or learning
disability would be one example (p. 47).
Of
historical interest is the fact that neuropsychology’s recent shift toward
demographically corrected scores based on race/ethnicity and other variables
has occurred with surprisingly little fanfare or controversy despite
ongoing debate in other domains of psychology. For example, when race-norming was applied to
pre-employment screening in the United States to increase the number of
minorities being chosen as job applicants, the result was the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, which outlawed race-norming
for applicant selection of referral (see Sackett & Wilk, 1994; Gottfredson,
1994; and Greenlaw & Jensen, 1996, for an interesting historical review of
the ill-fated attempt at race-norming the GATB) (p. 50).
There
is also evidence that when “corrective norms” are applied, some demographic
influences remain, and overcorrection may occur, resulting in score
distortion for some subgroups and a risk of increased false negatives
(e.g., Fastenau, 1998) (p. 50).
Importantly,
with regard to the WAIS-III/WMS-III, the Psychological Corporation explicitly
states that demographically adjusted scores are not intended for use in psychoeducational assessment, determination of intellectual deficiency,
vocational assessment, or any other context where the goal is to determine
absolute functional level (IQ or memory) in comparison to the general
population. Rather, demographically adjusted scores are best used for
neurodiagnostic assessment in order to minimize the impact of confounding
variables on the diagnosis of cognitive impairment. That is, they should be
used to infer strengths and weakness relative to a presumed pre-morbid standard
(The Psychological Corporation, 2002). Therefore, neuropsychologists need to
balance the risks and benefits of using within-group norms, and use them
with a full understanding of their implications and the situations in which
they are most appropriate (p. 51).
The
following select quotes from professional neuropsychological publications also
make it clear that the neuropsychological professional jury is still “out”
regarding the methodology and appropriate application of demographically
adjusted NPTS scores (emphasis added
via underline or bold font).
Clinical
neuropsychologists are always starving for good normative data for established
neuropsychological measures. Unfortunately, too many studies (and even
manuals) contain too few subjects and/or their samples are not representative
of the target population on important demographic variables, especially age
and education. This was the problem that Heaton, Grant, and Matthews
attempted to address with Comprehensive Norms for an Expanded Halstead Reitan Battery
(1991). This practical product arose as a direct result of the
authors’ 1986 chapter in an edited book (Heaton, Grant, & Matthews, 1986).
The project represents a substantial effort on the part of the authors, and it
has many commendable qualities. However, the merits are accompanied by
significant shortcomings (p. 444).
Our own informal
inquiries have indicated that many of the scientist-practitioners in clinical
neuropsychology have embraced this book in an uncritical manner. The strong and
unreflective nature of such acceptance of these norms tells us how good an idea
this kind of normative project is, in
the abstract. Unfortunately, this particular product does not contribute as
much as our expectations might lead us to anticipate. The format and marketing
are so convincing that few would comb the introductory pages to analyze the
test selection quirks and statistical/ design problems that abound (p.447).
While we
agree that this initial attempt at providing demographic corrections for
several commonly used tests could have been more statistically sophisticated,
and possibly could have been more user friendly, the evidence seems to indicate
that the norms do have significant advantages for neuropsychological clinical
work and research (p. 457).
It
is generally understood that demographically corrected normative standards are
based upon performances of adults who have developed normally, have typical,
mainstream educational backgrounds, and have no known history of brain injury
or disease. It follows logically from this that such norms should be used with
great caution, if at all, to identify acquired brain dysfunction in patients
who have developmental disorders or other-than-mainstream educational
backgrounds (e.g., special education). For example, it would be inappropriate to “adjust” a mentally
retarded person’s IQ upward because of a low education level, thereby
potentially depriving him/her of social services or mitigating considerations
in criminal prosecution.
As
we have noted, demographically corrected norms are used primarily to identify
the presence and nature of neurobehavioral changes due to known or possible
brain insult (injury or disease). Such norms are generally not the best
choice for characterizing the individual’s absolute level of functioning, or
functioning in relation to the general population of normal adults (Heaton
& Pendleton, 1981) (p. 147).
Heaton,
Grant, and Matthews (1991) published procedures for adjusting raw scores on
various neuropsychological tests according to the individual's age and
education. Despite rather widespread use of these score conversions in both
clinical work and research publications, there have been very few
investigations to evaluate the accuracy or limitations of these score
transformations (p. 181).
Inasmuch
as the HGM method brings about its greatest corrections among persons whose
scores are more likely to be affected by brain impairment, a question must
be raised concerning exactly what the HGM transformations are accomplishing.
It might seem, at least in part, that the corrections are, in fact, correcting
for subtle impairment of brain functions in less-educated and older persons—the
very condition that neuropsychological tests were developed to detect (p.
188).
Concluding Comments
Demographically adjusted (e.g., Heaton norms) scores
are 100% inconsistent with
determination of a person’s general level of intellectual functioning as per
the first prong of the diagnosis of MR/ID.
Demographically adjusted IQ scores, in particular, should not play a
critical role when determining if a person has a deficit in general
intellectual functioning. Furthermore,
interpretation of demographically adjusted NPST test scores (e.g., Halstead
Category Test) to provide convergent validity evidence regarding a person’s
level of general intelligence is not appropriate in the context of MR/ID
diagnosis.
American
Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities. (2010). Intellectual
disability: Definition, classification,
and systems of supports—11th Edition. Washington, DC: Author.
Fastenau, P. S. & Adams, K.
M. (1996). Book review: Heaton, Grant,
and Matthews' Comprehensive Norms: An Overzealous Attempt. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 18 (3),
444-448.
Heaton, R. K., Ryan, L., & Grant,
I. (2009). Demographic influences and
use of demographically corrected norms in neuropsychological assessment. In
Igor Grant and Kenneth M. Adams (Eds), Neuropsychological
Assessment of Neuropsychiatric and Neuromedical Disorders, Oxford
University Press US.
Lange, R. T., Chelune, G. J.,
Taylor, M. J., Woodward, T. S., & Heaton, R. K. (2006). Development
of demographic norms for four new WAIS-III/WMS-III indexes. Psychological Assessment, 18 (2), 174 181.
Romero, H. R., Lageman, S. K., Kamath, V., Irani, F., Sim, A., Suarez, P., Manly, J. J., Attix, D. K., & the Summit participants (2009). Challenges in the neuropsychological assessment of ethnic minorities: Summit Proceedings. The Clinical Neuropsychologist, 23, 761-779.
Russell, E. W. (2005). Norming subjects for the Halstead Reitan
battery. Archives of Clinical
Neuropsychology, 20, 479-484.
Sattler, J. (2001). Assessment of
Children: Cognitive Applications—4th
Edition. San Diego, CA: Jerome M. Sattler, Publisher, Inc.
Sherrill-Pattison, S., Donders, J., & Thompson, E.
(2000). Influence of demographic variables on neuropsychological test
performance after traumatic brain injury. The
Clinical Neuropsychologist, 14 (4), 496-503.
Silverberg, N., & Millis, S. (2009). Impairment versus deficiency in
neuropsychological assessment: Implications for ecological validity. Journal
of the International Neuropsychological Society (2009), 15, 94–102.
Strauss, E., Sherman, E. M. S., & Spreen, O. (2006). A Compendium of Neuropsychological Tests:
Administration, Norms, and Competency – 3rd Edition. New York,
NY: Oxford University Press.
Titus, J. B., Retzlaff, P. D., & Dean, R. S. (2002). Predicting
scores of the Halstead Category Test with the WAIS-III. International Journal of Neuroscience, 112, 1099-1114.
Yantz, C. L., Gavett, B. E., Lynch, J. K., & McCaffrey, R. J.
(2006). Potential for the interpretation disparities of Halstead-Reitan
neuropsychological battery performances in a litigating sample. Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology, 21, 809-817.
[1]
The term “pluralistic norms”
refers to the same concept as demographically adjusted norms and was the terminology
used in the 1970’s when procedures for adjusting IQ scores for minority
children based on race and socio-economic status were attempted. Although using a different approach, the theory
behind adjusting IQ scores is conceptually similar to that inherent in
demographically adjusted norms.
[2] It is important to note that
this quote is from the primary author of the Heaton norms. This statement
indicates that the author of the Heaton norms views them as useful in
“clinical” and “research” settings, which I interpret to not cover high stakes
forensic diagnostic purposes such as Atkins
cases.
Friday, July 6, 2012
Research byte: Third party observer effect on neuropsych results
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Friday, June 29, 2012
Research byte: Practice effects on neuropsych and IQ measures: Meta-analysis
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Sunday, September 4, 2011
Dissertation Dish: Two new neuropsych studies involving WJ III, D-KEFS and NEPSY
Examining the concurrent validity of visual and auditory attention tasks of the D-KEFS, NEPSY, and WJ III COG using structural equation modeling
by Mortimer, Jordana E., Ph.D., Texas Woman's University, 2011 , 247 pages; AAT 3464568
Abstract
Attention is a broad cognitive function that is thought to be a foundational skill necessary for all other neurocognitive operations. Differences in theoretical orientations have led to a lack of consensus regarding a specific definition of attention. Because attention theories have a direct impact upon cognitive assessments, continued debate has resulted in a failure to establish appropriate tasks which measure attention constructs. The purpose of this study was to determine the concurrent validity of the attention subscales of three commonly administered neurocognitive instruments: the Woodcock Johnson III Tests of Cognitive Abilities (WJ III COG; Woodcock, McGrew, & Mather, 2001c; Woodcock et al., 2007), the NEPSY: A Development Neuropsychological Assessment (Korkman, Kirk, & Kemp, 1998), and the Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System (D-KEFS; Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001). Additionally, this study examined the underlying factor structure of the D-KEFS, NEPSY, and WJ III COG, and their fit with four theories of attention. The four theories which were analyzed are Mirsky and colleagues' (1991) model of attention, the Cattell-Horn-Carroll model of cognitive abilities (CHC theory; McGrew, 2005), the Conceptual Model for School Neuropsychological Assessment (SNP model; Miller, 2007, 2010), and a model which examines tasks based on auditory and visual modalities. Data was extracted from archival case studies submitted to the KIDS, Inc.'s School Neuropsychology Post-Graduate Certification Program, which included a mixed clinical sample of children, age 8 through 12. Correlations were utilized to determine relationships among attention subtests. Some evidence demonstrated similar internal consistency of the attention subtests within both the WJ III COG and the NEPSY. Less evidence was provided in support of the internal validity of the D-KEFS. Relationships between the theories and attention subtests were examined using structural equation modeling. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted to determine how well the various attention theories fit with the attention subtests. Results from the CFA, demonstrated the model which assessed attention using visual and auditory modalities indicated the best fit with the sample data when compared to the other models. Limitations of the current investigation as well as suggestions for future studies are also discussed.
Validity of executive functioning tasks across the WJ III COG, NEPSY, and D-KEFS in a clinical population of children: Applicability to three neurocognitive theoriesby Avirett, Erin K., Ph.D., Texas Woman's University, 2011 , 244 pages; AAT 3464570
Abstract
Inconclusive research regarding the neurocognitive construct of executive functioning has restricted the development of valid pediatric executive functioning assessments (Floyd et al., 2006: Maricle, Johnson, & Avirett, 2010). Misunderstandings in the research have led to divergent executive functioning theories and assessment tasks. Therefore. it cannot be assumed that all executive functioning instruments are measuring the same construct. Given the common inclusion of executive functioning tasks in pediatric neuropsychological evaluations (Stuss & Alexander, 2000), it is important to determine the validity of executive functioning theories and assessment tools. Furthermore, because these evaluations are often administered to children with clinical diagnoses, it is important to assess validity issues with this group. Therefore, this study aimed to determine the concurrent validity of the executive functioning subscales of three commonly utilized neurocognitive instruments: the Woodcock Johnson III Tests of Cognitive Abilities (WJ III COG; Woodcock, McGrew, & Mather, 2001c), the NEPSY (Korkman, Kirk, & Kemp, 1998), and the Delis Kaplan Executive Function System (D-KEFS; Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001). An associated purpose of this study was to determine the underlying factor structure of the WJ III COG, NEPSY, and D-KEFS, and their fit with three theories of executive functioning. The three theories that were analyzed include the Anderson, Levin, and Jacob (2002) model of executive functioning, the Cattell-Horn-Carroll theory of cognitive abilities (CHC theory; McGrew, 2005), and the Conceptual Model for School Neuropsychological Assessment (SNP model; Miller, 2007, 2010). Archival data was extracted from school neuropsychology case study reports. Children from a clinical sample, aged 8 through 12, were included in the study. Bivariate correlations were conducted in order to determine relationships among executive functioning subtests. These analyses revealed that executive functioning subtests appear to be measuring distinct abilities and are not interchangeable. Furthermore; the reliable use of most of these subtests within a clinical population was indicated. Level of fit between executive functioning models and sample data was depicted using structural equation modeling and analyzed using confirmatory factor analysis. The SNP conceptual model indicated the best fit with sample data.
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Wednesday, August 31, 2011
Research Brief: Does neurological-image evidence influence jurors in criminal jury trials ?
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Wednesday, January 26, 2011
Blending neuropsychological and CHC psychometric IQ approaches to psych testing
Here is more on my take on how neuropsychological and CHC-based psychometric approaches to assessment can be understood and potentially blended. This is material from my keynote presentation at the Australian Neuropsychology Conference (click here for more information and a link to the PPT of the entire presentation).
Note: Images are embedded in this post. It should be possible to enlarge them by double clicking on each. If that does not work I would suggest you go to the link above and see the entire PPT show, which you can download for free.
CHC-based neuropsychologists have integrated CHC theory into assessment practice based largely on theoretical, non-CHC empirical research, or logical analysis. Empirical CHC-based neuropsychological assessment research has been sparse. The CHC psychometric-neuropsychological assessment gap is understandable given the two respective assessment models and distinct historical backgrounds. Hoelzle (2008) noted that: (a) the psychometric concept of g has had minimal clinical utility in neuropsychological assessment and theory, (b) neuropsychological assessment has been primarily atheoretical while psychometric research has been searching for the “holy grail” theoretical structural model of intelligence since the days of Spearman, and (c) psychometric models have been primarily focused on internal structural validity while neuropsychological assessment has focused more on the practical questions regarding the ability to differentiate between neurological and normal conditions. McGrew (2010a) described these different approaches as a difference between vertical (factor analysis) trait-oriented psychometric models and more horizontal (multiple regression) functional/pragmatic external prediction neuropsychological models. These two approaches are demonstrated visually below in the two slides.
As result of its pragmatic functional heritage, many neuropsychological assessment tests are mixed measures of multiple CHC domains. In the language of psychometric CHC Theory, many neuropsychological tests are factorially complex measures with considerable construct-irrelevant variance (when measurement of pure CHC constructs is the criterion). This contrasts with the strong emphasis in contemporary CHC intellectual assessment on developing tests that primarily measure one single CHC construct, purged as much as possible of non-relevant construct variance.
In the absence of CHC-grounded neuropsyhological assessment research and a consensus neuropsychological assessment model, psychometric (e.g., Flanagan, Alfonso, Ortiz & Dynda, 2010; McGrew, 2010a) , neuropsychological (Strauss et al., 2006), and “blended” neuropsychological+psychometric oriented scholars (e.g., Hale & Fiorello, 2004; Miller, 2007, 2010) have, at times, presented significantly different interpretations of neuropsychological or intelligence tests. For example, more neuropsychologically oriented researchers have described the copy and recall components of Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure (ROCF) test (Meyers & Meyers, 1995, 1996) as measuring planning and organizational abilities, visual memory, visual perception, constructional abilities, motor or visual-motor ability, episodic memory, and incidental learning (Hale & Fiorello, 2004; Straus et al., 2006). Hints of CHC terminology are present in some of these terms but there is no direct mapping to CHC Theory.
Conversely, starting with the results of Hoezle’s (2008) CHC-organized mini-Carroll like meta-analysis of the results of secondary factor analysis of 77 datasets that included neuropsychological and other ability measures (this is one of the best and most comprehensive dissertations I have ever read), McGrew (2010a) suggested that the copy component of the ROCF was likely a mixed measure of Gv-SR (narrow CHC ability of spatial relations in the broad Gv or visual-spatial domain), Gp-P2 (narrow CHC ability of finger dexterity in the broad Gp or psychomotor domain), with possible visual memory (Gv-Mv) involvement. As for the ROCF recall component, McGrew (2010a) suggests that it likely measures a mixture of Gv-MV (narrow CHC visual memory in the broad Gv domain), Glr-M6 (narrow CHC free recall ability in the broad Glr or long-term storage and retrieval domain), with possible involvement of working memory (Gsm-MW). Miller (2010) provides the “blended” interpretation of the ROCF as primarily a measure of visual-perceptual organization, visual-spatial ability and visual-spatial memory (Gv) in particular. Obviously the three sets of ROCF interpretations mention a number of similar abilities, yet practitioners are likely left confused given the varying terminology and ability descriptions.
My CHC neuropsych summaries for the ROCF are presented below:
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intelligence IQ tests IQ testing IQ scores CHC intelligence theory CHC theory Cattell-Horn-Carroll human cognitive abilities psychology school psychology individual differences cognitive psychology neuropsychology psychology special education educational psychology psychometrics psychological assessment psychological measurement IQs Corner neuroscience neurocognitive cognitive abilities cognition ROCF test Ray-Osterrith Complex Figure Test
Note: Images are embedded in this post. It should be possible to enlarge them by double clicking on each. If that does not work I would suggest you go to the link above and see the entire PPT show, which you can download for free.
CHC-based neuropsychologists have integrated CHC theory into assessment practice based largely on theoretical, non-CHC empirical research, or logical analysis. Empirical CHC-based neuropsychological assessment research has been sparse. The CHC psychometric-neuropsychological assessment gap is understandable given the two respective assessment models and distinct historical backgrounds. Hoelzle (2008) noted that: (a) the psychometric concept of g has had minimal clinical utility in neuropsychological assessment and theory, (b) neuropsychological assessment has been primarily atheoretical while psychometric research has been searching for the “holy grail” theoretical structural model of intelligence since the days of Spearman, and (c) psychometric models have been primarily focused on internal structural validity while neuropsychological assessment has focused more on the practical questions regarding the ability to differentiate between neurological and normal conditions. McGrew (2010a) described these different approaches as a difference between vertical (factor analysis) trait-oriented psychometric models and more horizontal (multiple regression) functional/pragmatic external prediction neuropsychological models. These two approaches are demonstrated visually below in the two slides.
As result of its pragmatic functional heritage, many neuropsychological assessment tests are mixed measures of multiple CHC domains. In the language of psychometric CHC Theory, many neuropsychological tests are factorially complex measures with considerable construct-irrelevant variance (when measurement of pure CHC constructs is the criterion). This contrasts with the strong emphasis in contemporary CHC intellectual assessment on developing tests that primarily measure one single CHC construct, purged as much as possible of non-relevant construct variance.
In the absence of CHC-grounded neuropsyhological assessment research and a consensus neuropsychological assessment model, psychometric (e.g., Flanagan, Alfonso, Ortiz & Dynda, 2010; McGrew, 2010a) , neuropsychological (Strauss et al., 2006), and “blended” neuropsychological+psychometric oriented scholars (e.g., Hale & Fiorello, 2004; Miller, 2007, 2010) have, at times, presented significantly different interpretations of neuropsychological or intelligence tests. For example, more neuropsychologically oriented researchers have described the copy and recall components of Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure (ROCF) test (Meyers & Meyers, 1995, 1996) as measuring planning and organizational abilities, visual memory, visual perception, constructional abilities, motor or visual-motor ability, episodic memory, and incidental learning (Hale & Fiorello, 2004; Straus et al., 2006). Hints of CHC terminology are present in some of these terms but there is no direct mapping to CHC Theory.
Conversely, starting with the results of Hoezle’s (2008) CHC-organized mini-Carroll like meta-analysis of the results of secondary factor analysis of 77 datasets that included neuropsychological and other ability measures (this is one of the best and most comprehensive dissertations I have ever read), McGrew (2010a) suggested that the copy component of the ROCF was likely a mixed measure of Gv-SR (narrow CHC ability of spatial relations in the broad Gv or visual-spatial domain), Gp-P2 (narrow CHC ability of finger dexterity in the broad Gp or psychomotor domain), with possible visual memory (Gv-Mv) involvement. As for the ROCF recall component, McGrew (2010a) suggests that it likely measures a mixture of Gv-MV (narrow CHC visual memory in the broad Gv domain), Glr-M6 (narrow CHC free recall ability in the broad Glr or long-term storage and retrieval domain), with possible involvement of working memory (Gsm-MW). Miller (2010) provides the “blended” interpretation of the ROCF as primarily a measure of visual-perceptual organization, visual-spatial ability and visual-spatial memory (Gv) in particular. Obviously the three sets of ROCF interpretations mention a number of similar abilities, yet practitioners are likely left confused given the varying terminology and ability descriptions.
My CHC neuropsych summaries for the ROCF are presented below:
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intelligence IQ tests IQ testing IQ scores CHC intelligence theory CHC theory Cattell-Horn-Carroll human cognitive abilities psychology school psychology individual differences cognitive psychology neuropsychology psychology special education educational psychology psychometrics psychological assessment psychological measurement IQs Corner neuroscience neurocognitive cognitive abilities cognition ROCF test Ray-Osterrith Complex Figure Test
Thursday, December 9, 2010
Research briefs: Factor analysis of SB5 and a neuropsychological test battery
As per usual when I make a research byte/brief post, if anyone would like to read the original article, I can share via email---with the understanding that the article is provided in exchange for a brief guest post about it's contents. :) (contact me at iap@earthlink.net if interested). Also, if figure/images are included in the post, they can usually be made larger by clicking on the image.
Doweling, N. M., Hermann, B., LaRue, A., & Sager, M. A. (2010). Latent Structure and Factorial Invariance of a Neuropsychological Test Battery for the Study of Preclinical Alzheimer's Disease. Neuropsychology, 24(6), 742-756.
Abstract
Objective: To examine the latent structure of a test battery currently being used in a longitudinal study of asymptomatic middle-aged adults with a parental history of Alzheimer's disease (AD) and test the invariance of the factor solution across subgroups defined by selected demographic variables and known genetic risk factors for AD. Method: An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and a sequence of confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) were conducted on 24 neuropsychological measures selected to provide a comprehensive estimate of cognitive abilities most likely to be affected in preclinical AD. Once the underlying latent model was defined and the structural validity established through model comparisons, a multigroup confirmatory factor analysis model was used to test for factorial invariance across groups. Results: The EFA solution revealed a factor structure consisting of five constructs: verbal ability, visuospatial ability, speed & executive function, working memory, and verbal learning & memory. The CFA models provided support for the hypothesized 5-factor structure. Results indicated factorial invariance of the model across all groups examined. Conclusions: Collectively, the results suggested a relatively strong psychometric basis for using the factor structure in clinical samples that match the characteristics of this cohort. This confirmed an invariant factor structure should prove useful in research aimed to detect the earliest cognitive signature of preclinical AD in similar middle aged cohorts.
Williams, T. H., McIntosh, D. E., Dixon, F., Newton, J. H., & Youman, E. (2010). A CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS OF THE STANFORD-BINET INTELLIGENCE SCALES, FIFTH EDITION, WITH A HIGH-ACHIEVING SAMPLE. Psychology in the Schools, 47(10), 1071-1083.
Abstract
The Stanford–Binet Intelligence Scale, Fifth Edition (SB5), is a recently published, multidimensional measure of intelligence based on Cattell–Horn–Carroll (CHC) theory. The author of the test provides results from confirmatory factor analyses in the technical manual supporting the five-factor structure of the instrument. Other authors have examined this factor structure through EFA using the standardization sample, and have not found evidence of a five-factor model. The purpose of the current study was to examine the internal construct validity of the SB5 using an independent sample of high-functioning students. Participants included 201 high-functioning, third-grade students ranging in age from 8 years, 4 months to 10 years, 11 months. Five models of the SB5 were analyzed using Analysis of Moment Structures (AMOS). Our findings indicated that a hierarchical, four-factor, post-hoc model provided the best fit to the data. Generally, implications for school psychologists include a better understanding of the factor structure of the SB5, especially as it relates to high-achieving children. Directions for future research are also discussed
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intelligence IQ tests IQ scores CHC theory Cattell-Horn-Carroll human cognitive abilities psychology school psychology individual differences cognitive psychology neuropsychology special education educational psychology psychometrics psychological assessment psychological measurement IQs Corner neuroscience neurocognitive cognitive abilities cognition factor analysis confirmatory factor analysis neuropsychological test battery Stanford-Binet V intelligence battery
Doweling, N. M., Hermann, B., LaRue, A., & Sager, M. A. (2010). Latent Structure and Factorial Invariance of a Neuropsychological Test Battery for the Study of Preclinical Alzheimer's Disease. Neuropsychology, 24(6), 742-756.
Abstract
Objective: To examine the latent structure of a test battery currently being used in a longitudinal study of asymptomatic middle-aged adults with a parental history of Alzheimer's disease (AD) and test the invariance of the factor solution across subgroups defined by selected demographic variables and known genetic risk factors for AD. Method: An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and a sequence of confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) were conducted on 24 neuropsychological measures selected to provide a comprehensive estimate of cognitive abilities most likely to be affected in preclinical AD. Once the underlying latent model was defined and the structural validity established through model comparisons, a multigroup confirmatory factor analysis model was used to test for factorial invariance across groups. Results: The EFA solution revealed a factor structure consisting of five constructs: verbal ability, visuospatial ability, speed & executive function, working memory, and verbal learning & memory. The CFA models provided support for the hypothesized 5-factor structure. Results indicated factorial invariance of the model across all groups examined. Conclusions: Collectively, the results suggested a relatively strong psychometric basis for using the factor structure in clinical samples that match the characteristics of this cohort. This confirmed an invariant factor structure should prove useful in research aimed to detect the earliest cognitive signature of preclinical AD in similar middle aged cohorts.
Williams, T. H., McIntosh, D. E., Dixon, F., Newton, J. H., & Youman, E. (2010). A CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS OF THE STANFORD-BINET INTELLIGENCE SCALES, FIFTH EDITION, WITH A HIGH-ACHIEVING SAMPLE. Psychology in the Schools, 47(10), 1071-1083.
Abstract
The Stanford–Binet Intelligence Scale, Fifth Edition (SB5), is a recently published, multidimensional measure of intelligence based on Cattell–Horn–Carroll (CHC) theory. The author of the test provides results from confirmatory factor analyses in the technical manual supporting the five-factor structure of the instrument. Other authors have examined this factor structure through EFA using the standardization sample, and have not found evidence of a five-factor model. The purpose of the current study was to examine the internal construct validity of the SB5 using an independent sample of high-functioning students. Participants included 201 high-functioning, third-grade students ranging in age from 8 years, 4 months to 10 years, 11 months. Five models of the SB5 were analyzed using Analysis of Moment Structures (AMOS). Our findings indicated that a hierarchical, four-factor, post-hoc model provided the best fit to the data. Generally, implications for school psychologists include a better understanding of the factor structure of the SB5, especially as it relates to high-achieving children. Directions for future research are also discussed
- iPost using BlogPress from my Kevin McGrew's iPad
intelligence IQ tests IQ scores CHC theory Cattell-Horn-Carroll human cognitive abilities psychology school psychology individual differences cognitive psychology neuropsychology special education educational psychology psychometrics psychological assessment psychological measurement IQs Corner neuroscience neurocognitive cognitive abilities cognition factor analysis confirmatory factor analysis neuropsychological test battery Stanford-Binet V intelligence battery
Tuesday, June 1, 2010
Brain injury outcome tests, scales and questionnaires book
Technorati Tags: Psychology, neuropsychology, neuroscience, brain injury, traumatic brain injury, TBI, brain injury assessment
Thursday, May 27, 2010
IiPost: Do neuropsych tests measure same abilities when translated to Spanish
Do neuropsychological tests have the same meaning in Spanish speakers as they do in English speakers?.
By Siedlecki, Karen L.; Manly, Jennifer J.; Brickman, Adam M.; Schupf, Nicole; Tang, Ming-Xin; Stern, Yaakov
Neuropsychology, Vol 24(3), May 2010, 402-411.
Abstract
Objective: The purpose of this study was to examine whether neuropsychological tests translated into Spanish measure the same cognitive constructs as the original English versions. Method: Older adult participants (N = 2,664), who did not exhibit dementia from the Washington Heights Inwood Columbia Aging Project (WHICAP), a community-based cohort from northern Manhattan, were evaluated with a comprehensive neuropsychological battery. The study cohort includes both English (n = 1,800) and Spanish speakers (n = 864) evaluated in their language of preference. Invariance analyses were conducted across language groups on a structural equation model comprising four neuropsychological factors (memory, language, visual-spatial ability, and processing speed). Results: The results of the analyses indicated that the four-factor model exhibited partial measurement invariance, demonstrated by invariant factor structure and factor loadings but nonequivalent observed score intercepts. Conclusion: The finding of invariant factor structure and factor loadings provides empirical evidence to support the implicit assumption that scores on neuropsychological tests are measuring equivalent psychological traits across these two language groups. At the structural level, the model exhibited invariant factor variances and covariances.
Thursday, April 22, 2010
iPost: Research links SES level to prefrontal cortex brain development
NeuropathLrng: How poverty can affect children's developing brains:
http://bit.ly/9WSF0a
Original Tweet: http://twitter.com/NeuropathLrng/status/12654246727
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Thursday, March 11, 2010
Book note: Hispanic neuropsychological assessment: Dr. Marcel Ponton
Thursday, January 7, 2010
Law review article: Irreconcilable Differences? The Troubled Marriage of Science and Law (Haack, 2009)
Susan Haack
University of Miami - School of Law; University of Miami - Department of Philosophy
Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 72, No. 1, 2009
University of Miami Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009-22
Because its business is to resolve disputed issues, the law very often calls on those fields of science where the pressure of commercial interests is most severe. Because the legal system aspires to handle disputes promptly, the scientific questions to which it seeks answers will often be those for which all the evidence is not yet in. Because of its case-specificity, the legal system often demands answers of a kind science is not well-equipped to supply; and, for related reasons, constitutes virtually the entire market for certain fields of forensic science and for certain psychiatric specialties. Because of its adversarial character, the law tends to draw in scientists who are more willing than most to give an opinion on less-than-overwhelming evidence; and the more often such a witness testifies, the more unbudgeably confident he may become in his opinion. Legal rules can make it impossible to bring potentially useful scientific information to light, and the legal penchant for “indicia” and the like can transform scientific subtleties into legal shibboleths. And because of its concern for precedent, and the desideratum of finality, the law sometimes lags behind scientific advances.
Keywords: expert testimony, Daubert, Joiner, science, inquiry vs. advocacy, fallibilism vs. finality, innovation vs. inertia
Technorati Tags: psychology, forensic psychology, forensic psychiatry, expert witnesses, expert testimony, scientific evidence, Daubert standard, science and law, neuroscience, law review articles
JAAPL special issue on evidence, Daubert standard and forensic psychiatry and the law
The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law Online has published a special issue covering evidence-based practice and the Daubert standard with the field of forensic psychiatry and law. The on-line table of contents is reproduced below. Thanks to Kevin Foley for bringing this to my attention.
Contents: December 2009, Volume 37, Issue 4
INTRODUCTION TO SPECIAL ISSUE:
EDITORIALS:
REGULAR ARTICLE:
ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY:
LEGAL DIGEST:
BOOK REVIEWS:
Contents: December 2009, Volume 37, Issue 4
INTRODUCTION TO SPECIAL ISSUE:
Graham D. Glancy and Michael Saini
The Confluence of Evidence-Based Practice and Daubert Within the Fields of Forensic Psychiatry and the Law
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 438-441. [Full Text] [PDF]
EDITORIALS:
Michael Welner
The Justice and Therapeutic Promise of Science-Based Research on Criminal Evil
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 442-449. [Full Text] [PDF]
REGULAR ARTICLE:
Richard Rogers and Jill Johansson-Love
Evaluating Competency to Stand Trial with Evidence-Based Practice
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 450-460. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
Frank Sirotich
The Criminal Justice Outcomes of Jail Diversion Programs for Persons With Mental Illness: A Review of the Evidence
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 461-472. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
Michael Saini
A Meta-analysis of the Psychological Treatment of Anger: Developing Guidelines for Evidence-Based Practice
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 473-488. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
J. Arturo Silva
Forensic Psychiatry, Neuroscience, and the Law
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 489-502. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
Richard D. Schneider
Commentary: Evidence-Based Practice and Forensic Psychiatry
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 503-508. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
Amy Phenix and Shoba Sreenivasan
A Practical Guide for the Evaluation of Sexual Recidivism Risk in Mentally Retarded Sex Offenders
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 509-524. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
Stanley L. Brodsky, Tess M. S. Neal, Robert J. Cramer, and Mitchell H. Ziemke
Credibility in the Courtroom: How Likeable Should an Expert Witness Be?
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 525-532. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY:
Neil Krishan Aggarwal
Allowing Independent Forensic Evaluations for Guantánamo Detainees
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 533-537. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
Marilyn Price and Donna M. Norris
White-Collar Crime: Corporate and Securities and Commodities Fraud
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 538-544. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
Sohrab Zahedi, Robert Burchuk, David C. Stone, and Alex Kopelowicz
Gun Laws and the Involuntarily Committed: A California Road Map
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 545-548. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
Anasuya Salem and Cecilia Leonard
Psychiatric and Clinical Sequelaeof Delirium and Competenceto Stand Trial
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 549-551. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
Joseph D. Bloom
Forensic Psychiatry and the Forensic Sciences: In Memory of Peter J. Batten, MD
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 552-555. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
LEGAL DIGEST:
J. Jason Buckland and Richard L. Frierson
Constitutionality of the Federal Sex-Offender Commitment Law
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 556-558. [Full Text] [PDF]
Joel Watts and Joy Stankowski
The Therapist-Patient Privilege Challenged
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 558-561. [Full Text] [PDF]
Praveen Kambam and Sherif Soliman
IQ in Miranda Waivers and Death Penalty
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 561-563. [Full Text] [PDF]
Sara G. West and Stephen Noffsinger
Absolute Right to Privacy for Prison Inmates
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 563-565. [Full Text] [PDF]
Edward Poa and Phillip Resnick
Arwen Podesta and D. Clay Kelly
Forced Medication for Death Penalty Appeals
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 567-570. [Full Text] [PDF]
Mehdi Qalbani and D. Clay Kelly
Franklin J. Bordenave, II and D. Clay Kelly
D. Clay Kelly
Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 573-574. [Full Text] [PDF]
BOOK REVIEWS:
Denise C. Kellaher
Drug Court: Constructing the Moral Identity of Drug Offenders
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 575. [Full Text] [PDF]
Elizabeth Hogan
Correctional Psychiatry: Practice Guidelines and Strategies
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2009 37: 576. [Full Text] [PDF]
M. Jerome Fialkov
Edward Poa
Technorati Tags: psychology, psychiatry, forensic psychiatry, forensic psychology, neuroscience, neuropsychology, psychiatry and law, psychology and law, competence for trial, mental retardation, MR, ID, intellectual disability, Miranda rights, Atkins cases, death penalty, capital punishment, ICDP blog
Wednesday, January 6, 2010
New expert added to ICDP professional expert blogroll: Dr. Timothy Derning
Clinical and Forensic Psychology
Timothy J. Derning, Ph.D., M.S.Ed. is an forensic psychologist specializing in neurocognitive and neurobehavioral disabilities, including Intellectual Disability/Mental Retardation (ID/MR), developmental disabilities, high functioning Autism/Asperger’s disorder, Nonverbal Learning Disorder (NLD), Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder, etc.
Over the course of the past 20 years he has testified in numerous capital and non-capital cases involving intellectual disabilities in juveniles and adults. He has given expert testimony in pre- and post-conviction cases regarding deficits related to mental retardation, adaptive abilities, developmental delay, social naïveté’, the impact of low intelligence, suggestibility, coercive influence, malingering, communication impairment, psychological trauma, psychopathology and mental illness as these pertain to forensic questions of trial competency, ability to understand and waive rights, confession validity, diminished capacity, competency for execution, dangerousness, etc. Dr. Derning has also prepared opinions in retrospective evaluations of mental retardation in ‘Atkins’ capital cases.
Dr. Derning has been retained and qualified as an expert in Federal courts, and in Superior Courts in California, as well as in jurisdictions of New York, Georgia, Arkansas, Texas, Florida, Hawaii, Arizona, Kansas, Missouri, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, and elsewhere. He served as the mental retardation expert in the case against Jesse Misskelley (‘The Memphis Three’), the mental retardation re-trial of Johnny Paul Penry in 2002, and mental retardation case Craig Godineaux (co-defendant, ‘Wendy’s Massacre’ Queens, NY). Dr. Derning was retained by Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro in two class-separate action suits brought against the California Dept. of Corrections and the California Board of Prison Terms regarding the identification and ADA accommodation of individuals with developmental disabilities (Clark v. California (1998); Armstrong v. Wilson (1999)).
He currently serves as a member of the American Association of Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD) Death Penalty Task Force. He also serves as a member of Arc California’s Task Force for Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder, and formerly served as a member of Arc’s California Task Force for Persons with Developmental Disabilities in the Criminal Justice System.
Over the past 20 years Dr. Derning has written and lectured on mental retardation and intellectual disabilities in the criminal justice system. He has conducted professional trainings and workshops for lawyers, mental health professionals, forensic psychologists, investigators, law enforcement, and the lay public at local, state, and national conferences. Working with Temple University's Institute on Disabilities he co-authored a training curriculum for mental health professionals regarding the assessment of defendants with mental retardation.
Dr. Derning serves as an independent psychological expert who subscribes to the ethical code of forensic psychology, which demands a balanced evaluation that is guided by the evaluation data and professional psychological research, favoring neither defense nor prosecution. He is not an advocate for individuals with intellectual disabilities, nor does advocate for or against the death penalty.
Contact information
710 W. Napa St.
Suite #2
Sonoma, CA 95476
Phone: 925-933-8661
Fax: 707-935-6224
timderning@aol.com
Technorati Tags: psychology, forensic psychology, mental retardation, intellectual disability, neurocognitive, FAS, developmental disabilites, MR, ID, death penalty, capital punishment, Atkins cases, Atkins experts, expert witnesses
Saturday, January 2, 2010
The state of Florida strikes again: Brown v Fl (2007, 2009)
A quick skim of the 2009 denial of relief reveals a number of familiar issues common to many Atkins cases -- bright line IQ score of 70, standard error of measurement (SEM), malingering, evidence of mental retardation prior to age 18, etc.
Although I've not completed an exhaustive and critical analysis of all documents, it continues to concern me that in this case, as in other Florida cases, the state appears to continue to ignore the concept of the standard error of measurement (SEM). Cheery v Florida( 2007) continues to rear its head in many of these decisions. It appears the state of Florida continues to rely on the Cherry court to establish an absolute IQ score of 70 or below...period. The state of Florida apparently does not understand, or does not want to accept, the concept of SEM.
The critical and important role of the SEM in intelligence testing, and Atkins cases in particular, has been discussed many times at this blog. We have also provided special technical reports to explain the concept of standard error of measurement. Click here to view all prior post dealing with the SEM.
It appears the court spent more time dealing with the issue of the credibility of the experts than more substantive diagnostic issues regarding mental retardation. This individual had an IQ score of 72 at age 10, and was placed in special education classrooms for those with intellectual disabilities. Although there appears to be some concerns regarding possible malingering (on later WAIS-III tests) and the status of the defendants adaptive behavior, I find it hard to believe that a child at the age of 10 would malinger to obtain an IQ score that would place them in special education classes for individuals with mental retardation. The score of 72 is clearly within the range for mental retardation eligibility (when one correctly recognizes the psychometric concept of SEM). When coupled with placement in special education classroom prior to the age of 18, I am perplexed why this information was so easily dismissed....largely due to the courts ignorance of the concept of SEM.
I'm sure there's much more to this case than revealed in the final court documents. However, Florida's continued reliance on a bright line IQ score of 70 and the failure to recognize the scientific and professionally recognized concept of SEM, is troubling.
Technorati Tags: psychology, forensic psychology, neuropsychology, school psychology, educational psychology, special education, mental retardation, intellectual disability, Atkins cases, ABA, American Bar Association, criminal justice, criminal defense, intelligence, IQ, IQ scores, adaptive behavior, standard error of measurement, SEM, Florida death penalty
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