See prior post regarding Hamm v Smith Atkins ID death penalty case where central issue is how to handle multiple IQ scores. All briefs are at that prior blog post page.
Oral arguments before the SCOTUS justices occurred this past Wednesday, 12-10-25. One can download audio file (arguments lasted 2 hours) or transcript of arguments at this link.
An email quick-blog post FYI.
This fall 2025, the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) will be hearing a case related to intelligence testing in the context of Atkins intellectual disability (ID) death penalty cases. The case is Hamm v Smith.
In 2002, in Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court abolished the death penalty for defendants with intellectual disabilities. The Court held that executing individuals with intellectual disabilities is cruel and unusual punishment, violating the Eighth Amendment. The Court afforded the states the power to define intellectual disability for the purpose of death penalty eligibility. Post-Atkins cases reveal that the states have composed superficial and oversimplified definitions of intellectual disability. State definitions lack consistency and include nonclinical standards. As a result, courts continue to sentence defendants with intellectual disabilities to death. This Note argues that states should adopt a uniform definition of intellectual disability for the purpose of death penalty eligibility and proposes a model standard in line with clinical standard
LaPrade, J., & Worrall, J. L. (2020). Determining Intellectual Disability in Death Penalty Cases: A State-by-State Analysis. Journal of Criminal Justice and Law.
In Moore v. Texas (2017), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Texas death penalty definitions of intellectual disability were inadequate because they strayed too far from clinical definitions. This study examines how each state defines intellectual disability with regard to death penalty eligibility. It reveals a wide variation in the standards used by states, with no clear consensus on definitions of intellectual disability or who should measure it. Variations pertain to age at onset, proof of intellectual disability status at the time of the crime, burden of proof required to make the intellectual disability determination, and who makes the final decision. Implications and suggestions for the future are discussed.
Petetan v TX (2021; one and two)
Bourgeois v US (2020). Prior decision (2011)
Race, Intellectual Disability, and Death: An Empirical Inquiry Into Invidious Influences on Atkins Determinations (2020). UCLA Law Review. Sheri Lynn Johnson, John H. Blume, Amelia Courtney Hritz, &Caisa Elizabeth Royer
ABSTRACT
In Atkins v. Virginia,the U.S. Supreme Court held that the execution of a person with intellectual
disability violates the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. After more than a decade of Atkins litigation, we perceived there to be a substantial risk that race influences intellectual disability-and consequently, life and death-determinations. Due to the difficulty of demonstrating the influence of race in a particular case, we decided to investigate its potential effects in a controlled experiment. We did so by manipulating race in three different ways and by presenting cases with both strong and ambiguous evidence of intellectual disability. We found statistically significant race effects when we showed the face of the defendant and when the evidence of intellectual disability we provided was ambiguous. The influence of race was more pronounced when we limited our sample to white mock jurors. Even with a relatively weak manipulation, the size of the race effect is substantial. We also discovered that many participants weighed the facts of the criminal case and the consequences of their decision (death penalty eligibility), even though it was not relevant to the determination of whether the claimant was (or was not) a person with intellectual disability. These findings shed light on why claims of intellectual disability almostnever succeed before juries: death-qualified jurors may not make the diagnostic determination based on the evidence, but instead likely upon their own assessment of death-worthiness.
Determining Intellectual Disability in Death Penalty Cases: A State-by-State Analysis. Jennifer LaPrade
John L. Worrall, 2020.
Journal of Criminal Justice and Law: Official
Journal of the Law and Public Policy Section
of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences
Volume 3, Issue 2, pp. 1-28 (2020)
Abstract
In Moore v. Texas (2017), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Texas death penalty definitions of intellectual disability were inadequate because they strayed too far from clinical definitions. This study examines how each state defines intellectual disability with regard to death penalty eligibility. It reveals a wide variation in the standards used by states, with no clear consensus on definitions of intellectual disability or who should measure it. Variations pertain to age at onset, proof of intellectual disability status at the time of the crime, burden of proof required to make the intellectual disability determination, and who makes the final decision. Implications and suggestions for the future are discussed.
'Man is Opposed to Fair Play': An Empirical Analysis of How the Fifth Circuit Has Failed to Take Seriously Atkins v. Virginia. Perlin, Harmon & Wetzel
Twice in the past few weeks, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has reversed adverse prior decisions regarding Atkins intellectual disability death penalty decisions.
Click here for Webster (2020)
Click here for Guevara (2020)
Prior documents and decisions related to these two cases can be found in the court decisions blog roll on the right-hand side of this blog.
The database we have considered here is infinitely depressing. There was only actual relief in 12.4% of the cases that raised Atkins issues, and this grouping of nine cases includes two in which the defendant died before the final relief could be implemented. What it reveals is a Court with little or no interest in the thoughtful opinions of Justice Stevens in Atkins and of Justice Kennedy in Hall. The science is ignored, and the jurisprudence is ignored. Baseless fears of undetected malingering, the mindless use of lay stereotypes of what “looks like” remorse, and the corrupt employment of “ethnic adjustments” to lawlessly raise IQ scores making certain minority defendants improperly eligible for execution all are reflected in the cases decided by the Fifth Circuit. Certainly, the earlier conclusion reached by Professor John Blume and his colleagues (in their empirical study of all Atkins claims) – that “Atkins is not evenhandedly protecting those it was designed to protect”296—rings as true today as it did when written eleven years ago. On the other hand, the cases reveal important potential strategies for defense counsel: (1) It is essential that allegations of malingering be vigorously rebutted through expert testimony; (2) even though the Fifth Circuit has not yet acknowledged its scientific validity, the Flynn effect must be brought to the Court’s attention, (3) the defendant should be given a WAIS test, and the WISC test must be avoided, (4) the use of lay stereotypes of “showing remorse” must be firmly discredited. If these are all done, then there is at least some chance that Atkins and its progeny will be given life in subsequent cases.
