Does the rot start at the top?
As readers of this blog will know, it is usually Woodley of Menie who darkens these pages with talk of genetic ruin, while James Flynn is the plucky New Zealander…
An attempt to provide understandable and up-to-date information regarding intelligence testing, intelligence theories, personal competence, adaptive behavior and intellectual disability (mental retardation) as they relate to death penalty (capital punishment) issues. A particular focus will be on psychological measurement, statistical and psychometric issues.
As readers of this blog will know, it is usually Woodley of Menie who darkens these pages with talk of genetic ruin, while James Flynn is the plucky New Zealander…
From Twitter, a Flipboard magazine by James Thompson
As readers of this blog will know, it is usually Woodley of Menie who darkens these pages with talk of genetic ruin, while James Flynn is the plucky New Zealander…



Providing key information for students or professionals in the fields of criminology, education, psychology, law, and law enforcement, this book documents the legal and clinical aspects of the issues related to intellectual disability and the death penalty.
• Provides a comprehensive review of the legal and clinical aspects of the death penalty and intellectual disability
• Offers a detailed discussion of the Supreme court decision in Atkins v. Virginia as well as a review of court decisions since that 2002 ruling
• Details the diagnostic issues related to determination of intellectual disability, such as the assessment of intellectual functioning, adaptive behavior, and age of onset
• Shares best practices in clinical assessment and important forensic matters that must be considered

[T]he Court reversed a decision of the Eleventh Circuit in an Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) case. AEDPA provides that a state prisoner is entitled to federal habeas relief only if the state trial court's adjudication of the prisoner's claim "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." In this case, an Alabama trial court sentenced Vernon Madison to death for murdering a police officer. Awaiting execution, Madison suffered several strokes and petitioned for habeas, asserting that he had become incompetent to be executed. Experts testified that although Madison could not remember the "sequence of events from the offense to his arrest to the trial or any of those details," he did understand he was "tried and imprisoned for murder and that Alabama will put him to death as punishment for that crime." The district court denied Madison's petition but the Eleventh Circuit reversed. Today, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that no Supreme Court precedent has "'clearly established' that a prisoner is incompetent to be executed because of a failure to remember his commission of the crime, as distinct from a failure to rationally comprehend the concepts of crime and punishment as applied in his case."Ginsburg, joined by Breyer and Sotomayor concurred, writing that while AEDPA precludes consideration of the question in this case, the question of "whether a State may administer the death penalty to a person whose disability leaves him without memory of him commission of a capital offense" "warrant[s] full airing." Breyer also concurred, writing separately to (once again) call into question the "unconscionably long periods of time that prisoners often spend on death row awaiting execution."




The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Christopher Slobogin. Even more than the title, the paper's abstract suggests it is a must-read for sentencing fans:
Most scholars who have written about the role of neuroscience in determining criminal liability and punishment take a stance somewhere between those who assert that neuroscience has virtually nothing to say about such determinations and those that claim it will upend the assumption that most choices to commit crime are blameworthy. At the same time, those who take this intermediate position have seldom clarified how they think neuroscience can help. This article tries to answer that question more precisely than most works in this vein. It identifies five types of neuroscience evidence that might be presented by the defense and discusses when that evidence is material under accepted legal doctrine. It concludes that, even on the assumption that the data presented are accurate, much commonly proffered neuroscientific evidence is immaterial or only weakly material, not only at trial but also at sentencing. At the same time, it recognizes that certain types of neuroscience evidence can be very useful in criminal adjudication, especially at sentencing.

1 What Is Intelligence? Probe the nature of intelligence by looking first at the phenomenon of savants—individuals who excel at a narrow mental skill. Does this qualify as…