Assessing Adaptive Functioning in Death Penalty Cases after Hall and DSM-5
- Leigh D. Hagan, PhD,
- Eric Y. Drogin, JD, PhD and
- Thomas J. Guilmette, PhD
+Author Affiliations
- Address correspondence to: Leigh D. Hagan, PhD, P.O. Box 350, Chesterfield, VA 23832. E-mail: lhagan@leighhagan.com.
Abstract
DSM-5 and Hall v. Florida (2014) have dramatically refocused attention on the assessment of adaptive functioning in death penalty cases. In this article, we address strategies for assessing the adaptive functioning of defendants who seek exemption from capital punishment pursuant to Atkins v. Virginia (2002). In particular, we assert that evaluations of adaptive functioning should address assets as well as deficits; seek to identify credible and reliable evidence concerning the developmental period and across the lifespan; distinguish incapacity from the mere absence of adaptive behavior; adhere faithfully to test manual instructions for using standardized measures of adaptive functioning; and account for potential bias on the part of informants. We conclude with brief caveats regarding the standard error of measurement (SEM) in light of Hall, with reference to examples of ordinary life activities that directly illuminate adaptive functioning relevant to capital cases.