An attempt to provide understandable and up-to-date information regarding intelligence testing, intelligence theories, personal competence, adaptive behavior and intellectual disability (mental retardation) as they relate to death penalty (capital punishment) issues. A particular focus will be on psychological measurement, statistical and psychometric issues.
Tuesday, June 23, 2020
Race, Intellectual Disability, and Death: An Empirical Inquiry into Invidious Influences on Atkins Determinations Part 1: Latinx Communities, Race, and the Criminal Justice System 66 UCLA Law Review 2019
Tuesday, June 16, 2020
Death Penalty Cases | SpringerLink
Death Penalty Cases
- 7Downloads
Abstract
In 1986, the USSC ruled that it was a violation of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution (cruel and unusual punishment) to execute someone who was 'insane'. (Ford v. Wainwright) In capital cases, a sentencing proceeding has, for many years, consisted of a jury hearing 'aggravating factors' from the state and 'mitigating factors' from the defense. Defense attorneys are now able to proffer someone's mental health history as a possible mitigating factor in capital cases, arguing that the mental illness played some role in the commission of the crime, and that therefore, the defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment rather than death. A case called Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) argued in front of the USSC resulted in a finding that the defense is entitled to use any possible mitigating evidence in a capital trial. Of course, the prosecution wants to present a strong case for capital punishment and therefore will present aggravating factors that include the defendant's propensity for violent behavior. Unfortunately, all too often these predictions of dangerousness are made in expert testimony where the expert is unaware of the real limitations documented in the research of predicting future violent behavior. In 2002, the USSC ruled that it was unconstitutional (again Eighth Amendment violation) to execute a mentally retarded defendant (Atkins v. Virginia). Unfortunately, several individual states adopted rather idiosyncratic definitions of mental retardation and some allowed the artificial inflation of I.Q. scores based on testimony that it was an 'ethnic adjustment'. This chapter describes some of the ways mental health professionals can work in death penalty clinics with defense attorneys or with state prosecutors on these cases.
Keywords
Mitigators Aggravators Eddings v. Oklahoma Mental retardation Ethnic adjustment Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution Habeas petitionSaturday, May 30, 2020
Multidimensional Malingering Criteria for Neuropsychological Assessment: A 20-Year Update of the Malingered Neuropsychological Dysfunction Criteria | Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology | Oxford Academic
https://academic.oup.com/acn/advance-article/doi/10.1093/arclin/acaa019/5830790
Thursday, May 21, 2020
Florida Supreme Court reverses itself on death-penalty issue | Miami Herald
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/crime/article242897781.html
Intelligence and Adaptive Behavior: A Meta-Analysis: School Psychology Review: Vol 0, No 0
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Kevin S. McGrew, PhD
Educational Psychologist
Director
Institute for Applied Psychometrics (IAP)
www.themindhub.com
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Friday, May 8, 2020
Yet another Texas execution postponed, though purportedly not for COVID reasons https://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2020/05/yet-another-texas-execution-postponed-though-purportedly-not-for-covid-reasons.html
Wednesday, May 6, 2020
In Case Permeated with Race Bias, Tennessee Plans to Execute Possibly Innocent and Intellectually Disabled Black Man in Murder of White Woman | Death Penalty Information Center
Monday, March 23, 2020
Georgias Atkins death penalty op-ed
Georgia's Unconstitutional Standard for Determining Intellectual Disability in Death Penalty Cases
By Sara Totonchi, March 20, 2020
Executive Director of the Southern Center for Human Rights and member of ACS Georgia Chapter Board of Advisors
In 1986, the state of Georgia executed Jerome Bowden, a man with a full-scale IQ of 65. While Bowden was strapped to the electric chair, he thanked the prison for taking good care of him. State officials faced widespread criticism for the execution and vowed to ensure that the state would not execute a defendant with intellectual disability again. Two years later, the state passed a law prohibiting such executions.
It's shocking to think that since the passage of the law 32 years ago, there has never been a single finding of intellectual disability at a trial involving intentional murder in Georgia. There is a simple reason for this: Georgia is the only state in the country that requires capital defendants to prove their intellectual disability beyond a reasonable doubt.
Long after Georgia enacted its law, the U.S. Supreme Court made clear in Atkins v. Virginia that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of defendants with intellectual disability. However, Georgia's unique standard means that, notwithstanding the Court's decision in Atkins, the state still is doing just that. This unconstitutional practice has to stop. That is why our office, the Southern Center for Human Rights, along with the Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center, filed an amicus brief in Raulerson v. Warden, No. 19-941, urging the Court to invalidate Georgia's standard. As we explained in our brief, there are three primary reasons as to why the Court should declare Georgia's statute unconstitutional.
First, there has not been a single finding of intellectual disability at trial in a case involving intentional murder in Georgia. In the words of one Eleventh Circuit judge, Georgia's onerous statute "demands a level of certainty that medical experts simply cannot provide." Because of this, capital defendants in Georgia do not have a meaningful opportunity to prove that they fall within the scope of Atkins.
Second, Georgia does not impose this standard for intellectual disability in any other context. For instance, in the education context, a student can be placed into special education as long as a comprehensive evaluation indicates intellectual deficits. In the social services context, an individual is eligible for disability services if she receives a diagnosis of intellectual disability. In both instances, the evaluation conforms with accepted medical standards. Georgia imposes an unattainable standard for proving intellectual disability only in the death penalty context—when the stakes are the highest.
Finally, it is clear that Georgia is not going to amend its statute to conform with the Constitution's demands. The Georgia Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the statute as constitutional. And the Georgia Legislature has consistently resisted efforts to change the standard, including as recently as 2018. Legislators have recognized that Georgia is an outlier, but nothing will change unless the Supreme Court intervenes.
The Court has warned that, if states are permitted "to define intellectual disability as they wished, the Court's decision in Atkins could become a nullity, and the Eighth Amendment's protection of human dignity would not become a reality." Georgia has confirmed the Court's fear. Warren Hill could not prove his disability, even though every expert agreed that he was intellectually disabled. Hill was executed. Willie Palmer could not prove his disability, even though he struggled to put his shoes on the correct feet. Palmer remains on death row. And Billy Raulerson also could not prove his disability, even though testimony at his trial indicated that he functions at the level of a 12-year-old. Raulerson is now at risk of execution.
The state of Georgia has executed an individual with intellectual disability, and it will do so again so long as it employs its unconstitutional standard. The Court should grant certiorari in Raulerson and bring Georgia into compliance with the Constitution
Saturday, March 7, 2020
The factor structure of cognitive functioning in cognitively healthy participants: A meta-analysis and meta-analysis of individual participant data. - PsycNET
https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2020-07834-001
Citation
Abstract
AbstractMany neuropsychologists are of the opinion that the multitude of cognitive tests may be grouped into a much smaller number of cognitive domains. However, there is little consensus on how many domains exist, what these domains are, nor on which cognitive tests belong to which domain. This incertitude can be solved by factor analysis, provided that the analysis includes a broad range of cognitive tests that have been administered to a very large number of people. In this article, two such factor analyses were performed, each combining multiple studies. However, because it was not possible to obtain complete multivariate data on more than the most common test variables in the field, not all possible domains were examined here. The first analysis was a factor meta-analysis of correlation matrices combining data of 60,398 healthy participants from 52 studies. Several models from the literature were fitted, of which a version based on the Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) model was found to describe the correlations better than the others. The second analysis was a factor analysis of the Advanced Neuropsychological Diagnostics Infrastructure (ANDI) database, combining scores of 11,881 participants from 54 Dutch and Belgian studies not included in the first meta-analysis. Again, the model fit was better for the CHC model than for other models. Therefore, we conclude that the CHC model best characterizes both cognitive domains and which test belongs to each domain. Therefore, although originally developed in the intelligence literature, the CHC model deserves more attention in neuropsychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved)
Friday, March 6, 2020
Procedural Challenge in Competency to Stand Trial Proceedings | Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law
http://jaapl.org/content/48/1/123?etoc
Brain Maturity and Sentence Severity | Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law
http://jaapl.org/content/48/1/112?etoc
Thursday, March 5, 2020
Raulerson v. Warden - SCOTUSblog - Atkins petition
https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/raulerson-v-warden/
Saturday, February 29, 2020
Wednesday, February 26, 2020
Ethical Practice in Forensic Psychology: A Guide for Mental Health Professionals, Second Edition
https://www.apa.org/pubs/books/4312028?tab=2&utm_campaign=apa_publishing&utm_medium=direct_email&utm_source=books&utm_content=newbookannouncement_ethicalpracticeinforensicpsyc_02242020&utm_term=text_middle_tableofcontents
Sunday, February 16, 2020
Flawed science? Two efforts launched to improve scientific validity of psychological test evidence in court https://forensicpsychologist.blogspot.com/2020/02/flawed-science-two-efforts-launched-to.html
Psychological Assessments in Legal Contexts: Are Courts Keeping “Junk Science” Out of the Courtroom? - Tess M. S. Neal, Christopher Slobogin, Michael J. Saks, David L. Faigman, Kurt F. Geisinger, 2019
SCOTUS for law students: The Supreme Court and the death penalty https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/02/scotus-for-law-students-the-supreme-court-and-the-death-penalty/
Thursday, January 23, 2020
The predictive power of intelligence: Miranda abilities of individuals with intellectual disability.
Abstract
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Kevin S. McGrew, PhD
Educational Psychologist
Director
Institute for Applied Psychometrics (IAP)
www.themindhub.com
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Tuesday, December 31, 2019
Recent hacked posts
Tuesday, December 17, 2019
Cohort differences on the CVLT-II and CVLT3: evidence of a negative Flynn effect on the attention/working memory and learning trials: The Clinical Neuropsychologist: Vol 0, No 0
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13854046.2019.1699605
Friday, December 6, 2019
Evaluating Intellectual Disability after the Moore v. Texas Redux | Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law
http://jaapl.org/content/47/4/486
Abstract
This article reviews the history of the U.S. Supreme Court's rulings on intellectual disability in capital cases, highlighting the difficulty states have had in devising a workable definition that meets constitutional standards. The Court's decisions in Penry v. Lynaugh (1989), Atkins v. Virginia (2002), and Hall v. Florida (2014) are briefly summarized. Next, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' ruling in Ex parte Briseno (2004) is discussed as a prelude to the Supreme Court's decision in Moore v. Texas I (2017). On remand, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals interpreted the Supreme Court's Moore I ruling in a manner that resulted in finding Mr. Moore intellectually able, and therefore eligible for the death penalty, in Ex parte Moore II (2018). Finally, the importance of the Supreme Court's most recent ruling on intellectual disability in capital cases, Moore v. Texas II (2019), is explored in depth. The article concludes with recommendations for best practices among forensic evaluators who assess capital defendants for intellectual disability.
Variations in reliability and validity do not influence judge, attorney, and mock juror decisions about psychological expert evidence. - PsycNET
Citation
Abstract
Objective: We tested whether the reliability and validity of psychological testing underlying an expert's opinion influenced judgments made by judges, attorneys, and mock jurors. Hypotheses: We predicted that the participants would judge the expert's evidence more positively when it had high validity and high reliability. Method: In Experiment 1, judges (N = 111) and attorneys (N = 95) read a summary of case facts and proffer of expert testimony on the intelligence of a litigant. The psychological testing varied in scientific quality; either there was (a) blind administration (i.e., the psychologist did not have an expectation for the test result) of a highly reliable test, (b) nonblind administration (i.e., the psychologist did have an expectation for the test result) of a highly reliable test, or (c) blind administration of a test with low reliability. In a trial simulation (Experiment 2), we varied the scientific quality of the intelligence test and whether the cross-examination addressed the scientific quality of the test. Results: The variations in scientific quality did not influence judges' admissibility decisions nor their ratings of scientific quality nor did it influence attorneys' decisions about whether to move to exclude the evidence. Attorneys' ratings of scientific quality were sensitive to variations in reliability but not the testing conditions. Scientifically informed cross-examinations did not help mock jurors (N = 192) evaluate the validity or the reliability of a psychological test. Conclusion: Cross-examination was an ineffective method for educating jurors about problems associated with nonblind testing and reliability, which highlights the importance of training judges to evaluate the quality of expert evidence. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved)
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Kevin S. McGrew, PhD
Educational Psychologist
Director
Institute for Applied Psychometrics (IAP)
www.themindhub.com
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Tuesday, December 3, 2019
Meta-analysis of relation between WCST and IQ
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Kevin S. McGrew, PhD
Educational Psychologist
Director
Institute for Applied Psychometrics (IAP)
www.themindhub.com
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Thursday, November 28, 2019
Ethnic adjustment abuses in forensic assessment of intellectual abilities. - PsycNET
Within the past few years, courts have been more open to accepting evidence of psychological research. For instance, in 2002, the United States Supreme Court, citing an American Psychological Association (APA) Amicus brief, declared that the execution of mentally retarded individuals was unconstitutional because it violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Between 2005 and 2012, the Supreme Court accepted APA briefs describing the limitations in neural development of adolescents and its relevance to sentencing. In 2013, the Court ruled that in assessing an individual's intelligence there must be a consideration of the standard error of measurement. All of this suggested a progressive movement in judicial recognition of psychological research. However, during the same time, many courts were allowing and accepting testimony in capital sentencing cases of so-called ethnic adjustment. Some psychologists were testifying that defendants who were from ethnic minority groups had IQ scores that were suppressed and that therefore their scores had to be "adjusted" upward to compensate for the suppression. However, these adjustments were based purely on clinical judgment and did not reflect any empirical studies. As a result, several of these individuals who had their IQ scores adjusted have been executed. This article will describe the case law surrounding this concept, ethical issues that it raises, and how a practitioner can provide useful consultation to attorneys who represent defendants in such cases. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved)
Tuesday, November 19, 2019
Thursday, November 7, 2019
Wednesday, November 6, 2019
After Being Reversed Twice, Texas Appeals Court Takes Intellectually Disabled Prisoner Off Death Row
Atkins Court Decisions: A bunch to update from FL and OK
I have been WAYYYYYYYY behind in posting recent Atkins court decisions and related documents. Here I post info regarding a number of cases, without comment. Click on each to access PDF files.
Bowles (2019, FL)
Harris (2019, OK)
Smith (2019, OK)
Walls (2019, FL; one, two). More info here.
Atkins Court Decision: TX CCA Commutes Bobby Moore’s Death Sentence in Intellectual Disability Case
After iterating through the courts for years, the Atkins case of Bobby Moore, which had the Texas Briseno factors as a core issue, has been settled.
Click here for news story. Here is another news story link.