Saturday, April 30, 2011

Research brief: Trail Making Test (Connections)--Measures Gf and Gs CHC abilities (Salthouse, in press)

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Court Fails To Bite on Defense Chicanery (Guest post): Atkins MR/ID decsions--Meyers v AL (2011)




A recent Atkins MR/ID decision re: Myers v Allen (AL; 2011, 2009, 2007) has been posted to the ICDP Court Decision blogroll. In addition, regular ICDP contributor, Kevin Foley, has provided the following guest blog commentary.


Court Fails To Bite on Defense Chicanery - Guest post by Kevin Foley.



Alabama inmate Robin Myers’ federal habeas attorneys claimed that Myers was mentally retarded (intellectually disabled). Myers had a big problem – his most current IQ testing on the WAIS-III, administered in 2006 - a year or so before his hearing when he was about 45 years old - showed a valid full scale IQ score of 84. Under most current definitions of intellectual disability, such a score sounds the death knell for an Atkins claim, since a person must prove that he currently intellectually disabled, and that he has scores which satisfy the first prong of the diagnosis. If the Flynn Effect was applied to his score, the most Myers could gain would be about 3 points, meaning his level of intellectual functioning would still be an 81, outside the range for a diagnosis of intellectual disability.

​Since Myers had some full scale IQ scores when he was a child that were in the intellectual disability range (75, 74, 71, and 64), his attorneys argued that what was relevant to the claim was whether Myers was intellectually disabled before age 18. The defense expert, “testified . . . that he was asked only to form and express an opinion about petitioner’s mental capacity before the age of 18, not his current capacity or his capacity at the time of the murder.” The court rejected the ploy, concluding that, “it is clear that Alabama courts would find that evidence of an IQ below 70 as a child, absent additional evidence of similar current scores and current deficits in adaptive skills, is not sufficient to render a defendant exempt from the death penalty. The Alabama Supreme Court specifically noted that ‘focus on [the defendant’s] functioning before the age of 18 is misplaced’ when that defendant’s ‘intellectual functioning and behavior as an adult places him above the mentally [retarded] range.’”

​The court was also unimpressed with the defense expert’s attempt to explain the 20 point increase in IQ score from childhood to adult (the expert contended that the childhood IQ score of 64 to be “the most accurate and complete’). According to the magistrate judge’s opinion, the defense expert “further explained the improvement in Mr. Myers’ IQ scores as a result of brain injury”. Of course, one typically associates a brain injury with a potential decline in intellectual functioning, not a gain. But the expert’s proffered explanation was of no consequence to the court, which pointed out that notwithstanding this explanation, the expert, “does not consider [Myers] to be mentally retarded at the present time.”


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Sunday, April 24, 2011

FYiPOST: Top-Ten Recent SSRN Downloads

in criminal law and procedure ejournals are here. The usual disclaimers apply. Rank Downloads Paper Title 1 442 The Law Enforcement Surveillance Reporting Gap Christopher Soghoian, Indiana University Bloomington - Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research, Date posted to database: April...





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Sunday, April 17, 2011

FYiPOST: Important new book urges "more prudent use of habeas in state criminal cases"

Book-cover

This is an FYIPOST to a post at Sentencing Law and Policy blog.


I am pleased to be able to blog about an important new book that arrived in the mail this week and that today has the showcase of the New York Times op-ed page.  The book, shown here, is titled "Habeas for the 21st Century: Uses, Abuses and the Future of the Great Writ" and is authored by Professors Joseph Hoffmann and Nancy King.  The book now has this supportive website and this new blog on habeas developments, and today's New York Times includes this op-ed from the authors headlined "Justice, Too Much and Too Expensive." The start of the op-ed effectively summarizes some of the key themes and proposals in the book:

<snip>. go to link below for the comp,eye post.






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FYiPOST: Top-Ten Recent SSRN Downloads

in criminal law and procedure ejournals are here. The usual disclaimers apply. Rank Downloads Paper Title 1 390 EU Antitrust Enforcement Powers and Procedural Rights and Guarantees: The Interplay Between EU Law, National Law, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of...





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Friday, April 15, 2011

Death penalty poll@procon_org, 4/15/11 4:25 PM

ProCon.org (@procon_org)
4/15/11 4:25 PM
Pros/Cons: Should the death penalty be allowed? deathpenalty.procon.org/view.answers.php


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Eligible for execution: Assessment of intellectual disability as per "Atkins": APA workshop

Mark your calendars if you plan to attend the APA conference this fall. Dr's Karen Salekin and Dr. Greg Olley are conducting the above titled full-day workshop at APA. Below is an image of the description. Click here for a link to the web page.

I can say, without reservation, that these are two some of a best professionals doing work in this area. As you note, they are listed as possible expert consultants here at the ICDP blog.

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Thursday, April 14, 2011

Psychologist who cleared inmates for death row reprimanded by Texas board

File under justice for those who practice voodoo psychometrics or what is typically called "junk science". Some of Dr. Denkowski's work has been previously mentioned at the ICDP blog under the label voodoo psychometrics.

The Texas Tribune: Psychologist Who Cleared Inmates for Death Row Is Reprimanded by Board

A psychologist who examined 14 inmates who are now on Texas’ Death Row — and two others who were subsequently executed — and found them intellectually competent enough to face the death penalty, agreed on Thursday never to perform such evaluations again. Lawyers for the 14 inmates hope the agreement will help their clients, who they argue are mentally handicapped, to escape lethal injection.

As part of a settlement, the Texas State Board of Examiners of Psychologists issued a reprimand against Dr. George Denkowski, whose testing methods have been sharply criticized by other psychologists and defense lawyers as unscientific. Dr. Denkowski agreed not to conduct intellectual disability evaluations in future criminal cases and to pay a fine of $5,500. In return, the board dismissed the complaints against him.

Texas defense lawyers and forensic psychologists across the nation have watched the case closely. Although Dr. Denkowski admitted no wrongdoing and defends his practice, those critical of his methods said the settlement could give those inmates still on death row an important appellate opportunity.

“It really suggests that he screwed up,” said Dick Burr, a lawyer who represents Steven Butler, a death row inmate, and who filed one of the complaints against Dr. Denkowski.

The United States Supreme Court ruled in 2002 that states cannot execute mentally handicapped people. But the court did not provide guidelines for determining whether a person is mentally handicapped, leaving it up to the states to create criteria. Texas courts have generally adopted a three-part definition that requires the convicted inmate to have below-average intellectual function, to lack adaptive behavior skills and to have had these problems since a young age.

Dr. Denkowski was an expert witness whom prosecutors — particularly in Harris County — relied upon to determine whether a murder defendant would be eligible for execution. In 2009, other psychologists and defense lawyers complained to the board of psychologist examiners that Dr. Denkowski used unscientific methods that artificially inflated intelligence scores to make defendants eligible for the death penalty.

Dr. Denkowski published a 2008 article in the American Journal of Forensic Psychology describing his technique for scoring defendants. He said traditional tests did not compensate for social and cultural factors. For example, he wrote, those who come from impoverished backgrounds may not have learned basic skills like using a thermometer or maintaining hygiene simply because those skills were not valued in their community. But that does not necessarily indicate a lack of intellectual function, he said.

Dr. Denkowski also explained why he deviated from the standard use of a test that evaluates adaptive behavior or life skills. The test is typically administered to family members and friends who know the person to ask about how the person functions — whether he is able to pay rent, fill out job applications, read menus, etc.

Dr. Denkowski administered that test to the inmate instead. People close to the individual, he wrote, “tend to understate a defendant’s actual functioning markedly” because they do not want him to face execution.

Other psychologists have rejected Dr. Denkowski’s methods, arguing that they have no scientific basis. The American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities in its 2010 manual for classifying intellectual disability strongly cautioned against using Dr. Denkowski’s methods “until firmly supported by empirical evidence.”

“What Denkowski has been doing is a pretty radical departure,” said Marc J. Tassé, director of the Ohio State University Nisonger Center and an expert in developmental disabilities. “There’s absolutely no scientific basis to his procedure.”

There is no evidence, Dr. Tassé said, that a person from a poor family is less likely to learn basic life skills. He said he knew of no other forensic psychologist who uses similar methods.

Jennifer Andrews, Dr. Denkowski’s lawyer, said her client vigorously denied that he violated any psychology board rules. Part of the problem, Ms. Andrews said, is that the board has not promulgated specific rules for conducting forensic evaluations for cases involving mentally handicapped individuals.

“Psychologists are left to use their best clinical judgment, which Dr. Denkowski used,” she said.

In 2007, Mark Ellis, a state district judge, concluded in the case of the death row inmate Daniel Plata that Dr. Denkowski’s methods did not align with accepted psychological practices and ethical guidelines. Judge Ellis threw out the 2005 evaluation by Dr. Denkowski, saying it “must be disregarded due to fatal errors in … administration and scoring.”

Mr. Plata’s sentence was commuted to life in 2008, and he is now at the Hodge Unit with other similarly disabled prisoners.

In a 2006 evaluation of Steven Butler, who was convicted in the killing of a store clerk, Dr. Denkowski rejected other I.Q. test scores that indicated Mr. Butler was well below average intelligence. He discounted behavioral evaluations from Mr. Butler’s family and friends, who said the young man could not understand the rules of basketball, had to have others read menus for him and had failed basic classes.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has stayed Mr. Butler’s execution pending the outcome of the complaint against Dr. Denkowski.

A clause in the settlement asserts that the agreement cannot be cited in capital punishment appeals, but Mr. Burr said he plans to use it — and Dr. Denkowski’s agreement not to conduct forensic evaluations again — to argue that Mr. Butler should be re-evaluated to ensure that Texas does not execute a mentally handicapped man.

State Senator Rodney Ellis, Democrat of Houston, chairman of the Innocence Project board and a member of the Criminal Justice Committee, said every case involving Dr. Denkowski should be reviewed by the courts.

“We cannot simply shrug our shoulders and sit by and watch while the state uses legal technicalities to execute these intellectually disabled men,” Mr. Ellis said, “especially on the word of someone who is no longer permitted to make these kinds of determinations.”


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FYiPOST:Videos of Stanford Law School's Law and Memory Conference

At link below

http://kolber.typepad.com/ethics_law_blog/2011/04/videos-of-stanford-law-schools-law-and-memory-conference.html


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Tuesday, April 12, 2011

More on Coleman v TN: Tennessee Supreme Court endorses expert testimony concerning IQ of condemned

Just posted the Coleman v TN decision last night.  Today SENTENCING, LAW AND POLICY had the following commentary.  

-------------------

As explained in this local article, on Monday the "Tennessee Supreme Court ruled ... that lower courts may look at more than IQ numbers in determining whether a death row inmate is intellectually disabled and thus ineligible for execution." Here is more on the ruling:

In ruling on the case of a Memphis man on death row for more than 30 years, the high court said judges also may consider expert witness opinions to determine whether a test score accurately reflects a person's functional IQ.

"We find that (state law) does not require that raw scores on I.Q. tests be accepted at their face value and that the courts may consider competent expert testimony showing that a test score does not accurately reflect a person's functional I.Q. or that the raw I.Q. test score is artificially inflated or deflated," Justice William Koch Jr. wrote in the court's unanimous opinion....

Under Tennessee law, mental retardation, now termed intellectual disability, means significantly below-average intellectual functioning with a functional intelligence quotient of 70 or below; deficits in adaptive behavior, and the intellectual disability must have been manifested by age 18.

The Supreme Court, however, said the law does not indicate what types of evidence may be considered and said there is no requirement that IQ scores be accepted at their face value.  The court said the lower courts should have considered testimony from two defense psychologists who said Coleman is intellectually disabled.

The full 46-page ruling in Coleman v. Tennessee, No. W2007-02767-SC-R11-PD (Tenn. April 11, 2011), is available at this link.






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Friday, April 8, 2011

FYiPOST: Brain Injury and competency for trail: Law and Biosciences Digest



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Top 5@SSRN, 4/8/11 1:16 PM

SSRN (@SSRN)
4/8/11 1:16 PM
Top 5 SSRN Papers this week: bit.ly/hmT06c


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AP101 Brief #8 (guest brief): Independent CFA of the French WAIS-IV by Golay et al. (2011)


This IAP AP101 Brief Report was sent to me for posting by Philippe Golay.  It is reproduced "as is" with only minor editing.  This is a guest blog/brief report.  Figures included should be possible to enlarge by double clicking on them.

If other folks have completed research related to this blog, and would like to make brief post reports, please contact the blogmaster @ iap@earthlink.net


Philippe Golay, Isabelle Reverte, Thierry Lecerf,
University of Geneva, Switzerland

The fourth edition of the French Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Adult (WAIS-IV) was recently released (Editions du Centre de Psychologie Appliquée – ECPA, 2011). The French WAIS-IV was standardized on a representative sample of 876 people in France ranging in age from 16 to 79. However, for some subtests (Letter Number, Figure Weights and Cancellation), normative data were restricted to 730 participants (and from 16 to 69 years only). In the French WAIS-IV manual, confirmatory Factor analyses were reported, and models with 1, 2, 3 and 4 factors were presented. CFAs supported a factorial structure with 4 factors. Surprisingly, no models based on the Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) theory were reported in the technical manual of the French WAIS-IV. Thus, the main goal of this VERY brief report is to provide a preliminary independent examination of the factor structure of the French WAIS-IV according to the CHC theory. Analyses were conducted on the basis of the subtest inter-correlation matrix and the standard deviations reported in the French manual (p. 50). We used the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to compare models.

In the first step, models based on the four-factors solution were tested: four-correlated factors (VCI, PRI, WMI, PSI) and a hierarchical model with four factors and one general factor. We also tested modified versions of the basic 4 factor models because they were suggested and reported in the technical manual. This variant included correlated error terms for Digit Span and Letter Number Sequencing, a cross-loading for Figure Weight on the WMI factor and a cross-loading for Arithmetic on the VCI factor. The model fit of both four factor models (with or without g) was greatly increased as a result. We also tested a bifactor model, in which all subtests scores directly load onto a general factor and also onto one first-order group factor. Results indicated that the bifactor “WAIS-IV” model fits better the data than the other WAIS-IV models.

In a second step, we tested a couple of CHC-based models. We retained a model (fig.1) in which Arithmetic loads both on Gsm and Gf but does not include a cross-loading for Figure Weight on the Gsm factor. This model was better than the basic four-factors WAIS model but slightly less adequate than both modified four-factors solutions. Finally, we tested a bifactor CHC-based model (fig.2). This model with 5 uncorrelated group factors and a first order g factor showed the best fit to the data. The results are summarized in figure 3.

These preliminary results indicated that CHC-based interpretation of the French WAIS-IV is also a valid alternative. Furthermore, bifactor models showed better fit to the data than their higher-order counterparts. This challenges a rather implicit but nevertheless strong assumption that the relationship between the general factor and each subtest is only mediated by the broad abilities.







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Tuesday, April 5, 2011

But he doesnt look mentally retarded (intellectually disabled): Guest post by Kevin Foley

The following is a guest blog post by a regular ICDP contributor, Kevin Foley.

But He Doesn’t Look Mentally Retarded (Intellectually Disabled)! Kevin F. Foley



    Two federal courts have approved trial court findings that persons – both of whom alleged they were mentally retarded (ID) – simply did not look and act as if they were mentally retarded.  In the Atkins matter concerning James Lee Henderson, where the state court concluded that Henderson was not mentally retarded, “The trial judge also explicitly relied upon his personal knowledge and recollection of Henderson’s in-court demeanor during both the trial and [the state court] habeas hearing.” [1]

    In an appeal from a denial of a disability claim, the federal appeals court stated, “The ALJ did not err in discrediting Hine’s IQ scores as there is substantial evidence in the record to support this decision. . . . Second, the ALJ found Hines’s demeanor at the hearing inconsistent with a finding of retardation.” [2]

    While the word demeanor may sound formal and legalistic, make no bones about it – the word refers to the way a person looked and acted.  Demeanor has been defined as the “outward behavior or bearing” of a person. [3]

     One has to question the wisdom of such conclusions. As a more insightful federal district judge observed, “The mildly mentally retarded ‘usually live independently or semi-independently in the community and . . . . [o]ften the mildly mentally retarded persons ‘pass’ in the community. In other words, neither their appearance nor demeanor, particularly on brief interaction, reveals the severity of their intellectual deficiency.’” [4]  In other words, the conclusion, “But he doesn’t look retarded,” is a dubious one at best.

    More recently a district court judge disapproved of a lower tribunal’s use of the “eyeball” technique of diagnosis in a federal disability case. “[I]t appears that the ALJ relied on his personal observations, in part, to discredit the plaintiff’s claim of significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning . . . But here, the court is not convinced that the ALJ’s personal observations, without support from other evidence or professional opinions, can constitute substantial evidence to support the rejection of the plaintiff’s I.Q. score.” [5]

    While a person with Down Syndrome may be readily identifiable by the way he or she looks, the majority of the mildly mentally retarded do not suffer from this or a similar genetic disorder.  With regard to the way a mentally retarded person looks,  “The physical examination may provide evidence of an obvious etiology often associated with mental retardation, such as Down syndrome.  More often, however, it will provide only supportive evidence . . .  or it will not provide any useful information about etiology at all.” [6] In other words, many mentally retarded persons do not any look any different than their non-intellectually disabled peers.

    A primary problem with lay conclusions that someone doesn’t sound or look mentally retarded is there is no reliable way to distinguish those who just barely qualify as “mentally retarded” from those who just barely miss qualifying – simply by the way they act in the formal setting of a courtroom – or elsewhere.  As Professor Karen Salekin and colleagues noted, “in comparison with their more severely disabled counterparts, individuals with mild ID are less likely to be identified as having a disability because their outward presentation is not recognizably different from the nonimpaired population.” [7]   Moreover, conclusions about a person not appearing to act as if he was mentally retarded can be misleading due to the fact that, “People with mental retardation often respond to such treatment [stigmatization] by trying to ‘pass’ as a person of average intelligence.” [8] 

    So there we have it – just like with many other aspects of adjudicating intellectual disability, courts can be found coming to the opposite conclusion on the same issue, without apparently being aware of their colleagues’ opposite approach.  The need for better guidance and uniformity is obvious, but apparently nowhere on the horizon.


1  Henderson v. Quarterman,  U.S.D.C., E.D. Tex., Civil Action No. 1:06-CV-507 (filed Mar. 31, 2008), slip op. at pg. 10 (emphasis added).
2  Hines v. Astrue, Case No. 07-3788 (8th Cir., Mar. 25, 2009), slip op. at 6 (emphasis added).  A third example can be found in  State v. McManus, __ N.E. 2d __, No. 82S00-0503-PD-78 (Ind. 2007), slip op. at pg. 8 (emphasis added), where the court noted, “Dr. David Hilton, a court-appointed psychiatrist, testified that his ‘abbreviated assessment of cognitive functioning would suggest probably low average intelligence,’ and he noted that McManus’ ‘general presentation, communication skills, and use of vocabulary . . . would not suggest mental retardation’”.  Of course, a person’s presentation refers to the way he presents himself – or looks – to others.
3  Oxford Dictionaries Online,  http://oxforddictionaries.com/view/entry/m_en_us1239284#m_en_us1239284 (accessed Mar. 31, 2011).
4  U.S. v. Hardy, No.  94-381  (E.D. La. Nov. 24, 2010), slip op. at 110-11, quoting from, MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE IN MENTAL RETARDATION (John W. Jacobson &  James Anton Mulick, eds., 1996).
5  Order, Whitmire v. Astrue, No. 3:09-3245-JFA (D. S.C., March 28, 2011), at pg. 9.
6  Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and System of Supports 75 (9th ed. 1992).
7  Karen L. Salekin, et al, Offenders With Intellectual Disability: Characteristics, Prevalence, and Issues in Forensic Assessment, 3 J. Mental Health Res. Intell. Disab. 97 (2010).
8  Elizabeth Nevind-Saunders, Incomprehensible Crimes: Defendants With Mental Retardation Charged With Statutory Rape,  N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1100 (2010).


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Time to Stop Executing the Mentally Retarded--The Case for Applying the Standard Error of Measurement

I am pleased to announce that the following IAP Applied Psychometrics 101 (#11) report is now available for viewing and download. I had the unique opportunity to tag along on this paper with Kevin Foley, who is conducting extensive research and writing re: Atkins MR/ID cases. This manuscript is intended more for individuals in the legal profession (judges, lawyers) and is thus written in law review review article format.

Although this report is intended primary for readers of the ICDP blog, I am also posting it to the IQ's Corner blog as those readers may find the attempt to explain SEM in terms understandable by non-psychologists of interest.

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Thursday, March 31, 2011

More on relevance of Daubert Standard to Atkins MR/ID death penalty cases

Ten days ago I made a post about an interesting Law Review Article dealing with scientific evidence and the Daubert standard.

Interestingly, a non-MR/ID court decision came to my attention almost simultaneously. The case is Millward & Millward v Acuity Speciality Products Group.

I am no lawyer and am not qualified to comment on the relevance of this court decision to Atkins MR/ID cases. However, a couple of trusted and respected colleagues of mine, who have extensive experience in law or psychology and law sent me comments and their permission to share their reactions and comments. They are reproduced below (with minor editing for format and readability) without comment.




Commentator # 1

The federal appeals court in Boston decided a case this week dealing with causation and stated that, “In this mode of reasoning [used by the expert], the use of scientific judgment is necessary.” And that, “No matter what methodology is used, ‘an evaluation of data and scientific evidence to determine whether an inference of causation is appropriate requires judgment and interpretation.’" Pgs 12-13.

There was no discussion whatsoever about “error rate.”

While disease causation and ID/MR assessment are far apart in the world of expert testimony, the court’s discussion is relevant in either situation, IMHO. With the ID/MR cases, since courts must decide whether the person is ID/MR, and can only do so with the use of expert testimony, experts have to be allowed to give their opinions. There are just some situations where the calculation of an accurate error rate is just not practical. But, my argument is there still needs to be some sort of definitive guidance in the areas, both legal-wise and psychology-wise. It shouldn't be like the Wild West
.


Commentator # 2

That is a great opinion regarding admissibility. I read it and found many places that are great teaching points on admissibility, especially for those of us testifying in an area often referred to as "soft science." I cut and pasted some of the more interesting passages below. The entire opinion is really well written and the court clearly took time to reason through cases like Kumho, Joiner, and Daubert and examine he total picture rather than focusing on the narrow findings that came from Daubert (or at least the way many courts interpret the findings in Daubert).

---------------------------------------------

These factors "do not constitute a 'definitive checklist or test.'"
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999) (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593). Given that "there are
many different kinds of experts, and many different kinds of
expertise," these factors "may or may not be pertinent in assessing
reliability, depending on the nature of the issue, the expert's
particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony." Id.

Exactly what is involved in "reliability" was not and could not have been filled out by Daubert. Rather, the answers must come from developing case law in adjudicating individualcontroversies. "[T]he question of admissibility 'must be tied to the facts of a particular case.'" Beaudette v. Louisville Ladder,Inc., 462 F.3d 22, 25-26 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Kumho Tire, 526U.S. at 150).

Although Daubert stated that trial courts should focus "on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate," Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595, the Court subsequently clarified that this focus "need not completely pretermit judicial consideration of an expert's conclusions," Ruiz-Troche, 161 F.3d at 81 (citing Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146). In Joiner, the Court explained that "conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another" and "nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the
ipse dixit of the expert." Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146. Expert
testimony may be excluded if there is "too great an analytical gap
between the data and the opinion proffered." Id. "[T]rial judges
may evaluate the data offered to support an expert's bottom-line
opinions to determine if that data provides adequate support to
mark the expert's testimony as reliable." Ruiz-Troche, 161 F.3d at
81.

This does not mean that trial courts are empowered "to determine which of several competing scientific theories has the best provenance." Id. at 85. "Daubert does not require that a party who proffers expert testimony carry the burden of proving to the judge that the expert's assessment of the situation is correct." Id. The proponent of the evidence must show only that "the expert's conclusion has been arrived at in a scientifically sound and methodologically reliable fashion." Id.; see also United States v. Vargas, 471 F.3d 255, 265 (1st Cir. 2006). The object of Daubert is "to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony on professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field."Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152.

So long as an expert's scientific testimony rests upon "'good grounds,' based on what is known," Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590,
it should be tested by the adversarial process, rather than
excluded for fear that jurors will not be able to handle the
scientific complexities, id. at 596. "Vigorous cross-examination,
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the
burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of
attacking shaky but admissible evidence."


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Atkins MR/ID Court Decision: Jones v McNeil (Fl, 2011)

Thanks (again) to Kevin Foley for sending me another Atkins decision.  Jones v McNeil (Fl, 2011) is now available and is being added to the Atkins Court Decision Blogroll

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Why IQ composite scores often are higher or lower than the subtest scores: Awesome video explanation

This past week Dr. Joel Schneider and I released a paper called " 'Just say no' to averaging IQ subtest scores." The report generated considerable discussion on a number of professional listservs.

One small portion of the paper explained why composite/cluster scores from IQ tests often are higher (or lower) than the arithmetic mean of the tests that comprise the composite. This observation often baffles test users.

I would urge those who have ponder this question to read that section of the report. And THEN, be prepared to be blown away by an instructional video Joel posted at his blog where he leads you through a visual-graphic explanation of the phenomena. Don't be scared by the geometry or some of the terms. Just sit back and relax and now recognize, even if all the technical stuff is not your cup-of-tea, that there is an explanation for this score phenomena. And when colleagues ask, just refer them to Joel's blog.

It is brilliant and worth a view, even if you are not a quantitatively oriented thinker.

Below is a screen capture of the start [double click on icon to enlarge]



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Wednesday, March 30, 2011

FYiPOST: Robinson on Coercive Indoctrination and "Rotten Social Background"

Recently posted to SSRN: "Are We Responsible for Who We Are? The Challenge for Criminal Law Theory in the Defenses of Coercive Indoctrination and 'Rotten Social Background'" U of Penn Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 11-10 PAUL H....





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FYiPOST: Pardo & Patterson on Neuroscience and Retributivism

Michael S. Pardo (pictured) and Dennis Patterson (University of Alabama School of Law and European University Institute) have posted Neuroscientific Challenges to Retributivism (THE FUTURE OF PUNISHMENT, Thomas Nadelhoffer, ed., Oxford University Press, Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:...





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Sunday, March 27, 2011

FYiPOST: Top-Ten Recent SSRN Downloads

in criminal law and procedure ejournals are here. The usual disclaimers apply. Rank Downloads Paper Title 1 482 An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment Orin S. Kerr, George Washington University - Law School, Date posted to database: January 26,...





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IAP Applied Psychometrics 101 Report #10: "Just say no" to averaging IQ subtest scores

Should psychologists engage in the practice of calculating simple arithmetic averages of two or more scaled or standard scores from different subtests (pseudo-composites) within or across different IQ batteries? Dr. Joel Schneider and I, Dr. Kevin McGrew say "no."

Do psychologists who include simple pseudo-composite scores in their reports, or make interpretations and recommendations based on such scores, have a professional responsibility to alert recipients of psychological reports (e.g., lawyers, the courts, parents, special education staff, other mental health practitioners, etc.) of the potential amount of error in their statements when simple pseudo-composite scores are the foundation of some of their statements? We believe "yes."

Simple pseudo-composite scores, in contrast to norm-based scores (i.e., composite scores with norms provided by test publishers/authors--e.g., Wechsler Verbal Comprehension Index), contain significant sources of error. Although they have intuitive appeal, this appeal cloaks hidden sources of error in the scores---with the amount of error being a function of a combination of psychometric variables.

IAP Applied Psychometrics 101 Report #10 addresses the psychometric issues involved in pseudo-composite scores.

In the report we offer recommendations and resources that allow users to calculate psychometrically sound pseudo-composites when they are deemed important and relevant to the interpretation of a person's assessment results.

Finally, understanding the sources of error in simple pseudo-composite scores provides an opportunity for practitioners to understand the paradoxical phenomenon frequently observed in practice where norm-based or psychometrically sound pseudo-composite scores are often higher (or lower) than the subtest scores that comprise the composite. The "total does not equal the average of the parts" phenomenon is explained conceptually, statistically, and via an interesting visual explanation based on trigonometry.



Abstract

The publishers and authors of intelligence test batteries provide norm-based composite scores based on two or more individual subtests. In practice, clinicians frequently form hypotheses based on combinations of tests for which norm-based composite scores are not available. In addition, with the emergence of Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) theory as the consensus psychometric theory of intelligence, clinicians are now more frequently “crossing batteries” to form composites intended to represent broad or narrow CHC abilities. Beyond simple “eye-balling” of groups of subtests, clinicians at times compute the arithmetic average of subtest scaled or standard scores (pseudo-composites). This practice suffers from serious psychometric flaws and can lead to incorrect diagnoses and decisions. The problems with pseudo-composite scores are explained and recommendations made for the proper calculation of special composite scores.


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Friday, March 25, 2011

FYiPOST: "Neuroscientific Challenges to Retributivism"

The title of this post is the title of this notable book chapter by Professors Michael Pardo and Dennis Patterson available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

We examine two recent challenges to retribution-based justifications for criminal punishment based on neuroscientific evidence.  The first seeks to undermine retributivism because of the brain activity of subjects engaged in punishment decisions for retributive (as opposed to consequentialist) reasons.  This challenge proceeds by linking retributivism with deontological moral theories and the brain activity correlated with deontological moral judgments.  The second challenge seeks to undermine retributivism by exposing, through neuroscientific information, the purportedly implausible foundation on which retributivism depends: one based on free will and folk psychology.

We conclude that neither challenge succeeds.  The first challenge fails, in part, because the brain activity of punishers does not provide the appropriate criteria for whether judgments regarding criminal punishment are justified or correct.  Moreover, retributivism does not necessarily depend on the success or failure of any particular moral theory.  The second challenge fails because neuroscience does not undermine the conceptions of free will or folk psychology on which retributivism depends.  Along the way, we point out a number of faulty inferences and problematic assumptions and presuppositions involved in these challenges to retributivism.






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Kevin McGrew, PhD
Educational Psychologist

Thursday, March 24, 2011

FYiPOST: The Death Penalty from an International Perspective

A recent book by Sanaz Alasti, "Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Comparative Perspective in International Conventions, the United States and Iran," explores the question of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment on an international level. The book reviews current practices in both Iran and the United States, focusing on the death penalty and the harshness of such practices as corporal punishment, long terms of imprisonment, and inflexibile laws mandating punishment.   Punishments are particularly examined in light of the universal declaration of human rights. Sanaz Alasti is a Fellow at Harvard law school, and has written numerous books and articles on various aspects of comparative criminal justice and penology.

(S. Alasti, "Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Comparative Perspective in International Conventions, the United States and Iran," Vandeplas Publishing 2009).  See more Books.






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FYiPOST: Neuroscience in courtrooms


Article in latest SA

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Seconds Before the Big OneEarthquake detection systems can sound the alarm in the moments before a big tremor strikes—time enough to save lives
By Richard Allen
The Enemy within: A New Pattern of Antibiotic ResistanceA new pattern of antibiotic resistance that is spreading around the globe may soon leave us defenseless against a frighteningly wide range of dangerous bacterial infections
By Maryn McKenna
Solving the Cocktail Party ProblemComputers have great trouble deciphering voices that are speaking simultaneously. That may soon change
By Graham P. Collins
Neuroscience in the CourtroomBrain scans and other types of neurological evidence are rarely a factor in trials today. Someday, however, they could transform judicial views of personal credibility and responsibility
By Michael S. Gazzaniga
Natural-Born KillerLethal from day one, the tentacled snake uses surprisingly sly tactics to capture fish
By Kenneth C. Catania
Food FightGenetically modified crops, says agro-research czar Roger Beachy, receive an unjustified shellacking from environmentalists
By Brendan Borrell
The Orderly Chaos of ProteinsTo do their magic in the cell, proteins must fold into rigid shapes—or so standard wisdom says. But a more tangled story is beginning to emerge
By A. Keith Dunker and Richard W. Kriwacki
The Inflation DebateIs the theory at the heart of modern cosmology deeply flawed?
By Paul J. Steinhardt
Can the Dead Sea Live?Irrigation and mining are sucking the salt lake dry, but together Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority could save the sacred sea
By Eitan Haddok
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Monday, March 21, 2011

FYiPOST: The Dana Foundation on the NYC Law and the Brain Conference

Nicky Penttila at the Dana Foundation wrote up a brief description of some of the presentations at the recent Law and the Brain Conference in New York City.





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Law Review Article: Haug & Baird (2011)-Essay: Finding the Error in Daubert







Thanks to Kevin Foley for sending this thought provoking Hastings Law Review Article on the Daubert standard by Haug and Baird (2011) re: scientific evidence. As an applied psychometrician, I find it interesting that the three types of error described mirror the three general classes of unreliability/error we measurement folks address in test development. The article will be added to the ICDP Law Review Article blogroll.

The authors focus on the "known rate of error" factor of Daubert, and they suggest a new test.

"If an expert can account for the measurement error, the random error,
and the systematic error in his evidence, then he ought to be permitted
to testify. On the other hand, if he should fail to account for any one or
more of these three types of error, then his testimony ought not be
admitted."















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