Friday, September 11, 2009

Dr. Stephen Greenspan guest comment post: Response to Dr. Judd re: adaptive behavior

Dr. Stephen Greenspan posted a lengthy response comment to Dr. Judd's comment post (re: the original Switzky & Greenspan adaptive behavior chapter post I made-----hope that makes sense and is not another "whose on first" bit). Dr. Greenspan's response can be seen under "comments" at the original Switzky & Greenspan AB chapter post I made. Given that I took Dr. Judd's long comment and turned it into a guest post (with his permission), I'm doing the same for Dr. Greenspan's comments.

Stephen Greenspan said...

I appreciate the kind comments (which I understand are in a guest blog by Dr. Ted Judd) on the chapter “lessons from Atkins” that appeared in WHAT IS MENTAL RETARDATION edited by Harvey Switzky and myself. Unfortunately those lessons do not appear to have been learned. The main point in that chapter is that adaptive behavior as applied in court settings has turned out to be a nightmare, because of the failure to ground it in the notion of “everyday intelligence”. This is a point I have been making in print since 1979, but Atkins experience has proved me more correct than I realized. In Indiana court decisions for example, “adaptive behavior” is frequently described as “adaptation” and any behavior that a defendant engages in which meet a basic need (an example given was eating out of a garbage can when hungry) is used as evidence of normal functioning. Then of course there are the ridiculous “Briseno factors” in Texas, in which their high court came up with a list of adaptive behaviors (such as any evidence of planning) that bear little or no resemblance to mild ID as we know it. What we need is to come up with a notion of “adaptive age” (and eating out of a garbage can would I think be at a pre-toddler—or German Shepherd-- adaptive age equivalent) and get across the notion of adaptive behavior as involving problem-solving at a more abstract level (such as understanding when an interrogator assuring you that confessing is in your interest is being deceptive). The forthcoming AAIDD manual (which I understand is likely to become known as “the green book”) basically just changes MR to ID, makes a few format improvements, but keeps the same primary emphasis on IQ and retains a construct of adaptive behavior that lacks any connection to “intelligence” broadly defined. My self-assigned task has been to try to find aspects of adaptive behavior deficit (such as “gullibility” and “foolish action”) that are more intellectually-grounded and that could be considered universal diagnostic indicators of ID (as framed by the red/ green books, there is no aspect of adaptive behavior which is central to the ID construct). I am working on a paper (invited by AAIDD classification committee chair Robert Schalock) that elaborates on all the reasons why I think the green book missed the boat (I will preview it as a guest blog here, by kind invitation of Dr. McGrew). Chief among these (which has profound implications for Atkins cases) is that AAIDD missed the opportunity to define the construct more broadly, to include the many people with brain-based disorders who fit the behavioral phenotype for ID but have IQ scores that are a little too high. (Harvey and I wrote our chapter very early in our Atkins experiences, and we naively wrote that attorneys in these cases do not make a big deal out of one or two IQ points. We have of course course learned that everything is disputed, especially one or two IQ points). I am honored that AAIDD cites me as providing the theoretical framework for the model of adaptive behavior but I need to point out that what I had in mind was a tripartite model of “adaptive intelligence” (which cause adaptive behavior to fade away) and and not continuing to view adaptive behavior as some vague add-on construct that involves such things as “has good breath” (an item on the ABAS-2)--better would be “understands the social and physical risks of having bad breath.”

Steve Greenspan (for my recent paper on “foolish action”, click on www.stephen-greenspan.com)

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Thursday, September 10, 2009

Strengthing Forensic Science in US webcast: US Senate Committee on the Judiciary



I just received an FYI re: this webcast:  Strengthing Forensic Science in the United States.  Information can be found at U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary hearing and meetings web page.

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Dr. Tedd Judd guest comment post re: adaptive behavior and Switzky and Greenspan (2005) chapter

Guest comment post re: adaptive behavior by Dr. Tedd Judd, a neuropsychologist and current President of the Hispanic Neuropsychological Society.

Dr. Tedd Judd contacted the blogmaster via email as he had tried to post comments to the recent post re: the adaptive behavior chapter by Switzky and Greenspan, but the comment box was too limited for his complete set of comments. Posted below are Dr. Tedd Judd's comments ("as is") regarding the Switzky and Greenspan chapter post.

It is gratifying to see individuals reading and responding to the content of this blog. Thanks to all current and future readers. Active scholarly discourse is one of the goals of this blog.

Dr. Tedd Judd's comments below:

Very good chapter which addressed many pertinent issues well. I especially like the general principle of putting greater emphasis on adaptive functioning, even though the measuring of adaptive functioning is and will likely continue to be more problematic than IQ testing. For too long we have been looking for the keys under the street lamp where the light is good instead of over in the dark where we dropped them.

I also like the emphasis on refining what we really mean by adaptive functioning. The available adaptive behavior scales, in my reading of them, not only fail to measure gullibility adequately, that actually seem to reward it by giving higher ratings to compliant behavior (something that, for me, reflects the nicey nice world of MR services). There are more details in my chapter except below.

I take a bit of exception with this chapter placing gullibility so centrally, however. Some people with MR are not very nice or compliant or gullible, but may be somewhat paranoid, egocentric, and angry, although perhaps for reasons of faulty thinking that are similar to the faulty thinking of those who are gullible. Those individuals may look much more like someone with an antisocial personality disorder (they may even be diagnosable with ASP), but with a cognitive deficit underlying that disorder. It seems to me that it is for just such individuals that the SCOTUS included in their reasons for the Atkins decision that for people with MR "their demeanor may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their crimes." So, while social skills deficits need greater elaboration and emphasis, they can take various forms.

I am hopeful that readers who have stuck with me thus far may be willing to pursue some discussion of related points from my chapter section below from


Adaptive Behavior Scales

Adaptive behavior rating scales are not tests of abilities. The focus person and/or an informant who knows that person well rate the person on the ability to carry out various everyday activities. These scales are particularly important in the diagnosis of mental retardation because the accepted definitions of mental retardation (American Association on Mental Retardation, 2002; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) require impairment not only on IQ testing but also in adaptive behavior. Such scales are typically normed by age on a nationally representative sample (Scales of Independent Behavior—Revised, Bruininks, Woodcock, Weatherman, & Hill, 1996; Adaptive Behavior Assessment System, Harrison & Oakland, 2000; AAMR Adaptive Behavior Scale, Nihira, Leland, & Lambert, 1993; Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale, Sparrow, Balla, & Cicchetti, 1985). These scales typically do not have validity scales to determine if there is response bias on the part of the rater. The cultural competence to complete the rating scales and potential biases of the informant must be taken into account.

Adaptive behavior is clearly culturally relative, and this is evident in the rating scales. For example, the referenced scales contain items referring to the use of telephones, microwaves, small electrical appliances, clothes washers and dryers, repair services, cars, seatbelts, air conditioners, thermometers, handkerchiefs, televisions, menus, dictionaries, alphabetizing, phone books, zip codes, bathroom cleaning supplies, electricity, scales, rulers, schedules, Christmas, Hanukah, forks, reading materials, ticket reservations, shoelaces, clocks, classified ads, and checkbooks. Access to these items is not universal and is related to culture, urbanization, and social class. There are no items referring to clotheslines, chopsticks, domestic animals, Ramadan, etc.

Other items depend upon cultural norms of behavior or values that are not universal (looking at others’ faces when talking, ending conversations, not interrupting, carrying identification, traveling independently in the community, stores with hours of operation, obeying street signs, needing time alone, choosing to join group activities, haircuts, daily bathing, punctuality, hospitality, controlling temper, “pleasant breath,” saying “thank you,” conversational distance, dating, etc.). Although several of these scales have been translated into Spanish (and possibly other languages) there has been minimal cultural adaptation of the items, and there are minimal instructions in the manuals concerning cross-cultural applications.

Some items imply that it is more functional to be compliant than to stand up for oneself. These items include: controlling anger when someone else breaks the rules, when an activity is cancelled, when disagreeing with friends, or when not getting one’s way; not telling a lie to escape punishment; saying “thank you” for gifts (something that is not a part of many Native American cultures); moving out of another person’s way; offering assistance and sympathy; selecting “good” friends; avoiding embarrassing others; doing extra work willingly; and following supervisor’s suggestions. There are no items giving credit for knowing: when and how to direct one’s anger, when it is wise to lie, when to offer assistance and sympathy and when not, when to use one’s own judgment and when to follow others’ in selecting friends, when it is appropriate to embarrass others, when it makes sense to do extra work or follow the supervisor and when to object or go on strike, etc. There are no items saying, “Asserts ones rights.” Or “Stands up for others who are treated unjustly.” It is sobering to realize that people might be declared legally stupid for having bad breath, not telling jokes, not making their beds, or not buying tickets in advance.

Adaptive behavior scales can play an important role in cross-cultural neuropsychology. At times they may help document that an individual who does not “test well” on standardized cognitive tests, perhaps for cultural reasons, nevertheless is able to function adequately and competently in this society. Adaptive behavior scales in brain injury cases can document the changes in a way that cognitive tests cannot. However, interpretation of low scores is problematic because the scales are culture bound. In some instances the adaptive behavior scale may function more as a measure of acculturation than of ability. At present such interpretations may require an item-by-item analysis of low scored items, perhaps including a discussion of those items with the rater and/or other cultural informant. In spite of their cultural limitations, however, these standardized scales have advantages over the evaluation of adaptive behavior exclusively by interview. They are more thorough than typical interviews, they allow for objective comparisons to known populations, and they allow for greater clarity regarding the database for opinions and decisions. They do not, however, replace the evaluation of adaptive behavior via interview, since interviews are likely to bring out the most pertinent impairments in adaptive behavior and may cover areas not found in the scales.

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Adaptive behavior: Use of the ABAS-II in adult forensic cases (Olley (2008)


I was given permission by Dr. Tom Oakland to post a PDF pre-publication version of chapter that was published in the following book covering one of the major adaptive behavior instruments used in the field of mental retardation/developmental disabilities (conflict of interest note - Dr. Oakland is a co-author of the ABAS-II).


Thank you Tom.


Olley, G. J. & Cox, A. W. (2008). Assessment of Adaptive Behavior in Adult Forensic Cases: The Use of the Adaptive Behavior Assessment System-II. In Oakland, T. and Harrison, P. (2008). Adaptive Behavior Assessment System-II: Clinical use and interpretation, Elsevier. A pre-pub copy of the chapter can be viewed by clicking here.


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Wednesday, September 9, 2009

Atkins v Virginia: American Psychological Associations position


Another FYI (no comment) post.

In this evenings searching of the internet I ran across the APA's Topic: Psychology and Law page where the position of APA in the Atkins v Virginia case is stated. Click here to view.



ACLU Press Releases on Atkins MR death penalty cases


FYI (and no comment) post.

Ran across the ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union) web page of press releases related to Atkins MR death penalty cases/issues. Click here to view.



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Atkins MR death penalty experts: Knowledge and exerience required (Olley, 2009)

What does it take to be an expert in Atkins MR death penalty cases? A good article outlining a number of the skills, knowledge, issues and expertise required is that by Olley (2009) in the special issue of the journal Applied Neuropsycholgy. Individuals considering testifying in Atkins MR death penalty cases should read this article in full.
  • Olley, J. G. 2009. Knowledge and Experience Required for Experts in Atkins Cases. Applied Neuropsychology,16 (2), 135-140.
Abstract
The United States Supreme Court’s Atkins v. Virginia (2002) decision has created a need for experts who are knowledgeable and experienced in both mental retardation and forensic psychology. This article summarizes the issues that are critical to the diagnosis in the ‘‘close calls’’ that typify Atkins cases. A resolution of such close calls hinges upon the expert’s ability to testify with regard to the characteristics of mild mental retardation and the way that diagnostic standards may be applied differently in clinical versus forensic settings. The critical impairments are not in the form of physical stigmata. They are characterized by difficulties in judgment when engaged in typical community functioning. The keys to these close calls are the individual’s problems in functioning in the community with the degree of independence required for adults.

ARTICLE SUMMARY

[note: Italics are direct quotes. Underline is emphasis added by the blogmaster]

According to the articles author:

Those who have been testifying in Atkins hearings have come from varied professional backgrounds. The knowledge and expertise needed for "expert testimony in Atkins involve an unusual mix of background in the field of developmental disabilities with a background in forensic psychology. This combination of credentials was rare before the Atkins decision, and, thus, psychologists and other experts who are asked to testify may have limited experience in some of the essential aspects of the diagnosis of mental retardation in this new context."

Forensic psychologists are most likely to be recognized and accepted by the courts as experts, but the majority of forensic psychologists have little training or experience in the field of developmental disabilites (mental retardation).

Given the lack of uniform training, the author suggests the following as key issues that Atkins experts need to be familiar with:
  • Relevant professional standards (note--see Standards, Ethics and Position Statements" links in current blogs sidebar (right side of blog)
  • Current definitions of mental retardation, and the recognition that different states may have different definitions and diagnostic criteria.
  • Relevant ethical principles of their profession "(American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 2005; American Psychological Association, 2002), position statements made by professional organizations (e.g., American Bar Association Task Force on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty, 2006; Bonnie, 2004; Committee on the Revision of the Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychology, 2008), and recommendations made by recognized authorities in the field (e.g., Bonnie & Gustafson, 2007; Ellis, 2003)."
  • Understand a key difference between clinical and forensic settings. In clinical settings, typically definitions and criteria are used to identify individuals "who meet the criteria and would benefit from services and supports." In such situations professional standards allow psychologists to excercise clinical judgment and to take into consideration the potential benefits of services for the assesed invididual. In contrast, the most significant issues in court settings are likely to focus more on the application of professional definitions in a more narrowly circumscribed and constrained legal context.

The author notes that "most Atkins cases are close calls; that is, evidence exists for and against the diagnosis, and if the defendant has mental retardation, it is in the mild range with functioning between two and three standard deviations below the population mean." The author then lists a number of important issues that must be recognized in these "close calls." They include, but are not limited to:

Impairment in Typical Community Functioning. This is not an easy task an involves a variety of issues, including:
  • Understanding that mild MR is primarily identified by impaired typical community functioning and not specific diagnostic signs or physical symptoms. The cause of mild MR is typically unnkown.
  • Typical functioning is difficulty to assess given that the person is incarcerated in a structured environment and collecting pre-incarceration information re: typical commmunity functioning requires significant effort.
  • An individuals typical functioning must be compared to the normative standards of the appropriate population (US population...not a prison population)
  • Recognition that mild MR may coexist with other disorders or diagnoses.
  • Self report information from the defendant "is of very questionable value in the diagnosis of mental retardation. The expert in an Atkins proceeding should, of course, meet with the defendant, interview him, and engage him in whatever activities might help to determine his understanding of his current situation, his ability to report on factual aspects of his history, and his ability to relate to others. However, the defendant’s assessment of his own functioning is not a valid source of data on which to form a diagnosis. Most people with mild mental retardation can engage in casual conversation and report on their experiences and other concrete topics. Limitations in understanding and communication become evident when the individual is asked to explain his statements or to discuss topics that require abstract reasoning or analysis."
  • "the extent to which the individual was able to live independently with minimal assistance is key to the diagnosis of mental retardation in close calls."
  • individuals with mild MR rarely have social relationshiops that are mutually beneficial and reciprocal. "In most cases, the individual has few friends and the existing relationships tend to be one-sided. That is, the individual depends on a parent or girlfriend or neighbor as a ‘benefactor’ or has acquaintances who try to exploit him for money, labor, drugs, or other resources."

Significant Impairment in General Intelligence. Select issues to recognize include:
  • A cause-and-effect relationship betwen intelligence (IQ) and adaptive functioning is difficult to prove
  • Atkins defendents typically have taken multiple IQ tests and the scores often fluctuate around the legal cut-off score. Experts need to recognize the potential reasons for this IQ variability and account for it in their interpretation and conclusions.

Training Issues in Forensic Psychology
  • States and jurisdictions may specify different standards regarding who can testify as an expert in Atkins cases. Experts need to be aware of the professional standards involved in a specific case before deciding to serve as an expert witness.
  • "psychologists preparing to testify in Atkins proceedings would benefit by becoming members of two divisions of the American Psychological Association. Division 33 (Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities) and Division 41 (American Psychology-Law Society) often provide information relevant to Atkins and offer the opportunity to become acquainted with colleagues with experience in this area."

Article summary
The expert in an Atkins proceeding must have experience with individuals with mild mental retardation, knowledge of the research on this population, and knowledge of the applicable laws and court procedures. This combination of knowledge and experience was rare before the Atkins decision, and experts who now work in this area must broaden their experiences to provide the most valid and objective information to the court. As the other articles in this issue have demonstrated, the diagnosis of mild mental retardation is complex and requires more than the rigid application of test scores. People with mild mental retardation may have basic academic skills and several areas of adequate community functioning. Their difficulties that set them apart are more likely located in their judgment than in their knowledge and skills. Reschly (2009, this issue) provides an excellent summary in noting that ‘‘The core issue is the use of abstract reasoning and judgment in coping with everyday demands in a socially and economically complex society.’’







Monday, September 7, 2009

Use of the Mexican WAIS-III in MR capital Atkin cases: Controversy reported in Applied Neuropsychology journal


Is the Mexican normed version of the WAIS-III appropriate for use in diagnosing mental retardation and, more importantly, is it appropriate for use in Atkins MR death penalty cases? Apparently a controversy has surfaced re: this question as reflected by three articles in the journal Applied Neuropsychology.

As background note, I've blogged previously about a special issue of this journal that dealt with Atkins cases. I've not completed reading all of those articles yet...there simply is not enough time in my day.

Given my obvious conflict of interest [I'm a coauthor of the competing WJ III and BAT III], I will not render any judgment "pro" or "con" regarding the debate. Instead, I'm making available (below) the abstract of a series of three articles published in the latest issue of Applied Neuropsychology that address the issue. Suen and Greenspan (2009a) make the case against the use of the Mexican WAIS-III. Escobedo and Hollingworth (2009) respond to Suen and Greenspan (2009a). Suen and Greenspan (2009b) then respond to Escobedo and Hollingworth (2009).

Readers will need to review the articles and make their own informed judgments. I would like to invite appropriatelly qualified scholars to consider submitting a guest comment post on all three articles and any other journal published research that bears on this specific controversy. If interested, contact me at my email in my "About Me" section of this blog. In addition, given my conflict of interest, I am requesting that anyone familiar with any similar controversies or questions regarding the BAT III to bring them to my attention as I would make those published articles available for review...also without comment.

Suen, H. K. & Greenspan, S. (2009a). Serious Problems with the Mexican Norms for the WAIS-III when Assessing Mental Retardation in Capital Cases. Applied Neuropsychology, 16 (3), 214-222. (click here).
A Spanish-language translation of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III (WAIS-III), normed in Mexico, is sometimes used when evaluating Spanish-speaking defendants in capital cases in order to diagnose possible mental retardation (MR). Although the manual for the Mexican test suggests use of the U.S. norms when diagnosing MR, the Mexican norms—which produce full-scale scores on average 12 points higher— are sometimes used for reasons that are similar to those used by proponents for ‘‘race-norming’’ in special education. Such an argument assumes, however, that the Mexican WAIS-III norms are valid. In this paper, we examined the validity of the Mexican WAIS-III norms and found six very serious problems with those norms: (1) extremely poor reliability, (2) lack of a meaningful reference population, (3) lack of score normalization, (4) exclusion of certain groups from the standardization sample,(5) use of incorrect statistics and calculations, and (6) incorrect application of the true score confidence interval method. An additional problem is the apparent absence of any social policy consensus within Mexico as to the definition and boundary parameters of MR. Taken together, these concerns lead one to the inescapable conclusion that the Mexican WAIS-III norms are not interpretable and should not be used for any high-stakes purpose, especially one as serious as whether a defendant should qualify for exemption against imposition of the death penalty.

Escobedo, P. S. & Hollingworth, L. (2009) Annotations on the Use of the Mexican Norms for the WAIS-III. Applied Neuropsychology, 16 (3), 223-227 (click here).
This article provides crucial information to judge the appropriateness of the Mexican version of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Third Edition and recognizes some limitations in both the process of its adaptation to the Mexican population and the norm development process. This is an effort to contribute to the debate initiated by Suen and Greenspan (2008), who argued in court against the use of Mexican norms in a death penalty case, which depended upon establishing the diagnosis of mental retardation. As a part of the defense team, these scholars argued a number of points against the use of the Mexican norms. With input from the lead researcher on the Mexican standardization process, some of the criticisms are addressed, and further information about the norm development process for this test in Mexico is provided in an attempt to be critical about the strengths and weaknesses of the use of existing Mexican norms. Finally, we argue that results from a single test must not be used to make life and death decisions and that test development is a continuous process influenced by culture,language, and indeed by norm-developing procedures and debates.

Suen, H. K. & Greenspan, S. (2009). Reply to Sanchez-Escobedo and Hollingworth: Why the Mexican Norms for the WAIS-III Continue to be Inadequate. Applied Neuropsychology, 16 (3), 228-229 (click here).
The discussion in Drs. Sanchez-Escobedo and Hollingworth’s paper independently confirms virtually all our observations regarding the psychometric and interpretive deficiencies of the Mexican norms for very high-stakes decisions, such as that involved in an Atkins hearing. Test publishers have an ethical obligation to caution potential users against the premature use of a developing assessment that does not yet meet the needed precision and evidence of validity required for very high-stakes decisions.

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Sunday, September 6, 2009

Book: Intellectual disability and civil rights in 20th century America

Rethinking adaptive behavior in light of MR Atkin's cases: Greespan and Switzky (2006) chapter


Although the primary focus of this blog is on the intellectual component of MR definition, assessment, etc. in Atkin's cases, material related to the second component of the MR definition (adaptive behavior) will also be covered. I have a long standing research interest in adaptive behavior which I will mention in a future post. When appropriate this blog will comment on conceptual, theoretical, and esp. measurement issues surrounding both intellectual competence and adaptive behavior

I just read a the following very thought provoking book chapter by Greenspan and Switzky.

  • Stephen Greenspan & Harvey N. Switzky (2006). Lessons from the Atkins decision for the next AAMR manual. In H.N. Switzky & S. Greenspan (Eds.), What is Mental Retardation?: Ideas for an evolving disability in the 21st century. (pp. 281- 300). Washington, DC: American Association on Mental Retardation. (click here to view chapter; click here to view book at AAIDD web page)

Based on their considerable experience as testifying experts in Atkin's MR/death penalty case, primarily with reference to the definition, assessment, and theoretical issues related to adaptive behavior, Greenspan and Switzky make numerous suggestions re: how the next version of the AAMR/AAIDD mental retardation manual should be changed, in light of the emerging prominent role of the manual in Atkin's cases. Atkin's cases have, more-or-less, forced the need to reexamine some of the underlying concepts and thinking related to the conceptualization and measurement of adaptive functioning.

Some of the key issues and ideas discussed are:
  • Problems and potential solutions to the self-rating format of adaptive behavior (AB) assessment tools
  • The need for multiple raters
  • "Reverse malingering" - individuals with mild MR having a tendency to exaggerate their level of skills and competence to try hide their disability
  • The failure of many AB instruments to provide adequate coverage of one of the critical components of AB: social skill deficits, social vulnerabilty, guillability, etc.
  • The problems in judging level of adaptive functioning based on the tasks involved in completing a crime
  • The suggestion to change the name of the construct to adaptive functioning--to jetison some of the historical baggage that is associated with the current AB term.
  • The inherent problems in judging adaptive functioning from clinical interviews, given the ability of many individuals with mild MR to "sound" more intelligent than they are.
  • Issues and ideas for establishing levels of AB retroactively (e.g., at the time the crime occured; the person's functioning before the age of 18)
  • The over-reliance on IQ scores and the suggesting to reverse the weight given to IQ and AB in the definition of MR.
  • The suggestion to bring back the "borderline" category of MR
It is clear that Greespan and Switzky have had considerable experience in addressing the AB component in Atkin's cases and their experiences have produced keen insights (and possible ideas) for improving the conceptualization, measurement, and use of AB definitions, measures, and scores in court settings. I can't wait to see the entire book.

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Thursday, September 3, 2009

Court decision upholds MR diagnosis in death penalty case: Davis v US (2009)


A recent US District Court decison (District of Maryland) was handed down April of this year (2009). Davis v US has been added to the Court Decisions section of this blog (see right-hand side of blog page).

In this case, the defendant was ruled to be MR and thus, was not eligible for the death penalty. Reading this decisions gives important insights re: how the courts weigh and judge conflicting expert testimony and evidence re: IQ scores and adaptive behavior. It is interesting to see how the court accepts or does not agree with different expert testimony and how it attends to the two primary professional definitions (AAMR/AAIDD APA) of MR.

Of interest re: IQ scores are discussions of the importance of full scale global IQ scores in the context of sub-composite discrepancies (Verbal vs Performanc IQ) and the relevance of the Flynn Effect. Also of interest is how the subjects history was used to establish MR during his developmental period (before age 18), the third prong of the accepted MR definitions (IQ deficit; adaptive behavior deficit; MR originating before age 18).




Wednesday, August 26, 2009

What topics do you want covered? The poll is open



On the right-hand side of this blog I've added a poll for voting on categories of topics readers would like posts on.  Please vote to help give direction and focus to future posts.  There is so much to discuss...some user feedback would be appreciated.

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New IQ, MR and Death Penalty blog: Looking for guest bloggers, ideas, suggestions, etc.

Today I'm officially unveiling the Intellectual Competence and the Death Penalty blog to others.  I've been running this blog "under the radar" in order to ascertain my real motivation in maintaining it and to build some initial content.  I think I'm ready to give it a "go for launch."

First, I would suggest that all readers check out my purpose statement.

Second, at this time I'm seeking nput from others on potential topics and issues that readers would like me to comment on...or find relevant research.  Send me ideas [or you will end up living with what I deem important].  Be sure they are related to the areas that are the focus of this blog (see purpose statement link above).

Third.  I'm seeking guest bloggers.  I'd be interested in mental health professionals who would be interested in making guests posts.  I'd also be interested in those from the legal profession who deal with Atkin's cases providing relevant guest posts.  Contact me via my email in my profile.

Fourth.  I'm seeking content and links.  If you know of relevant blogs, articles, links, resources, etc., please forward to me for possible inclusion.

Fifth.  I would appreciate blog roll links at other relevant blogs and web pages.  If you provide me a link, send me a note and I'll check out your site and, if relevant and appropriate, will add it to my blog roll.

Thank you.  I hope this blog finds its niche and provides useful information to those involved in the "life-and-death" issues surrounding mental retardation and the death penatly.

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Tuesday, August 25, 2009

Why might expert witness IQ scores differ? Intelligence theory and IQ tests

Why are divergent IQ score results often presented by different experts testifying in Atkin's cases?  The reasons are many.   I intend to explore the major measurement/psychometric reasons in a number of future posts.

One of the primary reasons may be the use of different IQ tests (by different psychologists) that vary in their breadth of measurement of the major domains of human intelligence.  In particular, I will focus on the contemporary consensus psychometric theory known as CHC theory to explain score differences.  What is CHC theory?

The Cattell-Horn-Carroll Theory of Cognitive Abilities (aka., CHC theory) is now serving as the blueprint for the development and/or revision of most major intelligence tests.  It is only a matter of time before the courts begin receiving expert testimony (and or reports) based on CHC-designed IQ batteries or non-CHC IQ batteries interpreted via the CHC lens.

This current post is intended to make readers aware of the prominence of CHC theory in intelligence testing circles.  Its application to IQ test results in Atkin's cases will be discussed  in future posts.  For now, readers should check out the two best overview articles the describe CHC theory.  Yes...they are written by the blogmaster.  This is not boasting...this is just a factual statement.  The two references are listed below.  One was an invited editorial in the journal Intelligence and the other a recent book chapter.  Links to the sources are provided below (note - the link for the book chapter is to a 2004 pre-publication web-based version of the eventual 2005 book chapter).
  • McGrew, K. (2009).  Editorial:  CHC theory and the human cognitive abilities project: Standing on the shoulders of the giants of psychometric intelligence research, Intelligence, 37, 1-10. (click here to view or download pdf)
  • McGrew, K. S. (2005).  The Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) theory of cognitive abilities:  Past, present and future. In D. Flanagan, & Harrison (Eds.), Contemporary intellectual assessment: Theories, tests, and issues (p.136-202). New York: Guilford Press. (click here to view web-based version of chapter)

Stay tuned.  Much more on this topic in the future.  If readers want to stay abreast re: the most recent CHC theory and assessment research, I post this information at a sister blog (Intelligent Insights on Intelligence Theories and Tests; aka., IQs Corner)

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Tuesday, August 18, 2009

Book review: A life for a life--The American Debate Over the Death Penalty

I received an FYI email from the Death Penalty Information Center regarding a new book about the death penalty in America. I do not have a copy nor have I read the book. This is an FYI post only...not a pro or con endorsement by the blogmaster.



From the DPIC web page the following book description:
In the book, A Life for a Life: The American Debate Over the Death Penalty, author Michael Dow Burkhead, a psychologist who has worked with criminal offenders for 25 years, explores the various trends in public opinion that influence crime prevention efforts, create public policy, and reform criminal law. He examines eight core issues about the use of executions: cruel and unusual punishment, discrimination, deterrence, due process, culpability, scripture, innocence, and justice. The book provides a brief history of capital punishment in the United States from the earliest known execution in1608 to the present time. Additional topics include the regionalization of capital punishment sentences, the spiritual and scriptural debate over the death penalty, the role of DNA evidence in modern death sentences, and the ongoing effects recent court rulings. The appendix includes recent state commission reports on the death penalty from Maryland, California, New Jersey, and Tennessee.

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Definition: Forensic Psychology

What is forensic psychology?

The Wikipedia definition page can be found by clicking here.

According to the American Board of Forensic Psychology:
Forensic Psychology is the application of the science and profession of psychology to questions and issues relating to law and the legal system. The word "forensic" comes from the Latin word "forensis," meaning "of the forum," where the law courts of ancient Rome were held. Today forensic refers to the application of scientific principles and practices to the adversary process where specially knowledgeable scientists play a role.



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APA Atkin's relevant professional divisions: 33 and 41

Psychologists involved in Atkin's proceedings need to be aware of certain standards, ethics, etc. On the right-side of this blog I'm adding (on a continual basis) important professional resources. As recommended in a recent article by Olley (2009; I'm currently skimming this article and will provide a post sometime soon), membership in certain American Psychological Association Divisions can be helpful in securing information, networking with others involved in Atkin's cases, etc. Two in particular are suggested:
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Journal: Mental & Physical Disability Law Reporter



In my last post I featured the ABA Commission on Mental and Physical Disability Law. I forgot to mention the journal publication featured by the commission, which would likely be a valuable resource for professionals involved in Atkin's death penalty cases. Check out Mental and Physical Disability Law Reporter. At the web page, the journal is briefly described as:

  • Published since 1976, the Reporter provides timely summaries of reported legal developments over a two-month period in 22 subject areas covering disability discrimination law and civil and criminal mental disability law. Available in print and online.

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ABA Commission on Mental and Physical Disability Law



A "must resource" for mental health professionals who become involved in Atkin's death penalty cases is the American Bar Association (ABA) Commission on Mental and Physical Disability Law (CMPDL). Below is the purpose statement for this ABA commission.

The Commission's mission is "to promote the ABA's commitment to justice and the rule of law for persons with mental, physical, and sensory disabilities and to promote their full and equal participation in the legal profession." The Commission consists of 15 members appointed by the ABA President-elect on an annual basis. It meets bi-annually at its headquarters in Washington, D.C. to map out future plans and to direct its current activities.

The ABA’s Commission on the Mentally Disabled was established in 1973 to respond to the advocacy needs of persons with mental disabilities. After the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, the ABA broadened the Commission’s mission to serve all persons with disabilities and changed its name to the Commission on Mental and Physical Disability Law (CMPDL). Today, the Commission carries out an array of projects and activities addressing disability-related public policy, disability law, and the professional needs of lawyers and law students with disabilities.


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Monday, August 17, 2009

Who is on death row (with focus on MR/IQ)? Cunningham and Vigen (2002) review

Who is on death row? What are the intellectual capabilities of individuals facing execution?

The following 2002 literature review attempted to answer the above (and more) questions. Whether the findings of this 7 year old survey hold true today is not known. If I can find relevant information I will post it.
  • Cunningham, M. D. and Vigen, M. P. (2002). Death Row Inmate Characteristics, Adjustment, and Confinement: A Critical Review of the Literature. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 20, 191–210 (click here to view).
ARTICLE SUMMARY

[note: Italics are direct quotes. Underline is emphasis added by the blogmaster]

Abstract

This article reviews and summarizes research on death row inmates. The contributions and weaknesses of death row demographic data, clinical studies, and research based on institutional records are critiqued. Our analysis shows that death row inmates are overwhelmingly male and disproportionately Southern. Racial representation remains controversial. Frequently death row inmates are intellectually limited and academically deficient. Histories of significant neurological insult are common, as are developmental histories of trauma, family disruption, and substance abuse. Rates of psychological disorder among death row inmates are high, with conditions of confinement appearing to precipitate or aggravate these disorders. Contrary to expectation, the extant research indicates that the majority of death row inmates do not exhibit violence in prison even in more open institutional settings. These findings have implications for forensic mental health sentencing evaluations, competent attorney representation, provision of mental health services, racial disparity in death sentences, death row security and confinement policies, and moral culpability considerations. Future research directions on death row populations are suggested.

According to Cunningham and Vigen (hereafter referred to as the "authors"), the research "literature on death row inmates has not been comprehensively summarized and reviewed. This article attempts to fill that void by reviewing the extant literature on the characteristics of death row inmates, their adjustment to prison, and their conditions of confinement."

The scope of coverage of this review article is impossible to summarize in a single blog post. More importantly, the focus of this blog is on the mental retardation/intellectual competence characteristics of this population. As thus, this post will only summarize the information in this survey article related to this focus. Other topics discussed (methodological review of prior research; woman, race, psychological disorders, neurological disorders, drug use, etc. issues) will not be covered (readers can view the original article for this information)


According to the authors:
  • Eleven of the 13 clinical studies reported data on the intellectual capability of death row samples. Mean IQ scores were in the average to low average range, generally consistent with the intellectual capabilities of general prison population inmates (Panton, 1976). A significant minority of death row inmates, though, exhibited marked intellectual limitations. For example, 27% of the Mississippi death row sample investigated by Cunningham and Vigen (1999) had WAIS-R Verbal IQ scores below 74.
  • Similarly, Frierson et al. (1998) reported that 28% of their death row sample obtained IQ scores in the borderline or mentally retarded classifications.
  • National demographic data (Snell, 2001) indicate that 52.3% of death row inmates did not finish high school and 12.7% attended only to the eighth grade or less. Median formal education was 11th grade. These rates of educational attainment are similar to or only modestly lower than those observed in the general state prison population nationwide
  • Clinical studies on death row inmates found a somewhat lower level of formal education, typically reporting a mean of ninth grade schooling.

Authors Conclusions:
While much of the research on death row inmates has limitations in specificity, sampling, methodology, and reporting, there are a number of recurrent findings. To summarize these, death row inmates are overwhelmingly male and disproportionately Southern. Over half of death row inmates are non-whites. A majority did not graduate from high school. Mean IQ scores of death row inmates are in the low average-to-average range, but a disturbingly large minority exhibits IQ scores in the borderline and mental retardation ranges. Functional literacy capabilities are well below what would be expected from the years of schooling attended. Whether these literacy deficits are the result of learning disabilities or other factors cannot be determined from the current data. There is also a significant incidence of neurological and neuropsychological abnormalities among death row inmates. Psychological disorders are quite frequent among death row inmates. The particularly adverse conditions of death row confinement in some jurisdictions appear to not only undermine efforts to adaptively cope, but also act to aggravate psychological symptoms. Current prison mental health interventions are insufficient.

Policy Implications (as per authors)
given the conclusions of the clinical studies, mental health experts performing forensic evaluations at capital sentencing should be attentive to the presence of neurological abnormalities, learning disabilities, psychiatric disorders, and traumatic developmental histories. These vulnerabilities were more frequently identified in studies that undertook broader and more time intensive evaluations. This speaks to the need for comprehensive examinations as well as sufficient interview duration for reasonable self-disclosure to occur. Adequate forensic evaluation at sentencing, therefore, requires particularly careful assessment of the vulnerabilities of this population, as well as knowledge of the current literature regarding the behavioral implications of these deficiencies and underlying adverse developmental factors.

the intellectual, literacy, and psychological deficits of most death row inmates render them incapable of responding to the demands of direct appeals or postconviction proceedings without the assistance and representation of qualified legal counsel

the significant percentage of racial minorities, and particularly African– Americans, on death row nationwide has varying interpretations—the most disturbing of these asserting that racial bias in the application of the death penalty, whether by race of offender or race of victim, is both a historical legacy and a continuing social policy problem.

the incidence of psychological symptoms and mental health problems among death row inmates calls for comprehensive mental health services. Effective treatment of psychological symptoms and disorders among death row inmates is not only humane, but likely to facilitate institutional management and reduce disciplinary misconduct.

it is disturbing that so many inmates on death row are so obviously damaged—developmentally, intellectually, educationally, neurologically, and psychologically. To the extent that the death penalty is intended to punish those murderers who are most morally culpable, there would seem to be some miscarriage of that intent when it is visited upon individuals who are manifestly damaged, deficient, or disturbed in their psychological development and functioning.




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Geography, MR and the death penatly: Ethics related issues for psychological experts

The state in which an individual with intellectual disabilities (MR) resides, when they commit a capital punishment crime, may have bearing on whether they are executed or not, and raises potential ethical issues for psychologists who conduct assessments as expert witnesses.

In the following 2006 journal article, Duvall and Morris outline a number of critical issues that psychologists must recognize when serving as expert witnesses in Atkin’s MR/death penalty cases. The primary focus of the article was on the U. S. Supreme Court Atkin's (2002) ruling that deferred to the states when defining mental retardation.
  • Duvall, J. C. & Morris, R. J. (2006). Assessing Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases: Critical Issues for Psychology and Psychological Practice (2006). Professional Psychology: Research and Practice 37 (6), 658 – 665. (click here to view)
Abstract
In 2002, the United States Supreme Court decided the Atkins case, which held that mentally retarded defendants could not be executed. The opinion gave no guidance on the definition of mental retardation, preferring to leave to individual states the task of determining not only the definition of mental retardation but also the assessment procedures to be used in making the diagnosis. This lack of guidance has resulted in many issues, including varying definitions of what constitutes mental retardation across states, use of different assessment procedures to make the determination that a person has mental retardation, and numerous psychometric concerns regarding the provision of psychological assessment services to the courts in capital cases that involve a defendant who may have mental retardation. This article examines these latter issues in detail from both psychological and legal perspectives and makes recommendations for practicing psychologists.

ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
[noteitalics designates direct quotes. Underlining reflects emphasis of the blogmaster].

MR Definition Issues:

The Atkins opinion recognized two different clinical definitions of mental retardation--the 1992 American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) defintion and, the 2000 definition published by the American Psychiatric Association in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., text rev.; 2000).
The 1992 AAMR mental retardation definition requires substantial limitations in present functioning “characterized by significantly sub-average intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with related limitations in two or more of the following applicable adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure and work.” Further, mental retardation must manifest before age 18 (Atkins v. Virginia, 2002, p. 308, n. 3).
The American Psychiatric Association formulation is as follows: The essential feature of mental retardation is significantly sub-average general intellectual functioning (Criterion A) that is accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the following skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social/ interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety (Criterion B). The onset must occur before age 18 years (Criterion C). (American Psychiatric Association, 2000, p. 41)
At the time of this 2006 article, according to the authors, the federal government and 38 states permitted the execution of defendants found guilty of capital crimes. Prior to Atkins only 19 states had enacted statutes prohibiting the execution of persons meeting a statutory definition of MR. After the SCOTUS decision an additional 10 states enacted such statutes. "In addition, 11 states that permit imposition of the death penalty still lack any express statutory bar to the execution of a person having mental retardation. These states are Alabama, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, and Wyoming (“Oklahoma Senate,” 2006; “Our Turn,” 2006; Rawls, 2005)."

An example of the post-Atkin's effect on states was the state of Texas which, via Atkins, "compelled the Texas Court of Appeals to make its own definition of mental retardation, and it chose the 1992 AAMR definition (Ex Parte Briseno, 2004). Courts in other states that still lack governing statutes have created their own definitions and procedures as well."

A valuable component of the this article was the provision (via a table) of a summary of the definitions, operational cut-off scores, and any mandated assessments in different states that had laws protecting individuals with MR from being executed (see Table 1 in article) As Duvall and Morris discuss, a situation can arise where a psychologist is faced with an ethical issue when a state has a different cut-off score for MR when compared to the AAMR and APA operational definitions.
many statutes appear to provide that an IQ score above 70 (or in Connecticut, above 69) would alone defeat a defendant’s claim that mental retardation exempts him or her from eligibility for the death penalty. These legislated cutoff scores directly conflict with American Psychiatric Association and AAMR definitions, which permit IQ scores of 70 to 75 as indicative of sufficiently subaverage intellectual functioning (Luckasson et al., 2002).

the use of a “70” IQ score as a cutoff score reflects a statistical convention rather than a natural boundary and that using precise cutoffs mistakenly suggests that a 1-point difference in two people’s scores reflects a significant difference in their cognitive capacities.


Flynn Effect issues:

According to Duvall and Morris, in 2006 no state statute specifically addressed the Flynn effect (see prior posts), an issue that can have a major impact on death penalty cases.
For example, in those cases in which a defendant was convicted during either the beginning or end of a renorming period, the defendant’s IQ could be artificially lower or higher.
Thus, a potentially important implication of the Flynn effect is that some borderline death row inmates or capital murder defendants who were not classified as mentally retarded in childhood because they were administered an older version of an IQ test will qualify as mentally retarded if they are administered a more recent test. Given the magnitude of the effect (nearly a full standard deviation decrease in IQ is associated with changing norms since the first edition of the WISC was phased out in the early 1970s), the shifts in eligibility for death row inmates could be significant.

Potential ethical issues:

As per the 2002 Ethics Code and Legally Mandated Procedures for Assessing Mental Retardation In the Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct (APA, 2002), Standard 9.02(a) states: “Psychologists administer, adapt, score, interpret, or use assessment techniques, interviews, tests, or instruments in a manner and for purposes that are appropriate in light of the research on or evidence of the usefulness and proper application of the techniques” (p. 1071).

Although this standard may sound simple in the abstract, Duvall and Morris discuss a number of potential ethical issues that may surface for psychologists as a function of the state in which they perform as an expert witness. For example:

the question arises whether the legally mandated practices in many states involving a number of test administrations by different experts within a short period are consistent with the “proper application” of the procedure for measuring IQ. Standard 2.04 of the ethics code states that “Psychologists’ work is based on established scientific and professional knowledge of the discipline” (APA, 2002, p. 1064). The question here is whether “established scientific and professional knowledge” supports psychologists performing multiple intellectual assessments within a short period of time, without communicating with other professionals regarding which tests were used, and without considering the impact of practice effects and related reliability and validity issues on the test results obtained. The concern is particularly pressing in states such as Kentucky and Tennessee where the case law appears to make the psychologist’s scoring of an IQ test the sole cause for disqualifying a defendant claiming mental retardation to escape
According to Duvall and Morris (in 2006):
it appears that no states whose statutes provide for more than one examination by different experts include any provision expressly addressing the psychological measurement issues or the test–retest reliability problems Moreover, no state statute mandates communication between the evaluators so multiple assessment using identical instruments can be avoided
A number of the issues raised by the authors boil down to “ how should a psychologist proceed who (a) is interested in providing psychological services to the court to determine whether a person has mental retardation and (b) desires to behave in a manner consistent with the APA ethics code?”

According to Duvall and Morris, the APA ethics code does provide some assistance for these situations via Standard 1.02:
which addresses what to do if ethical responsibilities conflict with law, regulations, or other governing authority. It states, psychologists must make known their commitment to the Ethics Code and take steps to resolve the conflict. If the conflict is not resolvable via such means, psychologists may adhere to the requirements of the law, regulations, or other governing legal authority. (APA, 2002, p. 1063)

However, Duvall and Morris point out that by following the law a psychologist could be violating basic principles and practices of accepted psychological testing practice—“therefore, a psychologist who provides psychological assessment services to a particular state, as well as any subsequent expert testimony, will conceivably act in accordance with the law while at the same time providing results and testimony that could very possibly be inconsistent with current professional standards of practice, or as the ethics code states, “established scientific and professional knowledge” (APA, 2002).”

So. What is a conflicted psychologist to do?
One way to counteract this conundrum is for the psychologist to follow Standard 1.02 of the APA ethics code by adhering to the law and stating in his or her psychological report, as well as indicating in his or her court testimony the limitations of his or her findings based on the standards of sound psychological testing practices. By informing the court, as well as the prosecution and defense, a decision can be made regarding the fairness of the psychologist’s assessment. A more simple solution is for psychologists to refuse appointments to provide assessments in those states whose statutes clearly violate sound psychometric practices. When the difference in a single IQ point can mean the difference between eligibility and ineligibility for the death penalty, it would appear to us that psychologists involved in these cases should apply the standard of psychological care advocated by the APA ethics code rather than the law.

Summary and Conclusion Section of Article

The lack of guidance in Atkins about definitions and procedures appears problematic for psychological practice because states have different definitions of mental retardation, cutoff score criterion, and assessment procedures. Moreover, some procedures mandated by statute appear to defy sound psychological measurement principles. These circumstances have created an ethical dilemma for those psychologists who choose to assist states in determining whether a defendant in a capital case has mental retardation. Psychologists must follow both the law and the ethics code of their profession. The problem is that the implementations of the Atkins decision in many states can cause psychologists to act in a manner that may violate the APA ethics code. In these instances, psychologists could refuse to accept a court appointment to provide such services and, therefore, avoid an ethical–legal conflict. In instances, however, where such an appointment is accepted, it would appear that psychologists should state clearly in their report to the courts (as well as in any subsequent testimony) the specific limitations associated with their findings that affect the external and internal validity of the test results.



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