Saturday, December 28, 2013


Loe, Scott A.
Psychology in the Schools, Vol. 51 Issue 1 – 2014: 97 - 106


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Monday, December 23, 2013

SCOTUS Hall v Florida Atkins ID update: Petitioners and Amicus Briefs--major focus on IQ "bright line" and SEM

The Atkins MR/ID case of Hall v Florida, which is to be heard by SCOTUS this spring, had two mportant briefs posted within the last week.

The Hall v Florida petition was filed Dec 16. Today, an Amicus Brief was filed by a number of organizations, led by the American Psychological Association.
Click here for a variety of posts re: Atkins cases in Flordia, which have been problematic due to the Florida "Cherry court" establishment of a "bright line" score of 70, with no consiseration of the standard error of measurement (SEM)

Friday, December 20, 2013

"Sentencing Juveniles: Eliminate the Bright-Line Rule of Majority" [feedly]

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"Sentencing Juveniles: Eliminate the Bright-Line Rule of Majority"

The title of this post is the title of this new article by Katie Ryan Van Camp just now appearing on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

The United States Supreme Court's often stated view that "death is different" has led to a line of decisions in which the Court carved out categorical Eighth Amendment exceptions for certain groups.  These cases hold that courts should not give the death penalty to individuals within those groups.  In Atkins v. Virginia, for example, the leading case within the "death is different" line, the Court held that the death penalty was not an appropriate punishment for mentally retarded offenders because it constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.  The Court continued to carve out exceptions for certain groups including juveniles.

Then the Court's view regarding the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment evolved.  No longer was "death" the only "different;" now, juveniles could be considered "different."  Following Roper, in which the Court held that sentencing juveniles — those under the age of eighteen — to death constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, a line of cases emerged in which the Court continued to carve out more exceptions for juveniles.

In each of these landmark decisions, the Court has found that to be considered a juvenile, the individual must be under the age of majority.  As found in Roper, and consistently followed in the other decisions within this line of cases, the age of majority is eighteen. Although the Court acknowledged that there are some juveniles under the age of majority who have attained a level of maturity "some adults will never reach" and "the qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18," the Court drew a line.  Thus, the age of majority is a bright-line rule.

Heeding the Court's own words, it should recognize that juveniles who are aged seventeen and those aged eighteen arguably are no different.  Research also suggests this to be true. This article argues, therefore, that because of the uncertainty surrounding "juvenile" brain development and because the bright-line rule of majority prevents courts from determining if an individual under the age of eighteen, the age of majority, has the requisite culpability deserving of the categorically excluded punishments, the Court should eliminate the bright-line rule of majority.  Further, although the majority of juveniles should not receive certain categorically excluded harsh punishments, a few should still receive those punishments, and it should be an option for all.

Part I of this article serves as background on the bright-line rule of majority and its application in "juveniles are different" cases.  Part II of this article argues that the Court should eliminate the bright-line rule of majority.  Part III of this article proposes a solution to the bright-line rule problem; that is, a case-by-case analysis should decide cases involving juveniles with age being another sentencing factor considered.  Age will thus act as an aggravating or mitigating factor in the sentencing phase of the criminal proceeding. Finally, Part IV of this article explains why a case-by-case analysis considering age as a sentencing factor is better than a bright-line rule of majority and addresses the potential counter-arguments to this proposal.

Thursday, December 19, 2013

Title Correction: Determining Intellectual Disability in the Courts: Focus on Capital Cases

12-20-13 Correction note:  The title listed at the AAIDD web page differs from the official title for this guide as submitted by the editor of this volume, and agree upon by the contributors.  The current title, and expected publication title, is:

 Determining Intellectual Disability in the Courts:  Focus on Capital Cases

The Death Penalty and Intellectual Disability: A Guide is now listed as a forthcomming publication at the AAIDD publications web page. A brief description from that page follows below

In the 2002 landmark decision Atkins v. Virginia 536 U.S. 304, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that executing a person with intellectual disability is a violation of the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits “cruel and unusual punishment,” but left states to determine their own criteria for intellectual disability. AAIDD has always advocated against the death penalty for people with intellectual disability and has long provided amicus curiae briefs in Supreme Court cases. Thus, in this comprehensive new book published by AAIDD, notable authors in the field of intellectual disability discuss all aspects of the issues, with a particular focus on foundational considerations, assessment factors and issues, and professional concerns in Atkins assessments.

The projected publication is sometime this spring.

Conflict of interest statement: I am the author of two of the chapters:

-Intellectual Functioning: Conceptual Issues
-Norm Obsolescence: The Flynn Effect

- Posted using BlogPress from my iPad

Journal Intelligence--Special Issue on the Flynn Effect

Web of Knowledge Table of Contents Alert

Journal Name: INTELLIGENCE (ISSN: 0160-2896)
Issue: Vol. 41 No. 6, 2013
IDS#: 263KK
Alert Expires: 10 JAN 2014
Number of Articles in Issue: 13 (13 included in this e-mail)
Organization ID: c4f3d919329a46768459d3e35b8102e6
Note: Instructions on how to purchase the full text of an article and Thomson Reuters Science Contact information are at the end of the e-mail.

*Pages: 751-752 (Editorial Material)
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Special Issue The Flynn Effect Re-Evaluated

Thompson, J

*INTELLIGENCE*, 41 (6):751-752; SI NOV-DEC 2013 


*Pages: 753-764 (Article)
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Overview of the Flynn effect

Williams, RL

*INTELLIGENCE*, 41 (6):753-764; SI NOV-DEC 2013 

Following WW2, various researchers found and reported secular gains in
IQ but it was not until additional reports appeared in the 1980s that
researchers began to look for the cause or causes. It was quickly
apparent that the gains were not limited to any group or nation, but the
manifestation of the gains was different depending on time and place.
For every discovery, there was a different or opposite result in a
different data set. Gains have been large, small, variable, and even
negative. Some researchers have found that the gains were on g, while
more have found no g loading. Abstract test formats, such as the Raven
have often shown the greatest gains, but gains have also appeared in
tests of crystallized intelligence. Some data has shown greater gains
for the lower half of the intelligence distribution, while others have
shown greater gains in the top half, and others have shown equal gains
at all levels. Hypotheses for the causes have included environmental
factors, genetic effects, reduced fertility, and methodological
dependence. Two models are discussed. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights


*Pages: 765-769 (Article)
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Who discovered the Flynn effect? A review of early studies of the secular increase of intelligence

Lynn, R

*INTELLIGENCE*, 41 (6):765-769; SI NOV-DEC 2013 

Flynn has been credited with having discovered the increase in IQs that
has been reported in a number of countries during most of the twentieth
century and that has come to be known as "the Flynn effect". This paper
documents and discusses a number of reports of increases in IQs that
were published from 1936 onwards before the phenomenon was rediscovered
by Flynn (1984, 1987). These early reports showed that the Flynn effect
is fully present in pre-school children, does not increase during the
school age years, and is greater for non-verbal abilities than for
verbal abilities. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.


*Pages: 770-779 (Article)
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An item-level examination of the Flynn effect on the National Intelligence Test in Estonia

Shiu, W; Beaujean, AA; Must, O; te Nijenhuis, J; Must, A

*INTELLIGENCE*, 41 (6):770-779; SI NOV-DEC 2013 

This study examined the Flynn effect (FE; i.e., the rise in IQ scores
over time) in Estonia using the Estonian version of the National
Intelligence Tests (NIT; Haggerty, Terman, Thorndike, Whipple & Yerkes,
1919; National Research Council, 1920). Using secondary data from two
cohorts (1934, n = 890 and 2006, n = 913) of students, we analyzed the
NIT's subtests using item response theory (IRT). For each subtest, we
first examined invariance in all the items and then linked the latent
variable (theta) scores between the two cohorts using the invariant
items. The results showed that there was a FE in theta for all subtests
except one, although there was much variability in the FE magnitude,
ranging from an effect size of 0.24 (3.60 IQ points) to 1.05 (15.75 IQ
points). In addition, this study showed there was a decrease in the
variability of theta for all the subtests, although only two of the
subtests showed large decreases (approximately .50 standard deviations).
Last, the subtests' precision of measuring theta was very similar at
both time points. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.


*Pages: 780-790 (Article)
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Changes in test-taking patterns over time

Must, O; Must, A

*INTELLIGENCE*, 41 (6):780-790; SI NOV-DEC 2013 

The current study aims to investigate the relationship between right,
wrong and missing answers to cognitive test items (test-taking patterns)
in the context of the Flynn Effect (FE). We compare two cohorts of
Estonian students (1933/36, n = 890; 2006, n = 913) using an Estonian
adaptation of the National Intelligence Tests and document three
simultaneous trends: fewer missing answers (-1 Cohen's d averaged over
subtests), and a rise in the number of right and wrong answers to the
subtests (average ds of .86 and .30, respectively). In the Arithmetical
Reasoning and Vocabulary subtests, adjustments for false-positive
answers (the number of right minus the number of wrong answers) reduced
the size of the Flynn Effect by half. These subtests were supposed to be
high g-loading subtests. Our conclusion is that rapid guessing has risen
over time and influenced tests scores more strongly over the years. The
FE is partly explained by changes in test-taking behavior over time. (C)
2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.


*Pages: 791-801 (Article)
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Item-response theory modeling of IQ gains (the Flynn effect) on crystallized intelligence: Rodgers' hypothesis yes, Brand's hypothesis perhaps

Pietschnig, J; Tran, US; Voracek, M

*INTELLIGENCE*, 41 (6):791-801; SI NOV-DEC 2013 

Potential explanations for generational intelligence test score gains
continue to be subject to intense debate and scrutiny in the scientific
community. However, the explanatory value of some of the proposed causes
remains difficult to determine, since only little empirical evidence is
available. To clarify the role of two scarcely investigated theories
accounting for the Flynn effect, this study set out to examine the role
of changing test-taking behavior (Brand's hypothesis) and of a narrowing
of the IQ ability distribution (Rodgers' hypothesis). Archival records
of crystallized intelligence test performance over a time-span of 17
years of a large number of psychiatric inpatients and outpatients in
Austria were investigated (N = 5445; 1978-94). This sample was
particularly suitable to investigate our hypotheses since participants
were under no pressure to perform which makes observed changes in test
taking behavior attributable to personal style and ability rather than
differential performance in pressure situations. Analytical approaches
of both classical test theory and item response theory (IRT) yielded
gains of 1.0 to 2.4 IQ points per decade. Test-taking behavior
indicative of guessing and decreasing population IQ variability appeared
to contribute both to IQ test score gains. IRT-based analyses showed
that gains were largely preserved when controlling for highest
educational qualification, while the test instrument showed measurement
invariance between cohorts. However, IRT-based results also suggested
that changes in test-taking behavior might not necessarily reflect
increased guessing, but item drift instead. In all, this evidence
emphasizes better performance of individuals of the lower tail of the IQ
ability distribution in more recent years as one important contributing
factor for generational IQ test score gains. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All
rights reserved.


*Pages: 802-807 (Article)
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Is the Flynn effect on g?: A meta-analysis

te Nijenhuis, J; van der Flier, H

*INTELLIGENCE*, 41 (6):802-807; SI NOV-DEC 2013 

Black/White differences in mean IQ have been clearly shown to strongly
correlate with g loadings, so large group differences on subtests of
high cognitive complexity and small group differences on subtests of low
cognitive complexity. IQ scores have been increasing over the last half
century, a phenomenon known as the Flynn effect. Flynn effect gains are
predominantly driven by environmental factors. Might these factors also
be responsible for group differences in intelligence? The empirical
studies on whether the pattern of Flynn effect gains is the same as the
pattern of group differences yield conflicting findings. A psychometric
meta-analysis on all studies with seven or more subtests reporting
correlations between g loadings and standardized score gains was carried
out, based on 5 papers, yielding 11 data points (total N = 16,663). It
yielded a true correlation of -.38, and none of the variance between the
studies could be attributed to moderators. It appears that the Flynn
effect and group differences have different causes. Suggestions for
future research are discussed. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights


*Pages: 808-816 (Article)
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Are cognitive differences between countries diminishing? Evidence from TIMSS and PISA

Meisenberg, G; Woodley, MA

*INTELLIGENCE*, 41 (6):808-816; SI NOV-DEC 2013 

Cognitive ability differences between countries can be large, with
average IQs ranging from approximately 70 in sub-Saharan Africa to 105
in the countries of north-east Asia. A likely reason for the great
magnitude of these differences is the Flynn effect, which massively
raised average IQs in economically advanced countries during the 20th
century. The present study tests the prediction that international IQ
differences are diminishing again because substantial Flynn effects are
now under way in the less developed "low-IQ countries" while
intelligence is stagnating in the economically advanced "high-IQ
countries." The hypothesis is examined with two periodically
administered scholastic assessment programs. TIMSS has tested 8th-grade
students periodically between 1995 and 2011 in mathematics and science,
and PISA has administered tests of mathematics, science and reading
between 2000 and 2009. In both TIMSS and PISA, low-scoring countries
tend to show a rising trend relative to higher-scoring countries.
Despite the short time series of only 9 and 16 years, the results
indicate that differences between high-scoring and low-scoring countries
are diminishing on these scholastic achievement tests. The results
support the prediction that through a combination of substantial Flynn
effects in low-scoring countries and diminished (or even negative) Flynn
effects in high-scoring countries, cognitive differences between
countries are getting smaller on a worldwide scale. (C) 2013 Elsevier
Inc. All rights reserved.


*Pages: 817-820 (Article)
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A negative Flynn effect in Finland, 1997-2009

Dutton, E; Lynn, R

*INTELLIGENCE*, 41 (6):817-820; SI NOV-DEC 2013 

The average IQs of approximately 25,000 18-20 year old male military
conscripts in Finland per year are reported for the years 1988 to 2009.
The results showed increases in the scores on tests of Shapes, Number
and Words over the years 1988 to 1997 averaging 4.0 IQ points a decade.
From 1997 to 2009 there were declines in all three tests averaging 2.0
IQ points a decade. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.


*Pages: 821-831 (Article)
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Ability rise in NAEP and narrowing ethnic gaps?

Rindermann, H; Thompson, J

*INTELLIGENCE*, 41 (6):821-831; SI NOV-DEC 2013 

US National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) results from 1971
to 2008 enable four different effects to be distinguished: Cohort rise
effects, gap-narrowing between ethnic groups, trends due to demographic
changes in by NAEP listed or not listed ethnic groups. NAEP means and
percentiles in reading and mathematics were transformed to conventional
IQs and SDs. The total increase from 1971 to 2008 was in the scale of
4.34 IQ points (dec = 1.17 IQ per decade). The ability distribution
became more homogenous (down from SD = 15.00 in 1971 to SD = 13.56 in
2008). Increases were larger for younger students (9-year olds: 2.02 IQ
per decade; 13-year olds: 1.20; 17-year olds: 0.30); larger at the lower
ability level (10th percentile dec = 1.79 vs. 90th percentile dec =
1.03). The largest increase was for Blacks (Whites dec = 1.29 IQ
Hispanics 2.27, Blacks 3.04). White-Hispanic-differences were reduced
from 11.59 to 8.46 IQ White-Black from 16.33 to 9.94 IQ If the racial
composition of the population had not changed, the mean gain for the
17-year-old group would have been 2.47 IQ points higher. Had the gap
between Whites and the two other groups not narrowed, the mean gain
would have been 1.70 IQ points lower. Demographic change has accounted
for a loss of 2.47 IQ points and according to cognitive human capital
theory $2001 GDP per capita per year, but total ethnic gap-narrowing has
provided a gain of $1377. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.


*Pages: 832-842 (Article)
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Four successful tests of the Cognitive Differentiation-Integration Effort hypothesis

Woodley, MA; Figueredo, J; Brown, SD; Ross, KC

*INTELLIGENCE*, 41 (6):832-842; SI NOV-DEC 2013 

The Cognitive Differentiation-Integration Effort (CD-IE) hypothesis
predicts that the dimension of life history speed (K) regulates the
strength of the correlation among cognitive abilities, such that
individuals with higher K exhibit more weakly integrated abilities than
those with lower K. It is predicted that this effect takes place
independently of the level of g owing to the absence of an individual
differences level correlation between K and g. CD-IE was examined using
two student samples: (I) an all female sample (N = 121), using the ALHB
as a measure of,K and the two SILS subtests of g; and (2) a combined
male and female sample (N = 346), using a shorter three-indicator
("Trifecta") measure of K. a general creativity measure comprised of two
subscales (writing and drawing "creative performance"), and the APM-18
measure of fluid cognition. A third, population-representative sample
was obtained from the NLSY (N = 11,907). A K-Factor was constructed from
convergent measures of subjective well-being, sociability, interpersonal
trust, internal locus of control, and delay of gratification, and a
g-factor was constructed from the 10 subscales of the ASVAB. A fourth
sample, addressing the question of ethnic differences was collected
encompassing eight different ethnic groups with a combined 107 specific
ability correlations with g. An aggregate K-Factor was constructed for
this sample based on convergent population-level indicators of
longevity, total fertility rates and infant mortality. Utilizing the
Continuous Parameter Estimation Model, in student sample I a significant
CD-1E effect was found on the SILS Abstract subtest (beta=-.215), but
not on the SILS Verbal subtest (beta=.069). In student sample 2, CD-IE
was observed on the general creativity measure (beta=-.127), but not on
the fluid cognitive ability measure (beta=-.057). Significant effects
were also observed on both the written and drawing creative output
subscales (beta=-.189 and -.183 respectively). In sample 3 (the NLSY),
generally statistically significant but small-magnitude CD-1E effects
were observed among all 10 ASVAB subtests (mean effect size beta=-.032).
In sample four, a near-significant CD-IE effect was detected
(beta=-.167). Controlling for subtest skew reduces the mean effect sizes
across individual differences samples (beta=-.071 in the student
samples, -.027 in the NLSY), but boosted it to significance in the
ethnic differences sample (beta=-.179). Controlling for the skew of
residuals reversed the signs of the CD-IE effects on the ASVAB Words and
Comprehension subscales, and also on the SILS Verbal subscale, but
amplified the magnitudes of the mean effects in the student and NLSY
samples (beta=-.036 and -.131), while reducing the effect size slightly
in the ethnic-differences sample (beta=-.172). In the individual
differences samples, these effects were demonstrated to be unconfounded
with sex of respondent and also unrelated to the Jensen effect. The
apparent independence of the effect from both level of g and
subtestg-loading suggests intriguing commonalities with the Lynn-Flynn
effect (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.


*Pages: 843-850 (Article)
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Were the Victorians cleverer than us? The decline in general intelligence estimated from a meta-analysis of the slowing of simple reaction time

Woodley, MA; te Nijenhuis, J; Murphy, R

*INTELLIGENCE*, 41 (6):843-850; SI NOV-DEC 2013 

The Victorian era was marked by an explosion of innovation and genius,
per capita rates of which appear to have declined subsequently. The
presence of dysgenic fertility for IQ amongst Western nations, starting
in the 19th century, suggests that these trends might be related to
declining IQ. This is because high-IQ people are more productive and
more creative. We tested the hypothesis that the Victorians were
cleverer than modern populations, using high-quality instruments, namely
measures of simple visual reaction time in a meta-analytic study. Simple
reaction time measures correlate substantially with measures of general
intelligence (g) and are considered elementary measures of cognition. In
this study we used the data on the secular slowing of simple reaction
time described in a meta-analysis of 14 age-matched studies from Western
countries conducted between 1889 and 2004 to estimate the decline in g
that may have resulted from the presence of dysgenic fertility. Using
psychometric meta-analysis we computed the true correlation between
simple reaction time and g, yielding a decline of -1.16 IQ points per
decade or -13.35 IQ points since Victorian times. These findings
strongly indicate that with respect to g the Victorians were
substantially cleverer than modern Western populations. (C) 2013
Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.


*Pages: 851-857 (Editorial Material)
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The "Flynn Effect" and Flynn's paradox

Flynn, JR

*INTELLIGENCE*, 41 (6):851-857; SI NOV-DEC 2013 

Friday, December 13, 2013

Brave New Death Penalty World: brain scans used to defeat death sentence [feedly]

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Brave New Death Penalty World: brain scans used to defeat death sentence

This new Wired piece, headlined "Did Brain Scans Just Save a Convicted Murderer From the Death Penalty?" suggests that defense lawyers in a recent federal capital trial devised another clever way to encourage jurors not to return a death verdict.  Here are the basic details:

John McCluskey escaped from an Arizona prison in July, 2010. A few days later, he and two accomplices — one of whom was both his cousin and fiancee — carjacked Linda and Gary Haas, a vacationing Oklahoma couple in their 60s.  McCluskey shot the Haases inside the camping trailer they were towing behind their truck, and set the trailer on fire with their bodies still inside. McCluskey was convicted for the carjacking and two murders in federal court on Oct. 7.

Yesterday the jury charged with deciding his sentence announced that it had been unable to come to a unanimous decision on the death penalty. That means he'll get life without parole.

Perhaps it's little wonder the jury couldn't agree — they'd been given a lot to consider. McCluskey's defense team had tried to convince them that he has several brain defects that, combined with other factors, contributed to his crimes and should be considered mitigating circumstances. The defense presented the results of several types of brain scans and various psychological tests, as well as testimony from neurologists and other experts....

In the sentencing phase of the trial, McCluskey's lawyers argued that, as a result of his brain abnormalities — as well as a slew of other unfortunate circumstances ranging from a breech birth, to abuse as a child, to drug and alcohol addiction — he was incapable of "a level of intent sufficient to allow consideration of the death penalty."  Essentially, they argued that his acts were impulsive, that he would have been incapable of planning such things.

Sunday, December 8, 2013

After teacher's death, suspect's trial in doubt - Atkins case in Montana

I thought you would be interested in this story I found on After teacher's death, suspect's trial in doubt (

"How should states decide if someone convicted of a crime has an intellectual disability, when the answer means life or death?" [feedly]

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"How should states decide if someone convicted of a crime has an intellectual disability, when the answer means life or death?"

The title of this post is the first sentence of this lengthy USA Today article headlined "Supreme Court to revisit death penalty for mentally disabled."  Here is more from an effective review of the challenging capital procedure issues now before SCOTUS:

In its 6-3 decision in Atkins v. Virginia, authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the court prohibited states from executing anyone with "mental retardation."  Mental health professionals define it as substantial limitations in intellectual functions such as reasoning or problem-solving, limitations in adaptive behavior or "street smarts," and evidence of the condition before age 18.  (Mental retardation is the term used in law, but most clinicians and The Associated Press refer to the condition as intellectual disability.)

After the decision, most states stuck with the three-pronged clinical definition, but Florida, Georgia, Mississippi and Texas set their own standards. Under Florida's law, if you have an IQ over 70, you're eligible for execution regardless of intellectual function or adaptive behavior.

Freddie Lee Hall, who has been on Florida's death row for more than 30 years and scored in the mid-70s on IQ tests, is arguing the state's standard amounts to unconstitutional punishment.  Most likely, the case won't result in a dramatic shift in national criminal justice policy, but will further clarify who should and should not be eligible for execution, said Ronald Tabak, an attorney who has represented multiple clients with intellectual disabilities and chairs the American Bar Association's death penalty committee....

The court's makeup has shifted since the 2002 Atkins decision.  But if the justices split along ideological lines, the vote could favor Hall, assuming that swing vote Justice Anthony Kennedy sides with Hall, as he did with Atkins in 2002.  Arguments are set for March 3.

Similar cases are percolating beyond Florida.  In Georgia, death row inmate Warren Hill is fighting execution based on substantial evidence that he is intellectually disabled. In Texas, where the courts use an anecdotal seven-part test largely based on the characteristics of the fictional character Lennie from John Steinbeck's novel "Of Mice and Men" to determine intellectual disability, multiple prisoners have been executed in recent years even when they've scored well below 70 on IQ tests.

Last year, Texas executed Marvin Wilson, who was convicted of murder in 1994, even though he had an IQ of 61.  In 2010, Virginia executed Teresa Lewis for her role in a murder-for-hire scheme, even though she had an IQ of 72 and her co-conspirators admitted Lewis did not plan the murder....

Still, the Atkins decision has had an impact on executions. At least 98 people have had their death sentence changed since 2002 by proving that they were intellectually disabled, according to data from the Death Penalty Information Center.  By their count, in the 18 years before the Atkins decision, at least 44 people who likely suffered from intellectual disabilities were executed.

Wednesday, December 4, 2013

Sharing Why Do Some People with Intellectual Disability Engage in Offending Behaviour and What Can We Do About It? Editorial via BrowZine

Why Do Some People with Intellectual Disability Engage in Offending Behaviour and What Can We Do About It? Editorial
Lindsay, William R.; Hastings, Richard P.; Beail, Nigel
Journal of Applied Research in Intellectual Disabilities, Vol. 26 Issue 5 – 2013: 351 - 356


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Sharing Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the Frontal Systems Behavior Scale (FrSBe) via BrowZine

Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the Frontal Systems Behavior Scale (FrSBe)
Carvalho, J. O.; Ready, R. E.; Malloy, P.; Grace, J.
Assessment, Vol. 20 Issue 5 – 2013: 632 - 641


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Sharing Miranda Rights Comprehension Instruments: A Critical Review via BrowZine

Miranda Rights Comprehension Instruments: A Critical Review
Frumkin, I. B.; Sellbom, M.
Assessment, Vol. 20 Issue 5 – 2013: 545 - 554


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Article: DSM-5: A Spotlight On Autism Spectrum Disorder and Intellectual Disability

Kevin McGrew, PhD
Educational Psychologist
Director, Institute for Applied Psychometrics